Skip to main content

Miriam Teschl

EHESS-Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, GREQAM, Faculty Member

Followers

142

Following

1

Public Views

I am an economist “by formation” and have done my PhD on “The Identity of the Economic Agent” in the special field of Economics and Philosophy. I have studied at the Universities of Graz (Austria), East-Anglia (UK), Aix-Marseille (GREQAM – France) and Cambridge (UK). I am currently Hertha Firnberg Research Fellow (Austrian Science Fund – FWF) at the Department of Economics at the University of Vienna and research on “Identity Decisions and Welfare”.

less

Sheryl Tuttle Ross

University of Wisconsin La Crosse

Roberte N. Hamayon

Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes

David Hirshleifer

University of California, Irvine

Yulie Foka-Kavalieraki

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Euromed Management

Francesco Di Iorio

Nankai University

George Mason University

Washington State University

University of Puget Sound

Jerry Kirkpatrick

California State Polytechnic University at Pomona

InterestsView All (12)

Uploads

Papers by Miriam Teschl

Review of Hausman's "Preference, Value, Choice and Welfare"

Short Review of Kahneman's "Thinking Fast and Slow"

Review of three books on Amartya Sen

Review of John Davis' "Individuals and identity in economics"

John Davis has written this book because individuals are important. This is obvious, some will sa... more John Davis has written this book because individuals are important. This is obvious, some will say. But not necessarily to economists, says Davis. Equipped with a respectable knowledge of relevant psychological, sociological, and philosophical theories, Davis examines in depth various representations of the individual in economics. He presents a useful, insightful and interesting picture of the various influences from other social sciences on the current characterisation of individuals that may be considered as a recent history of the representation of the economic agent. Davis also proposes other theories from philosophy and the social sciences that economists should incorporate to pay justice to what individuals are. He thus continues an analysis of the economic agent that he started in his previous book . Whereas in his first book he was primarily concerned with explaining his methodology and considering what he calls "orthodox" and "heterodox" representations of the economic agent, this time he is focusing on what may be called "mainstream" representations of the individual, that is, the different visions and versions of individuals that can be encountered these days in any major economics journal. 1 Central to Davis's methodology is the analysis of the representation of individuals in terms of two ontological criteria from the philosophical literature about personal identity: individuation and re-identification. These criteria stand for two different bounds: a lower bound-subpersonal-and an upper bound-supra-personal. The lower bound or identification criterion considers the question of whether the individual is a unique and single being that is not fragmented into multiple selves. The upper bound or re-identification criterion concerns the distinction between the individual and society, i.e., how much the individual is an independent and autonomous being and how much he or she is influenced or even determined by the "social". It determines whether

Review of Akerlof and Kranton's "Identity Economics"

Review of Caroline Gerschlager's "Deception in Markets"

Do markets foster selfishness?

Rationality and emotions

… of the Royal …, Jan 1, 2010

Is there personal identity in economics? A discussion of John B. Davis The Theory of Individual in Economics: Identity and Values

Ethics and Economics, Jan 1, 2005

John B. Davis explores the question of what the economic individual is. He bases his consideratio... more John B. Davis explores the question of what the economic individual is. He bases his considerations of orthodox economics on the assumption that these theories implicitly rely on a conception of the individual that has its origin in Locke's idea of the self as subjective inwardness. Economic history then is the attempt to deal with Locke's inherent problems that this view involved. If neoclassical economics still has aspects of human psychology, mainstream economics dropped the subjective concept of the individual out of their considerations. However, Davis demonstrates that even the neoclassical concept of the individual fails to pass the existence test of individual identity. The latter is an idea developed in analogy to philosophers' concern about personal identity and examines if the individual can be distinguished among different individuals and if he or she can be reidentified as the selfsame individual through time. The failure of the theory of the individual in orthodox economics led Davis to develop a concept of a socially embedded individual in accordance with heterodox accounts of economics. He submits this conception to the same test of individual identity. It appears that the socially embedded individual can be said to hold an identity in specific circumstances.

Selfish or selfless? The role of empathy in economics

Philosophical Transactions of …, Jan 1, 2010

Personal Identity Decisions for Examining Change

SCEME Workshop on Individuality and Rationality in …, Jan 1, 2006

In this article it is argued that the identity of a person is best considered as a process of con... more In this article it is argued that the identity of a person is best considered as a process of continuity and change. To take account of this changing identity, the individual is here presented in terms of two preference-orderings over a set of actions, one ordering referring to the person's actual-self, the other to the person's self-image or "who" the person would like to be. The interplay of these two orderings can explain personal identity decisions, that is, respective changes of either the actual self or the self-image of a person. This is achieved in particular by introducing two principles of choice, the "pleasure principle", based on the standard idea that pleasant actions are preferred over unpleasant ones, and the "self principle" which means that the person will choose those actions that transform the actual-self to bring it "closer" to the person's self-image. A systematic analysis of the possible decisions with which an individual can be faced will finally establish a first (incomplete) ranking of actions.

On the emergence of economic identity

Revue de Philosophie Economique, Jan 1, 2004

Changing identity: the emergence of social groups

Homo Economicus has progressed from an atomistic and self-interested individual in standard econo... more Homo Economicus has progressed from an atomistic and self-interested individual in standard economics to a socially embedded agent in modern economics who is endowed with a particular social identity or with specific preferences for the latter. While this vision makes the economic agent more realistic, its representation by adding variables in an agent's utility function poses problems. The distinction between the agent's own preferences and those that society imposes on the agent becomes both blurred, and difficult to make. In order to separate these two facets of preferences, we explore the idea of an agent's personal identity of which his social identity is one aspect. To consider personal identity means endowing the economic agent with the capacity to change, in particular, in the social space. This greatly complicates the problem of making welfare judgements since it is difficult to define a welfare improvement in the future. We next present a model in which the evolution of peoples' identities is stochastic. This can explain the appearance of individuals who seem to defy social convention. Our model shows how personal identity changes. We can find a social equilibrium only if personal identity matters little. But this suggests, paradoxically, that for individuals to have well-established identities, society must be one which is is not in equilibrium, but one which will continue to change and in which both the social groups and the individuals are constantly being modified.

Searching for identity in the capability space

Journal of Economic Methodology, Jan 1, 2006

In this paper, we consider the extension of the conception of the economic agent as a person who ... more In this paper, we consider the extension of the conception of the economic agent as a person who chooses particular actions in relation to his or her social identity. We do this in particular by analysing Akerlof and Kranton's recent models on 'economics and identity ' (2000). Amartya Sen has over the years consistently pointed out that a person might have different reasons to choose, including not only those that increase a person's self-interested utility, however broadly this self might be defined. The question then is how should one assess a person's well-being if her choices are not based on the maximisation of her 'own' utility. Against the background of these considerations, we will present our own analysis of the economic agent's identity, which is motivated not by the selfinterested choices, but by achieving consistency between one's characteristics and one's desired self-image through participation in different social groups. We propose to situate this identity-conception in a space of capabilities.

Adaptive preferences and capabilities: some preliminary conceptual explorations

Review of social economy, Jan 1, 2005

The Capability Approach (CA) as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, has in part been a ... more The Capability Approach (CA) as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, has in part been a response to the problem of adaptive preferences. Their argument says that people might adapt to certain unfavorable circumstances and any self-evaluation in terms of satisfaction or happiness will in this case necessarily be distorted. To evaluate people's wellbeing in terms of functionings and capabilities guarantees a more objective picture of people's life. Next to this strong criticism on subjective measurements of well-being, we observe an increasing interest in Subjective Well-Being (SWB) or Happiness studies that are included in the broader field of Hedonic Psychology. In this paper, we thus revise the original critique of adaptive preferences and compare it with a more detailed analysis of adaptation as it is presented in hedonic psychology. It becomes clear that adaptation can be a positive as well as a negative phenomenon and that the adaptive preference critique had a particular narrow view on adaptation. However, this does not mean SWB-research is not any longer susceptible to this critique. An alternative way to assess people's subjective well-being, but which could be considered to be more in line with the CA, is proposed by Daniel Kahneman's Objective Happiness. These are all relatively new considerations, especially in economics. Therefore much more research needs to be done on the positive and negative aspects of adaptation to understand its consequences on well-being -especially when evaluated within the capability-space.

Review of Hausman's "Preference, Value, Choice and Welfare"

Short Review of Kahneman's "Thinking Fast and Slow"

Review of three books on Amartya Sen

Review of John Davis' "Individuals and identity in economics"

John Davis has written this book because individuals are important. This is obvious, some will sa... more John Davis has written this book because individuals are important. This is obvious, some will say. But not necessarily to economists, says Davis. Equipped with a respectable knowledge of relevant psychological, sociological, and philosophical theories, Davis examines in depth various representations of the individual in economics. He presents a useful, insightful and interesting picture of the various influences from other social sciences on the current characterisation of individuals that may be considered as a recent history of the representation of the economic agent. Davis also proposes other theories from philosophy and the social sciences that economists should incorporate to pay justice to what individuals are. He thus continues an analysis of the economic agent that he started in his previous book . Whereas in his first book he was primarily concerned with explaining his methodology and considering what he calls "orthodox" and "heterodox" representations of the economic agent, this time he is focusing on what may be called "mainstream" representations of the individual, that is, the different visions and versions of individuals that can be encountered these days in any major economics journal. 1 Central to Davis's methodology is the analysis of the representation of individuals in terms of two ontological criteria from the philosophical literature about personal identity: individuation and re-identification. These criteria stand for two different bounds: a lower bound-subpersonal-and an upper bound-supra-personal. The lower bound or identification criterion considers the question of whether the individual is a unique and single being that is not fragmented into multiple selves. The upper bound or re-identification criterion concerns the distinction between the individual and society, i.e., how much the individual is an independent and autonomous being and how much he or she is influenced or even determined by the "social". It determines whether

Review of Akerlof and Kranton's "Identity Economics"

Review of Caroline Gerschlager's "Deception in Markets"

Do markets foster selfishness?

Rationality and emotions

… of the Royal …, Jan 1, 2010

Is there personal identity in economics? A discussion of John B. Davis The Theory of Individual in Economics: Identity and Values

Ethics and Economics, Jan 1, 2005

John B. Davis explores the question of what the economic individual is. He bases his consideratio... more John B. Davis explores the question of what the economic individual is. He bases his considerations of orthodox economics on the assumption that these theories implicitly rely on a conception of the individual that has its origin in Locke's idea of the self as subjective inwardness. Economic history then is the attempt to deal with Locke's inherent problems that this view involved. If neoclassical economics still has aspects of human psychology, mainstream economics dropped the subjective concept of the individual out of their considerations. However, Davis demonstrates that even the neoclassical concept of the individual fails to pass the existence test of individual identity. The latter is an idea developed in analogy to philosophers' concern about personal identity and examines if the individual can be distinguished among different individuals and if he or she can be reidentified as the selfsame individual through time. The failure of the theory of the individual in orthodox economics led Davis to develop a concept of a socially embedded individual in accordance with heterodox accounts of economics. He submits this conception to the same test of individual identity. It appears that the socially embedded individual can be said to hold an identity in specific circumstances.

Selfish or selfless? The role of empathy in economics

Philosophical Transactions of …, Jan 1, 2010

Personal Identity Decisions for Examining Change

SCEME Workshop on Individuality and Rationality in …, Jan 1, 2006

In this article it is argued that the identity of a person is best considered as a process of con... more In this article it is argued that the identity of a person is best considered as a process of continuity and change. To take account of this changing identity, the individual is here presented in terms of two preference-orderings over a set of actions, one ordering referring to the person's actual-self, the other to the person's self-image or "who" the person would like to be. The interplay of these two orderings can explain personal identity decisions, that is, respective changes of either the actual self or the self-image of a person. This is achieved in particular by introducing two principles of choice, the "pleasure principle", based on the standard idea that pleasant actions are preferred over unpleasant ones, and the "self principle" which means that the person will choose those actions that transform the actual-self to bring it "closer" to the person's self-image. A systematic analysis of the possible decisions with which an individual can be faced will finally establish a first (incomplete) ranking of actions.

On the emergence of economic identity

Revue de Philosophie Economique, Jan 1, 2004

Changing identity: the emergence of social groups

Homo Economicus has progressed from an atomistic and self-interested individual in standard econo... more Homo Economicus has progressed from an atomistic and self-interested individual in standard economics to a socially embedded agent in modern economics who is endowed with a particular social identity or with specific preferences for the latter. While this vision makes the economic agent more realistic, its representation by adding variables in an agent's utility function poses problems. The distinction between the agent's own preferences and those that society imposes on the agent becomes both blurred, and difficult to make. In order to separate these two facets of preferences, we explore the idea of an agent's personal identity of which his social identity is one aspect. To consider personal identity means endowing the economic agent with the capacity to change, in particular, in the social space. This greatly complicates the problem of making welfare judgements since it is difficult to define a welfare improvement in the future. We next present a model in which the evolution of peoples' identities is stochastic. This can explain the appearance of individuals who seem to defy social convention. Our model shows how personal identity changes. We can find a social equilibrium only if personal identity matters little. But this suggests, paradoxically, that for individuals to have well-established identities, society must be one which is is not in equilibrium, but one which will continue to change and in which both the social groups and the individuals are constantly being modified.

Searching for identity in the capability space

Journal of Economic Methodology, Jan 1, 2006

In this paper, we consider the extension of the conception of the economic agent as a person who ... more In this paper, we consider the extension of the conception of the economic agent as a person who chooses particular actions in relation to his or her social identity. We do this in particular by analysing Akerlof and Kranton's recent models on 'economics and identity ' (2000). Amartya Sen has over the years consistently pointed out that a person might have different reasons to choose, including not only those that increase a person's self-interested utility, however broadly this self might be defined. The question then is how should one assess a person's well-being if her choices are not based on the maximisation of her 'own' utility. Against the background of these considerations, we will present our own analysis of the economic agent's identity, which is motivated not by the selfinterested choices, but by achieving consistency between one's characteristics and one's desired self-image through participation in different social groups. We propose to situate this identity-conception in a space of capabilities.

Adaptive preferences and capabilities: some preliminary conceptual explorations

Review of social economy, Jan 1, 2005

The Capability Approach (CA) as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, has in part been a ... more The Capability Approach (CA) as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, has in part been a response to the problem of adaptive preferences. Their argument says that people might adapt to certain unfavorable circumstances and any self-evaluation in terms of satisfaction or happiness will in this case necessarily be distorted. To evaluate people's wellbeing in terms of functionings and capabilities guarantees a more objective picture of people's life. Next to this strong criticism on subjective measurements of well-being, we observe an increasing interest in Subjective Well-Being (SWB) or Happiness studies that are included in the broader field of Hedonic Psychology. In this paper, we thus revise the original critique of adaptive preferences and compare it with a more detailed analysis of adaptation as it is presented in hedonic psychology. It becomes clear that adaptation can be a positive as well as a negative phenomenon and that the adaptive preference critique had a particular narrow view on adaptation. However, this does not mean SWB-research is not any longer susceptible to this critique. An alternative way to assess people's subjective well-being, but which could be considered to be more in line with the CA, is proposed by Daniel Kahneman's Objective Happiness. These are all relatively new considerations, especially in economics. Therefore much more research needs to be done on the positive and negative aspects of adaptation to understand its consequences on well-being -especially when evaluated within the capability-space.