zugzwangとは 意味・読み方・使い方

語源

From German Zugzwang, from Zug (“move”) +‎ Zwang (“compulsion”).

発音

• IPA: /ˈzʌɡzwæŋ/, /ˈzʊɡ-/, /ˈzuːɡ-/, /-swæŋ/, /-zwɑŋ/, /-swɑŋ/, (Germanized) /ˈtsuːktswɑŋ/, /-tsvɑŋ/

名詞

zugzwang (countable and uncountable, plural zugzwangs or zugzwänge)

1. (chess) A situation in which a player is forced to make a disadvantageous move.
2. (figurative) A situation in which someone is forced to make a disadvantageous move.
   • 2002, Carl Friedrich Graumann, Werner Kallmeyer, editors, Perspective and Perspectivation in Discourse‎, page 174:

     An explanation for this phenomenon may be that speech acts that include instructions (e.g., a command or request) show a higher level of activity than speech acts of assertion; the ethnomethodological analysis of conversation speaks of conversational Zugzwänge: a request, a question or a command demands a reaction of the addressee.

   • 2014, Alexander J. Motyl, “PUTIN'S ZUGZWANG: The Russia-Ukraine Standoff”, in World Affairs‎, volume 177, number 2, page 60:

     Here, too, it is Russia that, ironically, is in Zugzwang. Because the central rationale of Moscow's occupation of Crimea was the defense of supposedly threatened Russians, Putin and his minions must continue insisting that Ukraine's Russians are under threat and that their right are being systematically violated.

   • 2015, Veera Laine, Toivo Martikainen, Katri Pynnöniemi, Sinikukka Saari, “Zugzwang in slow motion? The implications of Russia's system-level crisis”, in FIIA Analysis‎, number 6, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, page 5:

     not only is there a lack of good alternatives concerning some particular policy decisions, but the whole Russian system is moving towards a zugzwang.

   • 2015 June 11, Brian Whitmore, “Putin's Deadly Zugzwang”, in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty‎:

     "In chess terms, Putin is not in a stalemate, he's in a zugzwang: He is forced to make further moves even if they worsen his position, precisely because he must keep selling his 'war of civilizations' concept to Russians," Leonid Bershidsky, the self-exiled Russian political analyst wrote in Bloomberg recently.

   • 2016 November 9, Oleg N. Barabanov, “What If… the Soviet Union Had Not Collapsed?”, in Valdai Papers. Russia in Global Affairs‎:

     Perhaps the Soviet Union under Gromyko could have persuaded him against attacking Kuwait, which as we know, unleashed irreversible consequences in the Middle East and the world as a whole, opening the door to U.S. interventions around the world. But the question of whether Gromyko would have been more open to dialogue with the West and China remains unanswerable. Would he have launched a new round of détente in international relations (without, of course, giving up the whole game as Gorbachev did) or would he have maintained the Zugzwang in Soviet-U.S. affairs that Reagan and Andropov had established?

   • 2018, Douglas Selvage, “The Limits of Repression: Soviet Bloc Security Services vs. Transnational Helsinki Networks, 1976–1986”, in The CSCE and the End of the Cold War, New York · Oxford: Berghahn Books, →DOI, →ISBN, page 218:

     the Soviet concessions at Madrid did not prove enough to prevent the stationing of US Euromissiles as part of NATO’s dual-track decision, and Moscow found itself in economic and political Zugzwang at the end of the Andropov era, as Vladislav Zubok has pointed out.

   • 2020, Maximilian Ohle, Richard J. Cook, Zhaoying Han, “China’s engagement with Kazakhstan and Russia’s Zugzwang. Why is Nur-Sultan incurring regional power hedging?”, in Journal of Eurasian Studies, volume 11, number 1, →DOI:

     The empirical domain has illustrated Kazakhstan’s carefully calibrated hedging position amid the two regional Leviathans engaged in leverage seeking. The current paradigm insinuates that to respond to China’s rise, Russia is compelled to increase its engagement with Kazakhstan by maintaining its hierarchical grip over Nur-Sultan, while offering sufficient security provision (CSTO and, partly, SCO) and means for economic development (EAEU) to ensure that it remains in the Kremlin-centric political order. Nevertheless, Russia has not yet entirely released itself from the zugzwang situation, as it has to further resort to reactionary acts to restrain a rising China, despite the fact that any move possible would further constrain Russia geopolitically stemming from Beijing’s increasing power projection, chiefly in the economic domain (SREB).

   • 2022 June 17, Oleh Kozachuk, “PUTIN’S ZUGZWANG OR HOW TO SAVE RUSSIA?”, in Інститут демократизації та розвитку‎:

別の表記

• Zugzwang

Further reading

• zugzwang on Wikipedia.Wikipedia