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125 Ansichten10 SeitenDissoi Logoi
Der 'Dissoi Logoi' ist ein antikes Werk, das von einem anonymen Sophisten zwischen 403 und 395 v. Chr. verfasst wurde und sich mit gegensätzlichen Argumenten zu verschiedenen Themen beschäftigt. Die ersten fünf Abschnitte behandeln die Relativität von Werten wie Gut und Böse sowie Anstößigem und Anständigem, während die letzten Abschnitte Fragen zur Lehre von Weisheit und den Eigenschaften eines guten Rhetorikers aufwerfen. Trotz seiner Unvollständigkeit bleibt der Text ein bedeutendes Werk zur Erforschung der sophistischen Philosophie und Rhetorik.
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125 Ansichten10 SeitenDissoi Logoi
Der 'Dissoi Logoi' ist ein antikes Werk, das von einem anonymen Sophisten zwischen 403 und 395 v. Chr. verfasst wurde und sich mit gegensätzlichen Argumenten zu verschiedenen Themen beschäftigt. Die ersten fünf Abschnitte behandeln die Relativität von Werten wie Gut und Böse sowie Anstößigem und Anständigem, während die letzten Abschnitte Fragen zur Lehre von Weisheit und den Eigenschaften eines guten Rhetorikers aufwerfen. Trotz seiner Unvollständigkeit bleibt der Text ein bedeutendes Werk zur Erforschung der sophistischen Philosophie und Rhetorik.
Hochgeladen von
alesanalover22Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Wir nehmen die Rechte an Inhalten ernst. Wenn Sie vermuten, dass dies Ihr Inhalt ist, beanspruchen Sie ihn hier.
Verfügbare Formate
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Anonymous
‘The Dissoi Logoi, or Opposing Arguments, draws its title from its frst few
‘words; the original text is untitled and concerns more than opposing arguments. The
treatise was written by an anonymous author around 403 to 395 B.C. Although nu-
merous scholarly speculations have been put forward concerning the author's iden-
tity, it remains unknown, Most scholars agree, however, that the author was a
Sophist (and therefore probably male) who was strongly influenced by Protagoras
and was even possibly his student, and by Hippias, Gorgias, and Socrates. Transla-
tor T. M. Robinson believes thatthe text, written in a Doric Greek dialect, may have
been lecture notes prepared by this unknown Sophist, a native speaker of an Tonian
dialect, to organize his thoughts for a Doric-speaking audience."
‘The text we have, which is incomplete, consists of the following divisions: the
fist five sections (the fifth is untitled) explore opposing arguments on a number of
topics. Sections six through nine (the last three untitled) investigate, in order, the
questions of whether “wisdom and moral excellence” can be taught, whether poli
cal offices should be assigned by lot, what qualities the excellent rhetorician should
have, and how his (or her) memory might be trained. Since the text appears to con-
clude at the end of section six, some scholars have argued that itis a disjointed as-
semblage of unrelated observations. Robinson, although believing the text to be i
complete, contends that the topics of all nine extant sections are related to the
general theme of good government and how it is to be maintained through dis-
course. To understand this theme, one would need to know sbout methods of argu-
ment, the qualities and training of the orator, and so on.*
‘The “opposing arguments” of the firs five sections typically take the same form.
‘Two abstract torms, such as “good and bad” or “seemly and shameful,” are first pre-
sented as being “the same thing” because the same thing may be good for some
people but bad for others. Death is bad for those who die but good for the undertak-
es, to give one pithy example. This approach may seem to advocate a sort of situa:
tional ethics, which in some cases leads to cultural relativism. In other words, only
an individual's perspective can determine the value of a given object, act, experi-
ence, and so on. This approach realizes the famious dictum of Protagoras that “of all
things the measure is man, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not
that they are not!
‘Next, the two terms are presented as being essentially different, usually through.
arguments that emphasize the absurdity of calling the same action both good and
bad, or both scemly and shameful, and so on. This approach seems to endorse the
idea that these abstract qualities exist independent of the particular situation or
T.M, Robinson, Conrating Arguments: An Edin of the "DissolLogol” (New York: Amo Pres
tong).
Robinson, p79.
2Rosimond Kent Sprague, ed, The Older Sphlts (Columbia, S.C: University of Sout Carolin
Press 1972) p18
DIssor Loot object in which they are manifested —an approach that Plato would take one step
further, assigning such abstract qualities a transcendent essence.
‘Can we infer thatthe author takes @ position among these competing arguments?
Much scholarly debate has focused on this question. The use ofthe first person can-
not help us decide, because it was typical Sophist practice to argue for more than
fone side of an issue using “I.” This practice, no doubt, heightened the performative
Value of the verbal display, but it also had a serious intellectual purpose: to encour
age the exploration of all possible sides of a question. The scholarly tradition credits
rotagoras asthe first Sophist to teach this method of intellectual exploration, but it
pocame characteristic of the whole Sophistic Movement. At the very least, the prac
tice destabilized the unquestioned authority of arguments based on essential quali-
ties, As the lengthiest surviving text by an ancient Greek Sophist, the Dissoi Logoi
‘continues to provide a tich ground for scholarly investigation of the movement's
philosophical and rhetorical views.
Selected Bibliography
“.M. Robinson's Contrasting Arguments: An Edition of the “Dissoi Logoi” (1979) is the
ouce of the translation included here. Robinson's introduction and notes also provide the
most complete curent scholarly discussion of the text. Protagoras and the method of preseat-
ing contrasting arguments, ot disoilogoi, and sometimes also the Dissoi Logo! text itself,
discussed in most histories ofthe Sophistic Movement. Se especially G. B. Kerferd, The
Sophistic Movement (1981); Jacque
(1988; 1992); and Edward Schiappa,
ine de Romilly, Great Sophists in Periclean Athens
‘Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy
land Rhetoric (1991). Other references can be found inthe bibliography for Gorgias (P. 4).
Dissoi Logoi
x. ON GOOD AND BAD
On the matter of what is good and what is bad
‘contrasting arguments are put forward in Greece
by educated people: some say that what is good
and what is bad are two different things, others
that they are the same thing, and that the same
thing is good for some but bad for others, oF at
fone time good and at another time bad for the
same person. For myself, I side with the later
group, and I shall examine the view by reference
to human life, with its concern for food and drink
and sex. For these things are bad for those who
are sick, but good for the person who is healthy
“Transated by T-M. Robinson.
B CLASSICAL RHETORIC
oO
and needs them. Or again, lack of restraint in
these matters is bad for those who lack restraint,
bbut good for those who sell these commodities
and make money out of them. And illness is bad
forthe sick but good for the doctors. And death is
bad for those who die, but good for the undertak-
cers and the grave-diggers. Farming also, when it
makes a handsome success of producing crops, is
‘good for the farmers, but bad for the merchants
‘And itis bad forthe ship-owner if his metchant-
ships are involved in-a collision or get smashed
‘up, but good for the shipbuilders. Furthermore, it
is bad for everyone else, but good for the black-
smiths if a tool corrodes or loses its sharp edge or
gets broken to pieces. And undoubtedly it is bad
for everyone else, but good for the potters if pot- tery gets smashed. And itis bad for everyone
tlse, but good for the cobbler if footwear wears
‘ut or gets ripped apart. Again, when it comes to
Contests, be they gymnastic, or artistic, or mili-
tary —for example, when it comes to games (i.e,
foot-races) —votory is good forthe winner, but
bad forthe loers. And the same is also true for
wrestlers and borers and all those who take part
in artistic contests as well; for example, Iyte-
playing is good forthe winner, but bad for the
fosers. And in the mater of war (I shall speak
frst ofthe most recent events) the Spartan vie~
tory over the Athenians and their alles was good
for the Spartans but bad forthe Athenians and
their alles; and the victory which the Greeks
fvon over the Persians was good forthe Greeks,
but bad forthe non-Greeks. Again, the capture of
‘Troy was good for the Achaeans, but bad for the
‘Trojans, And the same holds for whet happened
to te Thebans and to the Argives. And the batle
between the Lapiths and the Centaurs was good
forthe Lapths, but bad forthe Centaurs. And it
is certainly the case thatthe fabled battle ofthe
gods and Giants, and its vctrious outcome, was
ood for the gods, but bad for the Giants. An-
‘ther view is that what is good is one thing and
‘what is bad is another thing: asthe name differs,
bo likewise does the reality. I myself also distin-
gmish the two in the above-mentioned manner
For I think it not even clear what sort of thing
would be good and what sort of thing bad if each
ofthe two were the same thing and not different
things; te situation would be an astonishing one
indeed. And I think thatthe man who says the
above-mentioned things would not even be able
to make a reply if someone were to pot the fol
lowing question: “Tell me now, did you ever be-
fore now do to your parents anything that was
good?” He might say, “Yes, I did a great dal
that was very good.” “In that case you ought to
do them a great deal that is very bad, if what is
good and what is bad are the same thing. Tell me,
did you ever before now do to your relatives any-
thing that was good? In such a case you were
doing them something bad. Or tell me, did you
ever before now do harm to your enemies? In
Such a case you did them a great deal that was
very beneficial. And please answer me this as
wel: Are you notin the position of pitying bes-
gars because they are in a very bad way and also
(Contrariwise) congratulating them for being well
off, if the same thing is good and bad?” And
there is nothiig to stop the King of Persia from
being in the same condition as beggars. For what
is for him a great deal of good is also a great deal
of evil, if the same thing is good and evil. And
‘we can assume that these things have been said
for every case. However, I shall also go through
each individual case, beginning with eating and
drinking and sexual intercourse. For, inthe same
way as has been mentioned above, if the same
thing is good and bad, it is good for those who
are ill should they do these things. And being
sick is bad for the sick and also good for them if
‘what is good and what is bad are the same thing.
‘And for allelse that has been mentioned in the
above argument this holds good. Not that I am
saying whatthe good is; I am trying rather to
point out that it.is not the same thing which is
bad and good, but that each is different from the
other.
2, ON SEEMLY AND SHAMEFUL
Contrasting arguments are-also put forward on
‘what is seemly and shameful. For some say that
what is seemly and what is shameful are two dif
ferent things; as the name differs, so likewise
does the reality. Others, however, say that the
same thing is both seemly and shameful. For my
paxt, I shall attempt an exposition of the matter
along the following lines: for example, it is
seemly for a boy in the flower of his growth to
‘gratify a respectable lover, but it is shameful for
‘a handsome boy to gratify one who is nor his
lover. And itis seemly for women to.wash ine
doors, but shameful to do it in a wrestling school;
Dut for men it is seemly to wash in a wrestling-
school or gymnasium. And to have sexual inter-
course with one's husband in private, where one
‘will be concealed from view by walls, is semly:
to do it outside, however, where somebody will
see, is shameful. And itis seemly to have sexual
intercourse with one's own husband, but very
shameful with someone else’s. Yes—and for the
hhusband too it is seemly to have sexual inter-
‘course with his own wife, but shameful with
someone else's. And for the husband itis shame-
49
ISsOr Loco ful to adom himself and smear himself with
white lead and wear gold omaments, but forthe
Wife itis seemly. And itis seemly t0 treat one’s
Friends kindly, bot shameful to treat one’s ene-
nies in such @ way. And it is shameful to run
way from one’s enemies, but seemly to run
‘away ftom one’s competitors in a stadium. And it
js shameful to slaughter those who are friends or
fellow-eitizens, but seemly to slaughter one’s en-
temies. And the above points apply to every case.
However, I shall go on to what cities and nations
consider shameful. To Spartans, for example, iis
Sseemly that girls should exercise naked.or walk
around bare-armed or without a tunic, but to
Tonians this is shameful. And (in Sparta) it is
Seemly that boys should nor learn arts or letters,
‘ut to fonians itis shameful not to know all these
things. Among Thesslians itis seemly for aman
fist to select the horses from the herd and then
tuain them and the mules himself, and seemly for
f man first to select a steer and then slaughter,
Skin, and cut it up himself: in Sicily, however,
Such activities are shameful, and the work of
Slaves. To Macedonians it appears to be seemly
that girs should love and have intercourse with
man before marrying a man, but shameful to do
this once they are married. To Greeks both prac-
tices are shameful, The Thracians count it an
fadornment that their girls tattoo themselves, but
jn the eyes of everyone else tafoo-marks are @
punishment for wrongdoers. And the Seythians
Consider it seemly that, after Killing aman, one
Should on the one hand scalp him and casry the
frontal hair on one's horse's brow and on the
ther hand gild or silver over the skull and drink
from it and offer libations to the gods; among the
Gresks no one would want to g0 into the same
hhouse asa person who had done that sort of titi
‘Mascagetes cut up thei parents and chen ea them,
and it seems to them an especially seemly form of
éentomipment to be buried inside one’s children if
a person dd this in Greece he would be driven out
of Greece and die a miserable death for doing
things that are shameful and horrible. The Persians
consider it seemly for men, too, to adorn them
selves, like women, and to have sexual inte-
Course with their daughter or mother or sister; the
Greeks consider such actions shameful and un-
Javwful. Again, to Lydians it appears seemly that
50 (CLASSICAL RHETORIC
‘girls should prostitute themselves to ear money,
and in that way get married; among the Greeks no
fone would be willing to marry any such gitl. And
Egyptians differ from everyone else in their views
‘on What is seemly. For here it appears seemly that
women should weave and do manual work, but
there it appears seemly that men should do such
things and that women should do what men do
here. Kneading clay with the hands, or dough
with the feet, is for them seemly, but for us just
the opposite. | thing that if one were to order all
‘mankind (o bring together into a single pile all
that each individual considered shameful, and
then again to take from this mass what each
thought seemly, nothing would be left, but they
‘would all, severally, take away. everything. For
rot everyone has the same views. 1 shall bring
forward as additional evidence some verses:
For if you make this distinction you will see the
other law that holds for mortal men: there is noth
ng thet is in every respect seemly or shameful, but
the Right Moment takes the same things and makes
them shameful and then changes them round and
‘makes them seemly.
‘To put the matter generally, all things are seemly
when done at the right moment, but shameful
‘when done at the wrong moment. What then
ave I managed to do? I said I would demon-
strate that the same. things are shameful and
seemly, and I demonstrated it in all the above-
mentioned cases. It is also said, when what is
shameful and what seemly is under discussion,
that each differs from the other. For if one were
to ask those who say that the same thing is
shameful and seemly whether any seemly thing
hhas ever been done by them, they will have to
that what they did was shameful, if what is
shameful and what is seemly are the same thing.
‘And if they know that a particular man is hand
some, they know that this same man is also uly
and if white, also black. And if it is seemly tc
treat the gods with respect, it is also shameful tc
treat the gods with respect, if the same thing is
shameful and seemly. And it can be assumed tha:
Thave made the same point in each and every in
stance. Turning to their (specific) argument: If i
is seemly for a woman to adorn herself, it i
shameful for a woman to adorn herself, if th same thing is shameful and seemily. And this ap-
plies to all the other cases: In Sparta itis seemly
for gitls to exercise naked, in Sparta it is shame-
ful for gil to exercise naked—and similarly in
all the other instances. They say that if some peo-
ple were to bring together from every part of the
‘world those things that are shameful, and were
then to call people together and command them
to take what each considered seemly, everything
would be taken away as seemly. I personally pro-
fess my astonishment if things that were shame
ful when they were brought together are going to
tum out to be seemly, and not the sort of things
they were when they came. Certainly if they had
‘brought horses or cattle or sheep or people they
would not have taken something else away. For
they would not even have taken brass away if
they had brought gold, nor lead if they had
‘brought silver coin, Do they really then take
away things that are seemly in place of the
shameful that they brought? Come now, if some
fone had brought along an ugly man, would he
have taken him away handsome instead? They
also adduce as witnesses poets—who write theit
poetry to give pleasure, not to propound truth.
3. ON JUST AND UNJUST
Contrasting arguments are also put forward on
the matter of what is just and what is unjust
‘Some say that what is just and what is unjust are
two different things, others thatthe same thing is.
just and unjust. For my pact, shall attempt to
bolster the latter view. And I shall say first of all
that itis just to tell lies and to deceive. Oppo-
nents of this" view might say that doing these
things to one’s enemies is shameful and base; yet
they would not say that itis shameful and base fo
do them to those whom one holds very dear—
parents, for example. For if it were necessary
that one’s father or mother should consume some
‘medicament (whether in solid or liquid form), but
he or she was unwilling, is it not just to give
them the medicament in their food or in their
‘drink and not say that itis init? So it is already
clear that itis just to tell lies and to deceive one’s
parents, and for that matter to steal the property
ff one’s fiends and use violence on those whom
‘one holds very dear.
For example, if some member of one's howse-
hhold had been brought to grief in some way and
‘were on the point of doing away with himself
‘with a sword or rope or some other implement, it
jg just to steal these implements, should one be
able to, or, should one arrive late on the scene
fand come upon him with the implement in his
hand, to take it away from him by force. And
surely itis just to enslave one’s enemies, should
‘one prove able to capture an entire city and sell it
into slavery? And breaking into buildings which
are the public property of one's fellow-citizens
appears to be just. For if one’s father has been
‘overpowered by his enemies and jailed, under
sentence of death, is it not just co break in through
the wall and steal one’s father away and so save
him? Or take oath-breaking. If a man were cap-
tured by the enemy and undertook on oath to be-
tray his city if they set him free, would this man
be acting justly if he kept his oath? I for my part
