Conference Presentations by Kevin W. Wong
In this paper, I explore whether Thomas Aquinas's hylomorphic anthropology is more in keeping wit... more In this paper, I explore whether Thomas Aquinas's hylomorphic anthropology is more in keeping with analytic physicalism or substance dualism and conclude it is the latter.
In this paper, I oscillate between defense and criticism. I aim to overturn two first impressions... more In this paper, I oscillate between defense and criticism. I aim to overturn two first impressions of monothelitism as explicated and defended by William Lane Craig and Garry DeWeese: First, that it fails to comply with the findings of the Third Ecumenical Council; second, that it is more philosophically intuitive than a Two-Minds Christology. I conclude by suggesting that something like the version of monothelitism that Craig and DeWeese proposes is needed for maintaining the singularity of Christ's person, and thus needed for maintaining an orthodox Christology.
In this paper, I defend the coherence of the hypostatic union by means of demonstrating the possi... more In this paper, I defend the coherence of the hypostatic union by means of demonstrating the possibility of Christ being omniscient and ignorant without contradiction. I first review and criticize Morris' Two-Minds Christology, that it solves this knowledge problem at the expense of unifying Christ's two distinct natures in his one person. I then describe and delimit omniscience so that it does not mean knowing all things knowable, but note the limitations of this characterization to the problem at hand. And then lastly, I resort to Audi's distinction between recalling and remembering in order to give a possible account of how Christ could know in one sense and yet not know in another sense some proposition.
Disclaimer: This is a work in progress, one I hope to return to at a later time to offer a more d... more Disclaimer: This is a work in progress, one I hope to return to at a later time to offer a more detailed exegetical analysis and a fuller philosophical treatment.
There is a resurgence of attacks upon the Judeo-Christian worldview by accusing the God of the Old Testament of engaging in evil acts. I argue that despite God’s intervention into his mental states, that the Pharaoh of Exodus was still genuinely free and fully morally responsible. I shall do so first by offering a very brief exegetical survey of the relevant texts. English translations have rendered the various Hebrew words as one word, “hardened,” making it appear as though the action—whether done by God or Pharaoh—was univocal throughout. This seems doubtful. There is also need for clarification for the Hebrew concept of “the heart.” Second, I will apply the conditions for a libertarian free act to Pharaoh to demonstrate that he was indeed free, particularly that he was the causal initiator of his actions rather than his beliefs and desires. Last, I demonstrate that God is not morally blameworthy for intervention on Pharaoh’s mental state as there are some forms of morally permissible enticement, such as sting operations conducted by law enforcement agencies. Some may say that even if God is not morally culpable of forcing Pharaoh to act as he did, surely he must be morally culpable for enticing Pharaoh much in the same way a drug dealer may not force any of his buyers to abuse drugs, but is guilty of enticing. I argue that there are varieties of morally permissible enticements, such as law enforcement sting operations, that demonstrate one’s already established moral character and so defend that God has not in fact engaged in any evil.
There seems to have been a recent rise in Christians holding to a libertarian view of free will. ... more There seems to have been a recent rise in Christians holding to a libertarian view of free will. And yet there are passages in the Bible that are particularly challenging to read with that understanding, such as the Exodus account of God hardening the heart of Pharaoh. Can libertarians remain faithful to the biblical text without ad hoc interpretation? I argue that the libertarian can in fact comfortably and naturally read the hardened heart episodes of the book of Exodus as comporting with that view of free will. I shall first engage in a very short Hebrew exegesis to clarify important terms that may have lost important nuance when translated into English. Second, I will characterize a slightly reconfigured libertarian understanding of free will that nonetheless remains intuitive and recognizably libertarian—particularly modifying alternate possibilities to be less important than causal sourcehood—and apply it to Pharaoh. Last, I will respond to worries that this adjusted libertarianism runs afoul of God tempting someone, something the Bible specifies that God does not in fact do, by drawing parallels to other incidents of morally permissible enticement, such as sting operations conducted by law enforcement.
In this paper presentation, I try to resolve two paradoxes involving our intuitions concerning om... more In this paper presentation, I try to resolve two paradoxes involving our intuitions concerning omnipotence: The paradox of the stone and the conjunction of the Incarnation with omnipotence. I hypothesize that joining God's omnipotence and His perfect moral character will grant us a beginning strategy for resolving both.
This paper has been updated to reflect questions and comments I received at ETS.
In this essay, I quickly survey exegetical and theological considerations for various interpretat... more In this essay, I quickly survey exegetical and theological considerations for various interpretations of the Cry of Dereliction, finding the two polar opposites (either the Trinitarian relations were broken or Jesus was not abandoned by the Father in any sense) to be too strong, and some middle ground is needed. I contend that a Two Minds Christology of the sort explicated by Thomas V. Morris, Oliver Crisp, and John Duns Scotus allows Christians to affirm that the Father did and did not abandon the Son at the same time, but not in the same sense. This gives us license for interpreting the Cry of Dereliction in a more literal or straight forward sense without fear of running contrary to classical Trinitarian theology that maintains the relation between the Father and Son cannot be broken.
Book Reviews by Kevin W. Wong
I review the Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology (sometimes listed on websites... more I review the Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology (sometimes listed on websites as The Routledge Companion to Theological Anthropology).
Teaching Documents by Kevin W. Wong
Our sample syllabus for introduction to analytic theology.
Papers by Kevin W. Wong
Philosophia Christi
In this essay, I introduce the symposium on Jordan Wessling’s book, Love Divine: A Systematic Acc... more In this essay, I introduce the symposium on Jordan Wessling’s book, Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God’s Love for Humanity, by discussing its origin as a book panel, providing the context for the significance of Wessling’s contribution, and previewing the essays that follow.
Perichoresis, 2021
Trenton Merricks has objected to dualist conceptions of the Incarnation in a similar way to Jaegw... more Trenton Merricks has objected to dualist conceptions of the Incarnation in a similar way to Jaegwon Kim’s pairing problem. On the original pairing problem, so argues Kim, we lack a pairing relationship between bodies and souls such that body A is causally paired with soul A and not soul B. Merricks, on the other hand, argues that whatever relations dualists propose that do pair bodies and souls together (e.g. causal relations) are relations that God the Son has with all bodies whatsoever via his divine attributes (e.g. God the Son could cause motion in any and all bodies via his omnipotence). So if we count these relations as sufficient for embodiment, then dualism implies that God the Son is embodied in all bodies whatsoever. I shall argue that while the original pairing problem might be easily answerable, the Christological pairing problem is not and that dualists must shift some of their focus from the defense of the soul’s existence to explicating the nature of the mind-body rel...
Journal of Analytic Theology
Journal of Analytic Theology
Journal of Analytic Theology
Perichoresis, 2021
Trenton Merricks has objected to dualist conceptions of the Incarnation in a similar way to Jaegw... more Trenton Merricks has objected to dualist conceptions of the Incarnation in a similar way to Jaegwon Kim's pairing problem. On the original pairing problem, so argues Kim, we lack a pairing relationship between bodies and souls such that body A is causally paired with soul A and not soul B. Merricks, on the other hand, argues that whatever relations dualists propose that do pair bodies and souls together (e.g. causal relations) are relations that God the Son has with all bodies whatsoever via his divine attributes (e.g. God the Son could cause motion in any and all bodies via his omnipotence). So if we count these relations as sufficient for embodiment, then dualism implies that God the Son is embodied in all bodies whatsoever. I shall argue that while the original pairing problem might be easily answerable, the Christological pairing problem is not and that dualists must shift some of their focus from the defense of the soul's existence to explicating the nature of the mind-body relationship.
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Conference Presentations by Kevin W. Wong
There is a resurgence of attacks upon the Judeo-Christian worldview by accusing the God of the Old Testament of engaging in evil acts. I argue that despite God’s intervention into his mental states, that the Pharaoh of Exodus was still genuinely free and fully morally responsible. I shall do so first by offering a very brief exegetical survey of the relevant texts. English translations have rendered the various Hebrew words as one word, “hardened,” making it appear as though the action—whether done by God or Pharaoh—was univocal throughout. This seems doubtful. There is also need for clarification for the Hebrew concept of “the heart.” Second, I will apply the conditions for a libertarian free act to Pharaoh to demonstrate that he was indeed free, particularly that he was the causal initiator of his actions rather than his beliefs and desires. Last, I demonstrate that God is not morally blameworthy for intervention on Pharaoh’s mental state as there are some forms of morally permissible enticement, such as sting operations conducted by law enforcement agencies. Some may say that even if God is not morally culpable of forcing Pharaoh to act as he did, surely he must be morally culpable for enticing Pharaoh much in the same way a drug dealer may not force any of his buyers to abuse drugs, but is guilty of enticing. I argue that there are varieties of morally permissible enticements, such as law enforcement sting operations, that demonstrate one’s already established moral character and so defend that God has not in fact engaged in any evil.
This paper has been updated to reflect questions and comments I received at ETS.
Book Reviews by Kevin W. Wong
The review was first published in the Journal of Analytic Theology here: http://journalofanalytictheology.com/jat/index.php/jat/article/view/jat.2016-4.100413221406a/316
Teaching Documents by Kevin W. Wong
Papers by Kevin W. Wong
There is a resurgence of attacks upon the Judeo-Christian worldview by accusing the God of the Old Testament of engaging in evil acts. I argue that despite God’s intervention into his mental states, that the Pharaoh of Exodus was still genuinely free and fully morally responsible. I shall do so first by offering a very brief exegetical survey of the relevant texts. English translations have rendered the various Hebrew words as one word, “hardened,” making it appear as though the action—whether done by God or Pharaoh—was univocal throughout. This seems doubtful. There is also need for clarification for the Hebrew concept of “the heart.” Second, I will apply the conditions for a libertarian free act to Pharaoh to demonstrate that he was indeed free, particularly that he was the causal initiator of his actions rather than his beliefs and desires. Last, I demonstrate that God is not morally blameworthy for intervention on Pharaoh’s mental state as there are some forms of morally permissible enticement, such as sting operations conducted by law enforcement agencies. Some may say that even if God is not morally culpable of forcing Pharaoh to act as he did, surely he must be morally culpable for enticing Pharaoh much in the same way a drug dealer may not force any of his buyers to abuse drugs, but is guilty of enticing. I argue that there are varieties of morally permissible enticements, such as law enforcement sting operations, that demonstrate one’s already established moral character and so defend that God has not in fact engaged in any evil.
This paper has been updated to reflect questions and comments I received at ETS.
The review was first published in the Journal of Analytic Theology here: http://journalofanalytictheology.com/jat/index.php/jat/article/view/jat.2016-4.100413221406a/316