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ORCID5th WINE 2009: Rome, Italy
- Stefano Leonardi:
Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Rome, Italy, December 14-18, 2009. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5929, Springer 2009, ISBN 978-3-642-10840-2
Invited Talks
- S. Muthukrishnan:
Ad Exchanges: Research Issues. 1-12 - H. Peyton Young:
Adaptive Learning in Systems of Interacting Agents. 13-16 - Éva Tardos:
Quantifying Outcomes in Games. 17
Regular Papers
- Martin Hoefer, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Röglin
, Shang-Hua Teng:
Competitive Routing over Time. 18-29 - Pinyan Lu:
On 2-Player Randomized Mechanisms for Scheduling. 30-41 - Patrick Briest, Martin Hoefer, Luciano Gualà, Carmine Ventre:
On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers. 42-54 - Angelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli:
On Best Response Dynamics in Weighted Congestion Games with Polynomial Delays. 55-66 - Leah Epstein, Elena Kleiman, Julián Mestre:
Parametric Packing of Selfish Items and the Subset Sum Algorithm. 67-78 - Sourav Chakraborty, Nikhil R. Devanur:
An Online Multi-unit Auction with Improved Competitive Ratio. 79-88 - Peng Shi, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo:
Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions. 89-100 - David Arthur, Rajeev Motwani, Aneesh Sharma, Ying Xu:
Pricing Strategies for Viral Marketing on Social Networks. 101-112 - Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Consistent Continuous Trust-Based Recommendation Systems. 113-124 - Jean Cardinal, Erik D. Demaine, Samuel Fiorini, Gwenaël Joret, Ilan Newman, Oren Weimann:
The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game on Planar and Bounded-Treewidth Graphs. 125-136 - Pinyan Lu, Yajun Wang, Yuan Zhou:
Tighter Bounds for Facility Games. 137-148 - Claudia Lindner, Jörg Rothe:
Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded Cake-Cutting Protocols. 149-159 - Thành Nguyen, Éva Tardos:
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria via Lovász Local Lemma. 160-171 - Renato Gomes, Nicole Immorlica, Evangelos Markakis:
Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment. 172-183 - Martin Gairing:
Covering Games: Approximation through Non-cooperation. 184-195 - Sharad Goel, Sébastien Lahaie, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Contract Auctions for Sponsored Search. 196-207 - Arpita Ghosh, Randolph Preston McAfee, Kishore Papineni, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Bidding for Representative Allocations for Display Advertising. 208-219 - Esteban Arcaute, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Social Networks and Stable Matchings in the Job Market. 220-231 - Leah Epstein, Elena Kleiman, Rob van Stee:
Maximizing the Minimum Load: The Cost of Selfishness. 232-243 - Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer, Daniel M. Reeves:
Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments. 244-255 - Paolo Penna, Florian Schoppmann, Riccardo Silvestri, Peter Widmayer:
Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games. 256-267 - Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman:
Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies. 268-279 - Rainer Feldmann, Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien:
Nash Equilibria for Voronoi Games on Transitive Graphs. 280-291 - Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Orestis Telelis:
Selfish Scheduling with Setup Times. 292-303 - Nithum Thain, Adrian Vetta:
Computational Aspects of Multimarket Price Wars. 304-315 - Dimitris Fotakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis:
The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games. 316-327 - Christopher A. Wilkens:
The Complexity of Models of International Trade. 328-339 - Angelina Vidali:
The Geometry of Truthfulness. 340-350 - Michal Feldman, Ran Tessler, Yoav Wilf:
Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent Externalities. 351-361 - Anand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna:
Nash Dynamics in Congestion Games with Similar Resources. 362-373 - Jon Feldman, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan, Martin Pál:
Online Ad Assignment with Free Disposal. 374-385 - Devansh Dikshit, Yadati Narahari:
Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks. 386-397 - Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian:
An Analysis of Troubled Assets Reverse Auction. 398-409 - Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi, Jie Zhang:
Direction Preserving Zero Point Computing and Applications. 410-421
Short Papers
- Vijay V. Vazirani, Lei Wang:
Continuity Properties of Equilibria in Some Fisher and Arrow-Debreu Market Models. 422-429 - Joud S. Khoury, Chaouki T. Abdallah, Kate Krause, Jorge Crichigno:
Route Distribution Incentives. 430-437 - Haris Aziz, Oded Lachish, Mike Paterson, Rahul Savani:
Wiretapping a Hidden Network. 438-446 - Ning Chen, Edith Elkind, Nick Gravin:
Refining the Cost of Cheap Labor in Set System Auctions. 447-454 - Josep Díaz, Dieter Mitsche, Navin Rustagi, Jared Saia:
On the Power of Mediators. 455-462 - Tobias Harks, Max Klimm, Rolf H. Möhring:
Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property. 463-470 - Ilan Adler, Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
A Note on Strictly Competitive Games. 471-474 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou:
The Efficiency of Fair Division. 475-482 - Krzysztof R. Apt, Evangelos Markakis:
Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism. 483-490 - Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami, Marina A. Epelman:
Subsidized Prediction Markets for Risk Averse Traders. 491-497 - Amos Fiat, Amiram Wingarten:
Envy, Multi Envy, and Revenue Maximization. 498-504 - Jacomo Corbo, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik:
Nudging Mechanisms for Technology Adoption. 505-512 - Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi:
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders. 513-520 - Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi:
Priority Right Auction for Komi Setting. 521-528 - B. V. Ashwinkumar, Robert Kleinberg:
Randomized Online Algorithms for the Buyback Problem. 529-536 - David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem, Mahyar Salek:
Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders. 537-544 - Arash Asadpour, Amin Saberi:
On the Inefficiency Ratio of Stable Equilibria in Congestion Games. 545-552 - Xi Alice Gao, Yiling Chen, David M. Pennock:
Betting on the Real Line. 553-560 - Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
Characterization of Strategy-Proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-Name-Proofness. 561-568 - Dömötör Pálvölgyi:
2D-TUCKER Is PPAD-Complete. 569-574 - Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Ingmar Weber:
Bidder Optimal Assignments for General Utilities. 575-582 - Xiaotie Deng, Jiajin Yu:
A New Ranking Scheme of the GSP Mechanism with Markovian Users. 583-590 - Joshua R. Davis, David Liben-Nowell, Alexa Sharp, Tom Wexler:
Mediated Equilibria in Load-Balancing Games. 591-599 - Thomas Voice, Maria Polukarov, Andrew Byde, Nicholas R. Jennings:
On the Impact of Strategy and Utility Structures on Congestion-Averse Games. 600-607 - Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot:
On Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut Game. 608-615 - Martin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik:
Stability and Convergence in Selfish Scheduling with Altruistic Agents. 616-622 - Qianya Lin, Yiling Chen:
Gaming Dynamic Parimutuel Markets. 623-631 - Mangesh Gupte, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Lu Han, Liviu Iftode, Pravin Shankar, Raluca M. Ursu:
News Posting by Strategic Users in a Social Network. 632-639
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