How do formal international institutions change and adjust to new circumstances? The conventional... more How do formal international institutions change and adjust to new circumstances? The conventional wisdom in International Relations (IR), outlined by rational design, is that the answer lies in designed flexibility, which allows states to adjust agreements. Drawing on rich but disparate literatures across subfields of political science-especially constructivism and historical institutionalism-we propose an alternative, which we call "emergent flexibility." Emergent flexibility is a property of international institutions that is not intentionally crafted by rule-makers when a rule is formally established, but is subsequently discovered, activated, and accessed by creative rule-users in ways unintended by designers. Rich case studies trace how rule-users have accessed emergent flexibility through the legal interpretive strategy of subsequent practice to change rigid rules of the UN Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights. A key implication of emergent flexibility...
When donors contemplate providing financial support to United Nations institutions they encounter... more When donors contemplate providing financial support to United Nations institutions they encounter a menu of funding options. Some UN institutions require mandatory dues, but most rely substantially on voluntary contributions, which donors can choose to earmark for specific purposes. How donors provide resources has widespread effects on the authority of UN governing bodies, donor control over UN programs, and the efficiency of UN operations. What explains how donors choose to fund UN programs and agencies? We advance a theory that emphasizes member state preferences over the affordability and policy substance of IO activity. Using data from two novel experiments and a case study of U.S. funding practices toward the United Nations (1945–1980s), we provide mixed-method evidence showing that a state is more likely to provide voluntary contributions when its preferences over the affordability and policy of IO activity differ from those of the governing coalition and more likely to provide mandatory contributions when its preferences are consistent with those of the governing coalition. Further, we demonstrate that preferences over policy substance are particularly important in explaining recent trends in donor earmarking.
In this article I introduce assembled institutions as an institutional form designed to mitigate ... more In this article I introduce assembled institutions as an institutional form designed to mitigate the challenges associated with institutional proliferation, fragmentation, and incoherent global governance. Assembled institutions are formed with a mandate to coordinate and formally integrate existing international organizations (IOs) in their institutional designs. Their promise is substantial; AIs are intended to produce efficiency gains and benefit from the diverse expertise of IOs incorporated in their designs. Yet in practice, such gains prove difficult to achieve. I theorize how the interests of IOs incorporated in AI designs combined with the multiple principals problem inherent in the institutional form, pose severe challenges to coordination. I illustrate the argument at the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and UNAIDS, two AIs that have struggled to facilitate coordination among prominent IOs.
What explains the design and development of funding rules at international organizations? I inves... more What explains the design and development of funding rules at international organizations? I investigate this question in the context of the United Nations system, which has undergone a dramatic shift in financing. Long associated with mandatory contributions, the United Nations increasingly relies on voluntary resources earmarked by individual donors. Previous studies have investigated the financing puzzle from a behavioral perspective and have found that wealthy donors use voluntary funding to rein in costs and constrain international organization programs. Providing an alternative theoretical approach, I investigate the financing puzzle from an institutional design perspective. I provide original United Nations funding rule data to demonstrate that it is not only funding practices, but also underlying funding rules, that have changed over time. I theorize how states with favorable views of the United Nations that sought to expand its activities — rather than those that desired to constrain it — had incentives to introduce funding rules that offered more flexibility and control to donors. I test the argument with a longitudinal case study of funding rule design and change at United Nations economic development institutions. The article expands the institutional design literature by integrating funding rules as a consequential design component and provides a novel explanation for changes in United Nations financing.
International relations scholarship largely accepts that multilateralism lies at the heart of the... more International relations scholarship largely accepts that multilateralism lies at the heart of the liberal international order and is instantiated in formal, intergovernmental organizations. This paper revisits the conventional wisdom regarding the multilateral character of international organization (IO) governance by drawing attention to the funding methods used to finance contemporary IOs. I argue that different funding rules constitute different modes of governance. While mandatory funding rules are easily reconciled with traditional conceptions of multilateralism, voluntary rules are not. In particular, restricted voluntary funding rules devolve authority over funding decisions to individual actors, undercutting the collective decision making that is central to multilateral governance. I demonstrate the relevance of the argument in the case of the United Nations, which has transformed from an institution reliant primarily on mandatory contributions, to one disproportionately reliant on restricted, voluntary funds. The counterintuitive result is an increasingly bilateral United Nations. The paper contributes to our understanding of the relationship between multilateralism and IO governance, and has implications for literature related to institutional design, delegation, and development aid. In addition, it raises empirical and normative questions regarding reliance on voluntary funding.
Financing for climate adaptation is governed by an unusual arrangement whereby theGEF channels fu... more Financing for climate adaptation is governed by an unusual arrangement whereby theGEF channels funds through other IGOs – including theWorld Bank, UNEP and UNDP – which in turn develop and implement projects on the ground. The concept and techniques of orchestration outlined by the framework authors help us understand this complicated governance arrangement. The GEF, as orchestrator, supports and steers various intermediaries (the “implementing agencies”) to effect change in target states (developing-country recipients). In our explanation of this outcome,we find support for four of the volume’s hypotheses: intermediary availability, orchestrator focality, goal divergence and state oversight. We also explore whether the relationship between the GEF and its implementing agencies is efficient and complementary. We find that this is generally the case and that the orchestrator capabilities and intermediary availability hypotheses capture this arrangement quite well. While the climate adaptation case offers considerable support for the theoretical framework, recent developments raise concerns about the robustness of orchestration as a governance equilibrium, which may evolve over time toward harder and direct modes of governance.
What factors influence IO faithfulness to mandates assigned by member states? Although recent lit... more What factors influence IO faithfulness to mandates assigned by member states? Although recent literature treats IOs agents as autonomous actors in global politics, most work continues to treat the bureaucracy of an international organization as a unitary actor. I argue that the unitary actor assumption limits our ability to assess how internal factors such as fragmentation influence agent faithfulness. When we conceive of IO bureaucracies as collective agents-those including more than one bureaucratic actor and subject to internal fragmentation-IO faithfulness can be more fully explained. Specifically, fragmentation limits faithfulness by inhibiting the effectiveness of principals' control mechanisms (i.e. oversight and agent screening and sanctioning). These arguments are illustrated using a case study of the World Health Organization and its efforts to improve health systems between 1982 and 2008. two anonymous reviewers at EJIR provided useful criticism and suggestions that greatly improved the paper.
What factors inhibit or facilitate cross-subfield conversations in political science? This articl... more What factors inhibit or facilitate cross-subfield conversations in political science? This article draws on diffusion scholarship to gain insight into cross-subfield communication. Diffusion scholarship represents a case where such communication might be expected, given that similar diffusion processes are analyzed in American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. We identify nearly 800 journal articles published on diffusion within political science between 1958 and 2008. Using network analysis we investigate the degree to which three “common culprits”—terminology, methodological approach, and journal type—influence levels of integration. We find the highest levels of integration among scholars using similar terms to describe diffusion processes, sharing a methodological approach (especially in quantitative scholarship), and publishing in a common set of subfield journals. These findings shed light on when cross-subfield communication is likely to occur with ease and when barriers may prove prohibitive.
Over the past fifty years, top political science journals have published hundreds of articles abo... more Over the past fifty years, top political science journals have published hundreds of articles about policy diffusion. This article reports on network analyses of how the ideas and approaches in these articles have spread both within and across the subfields of American politics, comparative politics and international relations. Then, based on a survey of the literature, the who, what, when, where, how and why of policy diffusion are addressed in order to identify and assess some of the main contributions and omissions in current scholarship. It is argued that studies of diffusion would benefit from paying more attention to developments in other subfields and from taking a more systematic approach to tackling the questions of when and how policy diffusion takes place.
How do formal international institutions change and adjust to new circumstances? The conventional... more How do formal international institutions change and adjust to new circumstances? The conventional wisdom in International Relations (IR), outlined by rational design, is that the answer lies in designed flexibility, which allows states to adjust agreements. Drawing on rich but disparate literatures across subfields of political science-especially constructivism and historical institutionalism-we propose an alternative, which we call "emergent flexibility." Emergent flexibility is a property of international institutions that is not intentionally crafted by rule-makers when a rule is formally established, but is subsequently discovered, activated, and accessed by creative rule-users in ways unintended by designers. Rich case studies trace how rule-users have accessed emergent flexibility through the legal interpretive strategy of subsequent practice to change rigid rules of the UN Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights. A key implication of emergent flexibility...
When donors contemplate providing financial support to United Nations institutions they encounter... more When donors contemplate providing financial support to United Nations institutions they encounter a menu of funding options. Some UN institutions require mandatory dues, but most rely substantially on voluntary contributions, which donors can choose to earmark for specific purposes. How donors provide resources has widespread effects on the authority of UN governing bodies, donor control over UN programs, and the efficiency of UN operations. What explains how donors choose to fund UN programs and agencies? We advance a theory that emphasizes member state preferences over the affordability and policy substance of IO activity. Using data from two novel experiments and a case study of U.S. funding practices toward the United Nations (1945–1980s), we provide mixed-method evidence showing that a state is more likely to provide voluntary contributions when its preferences over the affordability and policy of IO activity differ from those of the governing coalition and more likely to provide mandatory contributions when its preferences are consistent with those of the governing coalition. Further, we demonstrate that preferences over policy substance are particularly important in explaining recent trends in donor earmarking.
In this article I introduce assembled institutions as an institutional form designed to mitigate ... more In this article I introduce assembled institutions as an institutional form designed to mitigate the challenges associated with institutional proliferation, fragmentation, and incoherent global governance. Assembled institutions are formed with a mandate to coordinate and formally integrate existing international organizations (IOs) in their institutional designs. Their promise is substantial; AIs are intended to produce efficiency gains and benefit from the diverse expertise of IOs incorporated in their designs. Yet in practice, such gains prove difficult to achieve. I theorize how the interests of IOs incorporated in AI designs combined with the multiple principals problem inherent in the institutional form, pose severe challenges to coordination. I illustrate the argument at the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and UNAIDS, two AIs that have struggled to facilitate coordination among prominent IOs.
What explains the design and development of funding rules at international organizations? I inves... more What explains the design and development of funding rules at international organizations? I investigate this question in the context of the United Nations system, which has undergone a dramatic shift in financing. Long associated with mandatory contributions, the United Nations increasingly relies on voluntary resources earmarked by individual donors. Previous studies have investigated the financing puzzle from a behavioral perspective and have found that wealthy donors use voluntary funding to rein in costs and constrain international organization programs. Providing an alternative theoretical approach, I investigate the financing puzzle from an institutional design perspective. I provide original United Nations funding rule data to demonstrate that it is not only funding practices, but also underlying funding rules, that have changed over time. I theorize how states with favorable views of the United Nations that sought to expand its activities — rather than those that desired to constrain it — had incentives to introduce funding rules that offered more flexibility and control to donors. I test the argument with a longitudinal case study of funding rule design and change at United Nations economic development institutions. The article expands the institutional design literature by integrating funding rules as a consequential design component and provides a novel explanation for changes in United Nations financing.
International relations scholarship largely accepts that multilateralism lies at the heart of the... more International relations scholarship largely accepts that multilateralism lies at the heart of the liberal international order and is instantiated in formal, intergovernmental organizations. This paper revisits the conventional wisdom regarding the multilateral character of international organization (IO) governance by drawing attention to the funding methods used to finance contemporary IOs. I argue that different funding rules constitute different modes of governance. While mandatory funding rules are easily reconciled with traditional conceptions of multilateralism, voluntary rules are not. In particular, restricted voluntary funding rules devolve authority over funding decisions to individual actors, undercutting the collective decision making that is central to multilateral governance. I demonstrate the relevance of the argument in the case of the United Nations, which has transformed from an institution reliant primarily on mandatory contributions, to one disproportionately reliant on restricted, voluntary funds. The counterintuitive result is an increasingly bilateral United Nations. The paper contributes to our understanding of the relationship between multilateralism and IO governance, and has implications for literature related to institutional design, delegation, and development aid. In addition, it raises empirical and normative questions regarding reliance on voluntary funding.
Financing for climate adaptation is governed by an unusual arrangement whereby theGEF channels fu... more Financing for climate adaptation is governed by an unusual arrangement whereby theGEF channels funds through other IGOs – including theWorld Bank, UNEP and UNDP – which in turn develop and implement projects on the ground. The concept and techniques of orchestration outlined by the framework authors help us understand this complicated governance arrangement. The GEF, as orchestrator, supports and steers various intermediaries (the “implementing agencies”) to effect change in target states (developing-country recipients). In our explanation of this outcome,we find support for four of the volume’s hypotheses: intermediary availability, orchestrator focality, goal divergence and state oversight. We also explore whether the relationship between the GEF and its implementing agencies is efficient and complementary. We find that this is generally the case and that the orchestrator capabilities and intermediary availability hypotheses capture this arrangement quite well. While the climate adaptation case offers considerable support for the theoretical framework, recent developments raise concerns about the robustness of orchestration as a governance equilibrium, which may evolve over time toward harder and direct modes of governance.
What factors influence IO faithfulness to mandates assigned by member states? Although recent lit... more What factors influence IO faithfulness to mandates assigned by member states? Although recent literature treats IOs agents as autonomous actors in global politics, most work continues to treat the bureaucracy of an international organization as a unitary actor. I argue that the unitary actor assumption limits our ability to assess how internal factors such as fragmentation influence agent faithfulness. When we conceive of IO bureaucracies as collective agents-those including more than one bureaucratic actor and subject to internal fragmentation-IO faithfulness can be more fully explained. Specifically, fragmentation limits faithfulness by inhibiting the effectiveness of principals' control mechanisms (i.e. oversight and agent screening and sanctioning). These arguments are illustrated using a case study of the World Health Organization and its efforts to improve health systems between 1982 and 2008. two anonymous reviewers at EJIR provided useful criticism and suggestions that greatly improved the paper.
What factors inhibit or facilitate cross-subfield conversations in political science? This articl... more What factors inhibit or facilitate cross-subfield conversations in political science? This article draws on diffusion scholarship to gain insight into cross-subfield communication. Diffusion scholarship represents a case where such communication might be expected, given that similar diffusion processes are analyzed in American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. We identify nearly 800 journal articles published on diffusion within political science between 1958 and 2008. Using network analysis we investigate the degree to which three “common culprits”—terminology, methodological approach, and journal type—influence levels of integration. We find the highest levels of integration among scholars using similar terms to describe diffusion processes, sharing a methodological approach (especially in quantitative scholarship), and publishing in a common set of subfield journals. These findings shed light on when cross-subfield communication is likely to occur with ease and when barriers may prove prohibitive.
Over the past fifty years, top political science journals have published hundreds of articles abo... more Over the past fifty years, top political science journals have published hundreds of articles about policy diffusion. This article reports on network analyses of how the ideas and approaches in these articles have spread both within and across the subfields of American politics, comparative politics and international relations. Then, based on a survey of the literature, the who, what, when, where, how and why of policy diffusion are addressed in order to identify and assess some of the main contributions and omissions in current scholarship. It is argued that studies of diffusion would benefit from paying more attention to developments in other subfields and from taking a more systematic approach to tackling the questions of when and how policy diffusion takes place.
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Papers by Erin Graham