Oroszország számára a venezuelai gazdasági és politikai válság kiemelt kockázatúvá vált azzal, ho... more Oroszország számára a venezuelai gazdasági és politikai válság kiemelt kockázatúvá vált azzal, hogy az ellenzék vezetője, a nemzetgyűlés elnöki posztját betöltő Juan Guaidó, 2019. január 23-án ideiglenes elnöknek nyilvánította magát, és ezt az Egyesült Államok egyoldalúan elismerte. Az események domináns orosz értelmezése szerint az Egyesült Államok egyoldalúan, erővel próbálja elmozdítani egy szuverén ország legitimen megválasztott vezetőjét. Arra lehet tehát számítani, hogy Oroszország minden lehetséges fórumon és eszközzel elítéli majd az Egyesült Államokat a beavatkozás miatt, és igyekszik lassítani, akadályozni Maduro hatalomvesztését. Ezzel együtt Oroszország láthatóan elkezdte "beárazni", hogy Venezuelában hatalomváltásra kerülhet sor. Rövid távon Moszkva az átmenet menedzselésére törekszik, remélve, hogy valamilyen formában meg tudja őrizni legalább a befolyása egy részét. Hosszú távon pedig arra lehet számítani, hogy Oroszország a nyugati közösség egyoldalú beavatkozását hivatkozási alapként fogja használni, ezzel legitimálva saját, a nemzetközi rendet sértő múltbéli és esetleges jövőbeli lépéseit. Ilyen értelemben a venezuelai változások jelentősége messze túlmutat Dél-Amerikán, és a nemzetközi politika intézményes garanciáinak további gyengülése felé mutat.
This report analyses Russian propaganda and disinformation – here collectively called strategic d... more This report analyses Russian propaganda and disinformation – here collectively called strategic deception – concerning the conflict in Ukraine. The strategic deception is not exclusively a Russian term, but it does capture what we think is an essential feature of the current Russian foreign and security policy. It is driven by attempts to put the adversary into a defensive posture and off balance, and thus, to create conditions for surprise. The methods utilized in contemporary Russian strategic deception are partly the same that were already used in Soviet propaganda. But where Soviet propaganda was anchored in ideological truth claims, the contemporary Russian variant can be compared to a kaleidoscope: a light piercing through it is instantly transformed into multiple versions of reality. The main purpose of this report is to examine in detail the emergence and evolution of Russian metanarratives and the terms of distraction about the conflict in Ukraine, and on the basis of this analysis to ascertain the main policy objectives of Russian strategic deception inside Russia and in selected countries of the European Union. It is concluded that the best defence against strategic deception is well-grounded, fact-based knowledge and the willingness to invest into gathering it. No fog of falsehood is able to penetrate the solid walls of well-grounded knowledge and firm commitment to one’s values.
The 2020 sessions of the Strategy Group on Russia were organized with the generous support of the... more The 2020 sessions of the Strategy Group on Russia were organized with the generous support of the Robert Bosch Stiftung. As they took place under the Chatham House Rule, there are no quotes or attributions to any contributor in this paper. Instead, it intends to represent the collective wisdom of the participating experts and to serve as guidelines for the upcoming period.
German Council on Foreign Relations War in Nagorno-Karabakh A Two-Track Strategy for the EU After... more German Council on Foreign Relations War in Nagorno-Karabakh A Two-Track Strategy for the EU After two weeks of heavy fighting, the new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to escalate further. International actors have so far been unable to broker a ceasefire. In this case, the EU, with its limited leverage, can add most value by leading a response to the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe. EU diplomatic efforts should be led by France and Germany, coordinated with other member states, and also with Russia, to the extent necessary.
Since 1959, the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) has been active in the fi eld of European ... more Since 1959, the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) has been active in the fi eld of European integration as a non-profi t organisation. It is one of Germany's leading research institutes on foreign and European policy. The IEP works at the interface of academia, politics, administration, and civic education. In doing so, its tasks include scientifi c analyses of problems surrounding European politics and integration, as well as promotion of the practical application of its research fi ndings.
The human rights dialogue should, of course, not be abandoned, since protecting human rights and ... more The human rights dialogue should, of course, not be abandoned, since protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is a core value of the European Union as a whole, including its Neighbourhood Policy. This is particularly necessary following the 19 December 2010 events. However, strategic efforts should be concentrated more on the broader economic sphere. All in all, conditionality has not failed as a strategy towards Belarus, but should become more balanced. Instead of a solely human rights and democracy-dominated approach, in the long run EU conditionality should focus also on economic and administrative aspects. Such a shift could be applied also if the EU decides to introduce additional, stronger sanctions. All in all, also economic tools should be used for protecting human rights. 2.1.1 The sanctions that followed the 2006 presidential elections 6 2.1.2 We were standing on one foot, though we need to stand on two 8 2.2 The turning point-August 2008 2.3 From the Eastern Partnership to the January 2011 EU sanctions 3. The EU as an economic partner of Belarus 3.1 The crisis of the Belarusian economic model 3.2 The EU as a foreign trade partner 3.3 The EU and Western Europe as investors 3.4 The EU and Western Europe as creditors 3.4.1 Non-Western creditors and investors-an alliance of autocracies emerging? 3.5 Economic freedom-winds of (limited) change 4.
Az új-zélandi muszlimellenes terrortámadás és tanulságai Jelen írás a 2019. márciusi új-zélandi C... more Az új-zélandi muszlimellenes terrortámadás és tanulságai Jelen írás a 2019. márciusi új-zélandi Christchurchben elkövetett terrortámadást elemzi. Elsősorban arra hívja fel a figyelmet, hogy az elkövető az egész akciót úgy építette fel, hogy a lehető legnagyobb láthatóságot érje el. A szerzők úgy vélik, hogy az ilyen típusú terrortámadások a jövőben megszaporodhatnak, mert nem kizárható, hogy a christchurchi elkövető-akit a norvég Anders Breivik inspirált-másokat is hasonló terrorcselekményekre ösztönöz. Az iszlámellenes terrortámadásokban mára trenddé vált, hogy az elkövetők muszlim vallási intézményeket támadnak, ugyanis így a legnagyobb az esély rá, hogy specifikusan muszlimokat tudjanak ölni.
Although Belarus previously resisted pressure to deepen military cooperation with
Russia, after t... more Although Belarus previously resisted pressure to deepen military cooperation with Russia, after the crackdown on the protests that followed the 2020 presidential election Alexander Lukashenka has displayed less reluctance to engage in closer cooperation, indicating his growing dependence on Moscow. › Military cooperation between Russia and Belarus comprises multilateral dimensions, including within the institutional framework of the CSTO, and bilateral dimensions, in particular in the framework of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. › Russia has long been pushing Belarus to host a permanent military base. In March 2021 Lukashenka finally agreed to the presence of a joint Belarusian-Russian military unit, including combat-capable Russian forces. › Since 2020 joint Russian-Belarusian military manoeuvres have increased significantly. The Union Resolve 2022 exercise saw the largest ever Russian deployment of troops and weaponry to Belarus. This massive deployment proved to be the prelude to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a war in which Belarus is currently playing an active role. › The intensification of Russian-Belarusian military cooperation has serious regional implications, including for the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative.
The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, Oct 1, 2012
This article is intended to be an overview of the position of Russia in the foreign policies of t... more This article is intended to be an overview of the position of Russia in the foreign policies of the four Visegrad countries, thus of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The background motivation behind preparing this analysis was on the one hand to provide a general overview of an important direction of Visegrad external relations and to compare the national interests related to Russia. On the other hand, the study also intends to explore the common interests and the differences in the individual Russia policies of the Visegrad countries, and thus to assess the coherence of Visegrad cooperation towards Russia in general. The article focuses on the current state of affairs, thus the historical context of Visegrad-Russia relations will be touched only briefly.Hence, the main research questions to answer are the following. First, what are the common elements of the Visegrad's national foreign policies towards Russia? In other words, by turning to the vocabulary of mathematics, what are the common denominators in the four Visegrad countries' Russia policies?The second research question is closely related to the first one: what are the points of disagreement on Russia-what are the divisors? Of course, one needs to handle separately those issues where opinions in the Visegrad simply differ from those cases where the countries are rivalling each other, e.g., where a zero sum game is going on.The last question to answer is that when taking into account the common interests of the Visegrad countries in Russia, to what extent are the activities of the International Visegrad Fund (IVF) as an organisation in accordance with these objectives? The International Visegrad Fund is the only institutional emanation of the Visegrad cooperation,2 thus its activities deserve a closer look, and hence the question to be answered is does the IVF represent the shared interests of the Visegrad countries towards Russia? Is the IVF able to serve as an effective instrument in fostering the Visegrad interests related to Russia?Regarding the sources, the analysis strongly builds on primary sources, particularly on official government documents, used in order to define the individual national foreign policy interests. Academicians analysing the subject of Russia are in a surprisingly good position regarding the availability of primary sources: all four Visegrad countries have their foreign policy strategies and national security strategies accessible in English, and several interviews and declarations by various officials are also available. The same is true for study of the relevant activities of the International Visegrad Fund.3Secondary sources for the subject are also available in remarkable quantities, both from Visegrad authors and from outside the region. Thus, plenty of analyses is connected, of course, to the obvious importance of Russia for the whole region. In all four Visegrad countries several studies and analytical papers have been prepared about various aspects of the relationship with Russia.Poland has by far the largest and most diverse academic capabilities available for conducting Russia-related research. One may mention, among many others, the works of Marek Menkiszak,4 Adam Eberhardt,5 Przemys3aw urawski vel Grajewski6 and Agata £oskot-Strachota.7 From the Czech Republic, the works of Petr Kratochvil8 deserve particular attention in addition to the experts dealing specifically with energy security. From Slovakia, among many others, both Alexander Duleba9 and Vladimir Bene10 regularly prepare articles and studies related to Russia. The Hungarian expert community also has many well-known, competent analysts dealing with Russia. One may mention, for example the energy security expert Andras Deak,11 active diplomat Erno Keskeny,12 and the economist Zsuzsa Ludvig.13Regarding the knowledge on the Visegrad region in general from the Russian side, one definitely needs to mention the recently published Russian language book by Lyubov Shishelina from the Institute of Europe of the Russia Academy of Sciences titled Vishegradskaya Evropa: otkuda i kuda? …
After the collapse of Communism, the new Hungarian democracy was built up on the tacit consensus ... more After the collapse of Communism, the new Hungarian democracy was built up on the tacit consensus that any possible kind of anti-democratic takeover had to be avoided by the use of every possible institutional measure. Between 1989 and 1995 the bases of the democratic political environment were elaborated together with a sophisticated system of checks and balances. The old constitution of 1949 was modified to fit the new circumstances, and the Constitutional Court developed the necessary legal background for this. An extremely complicated electoral system was created which is considered capable of preventing large-scale election fraud. Hungary is a multiparty democracy, having four parties in Parliament, two large and two small ones. The government is composed of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats. The largest opposition party is the FIDESZ (Young Democrats’ Alliance/Hungarian Civic Union). A small conservative party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, is also in the opposition camp, though its relationship to the FIDESZ has become quite controversial. The government is led by the Prime Minister and ministers are responsible to him, not to Parliament. The President of the Republic has mostly symbolic rights. Thus, theoretically, the Prime Minister should have a moderately strong position. However, there are several specific laws which can only be modified with a two-thirds majority vote in order to prevent the government from administering fundamental changes. All the prime ministers of the Socialist Party – in the order of their taking office, Gyula Horn, Péter Medgyessy and Ferenc Gyurcsány – had to fight constantly for their position in the party as well. The FIDESZ government of 1998–2002 was more coherent in this aspect. Currently, Hungarian domestic policy is extremely divided and the campaign for the 2006 elections is already in progress, which makes it almost impossible for the government to take any significant decisions without generating harsh and immediate criticism from the opposition. The missile defence (MD) matter is not an exception in this regard.
The contemporary Russian perception of modern warfare is characterized by advocating the integral... more The contemporary Russian perception of modern warfare is characterized by advocating the integral use of all tools, means and resources available, let them be of military or non military nature. This holistic approach, frequently named “hybrid warfare” ii by Western analysts, as well as by NATO, includes also the use of various irregular and proxy forces, as one element of the toolkit a state may rely on when engaged in a contemporary conflict. The present analysis argues that from Moscow’s perspective using irregular formations constitutes an ordinary way of waging war and inflicting damage to the adversary. This approach is in line both with Russia’s Soviet heritage, as well as with the holistic perception of modern warfare that characterizes contemporary Russian military thinking.
This publication is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European ... more This publication is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and knowledge service, and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE). It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission nor by Hybrid CoE. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission or Hybrid CoE is responsible for the use that might be made of this publication. For information on the methodology and quality underlying the data used in this publication for which the source is neither Eurostat nor other Commission services, users should contact the referenced source. The designations employed and the presentation of material on the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the European Union concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
This report deals with Russia’s geopolitical objectives, policy and strategy, and their effects a... more This report deals with Russia’s geopolitical objectives, policy and strategy, and their effects across the wider Baltic Region. The second part sums up NATO’s response to this evolving strategic challenge, including the potential military threat posed by Russia.
After two weeks of heavy fighting, the new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karaba... more After two weeks of heavy fighting, the new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to escalate further. International actors have so far been unable to broker a ceasefire. In this case, the EU, with its limited leverage, can add most value by leading a response to the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe. EU diplomatic efforts should be led by France and Germany, coordinated with other member states, and also with Russia, to the extent necessary.
Oroszország számára a venezuelai gazdasági és politikai válság kiemelt kockázatúvá vált azzal, ho... more Oroszország számára a venezuelai gazdasági és politikai válság kiemelt kockázatúvá vált azzal, hogy az ellenzék vezetője, a nemzetgyűlés elnöki posztját betöltő Juan Guaidó, 2019. január 23-án ideiglenes elnöknek nyilvánította magát, és ezt az Egyesült Államok egyoldalúan elismerte. Az események domináns orosz értelmezése szerint az Egyesült Államok egyoldalúan, erővel próbálja elmozdítani egy szuverén ország legitimen megválasztott vezetőjét. Arra lehet tehát számítani, hogy Oroszország minden lehetséges fórumon és eszközzel elítéli majd az Egyesült Államokat a beavatkozás miatt, és igyekszik lassítani, akadályozni Maduro hatalomvesztését. Ezzel együtt Oroszország láthatóan elkezdte "beárazni", hogy Venezuelában hatalomváltásra kerülhet sor. Rövid távon Moszkva az átmenet menedzselésére törekszik, remélve, hogy valamilyen formában meg tudja őrizni legalább a befolyása egy részét. Hosszú távon pedig arra lehet számítani, hogy Oroszország a nyugati közösség egyoldalú beavatkozását hivatkozási alapként fogja használni, ezzel legitimálva saját, a nemzetközi rendet sértő múltbéli és esetleges jövőbeli lépéseit. Ilyen értelemben a venezuelai változások jelentősége messze túlmutat Dél-Amerikán, és a nemzetközi politika intézményes garanciáinak további gyengülése felé mutat.
This report analyses Russian propaganda and disinformation – here collectively called strategic d... more This report analyses Russian propaganda and disinformation – here collectively called strategic deception – concerning the conflict in Ukraine. The strategic deception is not exclusively a Russian term, but it does capture what we think is an essential feature of the current Russian foreign and security policy. It is driven by attempts to put the adversary into a defensive posture and off balance, and thus, to create conditions for surprise. The methods utilized in contemporary Russian strategic deception are partly the same that were already used in Soviet propaganda. But where Soviet propaganda was anchored in ideological truth claims, the contemporary Russian variant can be compared to a kaleidoscope: a light piercing through it is instantly transformed into multiple versions of reality. The main purpose of this report is to examine in detail the emergence and evolution of Russian metanarratives and the terms of distraction about the conflict in Ukraine, and on the basis of this analysis to ascertain the main policy objectives of Russian strategic deception inside Russia and in selected countries of the European Union. It is concluded that the best defence against strategic deception is well-grounded, fact-based knowledge and the willingness to invest into gathering it. No fog of falsehood is able to penetrate the solid walls of well-grounded knowledge and firm commitment to one’s values.
The 2020 sessions of the Strategy Group on Russia were organized with the generous support of the... more The 2020 sessions of the Strategy Group on Russia were organized with the generous support of the Robert Bosch Stiftung. As they took place under the Chatham House Rule, there are no quotes or attributions to any contributor in this paper. Instead, it intends to represent the collective wisdom of the participating experts and to serve as guidelines for the upcoming period.
German Council on Foreign Relations War in Nagorno-Karabakh A Two-Track Strategy for the EU After... more German Council on Foreign Relations War in Nagorno-Karabakh A Two-Track Strategy for the EU After two weeks of heavy fighting, the new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to escalate further. International actors have so far been unable to broker a ceasefire. In this case, the EU, with its limited leverage, can add most value by leading a response to the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe. EU diplomatic efforts should be led by France and Germany, coordinated with other member states, and also with Russia, to the extent necessary.
Since 1959, the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) has been active in the fi eld of European ... more Since 1959, the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) has been active in the fi eld of European integration as a non-profi t organisation. It is one of Germany's leading research institutes on foreign and European policy. The IEP works at the interface of academia, politics, administration, and civic education. In doing so, its tasks include scientifi c analyses of problems surrounding European politics and integration, as well as promotion of the practical application of its research fi ndings.
The human rights dialogue should, of course, not be abandoned, since protecting human rights and ... more The human rights dialogue should, of course, not be abandoned, since protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is a core value of the European Union as a whole, including its Neighbourhood Policy. This is particularly necessary following the 19 December 2010 events. However, strategic efforts should be concentrated more on the broader economic sphere. All in all, conditionality has not failed as a strategy towards Belarus, but should become more balanced. Instead of a solely human rights and democracy-dominated approach, in the long run EU conditionality should focus also on economic and administrative aspects. Such a shift could be applied also if the EU decides to introduce additional, stronger sanctions. All in all, also economic tools should be used for protecting human rights. 2.1.1 The sanctions that followed the 2006 presidential elections 6 2.1.2 We were standing on one foot, though we need to stand on two 8 2.2 The turning point-August 2008 2.3 From the Eastern Partnership to the January 2011 EU sanctions 3. The EU as an economic partner of Belarus 3.1 The crisis of the Belarusian economic model 3.2 The EU as a foreign trade partner 3.3 The EU and Western Europe as investors 3.4 The EU and Western Europe as creditors 3.4.1 Non-Western creditors and investors-an alliance of autocracies emerging? 3.5 Economic freedom-winds of (limited) change 4.
Az új-zélandi muszlimellenes terrortámadás és tanulságai Jelen írás a 2019. márciusi új-zélandi C... more Az új-zélandi muszlimellenes terrortámadás és tanulságai Jelen írás a 2019. márciusi új-zélandi Christchurchben elkövetett terrortámadást elemzi. Elsősorban arra hívja fel a figyelmet, hogy az elkövető az egész akciót úgy építette fel, hogy a lehető legnagyobb láthatóságot érje el. A szerzők úgy vélik, hogy az ilyen típusú terrortámadások a jövőben megszaporodhatnak, mert nem kizárható, hogy a christchurchi elkövető-akit a norvég Anders Breivik inspirált-másokat is hasonló terrorcselekményekre ösztönöz. Az iszlámellenes terrortámadásokban mára trenddé vált, hogy az elkövetők muszlim vallási intézményeket támadnak, ugyanis így a legnagyobb az esély rá, hogy specifikusan muszlimokat tudjanak ölni.
Although Belarus previously resisted pressure to deepen military cooperation with
Russia, after t... more Although Belarus previously resisted pressure to deepen military cooperation with Russia, after the crackdown on the protests that followed the 2020 presidential election Alexander Lukashenka has displayed less reluctance to engage in closer cooperation, indicating his growing dependence on Moscow. › Military cooperation between Russia and Belarus comprises multilateral dimensions, including within the institutional framework of the CSTO, and bilateral dimensions, in particular in the framework of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. › Russia has long been pushing Belarus to host a permanent military base. In March 2021 Lukashenka finally agreed to the presence of a joint Belarusian-Russian military unit, including combat-capable Russian forces. › Since 2020 joint Russian-Belarusian military manoeuvres have increased significantly. The Union Resolve 2022 exercise saw the largest ever Russian deployment of troops and weaponry to Belarus. This massive deployment proved to be the prelude to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a war in which Belarus is currently playing an active role. › The intensification of Russian-Belarusian military cooperation has serious regional implications, including for the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative.
The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, Oct 1, 2012
This article is intended to be an overview of the position of Russia in the foreign policies of t... more This article is intended to be an overview of the position of Russia in the foreign policies of the four Visegrad countries, thus of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The background motivation behind preparing this analysis was on the one hand to provide a general overview of an important direction of Visegrad external relations and to compare the national interests related to Russia. On the other hand, the study also intends to explore the common interests and the differences in the individual Russia policies of the Visegrad countries, and thus to assess the coherence of Visegrad cooperation towards Russia in general. The article focuses on the current state of affairs, thus the historical context of Visegrad-Russia relations will be touched only briefly.Hence, the main research questions to answer are the following. First, what are the common elements of the Visegrad's national foreign policies towards Russia? In other words, by turning to the vocabulary of mathematics, what are the common denominators in the four Visegrad countries' Russia policies?The second research question is closely related to the first one: what are the points of disagreement on Russia-what are the divisors? Of course, one needs to handle separately those issues where opinions in the Visegrad simply differ from those cases where the countries are rivalling each other, e.g., where a zero sum game is going on.The last question to answer is that when taking into account the common interests of the Visegrad countries in Russia, to what extent are the activities of the International Visegrad Fund (IVF) as an organisation in accordance with these objectives? The International Visegrad Fund is the only institutional emanation of the Visegrad cooperation,2 thus its activities deserve a closer look, and hence the question to be answered is does the IVF represent the shared interests of the Visegrad countries towards Russia? Is the IVF able to serve as an effective instrument in fostering the Visegrad interests related to Russia?Regarding the sources, the analysis strongly builds on primary sources, particularly on official government documents, used in order to define the individual national foreign policy interests. Academicians analysing the subject of Russia are in a surprisingly good position regarding the availability of primary sources: all four Visegrad countries have their foreign policy strategies and national security strategies accessible in English, and several interviews and declarations by various officials are also available. The same is true for study of the relevant activities of the International Visegrad Fund.3Secondary sources for the subject are also available in remarkable quantities, both from Visegrad authors and from outside the region. Thus, plenty of analyses is connected, of course, to the obvious importance of Russia for the whole region. In all four Visegrad countries several studies and analytical papers have been prepared about various aspects of the relationship with Russia.Poland has by far the largest and most diverse academic capabilities available for conducting Russia-related research. One may mention, among many others, the works of Marek Menkiszak,4 Adam Eberhardt,5 Przemys3aw urawski vel Grajewski6 and Agata £oskot-Strachota.7 From the Czech Republic, the works of Petr Kratochvil8 deserve particular attention in addition to the experts dealing specifically with energy security. From Slovakia, among many others, both Alexander Duleba9 and Vladimir Bene10 regularly prepare articles and studies related to Russia. The Hungarian expert community also has many well-known, competent analysts dealing with Russia. One may mention, for example the energy security expert Andras Deak,11 active diplomat Erno Keskeny,12 and the economist Zsuzsa Ludvig.13Regarding the knowledge on the Visegrad region in general from the Russian side, one definitely needs to mention the recently published Russian language book by Lyubov Shishelina from the Institute of Europe of the Russia Academy of Sciences titled Vishegradskaya Evropa: otkuda i kuda? …
After the collapse of Communism, the new Hungarian democracy was built up on the tacit consensus ... more After the collapse of Communism, the new Hungarian democracy was built up on the tacit consensus that any possible kind of anti-democratic takeover had to be avoided by the use of every possible institutional measure. Between 1989 and 1995 the bases of the democratic political environment were elaborated together with a sophisticated system of checks and balances. The old constitution of 1949 was modified to fit the new circumstances, and the Constitutional Court developed the necessary legal background for this. An extremely complicated electoral system was created which is considered capable of preventing large-scale election fraud. Hungary is a multiparty democracy, having four parties in Parliament, two large and two small ones. The government is composed of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats. The largest opposition party is the FIDESZ (Young Democrats’ Alliance/Hungarian Civic Union). A small conservative party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, is also in the opposition camp, though its relationship to the FIDESZ has become quite controversial. The government is led by the Prime Minister and ministers are responsible to him, not to Parliament. The President of the Republic has mostly symbolic rights. Thus, theoretically, the Prime Minister should have a moderately strong position. However, there are several specific laws which can only be modified with a two-thirds majority vote in order to prevent the government from administering fundamental changes. All the prime ministers of the Socialist Party – in the order of their taking office, Gyula Horn, Péter Medgyessy and Ferenc Gyurcsány – had to fight constantly for their position in the party as well. The FIDESZ government of 1998–2002 was more coherent in this aspect. Currently, Hungarian domestic policy is extremely divided and the campaign for the 2006 elections is already in progress, which makes it almost impossible for the government to take any significant decisions without generating harsh and immediate criticism from the opposition. The missile defence (MD) matter is not an exception in this regard.
The contemporary Russian perception of modern warfare is characterized by advocating the integral... more The contemporary Russian perception of modern warfare is characterized by advocating the integral use of all tools, means and resources available, let them be of military or non military nature. This holistic approach, frequently named “hybrid warfare” ii by Western analysts, as well as by NATO, includes also the use of various irregular and proxy forces, as one element of the toolkit a state may rely on when engaged in a contemporary conflict. The present analysis argues that from Moscow’s perspective using irregular formations constitutes an ordinary way of waging war and inflicting damage to the adversary. This approach is in line both with Russia’s Soviet heritage, as well as with the holistic perception of modern warfare that characterizes contemporary Russian military thinking.
This publication is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European ... more This publication is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and knowledge service, and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE). It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission nor by Hybrid CoE. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission or Hybrid CoE is responsible for the use that might be made of this publication. For information on the methodology and quality underlying the data used in this publication for which the source is neither Eurostat nor other Commission services, users should contact the referenced source. The designations employed and the presentation of material on the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the European Union concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
This report deals with Russia’s geopolitical objectives, policy and strategy, and their effects a... more This report deals with Russia’s geopolitical objectives, policy and strategy, and their effects across the wider Baltic Region. The second part sums up NATO’s response to this evolving strategic challenge, including the potential military threat posed by Russia.
After two weeks of heavy fighting, the new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karaba... more After two weeks of heavy fighting, the new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to escalate further. International actors have so far been unable to broker a ceasefire. In this case, the EU, with its limited leverage, can add most value by leading a response to the inevitable humanitarian catastrophe. EU diplomatic efforts should be led by France and Germany, coordinated with other member states, and also with Russia, to the extent necessary.
This Chaillot Paper seeks to provide readers with ambitious
foresight analysis and insights on ho... more This Chaillot Paper seeks to provide readers with ambitious foresight analysis and insights on how to be prepared for unexpected twists and turns in Russia’s future trajectory. The opening chapter highlights a set of key megatrends that will shape how Russia evolves in the decade ahead. Subsequent chapters focus on key sectors and analyse critical uncertainties that will influence Russia’s future course of development. They cover state-society relations in the country; its economic development and the evolution of its military posture; as well as how Russia’s relations with the EU’s eastern neighbours and China may unfold by 2030. Each of these chapters presents three alternative future scenarios. While they zoom in on specific themes and sectors, the concluding section offers a panoramic view of the various possible futures – combining elements of all of the preceding chapters to produce three holistic snapshots of Russia in 2030.
The relationship between the EU and Russia is characterised by a considerable degree of interdepe... more The relationship between the EU and Russia is characterised by a considerable degree of interdependence. In the 1990s and 2000s, the EU’s approach to Russia was based on the expectation that economic ties and interaction in various fields would contribute to regional stability and security and possibly even the democratisation of Russia. However, looking at the relationship today, one has to admit that the expected positive effects of interdependence have not materialised. Since 2014, the conflict over Ukraine and rising geopolitical tensions have pushed the Europeans to reassess their approach and put more emphasis on reducing the vulnerabilities created by mutual ties, notably (but not only) in the field of energy. Russia, for its part, has been keen to reduce its dependence on Europe, for instance in the financial sector and in respect of food imports. As a result, the preconditions for developing the EU-Russia relationship in accordance with the logic of positive interdependence have weakened further.
In this book, a number of internationally renowned experts explore mutual dependences between the EU and Russia in various fields, including energy, trade, the financial sector, the defence industry, cross-border cooperation and, perhaps most importantly, security. The book analyses perceptions, vulnerabilities, and ways to manage the ties on both sides.
The book is the outcome of a research project of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, carried out during 2018-2019. The project was supported by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
Highlights:
- The EU and Russia depend on each other in a number of fields, including energy, trade, the financial sector and security. These connections are asymmetric and create different vulnerabilities for both sides. - At best, economic interdependence between states may contribute to security and stability. However, in EU-Russia relations, the preconditions for positive interdependence were always weak and have further weakened since 2014. - The EU needs to pay more attention to reducing its vulnerabilities, caused for example by the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project. Russia has been keen to reduce its dependence on Europe, for instance in the financial sector and in respect of food imports. The Ukraine crisis has proved that Russia is willing to pay an economic price in order to pursue its geopolitical interests. - The EU and Russia need to develop a new conceptual basis for a more sober and functional relationship. There is no way back to “business as usual”.
On 23 December 2014, the Ukrainian parliament renounced Ukraine’s non-aligned status. The Ukraini... more On 23 December 2014, the Ukrainian parliament renounced Ukraine’s non-aligned status. The Ukrainian military is since transforming to NATO and adapting its armed forces to the NATO standards. Recent military exercises proved, that there is a real chance to improve and increase cooperation. Obviously due to the shared threats and transformational experience, regional cooperation has a strong logic. As Visegrad countries increase their defence cooperation, they should further investigate how to involve their Eastern neighbours to these activities. From a geographic perspective, Moldova is the next country in the region, which should be invited to this broader cooperation. This paper would like to evaluate the different fields of cooperation and recommend future steps for the decision-makers.
Uploads
Papers by Andras Racz
Russia, after the crackdown on the protests
that followed the 2020 presidential election Alexander Lukashenka has displayed
less reluctance to engage in closer cooperation, indicating his growing dependence
on Moscow.
› Military cooperation between Russia and
Belarus comprises multilateral dimensions,
including within the institutional framework of the CSTO, and bilateral dimensions,
in particular in the framework of the Union
State of Russia and Belarus.
› Russia has long been pushing Belarus to host
a permanent military base. In March 2021
Lukashenka finally agreed to the presence
of a joint Belarusian-Russian military unit,
including combat-capable Russian forces.
› Since 2020 joint Russian-Belarusian military manoeuvres have increased significantly. The Union Resolve 2022 exercise
saw the largest ever Russian deployment of
troops and weaponry to Belarus. This massive deployment proved to be the prelude to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a war in which
Belarus is currently playing an active role.
› The intensification of Russian-Belarusian
military cooperation has serious regional
implications, including for the EU’s Eastern
Partnership initiative.
The present analysis argues that from Moscow’s perspective using irregular formations constitutes an ordinary way of waging war and inflicting damage to the adversary. This approach is in line both with Russia’s Soviet heritage, as well as with the holistic perception of modern warfare that characterizes contemporary Russian military thinking.
and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE). It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to
the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission nor by
Hybrid CoE. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission or Hybrid CoE is responsible for the use
that might be made of this publication. For information on the methodology and quality underlying the data used in this publication for
which the source is neither Eurostat nor other Commission services, users should contact the referenced source. The designations employed
and the presentation of material on the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the European Union
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or
boundaries.
Russia, after the crackdown on the protests
that followed the 2020 presidential election Alexander Lukashenka has displayed
less reluctance to engage in closer cooperation, indicating his growing dependence
on Moscow.
› Military cooperation between Russia and
Belarus comprises multilateral dimensions,
including within the institutional framework of the CSTO, and bilateral dimensions,
in particular in the framework of the Union
State of Russia and Belarus.
› Russia has long been pushing Belarus to host
a permanent military base. In March 2021
Lukashenka finally agreed to the presence
of a joint Belarusian-Russian military unit,
including combat-capable Russian forces.
› Since 2020 joint Russian-Belarusian military manoeuvres have increased significantly. The Union Resolve 2022 exercise
saw the largest ever Russian deployment of
troops and weaponry to Belarus. This massive deployment proved to be the prelude to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a war in which
Belarus is currently playing an active role.
› The intensification of Russian-Belarusian
military cooperation has serious regional
implications, including for the EU’s Eastern
Partnership initiative.
The present analysis argues that from Moscow’s perspective using irregular formations constitutes an ordinary way of waging war and inflicting damage to the adversary. This approach is in line both with Russia’s Soviet heritage, as well as with the holistic perception of modern warfare that characterizes contemporary Russian military thinking.
and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE). It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to
the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission nor by
Hybrid CoE. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission or Hybrid CoE is responsible for the use
that might be made of this publication. For information on the methodology and quality underlying the data used in this publication for
which the source is neither Eurostat nor other Commission services, users should contact the referenced source. The designations employed
and the presentation of material on the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the European Union
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or
boundaries.
foresight analysis and insights on how to be prepared for
unexpected twists and turns in Russia’s future trajectory.
The opening chapter highlights a set of key megatrends
that will shape how Russia evolves in the decade ahead.
Subsequent chapters focus on key sectors and analyse
critical uncertainties that will influence Russia’s future
course of development. They cover state-society relations
in the country; its economic development and the evolution
of its military posture; as well as how Russia’s relations
with the EU’s eastern neighbours and China may unfold
by 2030. Each of these chapters presents three alternative
future scenarios. While they zoom in on specific themes
and sectors, the concluding section offers a panoramic
view of the various possible futures – combining elements
of all of the preceding chapters to produce three holistic
snapshots of Russia in 2030.
In this book, a number of internationally renowned experts explore mutual dependences between the EU and Russia in various fields, including energy, trade, the financial sector, the defence industry, cross-border cooperation and, perhaps most importantly, security. The book analyses perceptions, vulnerabilities, and ways to manage the ties on both sides.
The book is the outcome of a research project of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, carried out during 2018-2019. The project was supported by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
Highlights:
- The EU and Russia depend on each other in a number of fields, including energy, trade, the financial sector and security. These connections are asymmetric and create different vulnerabilities for both sides.
- At best, economic interdependence between states may contribute to security and stability. However, in EU-Russia relations, the preconditions for positive interdependence were always weak and have further weakened since 2014.
- The EU needs to pay more attention to reducing its vulnerabilities, caused for example by the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project.
Russia has been keen to reduce its dependence on Europe, for instance in the financial sector and in respect of food imports. The Ukraine crisis has proved that Russia is willing to pay an economic price in order to pursue its geopolitical interests.
- The EU and Russia need to develop a new conceptual basis for a more sober and functional relationship. There is no way back to “business as usual”.
As Visegrad countries increase their defence cooperation,
they should further investigate how to involve their Eastern neighbours to these activities. From a geographic perspective, Moldova is the next country in the region, which should be invited to this broader cooperation. This paper would like to evaluate the different
fields of cooperation and recommend future steps for the decision-makers.