Papers (English) by Antal Attila
DIALOP Conference on Integral Ecology for a Social Ecological Transformation Sophia University Institute in Loppiano (Florence-Italy), 11-13 January, 2024, 2024
I was honoured to be able to present the DIALOP Conference on Integral Ecology for a Social Ecolo... more I was honoured to be able to present the DIALOP Conference on Integral Ecology for a Social Ecological Transformation Sophia University Institute in Loppiano (Florence-Italy), 11-13 January, 2024. The title of my presentation: Ecological Emergency and Christian Universalism in the Era of Polycrisis.
In the framework of the refugee and migration crisis, the pandemic, and the wars, we have entered an era of overlapping crises, or polycrisis. The failures of liberal democracy opened the way of authoritarian right-wing populism, which on the one hand remained integrated into the neoliberal capitalism and on the other hand dismantled the legal basis of constitutional democracy. To mitigate the effects of the global ecological and climate crisis, we need the instruments of exceptional governance measures under democratic control. At the same time, we are witnessing that the authoritarian populist right (especially in Hungary) has started to use the tools of exceptional governance measures in a manipulative and undemocratic way. My position is that in order to tackle the ecological and climate crisis, we need to stop the continued authoritarian use of exceptional government measures. As Laudato si’ pointed it out very sharply: “Regrettably, many efforts to seek concrete solutions to the environmental crisis have proved ineffective, not only because of powerful opposition but also because of a more general lack of interest… We require a new and universal solidarity.” It is only through extraordinary measures of governance under national and supranational democratic control, established within the framework of Christian universalism and solidarity, that we can prepare for the era of polycrisis. The exceptional measures must be wrested from the hands of the authoritarian right, and this requires a political consensus that sees neoliberal capitalism as the root cause of the climate and ecological crisis.
Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies, 2023
This paper aims to examine the manifestations and abuses of the exceptionalist legal order in Hun... more This paper aims to examine the manifestations and abuses of the exceptionalist legal order in Hungary during the period of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the refugee crisis of 2015, the Orbán regime has been using the instruments of exceptional governance in a continuous way, which has become more and more pronounced in the context of the crises of recent years, especially the COVID-19 pandemic. In this paper, the author first presents the literature on the state of exception and its use by authoritarian populist regimes. Then, the author will discuss how the Orbán regime employs the tools of exceptional governance in an authoritarian manner, with a particular focus on how the tools of exceptional governance have become part of the constitutional structure. Finally, the author will explain the risks and anti-democratic dangers of the use of extraordinary measures of governance without checks and balances.
In this paper, it has been argued that an inevitable factor in the spread and hegemony of neolibe... more In this paper, it has been argued that an inevitable factor in the spread and hegemony of neoliberalism is the transformation of the legal system, and more specifically the restructure of law in line with neoliberalism. In the first part of the paper, which sets out the theoretical framework, I will explain how capitalism and the legal system are interconnected, since the legal system reflects the interests of the ruling classes of the time. I apply the theoretical frameworks to the Kádár regime in part two, where I examine its gradual neoliberalization in the context of the legal system. State socialist regimes have become a kind of "laboratory of the East" for neoliberalism, which is not to say that neoliberalism came from the West as some kind of "conquering" ideology, but rather that it has its roots in a transnational network of Western and Eastern
Next Left 14., 2023
This paper has been published in Crisis and progressive politics: How to make hard choices and su... more This paper has been published in Crisis and progressive politics: How to make hard choices and succeed? Next Left 14. FEPS - Foundation for European Progressive Studies and the Karl-Renner Institut. https://feps-europe.eu/publication/next-left-vol-14/
Freedom has always been a core part of the social democratic
normative triangle, with equality and solidarity/fraternity being the
other two values. As its political expression, freedom from economic
needs, social hardship and suppression, and democratic political
rights have, therefore, for over one and a half centuries, stood at the
centre of social democratic foci, from both programmatic and policy
perspectives. Especially, the combination of freedom and democracy
(of true or real, not only formal, democracy, that is) have always been
the core of social democratic self-understanding. Only citizens truly
free of economic and social precarities are capable of taking part in
democratic self-governance and a solidaristic society. Economic and
political freedom, as the bottom line, can only be realized hand in hand.
On the other hand, social democrats and the left, in general, in western
democracies have a complicated and sometimes uneasy relationship
with the concept of freedom. As it is often depicted as a political value
of the libertarian right, social democracy and progressive politicians,
who emphasize the role of the state and collective action, have for
many decades positioned themselves as being suspicious of limitless
freedom.
However, in recent years, diverse societal, ecological and political
crises have put social democratic understandings and pursuits of
freedom into question. Societal megatrends, such as individualisation
and liberalisation, have deeply altered the ways in which we imagine
social collectives and individual citizens’ interdependence. Social
inequalities, while shrinking between global regions, continue to
increase within many societies and diminish the freedom of choices for many. The Russian aggression in Ukraine challenges long-held ideas
of how achievements of freedom are to be secured. Authoritarian
and right-wing populist regimes, on the rise in many countries, cut
back on freedoms not only of ethnic, sexual or political minorities but
of the freedom of expression and political freedoms of all. Yet, they
do so in the name of defending democracy from too much freedom.
Furthermore, the raging climate crisis challenges the assumption of
freedom being unequivocally desirable.
One important dilemma social democracies currently face is that
of reconciling freedom and democracy – as this specifi c constellation
is coming under pressure in the increasingly complex societies of
today. In several constellations, freedom and democracy might appear
to contradict each other, for instance, when freedom of movement
and consumption contribute to a global resource use that is deeply
unsustainable. Maintaining social democratic values such as freedom,
equality and solidarity might, maybe more than ever, require cutting
back on certain freedoms and maybe even on past achievements of
democracy.
In the following chapter, we look at how the constellation of
freedom and democracy as core ingredients of the social democratic
normative horizon is currently challenged and how social democrats
might react. This affects all levels of party organisation, policy and
governance – from the very local party on the ground to the international
order. To better understand how the current multiple crises challenge
established social democratic beliefs, we identify four areas in which
established understandings of the democracy-freedom nexus are put
into question and social democratic convictions might be pushed out
of their comfort zone: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; the tide of
the authoritarian right in central and eastern Europe (CEE); the climate
crisis; and changing notions and the liberalisation of freedom within
social democracy. All of these developments press social democrats in Europe (and abroad) to revise their understandings of freedom and
its connection to democracy in light of a social democratic normative
horizon. How do contemporary crises and constellations question,
challenge or undermine the way social democracy has assumed
a normative horizon, including freedom, equality and solidarity? In
which ways might freedom be reframed or reconsidered to secure an
equal and solidaristic future society?
For many years, the Polish and Hungarian left has faced a common challenge of right-wing authorit... more For many years, the Polish and Hungarian left has faced a common challenge of right-wing authoritarian populism. Jarosław Kaczyński's and Viktor Orbán's parties have made several illiberal and authoritarian changes around the Vistula and Danube, which have significantly influenced the political rules of the game. The main objective of this paper is to verify the research thesis that in order to regain their former electoral significance, social democratic parties in both countries need to make far-reaching changes to their strategy. Besides the traditional cleavages, both the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Polish New Left should critically analyze the new fields of conflict with the Central and Eastern European (CEE) authoritarian right-wing populism. Moreover, the social democracy should be aware that the autocracy is a common regional challenge.
https://feps-europe.eu/publication/next-left-vol-13/
iCourts Working Paper Series, November 2022, 2022
Antal, Attila, The Constitutionalised Image of Enemy in the Hungarian Fundamental Law (November 2... more Antal, Attila, The Constitutionalised Image of Enemy in the Hungarian Fundamental Law (November 28, 2022). iCourts Working Paper Series, no. 311, 2022. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4287382 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4287382
Making a constitution is about making political identity and creating political community. This paper investigates how the Hungarian Fundamental Law (entered into force in 2012) and its amendments have been based on constant enemy creation. In the first section, the theoretical framework of enemy- and identity construction of the Orbán regime has been deeply analysed. The Schmittian concepts of friend and foe relation, repolitization, and the Kossellck’s well-known asymmetric counter concepts have been used to demonstrate the commitment of the Hungarian political regime to make constitutional identity as an enemy creation. In the second part the constitutional enemy creation has been contextualized and the pre-2010s roots of the constitutional weaponization and the emerging hegemony of the Orbán regime have been problematized. The main contribution of this paper is the set up of the deep analytical framework of the Constitutionalised Image of Enemy (CIE) which phrase has been named and introduced by this research. It has been argued here that the three main CIEs of the Hungarian Fundamental Law are the anti-Communism, anti-immigration and anti-gender attitude and its constitutional framework. Summarizing the paper, it is claimed here that at the heart of Hungarian constitutional identity is the Schmittian friend-enemy dichotomy which has been integrated in the framework of asymmetrical counter concepts, moreover the significant social impact of the CIEs is unleashed considerable anger and hatred.
Critical Legal Thinking, 2022
Rosa Luxemburg was an anti-war theorist and activist and she, as a co-founder of the Spartacus Le... more Rosa Luxemburg was an anti-war theorist and activist and she, as a co-founder of the Spartacus League, gave her life to her ideas and activism. We live in an era in which we must reconsider how we have thought about war and peace. As can be seen most recently in the case of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, we have become accustomed to receiving streamed versions of wars and humanitarian conflicts through the media. The separation of war from politics was a fundamental goal of modern political thought and practice among liberal and non-liberal political theorists – one which Rosa Luxemburg already agitated against at the beginning of the 20th century. On the one hand, the nature of war has changed in the sense that war is rarely seen as a conflict between independent nation-states (although the war in Ukraine is itself a counterexample). On the other hand, the line between war and non-war is blurred: there are several political actors who are interested in introducing the permanent state of exception elaborated by Giorgio Agamben. In the 20thcentury this came to its apogee with totalitarianism, and in the 21st century it continued in the framework of hybrid regimes created by right-wing nationalist populists. I will analyse here what the capitalist militarism of our time means in light of exceptional measures of governance. However, the exceptional legal and political situation can by no means be unlimited in the sense that, despite the exceptional legal regime introduced at national level, the fundamental system of international law and in particular human rights is not suspended. This is especially true if the state of exception is, with Rosa Luxemburg, understood as a modern form of capitalist militarism. In the following, I will address how the instruments of international law can be used to limit the capitalist militarism inherent in exceptional governance, thereby humanising it, also in the Luxemburgian sense.
https://criticallegalthinking.com/2022/11/24/the-new-form-of-capitalist-militarism-the-permanent-state-of-exception/
There is an emerging international network of authoritarian populist forces which started to impo... more There is an emerging international network of authoritarian populist forces which started to impose and maintain the challenges of our time by the tool of state of exception.
The Palgrave Handbook of Global Sustainability, 2022
This chapter examines the broadening concepts and meaning of environmental justice in terms of Eu... more This chapter examines the broadening concepts and meaning of environmental justice in terms of Europe in the era of ecological and climate emergency. It reveals how the broadening environmental justice discourse has absorbed several issues and has been applied at a global level. It is argued here that the reality of the global ecological and climate emergency has made climate justice a central theme of environmental justice. Environmental justice has been expanded to climate justice, because the environmental justice movements increasingly addressed the environmental and social conditions. In the European context, the analyzed wide range of environmental justice evolved in the framework of Aarhus Convention which institutionalized the framework of environmental democracy. The regime of environmental democracy of the Convention has so defined thinking about environmental justice that it has essentially narrowed down to procedural and corrective dimensions of environmental justice. There is a core imbalance of procedural and environmental rights in the Aarhus Convention, and this causes normative mismatch. All of this was burdened by the strong division in terms of the European center and periphery discussed in this Chapter. The socio-spatial aspects of environmental (in)justice are remarkable in Western and Central and European (CEE) scales. The centrum-periphery division is embedded into the implication and expectation of the CEE regime changes; it has been assumed that ecological modernization will be the effect of the double transition to capitalism and democracy; and at the same time, several social inequalities and burdens were raised by the integration into the global capitalism. It is analyzed here that the Roma minority has been suffering from the following environmental problems and injustices. The chapter concludes that there is a need to (re)enhance the social nature of environmental problems in the era of climate emergency, and this will strengthen the environmental consciousness in CEE and Western Europe as well. The European landscape revels the North-South gap in terms of environmental justice.
Graz Law Working Paper No 07-2021. 12 June 2021, 2021
We live in an era of overlapping states of exceptions: the climate and ecological emergency, the ... more We live in an era of overlapping states of exceptions: the climate and ecological emergency, the permanent crisis of global capitalism, the migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic. Relying on the Hungarian political system, this paper investigates how and why exceptional measures restructure our life. Against the background of the current Hungarian authoritarian populist regime, municipal experiences, and other contemporary tendencies, three main forms of states of exceptions are investigated: (1) the exceptionality of the migration crisis of 2015; (2) the climate emergencies declared by local governments, which are rather political declarations and not legally accepted versions of exceptional measures; (3) the overlapping forms of COVID-19-related emergencies. It can be argued that the main outcome of the exceptional measures is the rise of a new executive power and it is demonstrated how heavily authoritarian regimes rely on the state of exception. Amplifying the authoritarian tendencies and the abusive application of the exceptional legal order, the COVID-19 crisis basically proved that it is worth considering institutionalizing the climate and ecological emergency as a tool in the struggle of resolving the planetary crisis of our time.
Civil Society and COVID-19 in Hungary: The Complete Annexation of Civil Space, 2021
The paper examines the CSOs-government relations during the COVID-19 pandemic, first introducing ... more The paper examines the CSOs-government relations during the COVID-19 pandemic, first introducing how the pandemic affected the already authoritarian regime in Hungary and how this regime utilized the epidemic to extend and fortify its power. Then the paper presents the antecedents of the relationship between civil society and government in the frame of the National System of Cooperation (NSC). This relationship is unilaterally dominated by the government, and it may appear as a "4C strategy": Cooptation, Coercion, Crowding out, Creation (the creation of a new, loyal civil society). Exploring the civil society and government relations during the pandemic, the study will conclude that there was no government attempt to coordinate the activities of CSOs or to try to harmonize sectoral cooperation from a broader perspective. The occurrences demonstrated the explosion of solidarity and the carnival of solidarity. These forms of solidarity, however, remain informal and leave deepening structural problems untouched. The paper presents the results of an empirical research which was conducted between March and September of 2020. The nodal points of the research include the resilience and flexibility of the organizations, their efforts to assist during the emergency and lockdown, as well as the issues of networking and the nature of their relations with the national and local authorities.
Berlin Journal of Critical Theory, 2021
It has been investigated in this article that contrary to the assessment of
other commentators, t... more It has been investigated in this article that contrary to the assessment of
other commentators, the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis did not bring on or finalise the authoritarian turn in Hungary. Rather the conditions for authoritarian rule preceded the crisis and were certain to define how the government would respond to the crisis. It is beyond question that by introducing the so-called Enabling Act, which grants absolute power to the Prime Minister, the Orbán government has become an authoritarian political system. Evidently this represents a substantial danger to the European Union, one that has existed for some time but became heightened in the context of a fresh eurozone crisis. Nevertheless, the
unholy use of the coronavirus situation is just the latest stage of exceptional government in Hungary. The main social and political outcome of this permanent state of exception is the subjection of society to the forces of neoliberalism. Along with the new Enabling Law the neoliberalization of public services also put the Hungarian society in an incredibly difficult position to handle the threat of the epidemic. Moreover, the main cause behind the emerging Fascism is the class
politics of the political system, which is based on the compromise of the upper middle-class and national bourgeoisie. I propose here that the main aim of Orbán is to maintain the post-pandemic world by the unnecessary extension of state of exception. During the epidemic crisis Orbán has achieved all the neoliberal goals that have always defined his authoritarian policy. So, a new period of the system is in the making and Orbán is interested in the deepening of the crisis
Cities, 2020
This article aims to position postsocialist cities in Central and Eastern Europe in the broader d... more This article aims to position postsocialist cities in Central and Eastern Europe in the broader debate on urban environmental justice. The article crosscuts through all three dimensions of justice (distributive/distributional, procedural/participatory, and interactional/recognition) in the context of urban green and blue space provision. Environmental justice is still an emerging topic in postsocialist cities, constrained by market-orientation and neoliberal trends within society, privatization, and the primacy of private interests. The respective situation in postsocialist cities provides insights into the international debate on environmental justice, by highlighting some extremes related to neoliberal and populist governments and very rapid processes that lack long-term democratic consensus within societies. The findings of this study are discussed in the context of a postsocialist legacy, which includes broad tolerance for inequalities, a lack of solidarity in society, a lack of responsibility for the public interest, and extreme individualization and disregard for social interests. This has gradually led to the corporatization of local authorities and various business–government coalitions. This setting is more likely to favor business models related to the use and management of urban green and blue spaces than the environmental justice discourse.
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Brussels's Blog, 2020
Public Seminar, 2019
By the time we political scientists started discussing the “in-between” nature of the Hungarian p... more By the time we political scientists started discussing the “in-between” nature of the Hungarian political regime, by the time we began niggling over whether it is still a democracy or whether it is already something else, a modern autocracy had been built up in the heart of the EU. It has been proposed by political scientists that the illiberalism of Hungary’s “illiberal democracy” was aimed against social liberalism – against free speech, individual rights, etc. But it is not. The unique aspect of Hungarian illiberalism lies in the alliance between autocracy and neoliberal capitalism it has produced. This is why it is a clear and present danger to democracy.
The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics , 2019
This theoretical study aims to contribute to the literature dealing with populism from a transnat... more This theoretical study aims to contribute to the literature dealing with populism from a transnational perspective. I will apply the post-structuralist concept of Empire and Multitude developed by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri to theorize transnational populism. This is not the usual way of thinking about populism, because there are several internal debates and tensions between Hardt/Negri and Laclau/Mouffe (Hardt, Negri: 2017). Although there are very important trends (Kioupkiolis, Katsambekis: 2014; Kioupkiolis: 2014) in the critical literature to reconcile the populist and post-hegemonic tendencies as the hegemony of the multitude. This study relies on these tendencies. In the first part I am investigating the nature of the neoliberal world order as the Empire in the context of hegemony and populism. As it has been analysed in the first part of this paper, with the crisis of liberal democracy we have entered the era of populist democracy and there is a fierce struggle between the left and the right to define and maintain the core nature of democracy. It will be argued in the third part that right-wing nationalist populism can be seen as a manifestation of populism in the context of the Empire. I will emphasize the multitude as a counter-populist concept compared to the Empire. In the fourth part I put forward that the multitude as an empty signifier can achieve some reconciliation between Laclau/Mouffe and Hard/Negri. I will also argue that transnational populism needs to have its transnational political subject which should be based on the multitude reinterpreted in populist context.
Society and Economy, 2018
According to Cas Mudde, we live in a “populist Zeitgeist”. The paper argues that not just the 21s... more According to Cas Mudde, we live in a “populist Zeitgeist”. The paper argues that not just the 21st, but also the 20th century is about populism. In the first section I elaborate the theoretical background of populism, which is claimed to be a never-ending phenomenon: here, various notions of populism are analysed; I investigate the relationship between democracy and populism; and I refer to the biopolitical framework of populism (called biopopulism) as well. This theoretical framework will be used to analyse Communist populism in Hungary. I elaborate the populism of the Horthyera (1920-1944) in the context of Communist populism. Then I analyse the case of Communist populism in Hungary (1948-1989) according to the following aspects: in the context of the working class and the bourgeois elite; the biopolitical character of the regime; goulash Communism as populist legitimacy; and the viewpoint of socialist patriotism. The main aspect of Communist populism is summarized at the end of the third section, and I briefly refer to the afterlife of Communist populism as a nostalgic phenomenon. The regimes analysed in this study aimed to govern the entire life of the citizens, which is why biopopulism is a useful analytical concept. The biopopulist framework shows that the investigation of the historical backgrounds of populism is necessary to understand contemporary populist tendencies.
INOGOV Working Paper Series, 2018
I am dealing with the question of environmental and climate (in)justices in Eastern and Southern ... more I am dealing with the question of environmental and climate (in)justices in Eastern and Southern Europe in this paper. At first, I will refer to the theoretical pillars of environmental and climate justice and argue that there is an expanding sphere concerning environmentalism which has grounded the theory of climate justice. Environmental justice has expanded to include climate justice because – as will be elaborated here –the environmental justice movements increasingly argued that environmental and social conditions provide for individual and community needs, and that justice depends on environmental conditions. In the second part of this paper the connection between climate justice and social problems have been analysed. The investigation worked out here is based on a very important initiative called Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT) and its Environmental Justice Atlas. Demonstrating the social implications of climate injustice in Eastern and Southern Europe, I will focus on two main challenges related to environmental and climate injustice: the situation of the Roma communities in the region and the emerging case of fuel or energy poverty. This paper will conclude that we need to (re)enhance the social nature of environmental problems and this will strengthen the environmental consciousness in Eastern and Southern Europe. The related discourse of environmental and climate justice needs to be based on environmental identities constructed on ethnical and social solidarity.
A great challenge for the left is how to comply with both Marxist (especially Gramscian) and post... more A great challenge for the left is how to comply with both Marxist (especially Gramscian) and post-structuralist (Laclau-Mouffian) ideas about politics. How can this be realized in Hungary, where the political left after 1989 has never been Marxist and where 'discursive politics' is mastered by the far-Right? Attila Antal argues that the success of Hungarian right-wing populism should be a spur for the left to use populism more effectively: the core agenda for the European left should be to reconcile class and mass without xenophobia.
Environmental Justice in the Anthropocene Symposium 2017 , 2017
I am dealing in this paper with the question of environmental and climate (in)justices in Eastern... more I am dealing in this paper with the question of environmental and climate (in)justices in Eastern and South Europe (ESE). At first, I will refer the theoretical pillars of environmental justice and my statement is that there is an expanding sphere concerning environmentalism which has grounded the theory of climate justice. The environmental justice has been expanded to climate justice, because it increasingly addressed that the environmental and social conditions provide for individual and community needs and functioning and justice depends on the environmental conditions. It has been put forward here that populism could bring closer the importance of environmental and climate related disasters to the people’s everyday lives and experience. In the next part of this paper the connection of climate justice and social problems in ESE has been analyzed. The investigation elaborated here is based on a very important initiative called Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT) and its Environmental Justice Atlas. I will focus on two main environmental and climate injustice caused challenges: the first one is the situation of the Roma communities in ESE, and the second one is the emerging case of fuel or energy poverty. It has been raised here that an elitist populist regime, for instance in Hungary, how can damage the case of environmental and climate justice with instituted biopower. I will conclude this paper that we need to (re)enhance the social nature of environmental problems and this will strengthen the environmental consciousness in ESE. The relating discourse of environmental and climate justice in ESE is need to be based on environmental identities constructed on ethnical and social solidarity. Finally, we should have a look on the biopolitical structure of modern State.
Uploads
Papers (English) by Antal Attila
In the framework of the refugee and migration crisis, the pandemic, and the wars, we have entered an era of overlapping crises, or polycrisis. The failures of liberal democracy opened the way of authoritarian right-wing populism, which on the one hand remained integrated into the neoliberal capitalism and on the other hand dismantled the legal basis of constitutional democracy. To mitigate the effects of the global ecological and climate crisis, we need the instruments of exceptional governance measures under democratic control. At the same time, we are witnessing that the authoritarian populist right (especially in Hungary) has started to use the tools of exceptional governance measures in a manipulative and undemocratic way. My position is that in order to tackle the ecological and climate crisis, we need to stop the continued authoritarian use of exceptional government measures. As Laudato si’ pointed it out very sharply: “Regrettably, many efforts to seek concrete solutions to the environmental crisis have proved ineffective, not only because of powerful opposition but also because of a more general lack of interest… We require a new and universal solidarity.” It is only through extraordinary measures of governance under national and supranational democratic control, established within the framework of Christian universalism and solidarity, that we can prepare for the era of polycrisis. The exceptional measures must be wrested from the hands of the authoritarian right, and this requires a political consensus that sees neoliberal capitalism as the root cause of the climate and ecological crisis.
Freedom has always been a core part of the social democratic
normative triangle, with equality and solidarity/fraternity being the
other two values. As its political expression, freedom from economic
needs, social hardship and suppression, and democratic political
rights have, therefore, for over one and a half centuries, stood at the
centre of social democratic foci, from both programmatic and policy
perspectives. Especially, the combination of freedom and democracy
(of true or real, not only formal, democracy, that is) have always been
the core of social democratic self-understanding. Only citizens truly
free of economic and social precarities are capable of taking part in
democratic self-governance and a solidaristic society. Economic and
political freedom, as the bottom line, can only be realized hand in hand.
On the other hand, social democrats and the left, in general, in western
democracies have a complicated and sometimes uneasy relationship
with the concept of freedom. As it is often depicted as a political value
of the libertarian right, social democracy and progressive politicians,
who emphasize the role of the state and collective action, have for
many decades positioned themselves as being suspicious of limitless
freedom.
However, in recent years, diverse societal, ecological and political
crises have put social democratic understandings and pursuits of
freedom into question. Societal megatrends, such as individualisation
and liberalisation, have deeply altered the ways in which we imagine
social collectives and individual citizens’ interdependence. Social
inequalities, while shrinking between global regions, continue to
increase within many societies and diminish the freedom of choices for many. The Russian aggression in Ukraine challenges long-held ideas
of how achievements of freedom are to be secured. Authoritarian
and right-wing populist regimes, on the rise in many countries, cut
back on freedoms not only of ethnic, sexual or political minorities but
of the freedom of expression and political freedoms of all. Yet, they
do so in the name of defending democracy from too much freedom.
Furthermore, the raging climate crisis challenges the assumption of
freedom being unequivocally desirable.
One important dilemma social democracies currently face is that
of reconciling freedom and democracy – as this specifi c constellation
is coming under pressure in the increasingly complex societies of
today. In several constellations, freedom and democracy might appear
to contradict each other, for instance, when freedom of movement
and consumption contribute to a global resource use that is deeply
unsustainable. Maintaining social democratic values such as freedom,
equality and solidarity might, maybe more than ever, require cutting
back on certain freedoms and maybe even on past achievements of
democracy.
In the following chapter, we look at how the constellation of
freedom and democracy as core ingredients of the social democratic
normative horizon is currently challenged and how social democrats
might react. This affects all levels of party organisation, policy and
governance – from the very local party on the ground to the international
order. To better understand how the current multiple crises challenge
established social democratic beliefs, we identify four areas in which
established understandings of the democracy-freedom nexus are put
into question and social democratic convictions might be pushed out
of their comfort zone: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; the tide of
the authoritarian right in central and eastern Europe (CEE); the climate
crisis; and changing notions and the liberalisation of freedom within
social democracy. All of these developments press social democrats in Europe (and abroad) to revise their understandings of freedom and
its connection to democracy in light of a social democratic normative
horizon. How do contemporary crises and constellations question,
challenge or undermine the way social democracy has assumed
a normative horizon, including freedom, equality and solidarity? In
which ways might freedom be reframed or reconsidered to secure an
equal and solidaristic future society?
https://feps-europe.eu/publication/next-left-vol-13/
Making a constitution is about making political identity and creating political community. This paper investigates how the Hungarian Fundamental Law (entered into force in 2012) and its amendments have been based on constant enemy creation. In the first section, the theoretical framework of enemy- and identity construction of the Orbán regime has been deeply analysed. The Schmittian concepts of friend and foe relation, repolitization, and the Kossellck’s well-known asymmetric counter concepts have been used to demonstrate the commitment of the Hungarian political regime to make constitutional identity as an enemy creation. In the second part the constitutional enemy creation has been contextualized and the pre-2010s roots of the constitutional weaponization and the emerging hegemony of the Orbán regime have been problematized. The main contribution of this paper is the set up of the deep analytical framework of the Constitutionalised Image of Enemy (CIE) which phrase has been named and introduced by this research. It has been argued here that the three main CIEs of the Hungarian Fundamental Law are the anti-Communism, anti-immigration and anti-gender attitude and its constitutional framework. Summarizing the paper, it is claimed here that at the heart of Hungarian constitutional identity is the Schmittian friend-enemy dichotomy which has been integrated in the framework of asymmetrical counter concepts, moreover the significant social impact of the CIEs is unleashed considerable anger and hatred.
https://criticallegalthinking.com/2022/11/24/the-new-form-of-capitalist-militarism-the-permanent-state-of-exception/
other commentators, the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis did not bring on or finalise the authoritarian turn in Hungary. Rather the conditions for authoritarian rule preceded the crisis and were certain to define how the government would respond to the crisis. It is beyond question that by introducing the so-called Enabling Act, which grants absolute power to the Prime Minister, the Orbán government has become an authoritarian political system. Evidently this represents a substantial danger to the European Union, one that has existed for some time but became heightened in the context of a fresh eurozone crisis. Nevertheless, the
unholy use of the coronavirus situation is just the latest stage of exceptional government in Hungary. The main social and political outcome of this permanent state of exception is the subjection of society to the forces of neoliberalism. Along with the new Enabling Law the neoliberalization of public services also put the Hungarian society in an incredibly difficult position to handle the threat of the epidemic. Moreover, the main cause behind the emerging Fascism is the class
politics of the political system, which is based on the compromise of the upper middle-class and national bourgeoisie. I propose here that the main aim of Orbán is to maintain the post-pandemic world by the unnecessary extension of state of exception. During the epidemic crisis Orbán has achieved all the neoliberal goals that have always defined his authoritarian policy. So, a new period of the system is in the making and Orbán is interested in the deepening of the crisis
https://www.brexitblog-rosalux.eu/2020/04/07/orbans-enabling-act-ruling-the-post-pandemic-world/
In the framework of the refugee and migration crisis, the pandemic, and the wars, we have entered an era of overlapping crises, or polycrisis. The failures of liberal democracy opened the way of authoritarian right-wing populism, which on the one hand remained integrated into the neoliberal capitalism and on the other hand dismantled the legal basis of constitutional democracy. To mitigate the effects of the global ecological and climate crisis, we need the instruments of exceptional governance measures under democratic control. At the same time, we are witnessing that the authoritarian populist right (especially in Hungary) has started to use the tools of exceptional governance measures in a manipulative and undemocratic way. My position is that in order to tackle the ecological and climate crisis, we need to stop the continued authoritarian use of exceptional government measures. As Laudato si’ pointed it out very sharply: “Regrettably, many efforts to seek concrete solutions to the environmental crisis have proved ineffective, not only because of powerful opposition but also because of a more general lack of interest… We require a new and universal solidarity.” It is only through extraordinary measures of governance under national and supranational democratic control, established within the framework of Christian universalism and solidarity, that we can prepare for the era of polycrisis. The exceptional measures must be wrested from the hands of the authoritarian right, and this requires a political consensus that sees neoliberal capitalism as the root cause of the climate and ecological crisis.
Freedom has always been a core part of the social democratic
normative triangle, with equality and solidarity/fraternity being the
other two values. As its political expression, freedom from economic
needs, social hardship and suppression, and democratic political
rights have, therefore, for over one and a half centuries, stood at the
centre of social democratic foci, from both programmatic and policy
perspectives. Especially, the combination of freedom and democracy
(of true or real, not only formal, democracy, that is) have always been
the core of social democratic self-understanding. Only citizens truly
free of economic and social precarities are capable of taking part in
democratic self-governance and a solidaristic society. Economic and
political freedom, as the bottom line, can only be realized hand in hand.
On the other hand, social democrats and the left, in general, in western
democracies have a complicated and sometimes uneasy relationship
with the concept of freedom. As it is often depicted as a political value
of the libertarian right, social democracy and progressive politicians,
who emphasize the role of the state and collective action, have for
many decades positioned themselves as being suspicious of limitless
freedom.
However, in recent years, diverse societal, ecological and political
crises have put social democratic understandings and pursuits of
freedom into question. Societal megatrends, such as individualisation
and liberalisation, have deeply altered the ways in which we imagine
social collectives and individual citizens’ interdependence. Social
inequalities, while shrinking between global regions, continue to
increase within many societies and diminish the freedom of choices for many. The Russian aggression in Ukraine challenges long-held ideas
of how achievements of freedom are to be secured. Authoritarian
and right-wing populist regimes, on the rise in many countries, cut
back on freedoms not only of ethnic, sexual or political minorities but
of the freedom of expression and political freedoms of all. Yet, they
do so in the name of defending democracy from too much freedom.
Furthermore, the raging climate crisis challenges the assumption of
freedom being unequivocally desirable.
One important dilemma social democracies currently face is that
of reconciling freedom and democracy – as this specifi c constellation
is coming under pressure in the increasingly complex societies of
today. In several constellations, freedom and democracy might appear
to contradict each other, for instance, when freedom of movement
and consumption contribute to a global resource use that is deeply
unsustainable. Maintaining social democratic values such as freedom,
equality and solidarity might, maybe more than ever, require cutting
back on certain freedoms and maybe even on past achievements of
democracy.
In the following chapter, we look at how the constellation of
freedom and democracy as core ingredients of the social democratic
normative horizon is currently challenged and how social democrats
might react. This affects all levels of party organisation, policy and
governance – from the very local party on the ground to the international
order. To better understand how the current multiple crises challenge
established social democratic beliefs, we identify four areas in which
established understandings of the democracy-freedom nexus are put
into question and social democratic convictions might be pushed out
of their comfort zone: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; the tide of
the authoritarian right in central and eastern Europe (CEE); the climate
crisis; and changing notions and the liberalisation of freedom within
social democracy. All of these developments press social democrats in Europe (and abroad) to revise their understandings of freedom and
its connection to democracy in light of a social democratic normative
horizon. How do contemporary crises and constellations question,
challenge or undermine the way social democracy has assumed
a normative horizon, including freedom, equality and solidarity? In
which ways might freedom be reframed or reconsidered to secure an
equal and solidaristic future society?
https://feps-europe.eu/publication/next-left-vol-13/
Making a constitution is about making political identity and creating political community. This paper investigates how the Hungarian Fundamental Law (entered into force in 2012) and its amendments have been based on constant enemy creation. In the first section, the theoretical framework of enemy- and identity construction of the Orbán regime has been deeply analysed. The Schmittian concepts of friend and foe relation, repolitization, and the Kossellck’s well-known asymmetric counter concepts have been used to demonstrate the commitment of the Hungarian political regime to make constitutional identity as an enemy creation. In the second part the constitutional enemy creation has been contextualized and the pre-2010s roots of the constitutional weaponization and the emerging hegemony of the Orbán regime have been problematized. The main contribution of this paper is the set up of the deep analytical framework of the Constitutionalised Image of Enemy (CIE) which phrase has been named and introduced by this research. It has been argued here that the three main CIEs of the Hungarian Fundamental Law are the anti-Communism, anti-immigration and anti-gender attitude and its constitutional framework. Summarizing the paper, it is claimed here that at the heart of Hungarian constitutional identity is the Schmittian friend-enemy dichotomy which has been integrated in the framework of asymmetrical counter concepts, moreover the significant social impact of the CIEs is unleashed considerable anger and hatred.
https://criticallegalthinking.com/2022/11/24/the-new-form-of-capitalist-militarism-the-permanent-state-of-exception/
other commentators, the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis did not bring on or finalise the authoritarian turn in Hungary. Rather the conditions for authoritarian rule preceded the crisis and were certain to define how the government would respond to the crisis. It is beyond question that by introducing the so-called Enabling Act, which grants absolute power to the Prime Minister, the Orbán government has become an authoritarian political system. Evidently this represents a substantial danger to the European Union, one that has existed for some time but became heightened in the context of a fresh eurozone crisis. Nevertheless, the
unholy use of the coronavirus situation is just the latest stage of exceptional government in Hungary. The main social and political outcome of this permanent state of exception is the subjection of society to the forces of neoliberalism. Along with the new Enabling Law the neoliberalization of public services also put the Hungarian society in an incredibly difficult position to handle the threat of the epidemic. Moreover, the main cause behind the emerging Fascism is the class
politics of the political system, which is based on the compromise of the upper middle-class and national bourgeoisie. I propose here that the main aim of Orbán is to maintain the post-pandemic world by the unnecessary extension of state of exception. During the epidemic crisis Orbán has achieved all the neoliberal goals that have always defined his authoritarian policy. So, a new period of the system is in the making and Orbán is interested in the deepening of the crisis
https://www.brexitblog-rosalux.eu/2020/04/07/orbans-enabling-act-ruling-the-post-pandemic-world/
https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781793652270/Hungary-in-State-of-Exception-Authoritarian-Neoliberalism-from-the-Austro-Hungarian-Monarchy-to-the-COVID-19-Crisis
This book offers a deep historical and theoretical investigation into how this authoritarian, populist regime has evolved. Backlash from globalization in the 21st century, dissatisfaction with the European Union and international fiscal institutions have created a situation in which Orban’s regime is able to thrive. New kinds of autocracy cannot be properly understood without a thorough analysis of Eastern Europe’s development in the 20th century and the neoliberal agenda before and after the regime changes. There is a major oversight in the contemporary literature regarding the historical and theoretical origins of right-wing authoritarian populism in Hungary.
This book explores the main factors behind the Orbán regime including the country’s authoritarian populist past, the charismatic charm of populist leaders, and cooperation between neoliberal and state autocracy. By providing a thoroughly researched historical narrative and offering an alternative critique of right-wing populism, this text will prove invaluable for researchers seeking to understand Eastern European history and politics, as well as populism, authoritarianism and neoliberalism more broadly.
ISBN: 9781838677541
Chapter 1. Theory of Authoritarian Populism and Neoliberalism
Chapter 2. The Origins of Authoritarian Populism in Hungary
Chapter 3. The Orbán’s Regime: Neoliberal and Authoritarian Populist Backlash
Chapter 4. Conclusion: A War Between Law and Politics
Attila Antal is Senior Lecturer at Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary He is a coordinator at the Social Theory Research Group at the Institute of Political History. His research focuses on the political theory of populism, social and critical theory, theory of democracy, green political thought, ecological Marxism, constitutionalism and political history.
https://books.emeraldinsight.com/page/detail/The-Rise-of-Hungarian-Populism/?K=9781838677541
Of course, emergency legislations themselves are not novel to legal systems globally and are of course not inherently detrimental to the healthy functioning of democratic institutions. What matters is whether adequate checks and balances are similarly instituted to pre-empt the improper and disproportionate deployment of emergency measures that may create irreversible harm. This very much depends on the existing democratic institutions, whether they are healthy enough to withstand such affronts. Against this background, it should not come as a surprise to many that threads of news reports lamenting that further democratic backsliding started to appear since February as leaders of countries which already possess a track record of de-democratisation have capitalized on this opportunity to further weaken democracies.
One most prominent example is Hungary. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, with the help of Parliament which his Fidesz party occupies a supermajority of seats, passed an Enabling Act in late March which indefinitely suspended Parliament and allowed him to rule by decree until the law is revoked. The sweeping powers conferred, as critics noted, push Hungary further to the category of autocracy. Although the government has announced its intention to withdraw the Act in late May, longlasting consequences are nonetheless anticipated as substitution bills are also put in place.
Against this backdrop, contributors in this issue, many of them coming from Hungary themselves, discuss the causes, characteristics and impacts of the emergency legislation in Hungary and beyond. They include Dr. Antal Attila, Professor Attila Ágh, Professor Tímea Drinóczi, Professor Umut Korkut and Professor Matthijs Bogaards. The Government and Laws Committee thanks all our authors and wishes an enjoyable read for all our readers.
The cycle of meetings about political ideas of Tadeusz Mazowiecki organized by Polska Fundacja im. Roberta Schumanaon 6th November 2017, Warsaw.
At the election of 2010, the Fidesz and KDNP has gained a super (two-thirds parliamentary) majority at the Hungarian Parliament and this election can be identified with the rebirth of the Political which means the beginning of the Orbán era. A new Constitution called Fundamental Law was adopted on 18 April 2011 , promulgated a week later and entered into force on 1 January 2012. The Constitution of 1949, which has fundamentally been modified in 1989, has been replaced by the new Fundamental Law which means compared to the previous Constitution a significant political, legal and philosophical change. First of all, the National Avowal (the Preamble of the Fundamental Law) states that: “We do not recognise the communist constitution of 1949, since it was the basis for tyrannical rule; therefore we proclaim it to be invalid.” In my view the main constitutional changes introduced by the Fundamental Law and the Amendments define four main directions: (1) the values and perception of history; (2) the emergence of the Prime Minister and the decline of the counter powers; (3) the reinforcement of the national constitutional identity; (4) the Amendments of the Fundamental Law.
Abstract
It is a great honour being here, in a moment when the new rise of neo-fascism and authoritarian neoliberalism places a huge responsibility on us. This short lecture is about the authoritarian nature of capitalism and its cooperation with state autocracy. I am arguing here that the new militarist and imperialist nature of capitalism is the permanent state of exception. I am trying to put a specific emphasize on the unprecedent dangers raised by authoritarian regimes in the era of climate and ecological emergency.
March 7, 2019, Central European University, Budapest.
Abstract
This short contribution puts an emphasize on the main challenge raised by autocratic populist regimes, this is the legalization of autocracy. Analysing the Orbán's regime we can easily say that it is an undemocratic system: most of the media outlets have been centralized, the voting system serves the interests of the governing parties, the state administration has totally been politicized. Which is really frightening that these instruments are constitutionalized and the ethos of rule of law has been corrupted and destroyed. Several constitutional amendments adopted in Hungary after 2010 are unconstitutional and the whole legal systems has been drenched with this poisoning phenomenon. In my views, we have to face with the fact that Hungarian is not a democracy and there is no such a thing "rule of law under autocratic regime". Of course, there is functioning legal system, but it is governed by the authoritarian politics. That is why we should distinguish between rule of law and rule by law. The rule by law is a way how the political sphere (the Political) overrules the legal system.
According to post-Marxist, critical and discursive literature (Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe) it is obviously that populism is not just a Right-wing phenomenon and there is a thing which can be called transnational Left-wing populism (Benjamin Moffitt, Panos Panayotu). This version of populism is not an unknow phenomenon in this part of Europe, because the Communist regimes before 1989 a transnational populist agenda has been created (Antal, 2017b), but the Left-wing populism is seriously underrepresented in contemporary Eastern Europe.
I am investigating here the political theoretical (Antal, 2017a) and historical background of nationalist populism of our time in Eastern Europe analysing examples from the following countries of this region: Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania. My main thought is that the politics in this region has always been populist in that sense there is a constant need to contrast “the people” (as a large powerless group) and “the elite” (a small powerful group). This “never ending” political tradition of Eastern European populism turned up in the history once in nationalist and other times in transnational perspectives. However, the contemporary Right-wing nationalist populism means a relatively new phenomenon, but it has deeply historical ground in the interwar Right-wing nationalism. According to my other hypothesis, the governing Right-wing populist parties (especially the Fidesz in Hungary) use the nationalist discourse to create permanent political enemies inside and outside of the nation (Brubaker argues that this kind of nationalism appears as civilizationsim). These parties belong to the political elite and use populist discourse to cover up their corrupt politics which does not serve the interest of the people. In my view there is a new chapter in historical-theoretical complex of nationalism and populism in Eastern Europe, this is the emergence of populist entrepreneurs using nationalism to maintain their governing power based on populism, which raises several dangers.
I will put forward here that the contemporary Right-wing in Eastern Europe was able to rebuild its nationalism as a 21st century populism and the Left said goodbye its nationalist and populist roots and did not reconfigure its populism in transnational scales.
The Hungarian nationalist populism cannot be understood without the situation behind, that is why I am investigating in the first part of this paper the historical tradition of the regime and the wide context as the collapse of liberal democracy and the era of populism. After that I will analyze the political theories of the Orbán’s regime: the concept of Carl Schmitt, the leader democracy and political constitutionalism. In the third part the “System of National Cooperation” has been detailed analyzed: its electoral success (2010, 2014, 2018), the main characteristics and consequences. Concluding the paper, I will rise the question: what can the EU do with such a nationalist-populist and illiberal system? Dealing with this problem the theoretical (the EU as an externally coordinator) and practical (EU Rule of Law Mechanisms) assumption will be investigated here. My main concern is that without a serious political turn in Hungary (creating an anti-hegemony against the Orbán’s regime) the EU would not achieve success fighting for rule of law.
According to post-Marxist, critical and discursive literature (Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe) it is obviously that populism is not just a right-wing phenomenon and there is a thing which can be called transnational left-wing populism (Benjamin Moffitt, Panos Panayotu). This version of populism is not an unknow phenomenon in this part of Europe, because the Communist regimes before 1989 a transnational populist agenda has been created (Antal, 2017b), but the Left-wing populism is seriously underrepresented in contemporary Eastern Europe.
I am investigating here the political theoretical (Antal, 2017a) and historical background of nationalist populism of our time in Eastern Europe analysing examples from the following countries of this region: Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania. My main thought is that the politics in this region has always been populist in that sense there is a constant need to contrast “the people” (as a large powerless group) and “the elite” (a small powerful group). This “never ending” political tradition of Eastern European populism turned up in the history once in nationalist and other times in transnational perspectives. However, the contemporary Right-wing nationalist populism means a relatively new phenomenon, but it has deeply historical ground in the interwar Right-wing nationalism.
According to my other hypothesis, the governing Right-wing populist parties (especially the Fidesz in Hungary) use the nationalist discourse to create permanent political enemies inside and outside of the nation (Brubaker argues that this kind of nationalism appears as civilizationsim). These parties belong to the political elite and use populist discourse to cover up their corrupt politics which does not serve the interest of the people. In my view there is a new chapter in historical-theoretical complex of nationalism and populism in Eastern Europe, this is the emergence of populist entrepreneurs using nationalism to maintain their governing power based on populism, which raises several dangers.
A remarkable phenomenon is unfolding regarding the international networking of authoritarian populism: the Hungarian Orbán regime has for a long time been looking to the radicalising American right as a reference point, which after Trump's fall is also trying to build a strong international network for authoritarian right-wing tendencies. At the heart of these transatlantic ideological networks is the idea of the rise of the executive. There is an emergence of executive power in the era of exceptional government which means on the one hand that the executive power is extremely strengthened, on the other hand the theory of separation of powers has totally been redesigned and this has a huge impact on the landscape of democracy. In this paper the theoretical bases of Unitary Executive Theory (UET) and the Authoritarian Populism (AP) are investigated. It is proposed here that main common foundation of UET and AP is Carl Schmitt and his theory on the political sovereignty and the state of exception. Given these, UET and AP has been investigated here in the framework of presidentialization in the time of permanent state of exception. I am trying to critically investigate the rise of the executive branch in the West is held in the framework of democracy and in the East this phenomenon is blamed as a new rise of totalitarianism. I will point out that expansion of executive power is an inevitable danger, because the representative and parliamentary democracy has become empty by that the executive leaders pretend as the main political representative of their political communities. Upon the case of COVID-19 crisis the dangers caused by the uncontrolled executive power are even more present. It has been investigated here how the authoritarian populist Orbán regime relied on the state of exception declared during the pandemic. Moreover, I am arguing here that the common form of UET and AP regimes is constitutional dictatorship which is about to reformulate and acquire political sovereignty.
We live in an era of overlapping states of exceptions: the climate and ecological emergency, the permanent crisis of global capitalism, the migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic. Relying on the Hungarian political system, this paper investigates how and why exceptional measures restructure our life. Against the background of the current Hungarian authoritarian populist regime, municipal experiences, and other contemporary tendencies, three main forms of states of exceptions are investigated: (1) the exceptionality of the migration crisis of 2015; (2) the climate emergencies declared by local governments, which are rather political declarations and not legally accepted versions of exceptional measures; (3) the overlapping forms of COVID-19-related emergencies. It can be argued that the main outcome of the exceptional measures is the rise of a new executive power, and it is demonstrated how heavily authoritarian regimes rely on the state of exception. Amplifying the authoritarian tendencies and the abusive application of the exceptional legal order, the COVID-19 crisis basically proved that it is worth considering institutionalizing the climate and ecological emergency as a tool in the struggle of resolving the planetary crisis of our time.
Hibrid konferencia a Politikatörténeti Intézet és a CEU Demokrácia Intézet szervezésében, az OTKA/NKFIH Nyugati hatások és transzferek a magyar kultúrában és társadalomtudományokban az 1970-es és 1980-as években című projekt keretében
Időpont: 2022. január 12. (szerda) 14 óra
PROGRAM
14 óra: Köszöntő: Trencsényi Balázs (CEU DI)
14:10–15:30 1. Kulturális hatások, kulturális külpolitika
Földes György: A nyugati hatás és a „magyar ideológia”
Takács Róbert: A „coca-cola szocializmus” határai – amerikanizáció a vasfüggönyön túl?
László Szabolcs: A kultúrdiplomácia kapuőrei: A Kulturális Kapcsolatok Intézete az 1970-es években
Vita
15:40–17:00 2. Humán tudományok
Csunderlik Péter: Közép-Európa utópiája – Hanák Péter és a régióvita
Takács Erzsébet: Egy nemzetközi kutatás margójára. Adaptáció és tudományos transzfer az 1970-es, 1980-as évek hazai munkaszociológiájában
Kékesdi-Boldog Dalma: Nyugati hatások a médiaelméletben és tájékoztatáspolitikában
Vita
17:10–18:30 3. Közgazdaságtan, eszmetörténet
Antal Attila: A Kádár-rendszer neoliberalizálódása: nyugati és keleti hatások
Kőhegyi Gergő: Theiss Ede: Egy nemzetközi hírű közgazdász jelentéktelenné válásának története
Pinkasz András: Közgazdasági irányzatok vitái a nyolcvanas évek Magyarországán
Vita
The Semi-Permeable Iron Curtain Conference
1 July, 2021
http://www.antalattila.hu/2021/07/Neoliberalization-and-the-Kadar-Regime-Attila-Antal-2021.html
We live in an era of overlapping states of exceptions: the climate and ecological emergency, the permanent crisis of global capitalism, the migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic. Relying on the Hungarian political system, this paper investigates how and why exceptional measures restructure our life. Against the background of the current Hungarian authoritarian populist regime, municipal experiences, and other contemporary tendencies, three main forms of states of exceptions are investigated: (1) the exceptionality of the migration crisis of 2015; (2) the climate emergencies declared by local governments, which are rather political declarations and not legally accepted versions of exceptional measures; (3) the overlapping forms of COVID-19-related emergencies. It can be argued that the main outcome of the exceptional measures is the rise of a new executive power and it is demonstrated how heavily authoritarian regimes rely on the state of exception. Amplifying the authoritarian tendencies and the abusive application of the exceptional legal order, the COVID-19 crisis basically proved that it is worth considering institutionalizing the climate and ecological emergency as a tool in the struggle of resolving the planetary crisis of our time.
http://www.antalattila.hu/2021/06/REWI-Graz-INDI-2021-conference-attila-antal.html
A globális ökológiai- és klímaválság és annak legújabb leképeződése, a koronavírus okozta egészségügyi, gazdasági és társadalmi válság miden korábbinál erősebben veti fel a demokratikus biopolitika lehetőségének kérdését. A különféle politikai rendszerek sokféle választ adtak a COVID-19 által jelentett kihívásra, azonban közös pontnak tekinthető, hogy amint a globális kapitalizmus válságai esetén láttuk az állam szerepe hihetetlenül felértékelődött, továbbá a sokféle válságkezelési mechanizmus mindegyike biopolitikai beavatkozásokat jelentett a társadalmak életébe. A bevezetett rendkívüli intézkedések, kivételes jogrendek és állapotok tehát elhozták a biopolitika új korszakát. Ez, a járványhelyzet esetleges tartósságához igazodva alapvetően alakítja át azt, ahogyan a demokratikus politikáról, a demokráciáról, demokratikus felhatalmazottságról és intézményekről gondolkodunk. A végrehajtó hatalmak felerősödésének új időszakába lépünk tehát be, ahol a biztonságra törekvés sokféle, korábban magától értetődő demokratikus követelményt írhat felül. Az előadás azt a kérdést járja körül, hogy létezhet-e demokratikus biopolitika válságokkal terhelt korszakunkban.
This paper argues that neoliberalism, which has traditionally been taken as a Western phenomenon, do have Eastern origins, moreover Eastern Europe played a crucial role how the neoliberalism maintained the globalized capitalism. I put an emphasize on the fact that Eastern Europe has constantly been some kind of birthplace of and experimental laboratory for neoliberal capitalism. This paper examines on the one hand the impact of Vienna intellectuals on the Hungarian neoliberal tradition unfolding after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; on the other hand the ideological and political cooperation of Austro-Marxism and Hungarian Social Democracy in exile during the interwar period of Wien. This paper aims to investigate the interwar and post-war neoliberalism and left-wing alternatives and will conclude that Fascism and neoliberalism simultaneously tried to destroy social democracy.
The authoritarian populist regimes understood and applies this state of exception-based form of government. It has been investigated here that the climate and ecological emergency has changed this state of exception-based style of government, because the unprecedent climate and ecological tragedy require us to change our thinking about law and politics. I propose here that the new style of state of exception is induced by anthropogenic clime change and ecological disaster. It has been analysed here how several European municipalities and cities declared politically the climate emergency and what are the main policy and political outcomes of this new instrument In this paper, it has been argued how climate and ecological emergency should be regulated and can be a fundamental new form of state of exception.
7-8 November 2019, Södertörn University
https://www.sh.se/english/sodertorn-university/calendar/events/2019-03-21-cbees-annual-conference-2019-----central-and-eastern-europe-1989-2019-orders-and-freedoms
It seems to be that Hungary under the Orbán-era has become one of the main fighters for sovereignty after the Hungarian regime change. In this paper I am trying to challenge this over-simplification and show the many faces of the system. According to my hypothesis under the populist-nationalist surface of the Orbán-regime there is disappointing compromise between the government and the globalized capitalism. The most state direct (subsidies, tax benefits) and indirect (labour law against the employees) aids have been given by the “nationalist Orbán’s governments” since the regime change. In this sense I put an emphasize on the investigation this new form of post-modern nationalism which is based on discursive fight for sovereignty, but at the same time sacrifice it in the context of neoliberal capitalism. In this sense, I will analyse the pact between the Orbán’s governments and neoliberal (especially German) companies. The other face of Orbán’s nationalism is much more brutal and relating to the hate campaign against refugees and migrants which has destroyed the traditionally weak Hungarian solidarity networks after 1989. I am convinced because of the mentioned pact with neoliberal capitalism which damaged the state and national sovereignty, the regime has found a way to over-emphasize the fight for sovereignty. Emphasizing and analysing this embarrassing phenomenon, the abdication of sovereignty and the brutal fight for it, are the main goals of this paper.
Abstract:
The contemporary democracies are facing their deepest crisis and biggest challenge ever. Although several factors have changed, the core challenge remained: the oppression of authoritarian structures. In the second half of the 20th century the capitalism entered to its authoritarian neoliberal phase. At the beginning of the 21st century the authoritarian right has rapidly reborn in the field of authoritarian state, which can be called post-fascism. According to my concern, these two tendencies have tightly coupled in the framework of authoritarian right-wing populist regimes. Rosa Luxemburg showed that imperialism and imperialist war could not be overcome within the framework of capitalism. The rule of law based liberal democracy and liberal constitutionalism tried to put this militarist nature of capitalism into legal/constitutional frameworks. The failure of liberal democracy opened the contemporary way of authoritarian right-wing populism, which on the one hand remined integrated into neoliberal capitalism and on the other hand dismantled the legal basis of liberal constitutionalism (human rights, rule of law). A new hegemonic structure has been created in the USA under the Trump’s administration, in Putin’s and Erdoğan’s systems as well, and it is most striking in Eastern Europe especially in the post-fascist Hungarian Orbán’s regime.
This paper is based on my forthcoming book The Rise of Hungarian Populism: State Autocracy and the Orbán Regime which, analysing the Hungarian case, investigates how the authoritarian neoliberalism cooperates with authoritarian state ruled by the populist right. On this basis, I argue here that the authoritarian turn of our time is based on the common tyrannical nature of capitalism and post-fascist right-wing politics. My other main thought here is that the liberal democracy was undermined by not just the state autocracies, but the neoliberal autocracy. The authoritarian populism cannot be seen as an extreme form of freedom speech, nor the neoliberalism be considered as a form of economic freedom. Authoritarian populism and authoritarian neoliberalism are against freedom, justice, equality and democracy. The main challenges of our time how can we fight back against these constitutionalized dictatorships, because it is to say that authoritarian populism and neoliberalism are about to constitutionalize themselves.
It seems to be that Hungary under the Orbán-era has become one of the main fighters for sovereignty in the EU. In this paper I am trying to challenge this over-simplification and show the many faces of the system. According to my hypothesis under the populist-nationalist surface of the Orbán-regime there is disappointing compromise between the government and the globalized capitalism. The most state direct (subsidies, tax benefits) and indirect (labour law against the employees) aids have been given by the “nationalist Orbán’s governments” since the regime change. In this sense I put an emphasize on the investigation this new form of post-modern nationalism, which is based on discursive fight for sovereignty, but at the same time sacrifice it in the context of neoliberal capitalism. In this sense, I will analyse the pact between the Orbán’s governments and neoliberal (especially German) companies. Emphasizing and analysing this embarrassing phenomenon, the abdication of sovereignty and the brutal fight for it, are the main goals of this paper. I am dealing with this paper the discursive and economic nationalism as crucial factors of sovereignty.
A transcript of lecture held at Openness and Closedness – Culture and Science in Hungary and the Soviet Bloc after Helsinki Conference, 12 June 2019 organized by Institute of Political History, Budapest. http://polhist.hu/programok2/openness-and-closedness-culture-and-science-in-hungary-and-the-soviet-bloc-after-helsinki/
Az előadás abból indul ki, hogy a rendszerváltás utáni magyar politikai rendszer rendkívüli mértékben polarizált lett és olyan mély politikai törésvonalak alakultak ki a hazai politikai közösségek között, hogy ezek a viszonyrendszerek legtöbbször a gyűlölet kategóriájával írhatók le. Reinhard Koselleck beszél (1997) az ún. aszimmetrikus hozzárendelésekről, vagyis azokról az esetekről, amikor a tőlünk politikailag különbözőt elnevezzük, identitását megkonstruáljuk, ugyanakkor az így keletkezett identitás egyáltalán nem biztos, hogy összhangban van a valósággal vagy éppen az illető (a „politikai másik”) öndefiníciójával. Egy politikai tábor identitásának két legfontosabb összetevője az említett önmeghatározás és a mások általi meghatározottság (vagyis, hogy mások, főképp a politikai ellenfelek, mit gondolnak róla). Álláspontom szerint a gyűlölet és az ebből következő (verbális és tettleges) erőszak úgy vált a hazai politikai és társadalmi tér egyik legfőbb strukturáló tényezőjévé, hogy a szemben álló politikai táborok közötti identifikációs háborúban meghatározóvá váltak az aszimmetrikus hozzárendelések: ez azt jelenti, hogy szinte minden lehetőség elveszett az ellentétes álláspontok közötti párbeszédre, mert a másik identitásának meghatározása, uralása vált a legfőbb szemponttá. Az előadás a helyzet leírásán túl azt vizsgálja, hogy milyen káros hatásai vannak a permanens gyűlöletpolitikának a magyar társadalomra. Végül pedig a következő kérdéseket teszi fel: Létezik-e kiút a rendszerváltás utáni gyűlöletdiskurzusokból? Minek és hogyan kell változnia ahhoz a politikában és a társdalomban, hogy ne aszimmetrikus ellenfogalmakban gondolkodjunk? Mi lehet annak a hatása, ha a gyűlöletpolitikai megközelítés állandóvá és visszavonhatatlanná válik?
The contemporary left is facing its deepest crisis and biggest challenge. Although several factors have changed, the core challenge remained: the oppression of authoritarian structures. In the second half of the 20th century the capitalism entered to its authoritarian neoliberal phase. At the beginning of the 21st century the authoritarian right has rapidly reborn in the field of authoritarian state, which can be called post-fascism. According to my concern, these two tendencies have tightly coupled in the framework of autocratic right-wing populist regimes. Rosa Luxemburg showed that imperialism and imperialist war could not be overcome within the framework of capitalism. The liberal democracy and liberal constitutionalism tried to put this militarist nature of capitalism into legal/constitutional frameworks. The failure of liberal democracy opened the contemporary way of illiberal right-wing populism, which on the one hand remined integrated into neoliberal capitalism and on the other hand dismantled the legal basis of liberal constitutionalism (human rights, rule of law). A new hegemonic structure has been created in the USA under the Trump’s administration, in Putin’s and Erdoğan’s regimes as well, and it is most striking in Eastern Europe especially in the Hungarian Orbán’s regime.
I am investigating in this lecture how can the left in Eastern Europe struggle against the reconciliation of authoritarian neoliberalism and authoritarian state ruled by the right. I will argue, based on the Marxist and post-Marxist (Luxemburg, Gramsci) and critical theoretical (Hardt, Negri, Agamben, Laclau, Mouffe) literature, that populist turn of the Left will be necessary but not sufficient: achieving a new hegemony it seems to be inevitable that the left re-discover its anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist origins, because the authoritarian turn of our time is based on the common tyrannical nature of capitalism and right-wing politics.
University of Navarra, Spain 22-24 November 2018
In recent years in Eastern Europe the successful populist parties are mostly right-wing nationalist or exceptionally left-wing populist with a huge nationalist sentiment. It seems to be that in this region populism and nationalism have been closely related or merged. Moreover, following the traditional literature on populism, we can easily say that our contemporary “populist Zeitgeist” can be seen as some kind of (post)modern nationalism.
In this paper, I am dealing with the problem, how can we analyse populism in Eastern Europe. It is hard to say that populism and nationalism have nothing to do with each other, but I am convinced that populism cannot be identified with nationalism. That is why, I introduce the term of historical-theoretical complex of nationalism and populism. My proposed thesis here that the unprecedent breakthrough of right-wing nationalist populism is based on the reconciliation of hegemonistic and mass-based approaches by the right-wing. It could be embarrassing, but the right-wing nationalism was able to study from the Gramscian and Laclauian theories and created a hegemonic and identity project.
According to post-Marxist, critical literature (Laclau, Mouffe, Hardt and Negri) it is obviously that populism is not just a nationalist phenomenon and there is a thing which can be called transnational left-wing populism. This version of populism is not an unknow phenomenon in this part of Europe, because the Communist regimes before 1989. My main thought is that the politics in this region has always been populist in that sense there is a constant need to contrast “the people” (as a large powerless group) and “the elite” (a small powerful group). This “never ending” political tradition of Eastern European populism turned up in the history once in nationalist and other times in transnational perspectives.
I put here an emphasize on the multitude proposed here as a counter-populist concept compared to right-wing nationalist-populism. I put forward that the multitude as an empty signifier can achieve some reconciliation between Laclau/Mouffe and Hard/Negri. I argue here that the transnational populism needs to have its transnational political subject which should be based on the multitude reinterpreted in populist and hegemonial context.
5-6 October 2018 Athens, Greece
The Orbán’s regime has become one of the leading European players which made an enormous political capital upon the hate politics and dehumanizing others concerning the case of refugees and migration. This paper, based on the relevant social theoretical and critical literature (Foucault, Agamben, Hard and Negri), is dealing with the case, how the Orbán’s regime has created a permanent state of exception by the instruments of the police state. The main hypothesis elaborated here is that the regime can be understood as a brutal mixture of police state, neoliberal penal state, capitalist militarism, authoritarian capitalism and the biopolitical concepts of state of exception.
According to my concern the transformation and decline of the theory and practice of modern nation-state sovereignty has changed the nature of war which is an asymmetric situation and it can take place sate and non-state actors. The coalition around the separation of war from politics has broken up and there are several political actors who are interested in to introduce the permanent state of exception elaborated by Agamben. In my view, the disappearing borders of war can be interpreted in a way that war is dissolving in the peace situation and the rising of state of exception remarkably indicates this procedure. In this sense, the police forces have become the solders of the state of exception where the rule of war and even the legal bases of normal situation will be empty. The Fidesz political success in Hungary has a very close relationship with the party penal populist, nationalist and civilizationist attitude. In the centre of this populist-authoritarian hybrid regime is the penal nationalism based on blaming and criminalization of others.
In the first section I am dealing with the theroretical backgrounds. After that I will analyse the fusion of police and penal state in the populist era which will be called here after Agamben permanent state of exception. In the third part of this paper the practice of permanent state of exception is investigated in conjunction with the Hungarian case: I will put an emphasize on the methods of criminalization of others, the anti-refugee attitude and hate politics of the Orbán’s regime, moreover the civilizationist nature of the nationalist politics. All in all, I will conclude that the authoritarian-populist Orbán’s regime could be a clear and present danger in conjunction of European democracy.
A rendezvény célja az volt, hogy társadalomelméleti témákkal foglalkozó egyetemi hallgatók, doktoranduszok, kutatók, politikusok, illetve a társadalomelméleti témák iránt érdeklődők számára egy átfogó társadalomelméleti palettát villantson fel az adott témakörrel foglalkozó hazai szakemberek, gondolkodók közvetítésével. Az esemény mindenki számára nyitott volt, akik közösen akartak gondolkodni a kortárs társadalomelméleti témákról és a baloldalt feszítő dilemmákról, kihívásokról (az alapjövedelemtől egészen az aktuális gender-vitákig).
A nyári egyetem ezeken túl – a társadalomelmélet legjelentősebb teoretikusainak interpretálásával – bepillantást adott a TEM-ben folyó kutatási irányokba is.
A rendezvény célja továbbá azt volt, hogy egy olyan baloldali szellemi közösség kiépítésére tegyen lépéseket, amely alkalmas lehet a hazai baloldali gondolkodás megújítására, jelentős közéleti viták lefolytatására és együtt gondolkodásra. Célunk a jövőben is a közösségépítés és a közös gondolkodási, cselekvési perspektívák megtalálása.
A rendezvény második napján Ökopolitika, ökoszocializmus címmel tartottam előadást, amelynek diasora alább elérhető.
https://ujegyenloseg.hu/az-ellenzek-es-az-orbani-kettos-allam/
A 2010-ben bekövetkezett kormányváltás után hatalomra került Fidesz-KDNP a korábbi főáramú alkotmányfelfogáshoz képest alapvetően új paradigmát képvisel, s ehhez mérten szabta át a közjogi intézményrendszer egészét. Ezt a fordulatot korábban a jogi/liberális alkotmányosságról a politikai alkotmányosságra való áttérésként jellemeztem , ezt továbbgondolva, jelen írásban egyéb lehetséges értelmezési keretekre teszek javaslatot. A felkérésben foglaltak kapcsán tehát az az álláspontom, hogy felfedezhetőek olyan szervező elvek, amelyek kirajzolják a 2010 utáni változások mögött meghúzódó felfogást, s még inkább felfogásokat. A lehetséges alkotmányosság-felfogások bemutatása előtt – egyfajta előkérdésként – utalok arra is, hogy milyen változások következtek be a demokráciáról vallott felfogás tekintetében. Ezután összefoglalom a jogi és a politikai alkotmányosság jellemzőit, aztán pedig azt, hogy hogyan értelmezhető a 2010 utáni rendszer az illiberális és a populista alkotmányosság keretrendszereiben.
és politikai alkotmányosság kategóriáival. Az 1989 és 2010 között a balliberális oldal jogi alkotmányosság-paradigmája volt az uralkodó Magyarországon, amelynek demokráciaelméleti
leképeződése a Bruce Ackerman-féle alapjogi fundamentalizmus. A 2010-ben megindult alkotmányozási folyamat, az 1989-es Alkotmány 12 módosítása, végtére is az elfogadott Alaptörvény eddigi négy módosítása, éles törést jelent az eddigiekhez képest és felszínre hozta a jobboldalnak – a rendszerváltás óta alárendelt helyzetben lévő – politikai alkotmányosság-felfogását (demokráciaelméleti szempontból az ackermani monista koncepciót). Az új Alaptörvény hatálybalépése óta e két paradigma küzdelme soha nem látott méreteket öltött, és a két felfogás képviselői lényegében illegitimnek tekintik az ellentábor
nézeteit, és úgy vélik, hogy csak és kizárólag a saját megoldásuk „alkotmányos” és az ellentáboré szükségszerűen „alkotmányellenes”. A tanulmány másik fő hipotézise szerint
(ami újdonságot képviselhet a hazai irodalomban) ahhoz, hogy létrejöjjön valamilyen konszenzus e két alkotmányosság-felfogás között, szükség lesz egy közös alkotmányos értelmezési keretre, amely egyszerre van tekintettel a jogi és politikai alkotmányosságra, és nem pusztán a saját tábor sérelmekkel terhelt koncepcióját abszolutizálja. E tanulmány ehhez kíván csekély hozzájárulást tenni.
A kötet célja kettős. Egyrészt az utóbbi évek jelentős külföldi szakirodalma alapján ismerteti a neoliberalizmus nyugati történetét az intézmények, iskolák és legjelentősebb gondolkodók (Mises, Hayek és Friedman) középpontba állításával az Osztrák–Magyar Monarchiától kezdve egészen a Chicagói Iskoláig és a nekonzervatív reneszánszig. Másrészt bemutatja, hogy a neoliberalizmus (mint gazdasági és politikai eszmék összessége) hogyan jelent meg a Kádár-rendszerben, hogyan kezdte meg annak átalakítását, s hogy e folyamat végül miként csúcsosodott ki az államszocialista rendszerek bukásában és hozta el a neoliberális hegemónia korszakát.
A kötet egyik legfontosabb módszertani vezérfonala, hogy a neoliberalizmus egy több mint egy évszázados történetre visszatekintő eszmerendszer, amely ugyan nyugati gyökerű, de a keleti (főként államszocialista) rendszerek nagyon komoly tapasztalatokkal járultak hozzá a neoliberalizmus kifejlődéséhez. A legjelentősebb tapasztalat pedig az állam szerepére vonatkozik, ugyanis a kötetből kiderül: a neoliberalizmus – sokak elgondolásával ellentétben – korántsem azonosítható államellenességgel. Éppen a Kádár-rendszer vizsgálata mutatja meg: az államszocialista rendszerekbe beszivárgó neoliberalizmus azokat a megoldásokat kereste keleten, hogy az erős állam segítségével miként lehet a piaci viszonyokat hatékonyan működtetni. Korántsem az államszocialista Kádár-rendszerben megjelenő neoliberális tendenciák tették e berendezkedést neoliberálissá; de szellemileg (mindenekelőtt a reformközgazdászok segítségével) előkészítették és gördülékennyé tették Magyarország visszaintegrálódását a globális kapitalizmusba – és egyúttal kényszerpályára is állították az egész rendszerváltást és az azt követő időszakot.
A kötet a Napvilág Kiadónál jelent meg: https://napvilagkiado.eu/termek/a-kadar-rendszer-es-a-neoliberalizmus/
Beléptünk a kivételes állapot korszakába. A jogállam felfüggesztése korántsem pusztán autoriter populista rendszerekben fordulhat elő, a biopolitika és azon belül a kivételes állapot politikája nem a demokrácia/totalitarizmus mentén alakul, hanem a hatalom sajátossága – elsősorban a modern hatalomé. A közeljövőben ezért korántsem hagyhatjuk magunk mögött a kivételes állapotról és legkülönfélébb megnyilvánulásairól szóló diskurzust, hiszen nincs hová visszatérni a kivételes állapotok felfüggesztésével: a „régi világ” – amelyet nevezhetünk liberális demokráciának, jóléti kapitalizmusnak, posztvilágháborús világrendnek – véget ért; a klíma- és ökológiai válság kellős közepén sokkal inkább azzal kellene foglalkozni, hogy újraértékeljük viszonyunkat a kivételes állapothoz.
ISBN: 978-963-338-440-4
https://napvilagkiado.eu/product/kiveteles-allapotban/
feszítő igazságtalanságok elfogadhatatlan szintre emelkedtek, egyre gyengébbek a társadalmi szolidaritás szövetei. Mindezt tetézi, hogy a leszakadó társadalmi csoportok nem férnek hozzá a felemelkedésükhöz szükséges gazdasági erőforrásokhoz, de az emancipációjukhoz szükséges kulturális tartalmakhoz sem. Erre a megállapításra jutnak a tanulmányok szerzői, akik nem akarják elfogadni a mai helyzetet. Ők igazságosabb, szolidárisabb társadalmi-gazdasági rendszert és demokratikusabb politikai berendezkedést akarnak. Ettől az igénytől vezetve elemzik a tanulmányok az elmúlt negyedszázad társadalmi-politikai történéseit és struktúráit, irodalmi-esztétikai törekvéseit. Kötetünk jelzi: jelentkeztek olyan fiatalabb nemzedékhez tartozó tudósok, akik nem fogadják el sem a rendszerváltás utáni helyzetben kialakított közpolitikai megoldásokat mint alternatívanélkülieket, sem az eddigi utólagos olvasatokat mint egyedül lehetségeseket. Ez az új nemzedék – tetszik, nem tetszik – egyben látja az elmúlt negyedszázadot. Ez nem jelenti azt, hogy a szerzők általában egyenlőségjelet tennének az elmúlt időszakot uraló baloldali-liberális és jobboldali-neokonzervatív diskurzusok közé, de keresik és elemzik egymást feltételező létük társadalmi-gazdasági hátterét. A szerzők szakítanak az eddig jellemző gyakorlattal, amelyben a vita résztvevői önreflexió nélkül, csak a másik oldalt hibáztatják a bajokért, az áldatlan közállapotokért. Ennek az újításnak persze meglehet az ára: sértődés és elutasítás az érintettek részéről, de ezt az árat meg kell fizetnie annak, aki újat, mást akar. A kötet jelentős hányadát olyan tanulmányok alkotják, amelyek a többek által holtnak nyilvánított politikai gazdaságtan, illetve a szociológia eszköztárával elemzik a közelmúlt és a jelen politikai viszonyait. Ezekben a témakörökben olyan, korábban örökre letudottnak vett fogalmak és kategóriák segítik az elemzést, mint az osztály, az osztálystruktúra, kapitalizmus és részvételi demokrácia. Más elemzések megmutatják a folytonosságot a jövedelemelosztásban, a szociális és kisebbségpolitikában. A kötet szerzői azt üzenik: társadalmi szolidaritás nélkül nincs igazságosság, emancipáció nélkül nincs igazi szabadság. Közös, saját
értékvilágot tükröző identitás nélkül nincs saját lábán álló politikai mozgalom. A tanulmányokból az a következtetés adódik, hogy a nemzeti együttműködés rendszerét fel kell hogy váltsa az európai együttműködésben részt vállaló Magyar Köztársaság társadalmi-gazdasági szolidaritásnak formát adó demokráciája. Ennek az új köztársaságnak tagadnia kell az illiberális berendezkedést, de nem lehet puszta folytatása a 2010 előtti liberális alkotmányos demokráciának. A korábbi modernizációs konszenzus helyébe az igazságosabb társadalom vízióját
célszerű állítani, a zárt nemzetfelfogást a nyitott, befogadó nemzetfelfogással érdemes felváltani. A Politikatörténeti Alapítvány ösztöndíjasainak részvételével és támogatásával megszerveződött a Politikatörténeti Intézet Társadalomelméleti Műhelye. Ez a kötet – amely a 2015. november 26-án megrendezésre került A mai magyar valóság az elmúlt negyed század tükrében című konferencián elhangzott előadások írásos változatait tartalmazza – az első terméke az itt folyó tudományos, elméleti munkának. Az intézet, a műhely annak a tudatában tevékenykedik, hogy új gondolatok nélkül nincs új stratégia, a baloldaliság megújítása nélkül nincs baloldali megújulás.
2016. március
Földes György és Antal Attila