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9th TARK 2003: Bloomington, Indiana, USA
- Joseph Y. Halpern, Moshe Tennenholtz:

Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-2003), Bloomington, Indiana, USA, June 20-22, 2003. ACM 2003, ISBN 1-58113-731-1 - Andrés Perea:

Rationalizability and minimal complexity in dynamic games. 1-14 - Oliver Schulte:

Iterated backward inference: an algorithm for proper rationalizability. 15-28 - Roland G. Fryer, Matthew O. Jackson

:
Categorical cognition: a psychological model of categories and identification in decision making: extended abstract. 29-34 - Pierfrancesco La Mura

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Decision-theoretic entropy. 35-44 - Robert van Rooy:

Being polite is a handicap: towards a game theoretical analysis of polite linguistic behavior. 45-58 - Robert McGrew, Ryan Porter, Yoav Shoham:

Towards a general theory of non-cooperative computation. 59-71 - Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, Noam Nisan

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Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions. 72-87 - Michael J. Kearns:

Structured interaction in game theory. 88 - Dov Monderer:

Economic efficiency versus complexity communication. 89 - Geir B. Asheim

, Ylva Søvik:
The semantics of preference-based belief operators. 90-103 - Ron van der Meyden, Manas K. Patra:

Knowledge in quantum systems. 104-117 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Riccardo Pucella:

Probabilistic algorithmic knowledge. 118-130 - Wolfgang Spohn:

Enumerative induction. 131-144 - Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier, Burkhard C. Schipper:

Multi-person unawareness. 145-158 - Richard Booth, Samir Chopra, Aditya Ghose, Thomas Andreas Meyer

:
Belief liberation (and retraction). 159-172 - Horacio L. Arló-Costa:

Iterated abduction and conditional coherence. 173-186 - Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones

, D. Marc Kilgour:
Dynamic models of coalition formation: fallback vs. build-up. 187-200 - Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm:

How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? 201-214 - Georg Gottlob, Gianluigi Greco, Francesco Scarcello

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Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy games. 215-230 - Daniel B. Neill

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Cooperation and coordination in the turn-taking dilemma. 231-244

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