Notes on gangster states: why legitimacy matters when the state has a monopoly on coercive and lethal force.

12th January 2026

One priority for a modern state – perhaps the highest priority – is for it to keep its citizens safe from harm.

And within that priority is the need for the state to to keep its citizens safe from harm inflicted by the state itself.

A modern state has – or should have – a monopoly on legitimate coercive and indeed lethal force.

By “legitimate” is meant that the force used will have a lawful basis, will be used in accordance with legal rules, is sanctioned ultimately by someone capable of being publicly accountable, and is capable of review by an independent court.

So what happens when this breaks down?

What happens when the it is the state that is inflicting injury and death on its own citizens – or on people in its care?

And what happens when that coercive and lethal force does not appear to have a legal basis and/or is not in accordance with legal rules and/or is sanctioned by those with no accountability and/or is not capable of independent judicial review?

That is: what happens, for any or all these reasons, the use of coercive and lethal use of force does not seem to have any legitimacy?

What happens when the only justification for the use of coercive and lethal use of force – or excuse or pretext – is that might is right?

Well, among other things, you have a fundamental failure in the functioning of a modern state.

For the key word here is “legitimacy”.

Anybody can (seek to) use coercive and lethal force – and many will get away with it.

And if that is possible, then you have a gangster state, an outlaw state, a pirate state – where anything goes by those who can use coercive and lethal force and be protected from any legal or political consequences.

Some may like the idea of such a state – some may read science fiction or fantasy fiction where there are cities or entire societies where might is right.

Or when may look at various places – now and throughout history – where any sense of a legitimate central order has broken down. And what one will often see are massacres and gangsterism.

That is why there is a quid pro quo – the state gets to have a monopoly on the use of coercive and lethal force, in return for that coercive and lethal force being used legitimately.

That is that the force used will have a lawful basis, will be used in accordance with legal rules, is sanctioned ultimately by someone capable of being publicly accountable, and is capable of review by an independent court.

*

Now looking at the United States, there appears to be the free use of coercive and lethal force by the federal agency ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement).

Last week Renee Nicole Good was killed by ICE in circumstances that seem to have been murder: a state execution of an innocent person on the streets for no good reason.

At the start of that day three children had a mother and at the end of that day they did not, just because an ICE agent decided to shoot their mother three times in the face.

I have written about this over at Prospect in an article entitled Death in Minnesota – please click here to read it.

Fatalities happen, police shootings of innocent people happen – but what was especially striking about this killing was the response of the federal government and its supporters.

For want of a better word: they celebrated the killing.

The woman somehow deserved it because she was dubbed “domestic terrorist”.

*

Now turning back to the general issue of legitimacy, we can see that this use of lethal (and not only coercive) force appears from from any of those elements which can (in limited circumstances) render it legitimate.

The extra-judicial execution of Renee Nicole Good seems not to have a legal basis, it was not in accordance with legal rules, was sanctioned (even implicitly) by those who seek to evade accountability, and it may not be capable of review by an independent court.

The federal state is resisting working with the local police.

It looks as if the state is confident it can get away with it.

*

But.

The cost of the state getting away with it will be further diminution of the legitimacy of the state having a monopoly of coercive and legal power.

Yes, as a matter of realpolitik, the state can seemingly do as it wishes.

Yet in the medium term, legitimacy matters.

A society is not easy to govern unless there is at least acceptance of the powers of the police and the military: sheer repression is expensive and often unsustainable.

That is why the wise tyrant hides behind a veneer of legalism and constitutionality.

And that is also why gangster states rarely last very long.

***

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We are Christopher Isherwood, watching the scenes in the Berlin street below from our apartment window above.

8th January 2026

Watching from afar further shifts in a worsening polity

The Berlin novels and notebooks of Christopher Isherwood from the early 1930s contain fascinating characters – even though the apparent real-life inspirations for the likes of Sally Bowles (Jean Ross) and Arthur Norris (Gerald Hamilton) were somewhat different from their fictional counterparts.

But the most fascinating – and complex – creations in those works were the narrators – sometimes “Christopher Isherwood” (in inverted commas), sometimes William Bradshaw.

Do not be taken in by the deft misdirections of the narrator:

“I am a camera with its shutter open, quite passive, recording, not thinking.”

The narrator is not any passive camera, though he wants you to think so.

(For, as always, Isherwood is very charming.)

He is instead skilfully writing about difficult subjects – including the visible slide to Nazism and barbarity all around him – while making you feel you are working these things out for yourself from the details he provides.

He says he is recording, not thinking – but he is very much making you think.

*

Like Isherwood – or “Isherwood” – walking the Berlin streets or looking down from his apartment window, we all – via social media and mobile phone footage – can now have glimpses of an ever-worsening situation in the United States (and also elsewhere).

And again like those reading his narrative, we can put two and two together and realise what is going on in what we don’t glimpse – which is not reported on social (or mainstream) media or recorded on mobile devices.

What happened yesterday to a woman in Minnesota was horrific – and yet we know that it cannot be unique. One can tell that the distinctive quality of this incident is that it was caught on camera when many others are not. There is no reason to believe it was a one-off.

As such anyone watching can tell what is happening off-camera – but, as with Isherwood and others in the early 1930s, there is very little which we can do (especially from the other side of the Atlantic).

(And, which is a fair point, the well-documented record of the United Kingdom state in killing and torturing people in Northern Ireland, Kenya, Iraq and Afghanistan confers on us no moral superiority.)

*

No slide towards barbarity and Fascism is inevitable: even in the 1930s some countries were able to steer their polities in a different direction. Little or nothing is bound to happen in human affairs. Things can change for better, and sometimes do.

But nonetheless the sense of dread and doom that must have been a feature of the early 1930s is sometimes inescapable.

The evidence from our virtual apartment window does not point in an encouraging direction.

***

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But what about international law?

6th January 2026

What happens to an international legal order when a superpower goes rogue

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The notion of international law prompts strong opinions.

(Here is meant what lawyers call “public international law” – in general, the law which governs nation states and international organisations. There is also “private international law” which is generally dull and uncontroversial – cross-border contracts and what-not.)

Some even doubt international law exists.

*

I once heard a very distinguished legal academic – whose name is on the spines of volumes in every law library throughout the land – aver the following:

“In court, the laws of England and Wales are a matter of law. You just have to show the relevant legal authority or instrument and the court should accept that as what the law is.

“Foreign law – say the law of France – is different. This is a matter of evidence – expert evidence. You get an expert in that foreign law and their evidence is put before the court.

And international law, well. (Pause.)

International law is a matter of fiction.”

*

There is perhaps no other branch of law which is the subject of such scepticism, if not outright denial, among even lawyers themselves.

*

From one perspective, this rejection is perhaps understandable.

A great deal of what is called (public) international law will never be determined or enforced by a court of competent jurisdiction – it will never be litigated, and the nation state (and head of state) breaching that law will feel confident there will not be any consequences.

As one famous jurist once put it: “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”

And if there ain’t a court that will “do” international law then it is little or nothing more than a polite political fiction – a set of normative assertions with no positive existence.

*

But.

There is more to law than its determination or enforcement by a court.

Even domestically, the vast majority of statutory provisions – and indeed many statutes – have never been litigated and will probably never be litigated. Yet they are still the law.

And this is because – in very general terms – they are recognised to be the law and parties regulate themselves accordingly.

As the greatest of all contract law academics G. H. Treitel put it in his classic definition of a contract (emphasis added):

“A contract is an agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced or recognised by law.”

Enforcement – and thereby the possibility of enforcement – is not the only test of whether a thing is a law or not.

*

In (public) international law, many of the obligations are created and agreed by nation states themselves. These are usually in the form of treaties.

There can be treaties between states for particular purposes – and there can be treaties of general of general application. Sometimes the latter are called conventions, as in the Geneva convention. And there can be charters to which member states subscribe – sometimes to create international organisations. There are many ways in which obligations in public international law can be created and agreed.

And then there is what is called customary international law – the international laws which are said to govern nation states regardless of whether the nation state agrees to those laws.

Taken together all these laws constitute (public) international law.

The problem is, however, very little of that law can or will ever be litigated.

But it is treated generally- that is, recognised – by many nation states as law nonetheless.

*

One may have sympathy with the view, to adapt the famous aphorism attributed to Gandhi about western civilisation, that international law would be a good idea.

And generally, when nation states recognise it and regulate their conduct accordingly, it is a good thing as well as a good idea.

But what happens when a nation state – a superpower no less – goes rogue?

Where just because it can – like a dog licking itself – it breaches international law again and again, with barely a shrug?

One response is to say that such (mis)conduct discredits the notion of international law entirely – that the polite fiction of international law has been undermined by the (to say the least) impolite.

It is certainly the case that the current administration of that superpower – the United States – do not seem to care less about international law when it would restrain them.

(No doubt they would plead international law against another country if it suited them.)

But the notion of being in breach of international law is not the same as international law not existing.

International law is still there – it is just not being complied with.

International law is still there – it is just not capable of being enforced in these instances (at least not yet).

Other nations will recognise and abide by those laws even if the United States will not.

*

An eminent professor may say international law is a matter of fiction, but unfortunately the many breaches of international law by the United States are a not a matter of fiction.

***

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The United States is a gangster state at home and a rogue state abroad

 

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Jane Austen as a writer about law

Boxing Day 2025

Some notes on Sense and Sensibility and Pride and Prejudice

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There were a couple of significant Jane Austen anniversaries this year.

 

It was the 250th anniversary of her birth earlier this month, and it was the 30th anniversary of the best adaptation of one of her novels.

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(Of course, many of the costume drama adaptations of her works are good as costume dramas. But the glory for me of her novels is in how she uses the written word and the gaps between those words – what she writes and what she does not write, and how she reveals miscommunications and deploys irony. Turning the stories into visual period feasts seems awkward. You may as well just watch Bridgerton. And, again for me, perhaps only Clueless gets to the essence of a character she created.)

*

To begin with a disclosure of bias: I am a Janeite and I regard her as the greatest writer in the English language. You no doubt may disagree, but you should know this as a starting point.

The implication of regarding her as the greatest writer is that she is likely to be a great writer on any topic she covers: from gardens to what we now call stately homes.

But I am a legal commentator, and it is her writing about law that I want to discuss here. For I would like to make a case for her being a great writer about law – to put alongside Franz Kafka and maybe Charles Dickens.

The thing is though you hardly know she is writing about law – she describes highly complex areas of law deftly. You take in the law’s significance and the predicaments in which the law places her characters and how legal relationships drive the plot.

Let us see how she does it in her first two novels, Sense and Sensibility and Pride and Prejudice.

(Note that in the quotes below the emphasis, of course, has been added. For convenience I have taken the texts from my Kindle version of the complete novels.)

**

Sense and Sensibility

Here is the famous first paragraph:

The family of Dashwood had long been settled in Sussex. Their estate was large, and their residence was at Norland Park, in the centre of their property, where, for many generations, they had lived in so respectable a manner as to engage the general good opinion of their surrounding acquaintance.

Straight away, like a skilled land law lecturer, she distinguishes between an estate, a residence, and property.

She then explains the significance of an estate.

The late owner of this estate was a single man, who lived to a very advanced age, and who for many years of his life, had a constant companion and housekeeper in his sister. But her death, which happened ten years before his own, produced a great alteration in his home; for to supply her loss, he invited and received into his house the family of his nephew Mr. Henry Dashwood, the legal inheritor of the Norland estate, and the person to whom he intended to bequeath it.

Austen soon moves on to showing how this affects others.

By a former marriage, Mr. Henry Dashwood had one son: by his present lady, three daughters. The son, a steady respectable young man, was amply provided for by the fortune of his mother, which had been large, and half of which devolved on him on his coming of age. By his own marriage, likewise, which happened soon afterwards, he added to his wealth. To him therefore the succession to the Norland estate was not so really important as to his sisters; for their fortune, independent of what might arise to them from their father’s inheriting that property, could be but small.

Now, having set out these basic elements of property law and succession, she turns to the crucial legal development (accompanied with gentle wit).

The old gentleman died: his will was read, and like almost every other will, gave as much disappointment as pleasure.

Austen now does some sophisticated legal world-building, having given readers the fundamental points, mixed with doses of characterisation.

He was neither so unjust, nor so ungrateful, as to leave his estate from his nephew; but he left it to him on such terms as destroyed half the value of the bequest. Mr. Dashwood had wished for it more for the sake of his wife and daughters than for himself or his son; but to his son, and his son’s son, a child of four years old, it was secured, in such a way, as to leave to himself no power of providing for those who were most dear to him, and who most needed a provision by any charge on the estate, or by any sale of its valuable woods. The whole was tied up for the benefit of this child, who, in occasional visits with his father and mother at Norland, had so far gained on the affections of his uncle, by such attractions as are by no means unusual in children of two or three years old; an imperfect articulation, an earnest desire of having his own way, many cunning tricks, and a great deal of noise, as to outweigh all the value of all the attention which, for years, he had received from his niece and her daughters. He meant not to be unkind, however, and, as a mark of his affection for the three girls, he left them a thousand pounds a-piece.

And then we move with speed to the second legal development: the nephew’s death.

Mr. Dashwood’s disappointment was, at first, severe; but his temper was cheerful and sanguine; and he might reasonably hope to live many years, and by living economically, lay by a considerable sum from the produce of an estate already large, and capable of almost immediate improvement. But the fortune, which had been so tardy in coming, was his only one twelvemonth. He survived his uncle no longer; and ten thousand pounds, including the late legacies, was all that remained for his widow and daughters.

In the passages above we see terms like “secured” and “tied up” – but now Austen changes gear so as to emphasise the relative weakness of mere assurances, recommendations, and promises.

His son was sent for as soon as his danger was known, and to him Mr. Dashwood recommended, with all the strength and urgency which illness could command, the interest of his mother-in-law and sisters.

Mr. John Dashwood had not the strong feelings of the rest of the family; but he was affected by a recommendation of such a nature at such a time, and he promised to do every thing in his power to make them comfortable. His father was rendered easy by such an assurance, and Mr. John Dashwood had then leisure to consider how much there might prudently be in his power to do for them.

[…]

When he gave his promise to his father, he meditated within himself to increase the fortunes of his sisters by the present of a thousand pounds a-piece.

[…]

And so by the following chapters we already know the truth of what Mrs. John Dashwood says about this.

“And I must say this: that you owe no particular gratitude to him, nor attention to his wishes; for we very well know that if he could, he would have left almost everything in the world to them.”

*

The legal situation of others at the house as mere visitors – with no rights in respect of the residence – is also explained, almost in passing, in the first and second chapters.

Mrs. John Dashwood, without sending any notice of her intention to her mother-in-law, arrived with her child and their attendants. No one could dispute her right to come; the house was her husband’s from the moment of his father’s decease

[…]

Mrs. John Dashwood now installed herself mistress of Norland; and her mother and sisters-in-law were degraded to the condition of visitors.

*

By the second chapter Austen is being even more skilful and confident in how she explains the law.

In a conversation between John Dashwood in his wife, we have this exposition dump which – because of the characterisation and framing – seems entirely natural to come from the mouth of Mrs. John Dashwood.

“An annuity is a very serious business; it comes over and over every year, and there is no getting rid of it. You are not aware of what you are doing. I have known a great deal of the trouble of annuities; for my mother was clogged with the payment of three to old superannuated servants by my father’s will, and it is amazing how disagreeable she found it. […]”

In the hands of most other writers such an explanation of annuities would have jarred. But by this point, we think this is exactly what this character would say and that she would also say it in just this way.

**

Pride and Prejudice

Unlike Sense and Sensibility, Austen in her second published novel waits a few chapters before she explains the relevant law.

And now she is not even full sentences, just the first clause of this sentence in chapter 7

Mr. Bennet’s property consisted almost entirely in an estate of two thousand a year, which, unfortunately for his daughters, was entailed, in default of heirs male, on a distant relation; and their mother’s fortune, though ample for her situation in life, could but ill supply the deficiency of his. Her father had been an attorney in Meryton, and had left her four thousand pounds.

Even if you read a lot about the law you will rarely, if at all, find a complex legal concept – an entail – explained so succinctly – and in less than a full sentence.

We now know enough to deal with this key passage a few chapters later.

“About a month ago I received this letter; and about a fortnight ago I answered it, for I thought it a case of some delicacy, and requiring early attention. It is from my cousin, Mr. Collins, who, when I am dead, may turn you all out of this house as soon as he pleases.”

“Oh! my dear,” cried his wife, “I cannot bear to hear that mentioned. Pray do not talk of that odious man. I do think it is the hardest thing in the world, that your estate should be entailed away from your own children; and I am sure, if I had been you, I should have tried long ago to do something or other about it.”

Jane and Elizabeth tried to explain to her the nature of an entail. They had often attempted to do it before, but it was a subject on which Mrs. Bennet was beyond the reach of reason, and she continued to rail bitterly against the cruelty of settling an estate away from a family of five daughters, in favour of a man whom nobody cared anything about.

And that last sentence is rather clever and a little naughty – because Mrs. Bennet actually grasps the brutal consequence of the entail for her daughters.

Neither the mother nor the reader need an explanation from Jane and Elizabeth. Austen has already explained it.

Towards the end of the book we have this exchange

“I never can be thankful, Mr. Bennet, for anything about the entail. How anyone could have the conscience to entail away an estate from one’s own daughters, I cannot understand; and all for the sake of Mr. Collins too! Why should he have it more than anybody else?” “I leave it to yourself to determine,” said Mr. Bennet.

And with this Austen also leaves it to her readers to determine the nature of entails and their iniquities.

**

Perhaps I will do another post on law the other novels, or perhaps a post on how Austen writes about lawyers – especially in Persuasion. (Maybe I will do this as a treat for paying subscribers.)

But what I wanted to convey here is just how brilliant Austen was as a writer about law. What, say, Dickens shovels on the page, Austen weaves so delicately that you hardly realise what she is doing.

Everyone knows Dickens was a great writer about law – he basically tells you this himself. But few realise that Austen is also a great writer about law – and in my view the better one. Only Kafka – himself a qualified lawyer – can in my view compare.

So a happy 250th birthday to Jane Austen (and happy 30th birthday for Clueless) and I hope this post encourages you to (re-)read her novels.

Clueless aside, they are all so much more satisfying than the film and television adaptations.

***

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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A guided tour of President Trump’s 33-page, $5 billion lawsuit against the British Broadcasting Corporation

16th December 2025

Over at my Substack I have done a post on the Trump lawsuit against the BBC.  It is currently behind a paywall.

I have also posted it on Patreon for those of you who subscribe there.

If you support my work by other means, like PayPal, reply with details below and I can email the post to you. Your reply will not be published.

 

The correct way to go around reviewing the ECHR – and the incorrect reasons for doing so

15th December 2025

The European Council met “unofficially” to review the European Convention on Human Rights in the context of migration asylum. This news prompted, for me, mixed feelings.

The mixed feelings meant my response was not entirely negative.

But what could possibly be positive?

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The good thing is that any changes are being done by discussion and deliberation. That signatories are not threatening to leave or to break the convention.

The convention and other constitutional and human rights codes are often called “living instruments” – though this is usually taken to mean that the scope of that code and of its provisions can be adapted and expanded by courts and tribunals from time to time.

But for any legal code to be a “living instrument” also means it can be amended and restricted (or expanded) by the codifiers from time to time – that is the legislators that wrote and ratified the code.

This is the rough that goes with the smooth if you sincerely believe constitutional and human rights codes to be “living instruments”.

No legal code, whether drawn up in 1950 – or 1215 or 1688-89 or 1789 or whenever – should be treated as unalterable: written in stone as opposed to on parchment or paper (or now in an electronic template).

Politicians revisiting constitutional and human rights codes is the price we pay for judges being able to develop those codes and their provisions.

Of course, it may well be (as is the case here) that the politicians are up to no good, that what they want to do is illiberal and misconceived.

But that is a separate and distinct argument to be had to whether the codes should be immune from political review.

As it is, the expressed “legitimate concerns” (such a cant phrase) about can and should be met by other means, rather than rigging the convention so that member states win cased which they are currently losing.

*

One example, which should be better known but is not because the United Kingdom government did not want to shout about it, was the case of Abu Qatada.

His extradition to Jordan to face terrorism charges was blocked because evidence against him had been extracted by torture.

Ministers and the media huffed and puffed and threatened to blow the United Kingdom out of the ECHR.

But in the end – quietly – the governments of the United Kingdom and Jordan agreed a treaty that torture-gained evidence would not be used in such case.

Abu Qatada was extradited and then…

…he was cleared of terrorism charges.

Similar arrangements could be made in respect of other individuals who are resisting being sent to inhuman and degrading conditions.

*

Anyway, I have set out the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, about this European Council deliberation over at Prospect – please click and read.

You can leave any comments on that piece below.

Extremism, conformity, and the problem of law

9th December 2025

How the law can (attempt to) regulate extremism, but it can really do nothing about conformism.

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Let us start with this thought-provoking passage:

When I visited Auschwitz many years ago, someone in our group said that this is what happens when extremism flourishes.

Our tour guide replied:

“This place is not explained by extremism. It is explained by conformity.”

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That exchange was in a recent post by Ian Dunt, which you can read here.

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The state can have a good go at regulating extremism.

The state can seek to define it, for definitions are often the starting point for law and policy.

In the United Kingdom we have the following official definition of extremism:

Extremism is the promotion or advancement of an ideology based on violence, hatred or intolerance, that aims to:

(1) negate or destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms of others; or

(2) undermine, overturn or replace the UK’s system of liberal parliamentary democracyand democratic rights; or

(3) intentionally create a permissive environment for others to achieve the results in (1) or (2).

The types of behaviour below are indicative of the kind of promotion or advancement which may be relevant to the definition, and are an important guide to its application. The further context below is also an essential part of the definition.

If you look at the government’s webpage, you will see that this definition even has footnotes:

A definition with its own footnotes that define terms within the definition: this is serious stuff.

*

The term “extremism” is even used in statutes and statutory instruments:

And once you have a term defined officially, and used widely in legal instruments, you can do legal and policy things in respect of that term:

And so we have things like the Prevent Strategy which seeks to stop extremism becoming terrorism:

And we have Crown Prosecution Service guidance which refers to extremism:

And so on.

Extremism is a bureaucratic category and, as such, a government can have laws and policies that deal seek to deal with it.

Those laws and policies may have limited or no effect, or indeed counter-productive effects, but at least the state can have a good go at addressing extremism.

*

Now let us turn from extremism to conformity – the thing which the passage quoted at the head of this post warned us against:

When I visited Auschwitz many years ago, someone in our group said that this is what happens when extremism flourishes.

Our tour guide replied:

“This place is not explained by extremism. It is explained by conformity.”

What can law and policy do about conformity?

*

There is perhaps nothing the law can do to counter conformity.

This is because – maybe literally, maybe logically – the law actually requires conformity.

Maybe a law against conformity is even a contradiction-in-terms, if you think about it.

One premise of law is that, well, people comply with it.

A law which sought to counter conformity would no doubt be rather self-defeating.

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The same can be said about policy: again one point about policy is that officials and the public are supposed to abide by it.

Policy, in general terms, provides what officials and the public should and should not do in certain situations. There may be exceptions in specific circumstances, but policy provides the general thrust of public action.

And on this basis, a policy against conformity is perhaps also a contradiction-in-terms, if you think about it.

*

There is probably nothing law and policy can do to counter the threat of conformity.

Indeed, once illiberals and authoritarians have public power, and so can determine law and policy, conformity will reinforce illiberalism and authoritarianism.

And, as and when illiberalism and authoritarianism slide into extremism, then conformity will reinforce that extremism.

*

The problem of conformity cannot thereby be solved by law and policy.

The danger needs to be addressed by other means.

And that other means is, of course, politics.

One may not be able to have a law or a policy against conformity, but one can certainly be politically opposed to it – to campaign and vote or otherwise mobilise against extremists who want to take control of the state.

And this includes resisting the temptation to conform – that is to nod-along with what is happening.

There are always extremists.

But what gives them power is not the appeal of their extremism, but the comfort others have in conformity.

*

When I visited Auschwitz many years ago, someone in our group said that this is what happens when extremism flourishes.

Our tour guide replied:

“This place is not explained by extremism. It is explained by conformity.”

***

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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How the BBC censored the line that Trump is “the most openly corrupt president in American history”

30th November 2025

 

 

The British Broadcasting Corporation’s Reith Lectures are prestigious things, a highlight of the broadcasting year.

The 2025 lecturer is Rutger Bregman.

The first of this year’s lectures is available to listen here and there is a BBC transcript of that lecture here.

But there is something missing from the broadcast lecture and the transcript.

The broadcast lecture and the published transcript are not a complete and accurate record of what was actually said.

What is missing – edited out by the BBC – is a single line.

The line is that Donald Trump is “the most openly corrupt president in American history”.

As a special treat for those who are kind enough to pay for subscriptions for this blog, I have done a close look at those “legal reasons” from an English media law perspective.

You can read it on Substack here and on Patreon here.

If you financially support this blog by other means (eg PayPal), leave a comment below (which will not be published) and I can either add you as a complementary subscriber or send the post to your email address.