Signed Decision Receipts for Machine-to-Machine Access Control
draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts-03
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Tom Farley | ||
| Last updated | 2026-09-03 | ||
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draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts-03
Independent T. Farley
Internet-Draft ScopeBlind (Veritas Acta)
Intended status: Informational 29 August 2026
Expires: 2 March 2027
Signed Decision Receipts for Machine-to-Machine Access Control
draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts-03
Abstract
This document defines a portable, cryptographically signed receipt
format for recording machine-to-machine access control decisions.
Each receipt captures the identity of the decision maker, the tool or
resource being accessed, the policy evaluation result, and a
timestamp. All of these are signed with Ed25519 [RFC8032] and
serialized using deterministic JSON canonicalization [RFC8785].
The format is designed for environments where AI agents invoke tools
on behalf of human operators, particularly the Model Context Protocol
(MCP) ecosystem. Receipts are independently verifiable without
contacting the issuer, enabling offline audit, regulatory compliance,
and cross-organizational trust federation.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 March 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Relationship to MCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Receipt Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Signed Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1. Signature Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Receipt Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Access Decision Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.1. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Restraint Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Arena Battle Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3.1. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. Agent Lifecycle Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4.1. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5. Spending Authority Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5.1. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6. Formal Debate Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Evidence Predicate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Signing and Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. Signing Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. Verification Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.3. Public Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. Commitment Mode (Optional Extension) . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.1. Merkle Tree Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.2. Canonical Leaf Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.3. Leaf Sort Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.4. Salt Construction and Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.5. Selective Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.6. Signature Scope (Normative Clarification) . . . . . . . . 21
6.7. Chain Hash Scope (Normative Clarification) . . . . . . . 22
6.8. Policy Digest Construction (Normative) . . . . . . . . . 22
6.8.1. Policy Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.9. Signature Algorithm Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.10. Context Binding for ZK Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.11. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
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7. Trust Tiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8. Agent Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8.1. Passport Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8.2. DPoP Binding (Future) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.1. Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.2. Key Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.3. Payload Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.4. Canonicalization Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.5. Key Distribution and Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.6. Verifier Identity Is Not Receipt Content . . . . . . . . 29
9.7. Chain Completeness and Truncation . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.8. Decisions Are Not Executions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.9. Evidence Predicate: False Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix A. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A.1. protect-mcp (Reference Implementation) . . . . . . . . . 34
A.2. @veritasacta/verify (Verifier) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.3. @scopeblind/passport (Identity SDK) . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.4. protect-mcp-adk (Google ADK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.5. scopeblind-pydantic-ai (Pydantic AI) . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.6. scopeblind-llamaindex (LlamaIndex) . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.7. @scopeblind/vercel-ai (Vercel AI SDK) . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.8. @scopeblind/langchain (LangChain + LangGraph) . . . . . . 36
A.9. Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit (Enterprise
Consumer) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.10. AWS Cedar for Agents (WASM Policy Engine) . . . . . . . . 36
A.11. Sigstore Rekor (Transparency Log Anchor) . . . . . . . . 37
Appendix B. Example: Complete Verification Flow . . . . . . . . 37
B.1. Step 1: Generate Issuer Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B.2. Step 2: Sign a Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B.3. Step 3: Verify (CLI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix C. Changes from -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix D. Changes from -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix E. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1. Introduction
As AI agents increasingly act autonomously (invoking tools, accessing
APIs, and modifying state), there is a growing need for cryptographic
evidence of what decisions were made, by whom, and under what policy.
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Current approaches rely on centralized logging (e.g., CloudWatch,
SIEM ingestion), which requires trust in the log operator and
provides no independent verifiability. A compromised or malicious
operator can silently alter or omit log entries.
This specification defines a *Signed Decision Receipt* format that
provides:
1. *Portable evidence*: Receipts are self-contained JSON objects
that can be stored, transmitted, and verified independently.
2. *Cryptographic integrity*: Each receipt is signed using Ed25519
(RFC 8032), ensuring tamper detection without PKI infrastructure.
3. *Offline verification*: Any party with the issuer's public key
can verify a receipt without network access or API calls.
4. *Minimal disclosure*: Receipts capture the decision metadata
(tool name, decision, tier, timestamp) without logging raw
request payloads, prompts, or sensitive parameters.
1.1. Relationship to MCP
The Model Context Protocol [MCP] defines a JSON-RPC transport for AI
tool invocation but provides no built-in access control, auditing, or
accountability mechanism. This specification is designed to be
deployed at the MCP transport layer (typically as a stdio proxy)
without modifications to the MCP protocol itself.
This specification is complementary to [I-D.serra-mcp-discovery-uri],
which defines the mcp:// URI scheme and server discovery mechanism.
Discovery (how an agent finds a server) and accountability (what gets
recorded after the agent uses it) are independently deployable
layers. A server's discovery manifest MAY declare a trust_class that
informs receipt-generating proxies of the server's operating context
(e.g., "regulated"), enabling jurisdiction-aware policy evaluation
without encoding legal regime information in the receipt itself.
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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2. Receipt Structure
A Signed Decision Receipt is a JSON object with two top-level fields:
payload and signature.
2.1. Signed Envelope
{
"payload": { ... },
"signature": {
"alg": "EdDSA",
"kid": "<issuer-identifier>",
"sig": "<hex-encoded-ed25519-signature>"
}
}
This is the envelope shape, and it is the shape new implementations
SHOULD emit. A second, flat shape carries the payload fields at the
top level alongside a signature member that is a hexadecimal string.
It predates the envelope and remains in use. The two shapes are
signed over different byte strings, and an implementation MUST
determine which shape it is handling before computing or checking a
signature; see Section 6.6. Except where a shape is named
explicitly, the remainder of this document describes the envelope
shape.
2.1.1. Signature Object
alg (REQUIRED): The signature algorithm. The mandatory-to-implement
algorithm is "EdDSA" for Ed25519 as defined in [RFC8032].
Implementations MAY additionally support "ES256" (ECDSA with P-256
and SHA-256) to accommodate systems that use P-256 keys natively.
Verifiers MUST support "EdDSA" and SHOULD support "ES256". This
list is not closed; see Section 6.9 for registered values and for
the algorithms recommended for new deployments.
kid (REQUIRED): The key identifier of the signing key. This is an
opaque string that SHOULD resolve to a public key via a well-known
endpoint or out-of-band distribution. The RECOMMENDED format is
sb:issuer:<base58-fingerprint> where the fingerprint is the first
12 characters of the Base58-encoded Ed25519 public key.
sig (REQUIRED): The signature over the signing input defined in
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Section 6.6, encoded as a lowercase hexadecimal string. The
encoded length is determined by the algorithm named in alg and is
not fixed by this document: Ed25519 produces 64 bytes and
therefore 128 hexadecimal characters, while other registered
algorithms produce other lengths. Verifiers MUST NOT reject a
signature on encoded length alone.
2.2. Payload
The payload is a JSON object whose schema depends on the receipt
type. This section lists the members common to all payload types.
Members specific to one receipt type are defined with that type in
Section 3. A member defined elsewhere in this document that may
appear in any payload type is listed here.
type (REQUIRED): A namespaced string identifying the receipt type.
Examples: "protectmcp:decision", "protectmcp:restraint",
"blindllm:arena-battle".
issued_at (REQUIRED): ISO 8601 timestamp [RFC3339] of when the
receipt was created. MUST include timezone designator (typically
"Z" for UTC).
issuer_id (REQUIRED): The identifier of the entity that issued and
signed the receipt. MUST match the kid field in the signature
object.
previousReceiptHash (OPTIONAL): A link to the immediately preceding
receipt in a receipt chain, present at most once. When present it
MUST be a member of the payload object, not of the enclosing
receipt object, and its value MUST be computed as specified in
Section 6.7.
The first receipt in a chain MUST omit the member entirely rather
than carrying null or an empty string, which would produce
different JCS output and therefore a different signature. A
receipt that omits it is either a chain genesis or an unchained
receipt; the format does not distinguish these, and a verifier
MUST NOT infer chain membership from its absence.
evidence (OPTIONAL): The evidentiary basis the decision rested on,
as defined in Section 4. When present it MUST be an array. A
verifier that does not implement the predicate MUST still verify
the receipt signature and chain, and MUST ignore this member
otherwise.
committed_fields_root (OPTIONAL): The Merkle root committing to
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selectively disclosable fields, as defined in Section 6. Present
only in commitment mode. A verifier that does not implement
commitment mode MUST ignore this member when verifying the
signature, though the member remains covered by that signature.
payload_digest (OPTIONAL): A content-addressable hash of associated
data (tool input, tool output, or other large payloads) that is
too large to embed in the receipt. Format: an object containing
hash (SHA-256 hex string), size (byte count), and optionally
preview (first 256 characters). Enables integrity verification of
associated data without embedding it in the receipt.
hook_latency_ms (OPTIONAL): The time in milliseconds spent
evaluating the policy decision. Enables operators to verify that
security middleware adds negligible overhead (<5ms is RECOMMENDED
for synchronous policy checks).
tool_duration_ms (OPTIONAL): The time in milliseconds between the
initiation and completion of the tool invocation. Present only in
post-execution receipts.
sandbox_state (OPTIONAL): Whether the execution environment had OS-
level containment active at the time of the decision. One of:
"enabled", "disabled", "unavailable". Enables auditors to verify
that agent actions occurred within a sandboxed environment.
action_ref (OPTIONAL): A cross-engine correlation anchor: the
SHA-256 hash of the canonical representation of the action being
evaluated. When two or more governance engines evaluate the same
action independently, both receipts carry the same action_ref,
enabling bilateral verification without either engine needing to
trust the other.
The computation is:
action_ref = SHA-256(canonicalize({
agentId,
actionType,
scopeRequired,
timestamp
}))
where canonicalize follows RFC 8785 (JCS) and scopeRequired is
sorted lexicographically before canonicalization. The resulting
hex string is deterministic: same inputs produce the same hash
regardless of implementation language.
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This field is RECOMMENDED when the receipt will be consumed by
external governance frameworks or cross-engine audit tools.
iteration_id (OPTIONAL): A logical iteration grouping identifier for
multi-step agent workflows. When an agent runs in an optimization
loop or a multi-round deliberation, receipts within the same
iteration share the same iteration_id. This enables behavioral
analysis tools to group receipts by logical iteration rather than
by receipt count.
The value is an opaque string. Hierarchy may be encoded by
convention using dot-separated segments (e.g., "run_7.sub_3"
encodes a nested iteration at depth 2). The field is agent-
declared metadata for grouping purposes, NOT a security boundary:
a malicious agent could set misleading values. Receipt signatures
cover this field (tamper-evident) but do not vouch for its
semantic accuracy.
3. Receipt Types
This specification defines six receipt types. Implementations MAY
define additional types using the namespaced type field.
3.1. Access Decision Receipt
Type: protectmcp:decision
Records the outcome of a policy evaluation for a tool invocation.
{
"type": "protectmcp:decision",
"tool_name": "delete_database",
"decision": "deny",
"reason": "tier_insufficient",
"agent_tier": "signed-known",
"required_tier": "privileged",
"policy_digest": "sha256:a8f3...c91e",
"session_id": "ses_7f8a2b",
"issued_at": "2026-03-22T14:32:04.102Z",
"issuer_id": "sb:issuer:4Kpm7Q3wXx2b"
}
3.1.1. Fields
tool_name (REQUIRED): The name of the tool being invoked, as
declared in the MCP tools/list response.
decision (REQUIRED): The policy evaluation result. One of: "allow",
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"deny", "rate_limit", "require_approval". The value
"require_approval" records that the action was held pending human
approval at decision time; the terminal outcome of the held
action, if it executes, is recorded in a subsequent receipt.
reason (OPTIONAL): A machine-readable reason code for the decision.
Examples: "tier_insufficient", "rate_exceeded", "policy_block",
"agent_refusal".
agent_tier (OPTIONAL): The trust tier of the requesting agent at the
time of the decision. One of: "unknown", "signed-known",
"evidenced", "privileged".
required_tier (OPTIONAL): The minimum trust tier required by the
policy for this tool.
policy_digest (OPTIONAL): A content-addressable hash of the policy
in effect at the time of the decision. Format: "sha256:<hex>",
computed per Section 6.8. A digest whose construction is not
published is an opaque label, not a commitment; see Section 6.8.1.
session_id (OPTIONAL): An opaque identifier for the MCP session.
MUST NOT contain PII or be correlatable across sessions unless the
operator explicitly configures session binding.
3.2. Restraint Receipt
Type: protectmcp:restraint
Records an agent's interaction with a policy boundary, specifically
whether the agent attempted to use a restricted tool and whether the
restriction was enforced by an external policy or self-imposed.
{
"type": "protectmcp:restraint",
"agent_id": "sb:agent:8xKm3Qw2Yb1c",
"agent_manifest_version": "1.2.0",
"tool_name": "rm_rf",
"decision": "deny",
"denial_type": "policy-block",
"issued_at": "2026-03-22T14:35:12.441Z",
"issuer_id": "sb:issuer:4Kpm7Q3wXx2b"
}
3.2.1. Fields
agent_id (REQUIRED): The identifier of the agent whose tool call was
evaluated.
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agent_manifest_version (REQUIRED): The semantic version of the
agent's manifest at the time of the decision.
tool_name (REQUIRED): The tool that was called or attempted.
decision (REQUIRED): One of: "allow", "deny".
denial_type (OPTIONAL): If the decision is "deny", indicates whether
the denial was imposed by external policy ("policy-block") or
self-imposed by the agent ("agent-refusal").
3.3. Arena Battle Receipt
Type: blindllm:arena-battle
Records the outcome of a competitive evaluation between two AI
agents, as conducted by a neutral arena platform.
{
"type": "blindllm:arena-battle",
"battle_id": "bat_9x8f7a2b",
"lane_id": "lane_creative_writing",
"agent_a": {
"id": "sb:agent:3mK9pQ7wXx2b",
"manifest_version": "2.1.0"
},
"agent_b": {
"id": "sb:agent:8xKm3Qw2Yb1c",
"manifest_version": "1.4.0"
},
"winner": "A",
"issued_at": "2026-03-22T15:00:00.000Z",
"issuer_id": "sb:issuer:4Kpm7Q3wXx2b"
}
3.3.1. Fields
battle_id (REQUIRED): Unique identifier for the battle instance.
lane_id (REQUIRED): The evaluation category or "lane" in which the
battle occurred.
agent_a, agent_b (REQUIRED): Objects identifying each participant,
containing: - id: The agent's passport identifier. -
manifest_version: The agent's manifest version at battle time.
winner (REQUIRED): One of: "A", "B", "tie".
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3.4. Agent Lifecycle Receipt
Type: protectmcp:lifecycle
Records agent lifecycle events in multi-agent orchestration systems
(swarms, coordinator mode, scheduled agents). Enables reconstruction
of the full agent topology from the receipt DAG.
{
"type": "protectmcp:lifecycle",
"lifecycle_event": "subagent_start",
"agent_id": "worker-a1b",
"agent_type": "general-purpose",
"parent_session_id": "ses_7f8a2b",
"team_name": "backend-ops",
"sandbox_state": "enabled",
"issued_at": "2026-04-01T10:15:00.000Z",
"issuer_id": "sb:issuer:4Kpm7Q3wXx2b"
}
3.4.1. Fields
lifecycle_event (REQUIRED): One of: "subagent_start",
"subagent_stop", "session_start", "session_end", "task_created",
"task_completed", "teammate_idle", "config_change".
agent_id (OPTIONAL): The identifier of the agent involved in the
lifecycle event.
agent_type (OPTIONAL): The type of agent (e.g., "coordinator",
"worker", "standalone", "general-purpose").
parent_session_id (OPTIONAL): The session identifier of the parent/
coordinator agent. Creates a verifiable parent-child relationship
in the DAG.
team_name (OPTIONAL): The team or swarm name, if operating in multi-
agent mode.
3.5. Spending Authority Receipt
Type: scopeblind:spending_authority
Records the outcome of an issuer-blind spending authorization check.
Proves that an agent's purchase is within authorized limits without
revealing organizational identity, budget ceiling, or delegation
chain.
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{
"type": "scopeblind:spending_authority",
"amount": 99.50,
"currency": "USD",
"category": "cloud_compute",
"utilization_band": "low",
"decision": "allow",
"policy_digest": "sha256:a8f3...c91e",
"issued_at": "2026-04-01T12:00:00.000Z",
"issuer_id": "sb:issuer:4Kpm7Q3wXx2b"
}
3.5.1. Fields
amount (REQUIRED): The monetary amount of the transaction.
currency (REQUIRED): ISO 4217 currency code (e.g., "USD").
category (OPTIONAL): A classification of the spending type (e.g.,
"cloud_compute", "saas_subscription", "api_usage").
utilization_band (OPTIONAL): A coarse indicator of budget
utilization. One of: "low" (<25%), "medium" (25-75%), "high"
(75-100%), "exceeded". The exact budget ceiling is NOT disclosed,
only the band. This prevents price discrimination while proving
budget compliance.
decision (REQUIRED): One of: "allow", "deny".
The receipt deliberately EXCLUDES: organization name, total budget
ceiling, exact remaining budget, agent identity, and delegation
chain. Verification uses VOPRF ([RFC9497]) to confirm receipt
validity without the verifier learning which organization issued it.
3.6. Formal Debate Receipt
Type: blindllm:formal-debate
Records the outcome of a structured debate with audience and judge
scoring. Extends the arena battle format with additional governance
fields.
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{
"type": "blindllm:formal-debate",
"debate_id": "dbt_4f2a8c",
"spec_id": "spec_ai_safety_v2",
"lane_id": "lane_policy",
"artifact_hash": "sha256:b3c4d5e6...",
"resolution_hash": "sha256:f7a8b9c0...",
"pro": {
"id": "sb:agent:3mK9pQ7wXx2b",
"manifest_version": "2.1.0"
},
"con": {
"id": "sb:agent:8xKm3Qw2Yb1c",
"manifest_version": "1.4.0"
},
"audience_winner": "pro",
"judge_winner": "pro",
"restraint_result": "clean",
"issued_at": "2026-03-22T16:30:00.000Z",
"issuer_id": "sb:issuer:4Kpm7Q3wXx2b"
}
4. Evidence Predicate
An Access Decision Receipt records which decision was made and, via
policy_digest, under which policy. For high-stakes actions the
decision's evidentiary basis is itself material: was the action
cleared because data-rights were satisfied, provenance verified, and
compliance posture fresh, or held because one of those failed? The
OPTIONAL evidence field records that basis. It is defined here for
the Access Decision Receipt; other receipt types MAY carry it with
the same semantics.
"evidence": [
{ "dimension": "data_rights", "state": "satisfied",
"source": {
"authority": "Example Fund Administrator",
"ref": "sha256:...",
"kid": "sb:issuer:9admin7Custo",
"alg": "EdDSA",
"sig": "<hex signature by the administrator over the claim>" },
"as_of": "2026-06-30T21:00:00Z" },
{ "dimension": "provenance", "state": "failed",
"source": { "authority": "runtime:request-origin",
"ref": "request/origin-header" } }
]
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4.1. Fields
dimension (REQUIRED): The class of evidence. Core values:
"data_rights", "provenance", "compliance", "freshness", "consent",
"identity", "authorization", "integrity". Implementations MAY
define additional dimensions using a namespaced extension of the
form x-<vendor>:<name>, where <vendor> matches [a-z0-9]+ and
<name> matches [a-z0-9_.-]+ (both lowercase).
state (REQUIRED): The evaluated state of this dimension at decision
time. One of: "satisfied", "unverified", "stale", "failed",
"not_applicable".
source (REQUIRED): The provenance of the evidence, an object with
authority (the attesting party; advisory), ref (a resolvable
reference or a "sha256:<hex>" digest of the attested subject), an
OPTIONAL kid (the attesting authority's key id), an OPTIONAL alg
(the signature algorithm, taking the same values as the alg member
of Section 2.1.1, and defaulting to "EdDSA" when absent), and an
OPTIONAL sig (the authority's signature over the JCS-canonical
claim, encoded as a lowercase hexadecimal string and verifiable
under kid). As in Section 2.1.1, the encoded length of sig is
determined by alg and is not fixed by this document; a relying
party MUST NOT reject a source signature on encoded length alone.
An attesting authority need not use the same algorithm as the
receipt signer. See Section 4.3: a named authority or kid is NOT
proof of authorship; only a verified sig is.
as_of (OPTIONAL): An RFC 3339 timestamp of when the evidence was
current. RECOMMENDED for freshness-relevant dimensions.
The signed claim is the JSON object built from the entry's dimension,
state, and as_of together with the source's ref: { dimension, ref,
state } plus an as_of member when the entry carries one. When as_of
is absent the as_of member is OMITTED from the claim; it MUST NOT be
encoded as null. The producer canonicalizes this object under JCS
and signs the resulting bytes; source.sig is that signature. A
relying party reconstructs the same claim from the entry and verifies
source.sig over its JCS bytes.
4.2. Properties
evidence is OPTIONAL and additive. A verifier that does not
understand it MUST still verify the receipt's signature and chain;
the field is covered by the signature (tamper-evident) but requires
no verifier action. It is canonicalized under JCS with the rest of
the payload and is therefore signed. It MUST NOT carry raw evidence
content (positions, prompts, tool payloads); it carries states,
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references, digests, and timestamps only.
Evidence entries MAY be committed and selectively disclosed under
Section 6. When they are, the unit of disclosure MUST be the whole
entry. A producer MUST NOT disclose an entry's dimension and state
while withholding its source, because a relying party cannot apply
Section 4.3 to an entry whose source it cannot see, and a disclosed
"satisfied" with no visible source is precisely the false assurance
Section 9.9 warns against. Withholding an entry in full is
permitted; a relying party MUST NOT infer from a disclosed set that
no further entries exist.
4.3. Trust Model
evidence is a set of claims made by the receipt SIGNER. Every field
of every entry, including source.authority and source.kid, is inside
the payload the signer fully controls; the receipt signature proves
only that the signer ASSERTED them. A present or trusted-looking
source.kid is therefore NOT proof that the named authority attested
anything. It is exactly the in-payload, signer-controlled value that
Section 9.5 warns is "strictly worse than no signature at all,
because it provides false assurance."
A relying party MUST NOT treat any evidence dimension as INDEPENDENT
corroboration unless ALL of the following hold: (1) the entry carries
a source.sig; (2) the relying party obtains the corresponding public
key OUT OF BAND via the mechanisms in Section 9.5 (not from the
receipt) and confirms that key's identifier equals source.kid; (3)
the relying party's out-of-band trust policy identifies the source
key as belonging to a control domain DISTINCT from the receipt
signer. At a minimum, the source public key MUST NOT equal the key
that signed the enclosing receipt; and (4) source.sig verifies under
that key over the JCS bytes of the claim.
Condition 3 is load-bearing: every relying party MUST already pin the
receipt signer's own key out of band, because that is the only way to
verify the receipt at all. Public-key inequality alone is necessary
but not sufficient: the relying party also needs a trust-policy
determination that the source key is outside the receipt signer's
control. Without this requirement, a receipt signer could sign an
evidence claim with its OWN key, satisfy conditions 1, 2, and 4, and
manufacture "independent" corroboration of itself. An entry whose
source.kid resolves to the receipt's signing key, or whose control
domain cannot be established independently, is self-attestation and
MUST NOT be counted as independent corroboration.
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A dimension without a verifiable, independent source.sig is the
receipt signer's own claim and MUST NOT raise the assurance a relying
party places in the decision, regardless of the authority or kid it
names. Producers SHOULD mark a self-attested basis with an authority
of runtime:<component>, but this labelling is advisory: because the
producer controls it, a relying party MUST identify a non-
corroborating dimension by the ABSENCE of a verifiable, independent
source.sig, not by trusting the label.
A verified source.sig proves only that the authority attested the
claim tuple; it does NOT prove the authority observed or endorsed the
enclosing decision. The claim binds nothing from the receipt (no
session_id, policy_digest, tool_name, or decision), so the same
signed claim may lawfully appear in many receipts. A relying party
MUST additionally judge whether the claim's ref and as_of pertain to
the action being decided, and SHOULD bound acceptance by as_of.
5. Signing and Verification
5.1. Signing Process
1. Construct the payload object with all required fields.
2. Construct the receipt object carrying that payload as its payload
member.
3. Form the signing input for the envelope shape: canonicalize the
payload member using JCS [RFC8785]. The canonical form is a
deterministic JSON serialization with sorted keys and no
whitespace. The signing input is the payload member alone; it
does not include the enclosing receipt object. For the flat
shape the signing input is the receipt minus its signature
member. See Section 6.6, which an implementation MUST consult
before computing either.
4. Convert the canonical JSON string to a UTF-8 byte sequence.
5. Sign the byte sequence using Ed25519 [RFC8032] with the issuer's
secret key.
6. Encode the signature as a lowercase hexadecimal string.
7. Attach the signature object to the original (non-canonicalized)
receipt as its signature member. The transmitted receipt carries
the payload exactly as constructed; canonicalization is performed
only to derive the signing input and its output is not
transmitted.
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5.2. Verification Process
1. Determine the receipt shape as defined in Section 6.6 and extract
the signature. In the envelope shape the signature is the
signature member, an object. In the flat shape it is the
signature member, a hexadecimal string, and the algorithm and key
identifier are carried as separate members of the receipt.
2. Reconstruct the signing input for the shape received, as defined
in Section 6.6: for the envelope shape, canonicalize the payload
member as received; for the flat shape, canonicalize the receipt
minus its signature member. This reproduces the byte string the
signer formed in Section 5.1. Applying the wrong shape's rule
produces a different byte string and causes verification of
correctly signed receipts to fail.
3. Convert the canonical JSON to a UTF-8 byte sequence.
4. Resolve the public key using the key identifier carried by the
receipt. The RECOMMENDED resolution mechanism is a JWK Set
endpoint [RFC7517] at /.well-known/acta-keys.json. The key MUST
be obtained through that mechanism or another out-of-band trust
anchor, never from the receipt itself; see Section 9.5.
5. Verify the signature over the canonical bytes using the resolved
public key and the algorithm declared by the receipt, not an
algorithm assumed by the verifier; see Section 6.9.
6. If verification succeeds, the receipt is authentic and has not
been tampered with. If verification fails, the receipt MUST be
rejected.
5.3. Public Key Distribution
Issuers SHOULD publish their public keys as a JWK Set [RFC7517] at a
well-known endpoint:
GET /.well-known/acta-keys.json
{
"keys": [{
"kty": "OKP",
"crv": "Ed25519",
"kid": "sb:issuer:4Kpm7Q3wXx2b",
"x": "<base64url-encoded-public-key>",
"use": "sig"
}]
}
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The x parameter MUST be the base64url-encoded Ed25519 public key as
specified in [RFC8037].
For offline verification, public keys MAY be distributed out-of-band
(e.g., embedded in configuration files, published in DNS TXT records,
or included in agent manifests).
6. Commitment Mode (Optional Extension)
This section defines an OPTIONAL extension that allows a receipt to
carry cryptographic commitments to its field values in place of (or
alongside) cleartext. Selective disclosure is performed by revealing
inclusion proofs for individual fields. The commitment construction
is SHA-256 over a salt-prefixed canonical leaf, organized into a
Merkle tree following [RFC6962] domain-separation conventions.
A receipt that uses commitment mode includes a single new field,
committed_fields_root, in its payload. Verifiers that do not
recognize this field MUST ignore it when performing signature
verification, as the field is part of the canonical signed payload
but its semantics are scoped to consumers that opt into commitment
mode.
The Merkle tree organization is byte-identical to Certificate
Transparency [RFC6962], and implementations SHOULD reuse code from
that ecosystem.
This construction is not SD-JWT. SD-JWT [RFC9901] achieves selective
disclosure with salted hashes placed in an _sd array, with no tree;
this extension commits to fields through an RFC 6962 Merkle tree.
The two are different constructions and produce different bytes. A
deployment that needs selective disclosure over JWT claims, and does
not need a tree, SHOULD use SD-JWT rather than this extension.
6.1. Merkle Tree Construction
Implementations MUST use the following RFC 6962-style construction
with explicit one-byte domain separation:
leaf_hash = SHA-256(0x00 || canonical_leaf_bytes)
internal_hash = SHA-256(0x01 || left_child_hash || right_child_hash)
For a list of leaf hashes D of length n:
* If n == 1, the Merkle root is D[0].
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* Otherwise, let k be the largest power of two strictly less than n.
The root is SHA-256(0x01 || MerkleRoot(D[0..k]) ||
MerkleRoot(D[k..n])).
This construction handles non-power-of-two leaf counts without
padding by recursively splitting on the largest power of two,
matching [RFC6962] Section 2.1.
The committed_fields_root field MUST be the lowercase hex encoding of
the resulting 32-byte Merkle root.
6.2. Canonical Leaf Layout
Each leaf encodes a single committed field as a JCS [RFC8785]-
canonicalized JSON object:
canonical_leaf_bytes = JCS({
"name": field_name,
"salt": base64url_unpadded(salt_bytes),
"value": field_value
})
The name field MUST be the field's identifier within the receipt
payload (e.g., "principal", "action"). Including the field name in
the leaf binds the commitment to a specific field and prevents cross-
field substitution attacks. The value field MUST be the cleartext
field value, preserving its original JSON type (string, number,
boolean, object, or array). The salt field MUST be the base64url-
encoded (without padding, per [RFC4648] Section 5) byte string of the
salt.
6.3. Leaf Sort Order
Leaves MUST be ordered by the byte-lexicographic order of the UTF-8
encoded name field. Implementations MUST NOT apply locale-aware
collation, case folding, or Unicode normalization. Two
implementations that disagree on sort order will produce different
roots; this rule eliminates that source of interoperability failure.
6.4. Salt Construction and Storage
Each committed field MUST have its own salt. Salts MUST be at least
16 bytes and SHOULD be 32 bytes. Implementations SHOULD generate
salts using a cryptographically secure random number generator (e.g.,
crypto.getRandomValues in browsers, or os.urandom on POSIX).
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Implementations MAY derive salts deterministically from a per-subject
master secret, but MUST ensure that erasure of one subject's master
secret cannot affect commitments belonging to other subjects. The
simplest implementation strategy is to use a fresh random salt per
field per receipt; this is the RECOMMENDED default.
The salt-prefix ordering for the leaf-level hash inside the canonical
leaf JSON object is implementation-internal: the leaf hash is SHA-256
over the JCS-canonicalized object, not over a raw concatenation.
This sidesteps salt-ordering ambiguity entirely.
For implementations that emit a separate per-field commitment value
alongside the Merkle leaf (for example, in earlier draft versions or
in a per-field disclosure envelope), the per-field commitment MUST be
computed as SHA-256(salt || value_bytes) where value_bytes is the
UTF-8 encoding of the JSON-stringified value. Implementations MUST
NOT use the reverse ordering SHA-256(value_bytes || salt); receipts
that do so MUST be rejected as malformed.
6.5. Selective Disclosure
To disclose a single field to a verifier, the discloser provides:
1. The cleartext field name, value, and salt.
2. A Merkle inclusion proof, consisting of the leaf's zero-based
index within the canonically-sorted leaf list, the total
tree_size, and the ordered list of siblings (hex-encoded SHA-256
hashes) along the path from the leaf to the root.
No left/right indicator is carried for each sibling, and none is
needed. Because Section 6.1 fixes the split at the largest power of
two strictly less than the node count, the side of every sibling is
determined by index and tree_size alone, and a verifier MUST derive
it under that rule. This is deliberate rather than an omission. A
verifier that instead assumes a padded fixed-depth tree, taking the
side from the bits of index as is common in implementations that pad
the leaf count up to a power of two, agrees with this construction
only when the leaf count is already a power of two and diverges at
every other size. For tree_size 5 and index 4 the correct path has
one element, while the padded derivation expects three.
The verifier reconstructs the leaf hash from the disclosed (name,
salt, value) tuple, walks the inclusion proof, and compares the
resulting root to committed_fields_root in the signed receipt.
Mismatch MUST cause the disclosure to be rejected.
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A formal Disclosure object with recipient binding, expiry, custody
chain, and revocation handle is OUT OF SCOPE for this draft and is
deferred to a future revision. Implementations MAY use a minimal
disclosure envelope of {name, value, salt, proof} in the interim.
6.6. Signature Scope (Normative Clarification)
The signature MUST cover the canonical JCS bytes of the _signing
input_ directly: the UTF-8 byte sequence produced by the signing
process in Section 5.1, used as the message input to the signature
algorithm with no intermediate hash.
Two receipt shapes are in use, and the signing input differs between
them. An implementation MUST determine the shape before computing
the signing input, and MUST NOT apply one shape's rule to the other;
the two produce different byte strings, and crossing them causes
verification of correctly signed receipts to fail.
Envelope shape: The receipt is the object shown in Section 2.1,
carrying exactly two members: a payload member and a signature
member that is an object with alg, kid, and sig. The signing
input is JCS(payload): the payload member canonicalized on its
own, not the enclosing receipt object.
Flat shape: The receipt carries its fields at the top level
alongside a signature member that is a hexadecimal string. There
is no payload member to canonicalize, so the signing input is the
receipt object with the signature member removed, canonicalized.
This shape predates the envelope and remains in use; new
implementations SHOULD emit the envelope shape.
In both shapes the signing input excludes the signature, and in
neither is the signature computed over a receipt that already
contains one.
In either shape the object canonicalized MUST NOT contain a signature
member, and that member MUST NOT be included as null or as the empty
string; these produce different JCS output and break
interoperability.
The alg and kid members of the signature object are therefore not
covered by the signature. A verifier resolves the key from kid
through the mechanisms in Section 9.5 and verification fails if
either member is altered, so this is not a substitution vector, but a
verifier MUST NOT treat either member as attested content.
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Standard PureEdDSA [RFC8032] hashes the message internally;
implementations MUST NOT pre-hash the canonical bytes (for example
with SHA-256) before signing.
6.7. Chain Hash Scope (Normative Clarification)
The previousReceiptHash field MUST be the string "sha256:" followed
by the lowercase hex encoding of SHA-256(JCS(receipt)), where receipt
is the entire signed receipt object including the signature member.
For example: "sha256:6699b21fea5819eea4df...".
Two choices here are deliberate.
The preimage is the whole receipt, not its payload member. Including
the signature binds the chain to specific signed bytes, so re-signing
an identical payload, after a key rotation for instance, produces a
distinct chain link and is visible as a chain event. Hashing the
payload alone would make a re-signed receipt indistinguishable from
the original, which is the opposite of what a chain is for.
The algorithm prefix makes the digest self-describing, matching the
form used by policy_digest and by source.ref in Section 4. A
verifier MUST reject a previousReceiptHash whose prefix names an
algorithm it does not implement, rather than assuming SHA-256 from
the length. A bare hex digest with no prefix is the encoding used by
earlier revisions; verifiers MAY accept it for compatibility but MUST
NOT emit it.
6.8. Policy Digest Construction (Normative)
A policy_digest is only evidence if a verifier who has never
communicated with the evaluator can recompute it from public bytes
alone. An identifier whose derivation is private relocates the self-
attestation problem from the decision to the policy: the verifier
must trust the evaluator's claim about which policy governed the
decision. To close this, the digest construction is normative.
The policy digest commits to a manifest of the exact policy source
files:
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M = {
"construction": "acta-policy-digest-v1",
"engine": <engine identifier, e.g. "cedar" or "builtin">,
"files": [
{ "name": <file name>,
"sha256": <lowercase hex SHA-256 over the file's exact
UTF-8 bytes> },
...
] // sorted by name, code point order
}
policy_digest = "sha256:" || lowercase_hex(SHA-256(UTF-8(JCS(M))))
Rules:
* Each file is hashed individually over its exact bytes.
Implementations MUST NOT concatenate policy sources before
hashing: concatenation cannot distinguish the file sets ["ab","c"]
and ["a","bc"], and a join delimiter only relocates the ambiguity.
* Entries are sorted by name in code point order, so the digest is
independent of directory read order. Names are included in the
manifest, so renames produce a distinct digest.
* For a policy supplied as a single in-memory source rather than a
file, the entry name MUST be "policy.<ext>" for the engine's
conventional extension (for Cedar, "policy.cedar").
* For policy expressed as structured configuration rather than
source files, the file bytes are the UTF-8 encoding of the JCS
canonical form of the policy object, under the name "policy.json".
Signature validity and policy freshness remain distinct checks: a
receipt whose policy_digest matches a genuinely published policy can
still be stale if that policy is no longer the one in force at
verification time. A conformant verifier that evaluates policy
binding MUST compare the receipt's digest against the policy
currently in force, in addition to verifying the receipt signature.
Compatibility note: implementations of earlier revisions of this
document (protect-mcp before 0.10.0) emitted engine-specific digest
preimages truncated to 16 hexadecimal characters with no algorithm
prefix. Verifiers SHOULD treat such values as opaque labels rather
than recomputable commitments.
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6.8.1. Policy Publication
An issuer that wants third parties to verify which policy governed
its decisions publishes the policy bytes and the preimage
specification together, addressed by the digest itself:
https://<issuer-domain>/.well-known/acta-policies/<hex>.json
{
"schema": "acta.policy-bundle.v1",
"construction": "acta-policy-digest-v1",
"engine": "cedar",
"policy_digest": "sha256:<hex>",
"files": [
{ "name": <file name>, "sha256": <hex>, "content": <string> },
...
],
"generated_at": <RFC 3339 timestamp>
}
where <hex> in the path is the digest value without the "sha256:"
prefix. A verifier recomputes the bundle from its own bytes: hash
each content and compare to its sha256, construct the manifest M from
the (name, sha256) pairs, and compare "sha256:" || hex(SHA-
256(JCS(M))) to policy_digest. No communication with the issuer
beyond fetching the bundle is required, and the bundle MAY equally be
delivered out of band.
6.9. Signature Algorithm Agility
Receipts MAY be signed with any of the following algorithms,
identified by their JOSE/JWS algorithm names [RFC7518]:
* EdDSA (Ed25519, [RFC8032]): Mandatory-to-implement (MTI) baseline.
* ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204): RECOMMENDED for new deployments and post-
quantum readiness.
* ES256 (ECDSA over P-256): Permitted for compatibility with
existing credentials, particularly those used in
[I-D.google-cfrg-libzk] ZK proof composition.
The signature object MUST contain an alg field carrying the algorithm
name as a string. Verifiers MUST verify each receipt against the
algorithm declared in its own signature.alg field. Chains MAY
contain receipts signed under different algorithms; verifiers MUST
handle each receipt independently.
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The hash-based constructions in this document degrade gracefully
under quantum attack rather than breaking. Grover's algorithm
reduces SHA-256 pre-image resistance to roughly 2^128 work, which
remains infeasible. Collision resistance is already bounded at 2^128
classically by the birthday bound, and known quantum collision
methods do not improve on that at any practical memory or time cost.
These constructions therefore need no change. The classical-
cryptography component is the outer signature, which the algorithm
agility above allows to be upgraded in place.
6.10. Context Binding for ZK Proofs
When a receipt's principal (or any committed field) references a
zero-knowledge proof produced under a separate ZK protocol (e.g.,
[I-D.google-cfrg-libzk]), the ZK proof MUST bind to the receipt's
committed_fields_root as a public input or context hash. Without
this binding, a valid ZK proof is replayable into a different receipt
with a different committed_fields_root.
The committed-fields root serves double duty: it commits to the
selectively-disclosable receipt content, and it provides a
deterministic, signature-independent context hash that any external
proof system can bind against.
6.11. Test Vectors
An interoperability test suite is published alongside this draft.
The minimum set is:
* A cleartext receipt with no committed_fields_root field (signature
and JCS output only).
* A receipt with four committed fields: the expected Merkle root and
an inclusion proof for each field.
* A chain of three receipts: the expected previousReceiptHash
values.
* A tampered Merkle proof: MUST fail verification.
* An algorithm-mixed chain (Ed25519 followed by ML-DSA-65): MUST
verify successfully when each receipt is checked against its own
algorithm.
* A non-power-of-two leaf count (e.g., five committed fields):
exercises the recursive split rule.
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Test vectors use fixed (non-random) salts to remain reproducible
across implementations. Production deployments MUST NOT reuse the
test-vector salts and MUST follow the salt construction guidance in
Section 6.4.
7. Trust Tiers
This specification defines a four-level trust hierarchy for agent
identity. Trust tiers are used by policy engines to gate tool
access.
unknown: No identity presented. Default tier for anonymous
connections.
signed-known: Agent presents a valid signed manifest with a
verifiable Ed25519 public key. Identity is pseudonymous but
consistent.
evidenced: Agent has accumulated verifiable evidence receipts (e.g.,
arena battle outcomes, successful restraint records) that
demonstrate a track record of trustworthy behavior.
privileged: Operator has explicitly granted elevated access.
Typically requires out-of-band verification (e.g., organization
membership, contractual agreement).
Trust tier transitions are unidirectional within a session but MAY be
re-evaluated across sessions based on accumulated evidence.
8. Agent Identity
8.1. Passport Manifest
An agent's identity is expressed as a signed manifest:
{
"type": "scopeblind:agent-manifest",
"id": "sb:agent:3mK9pQ7wXx2b",
"version": "2.1.0",
"previous_version": "2.0.0",
"created_at": "2026-03-20T10:00:00Z",
"public_key": "<base58-ed25519-public-key>"
}
Manifests are IMMUTABLE once signed. Version changes create new
manifests that reference their predecessor via previous_version,
forming a verifiable version chain.
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8.2. DPoP Binding (Future)
For remote MCP transports (HTTP/SSE), agent identity MAY be bound to
per-request proof-of-possession using DPoP [RFC9449]. The
auth_key_bindings field in the manifest links the agent's Ed25519
identity key to one or more P-256 DPoP keys.
This binding creates a verifiable delegation chain:
Operator -> Agent Identity (Ed25519) -> Request Auth (P-256 DPoP)
9. Security Considerations
9.1. Replay Protection
Receipts include an issued_at timestamp but do not include a nonce or
sequence number.
This guidance applies to _live presentation_: a receipt offered as
evidence of a currently effective authorization. In that case
verifiers SHOULD reject receipts whose timestamps are unreasonably
old (implementation-defined; 24 hours is RECOMMENDED as a default).
It does not apply to _archival verification_: examining a receipt as
a record of what was authorized at some past time, which is one of
the purposes stated in Section 1. Applying a freshness window there
would reject every receipt in an audit older than the window. A
verifier performing archival verification SHOULD NOT apply one, and
SHOULD report the receipt's age rather than deciding on the caller's
behalf.
For environments requiring stronger replay protection,
implementations MAY add a nonce field to the payload.
9.2. Key Compromise
If an issuer's signing key is compromised, all receipts signed with
that key become suspect. Issuers SHOULD implement key rotation by
publishing new keys at the well-known endpoint and including a
valid_from / valid_until window in the JWK metadata.
Verifiers SHOULD check key validity windows when available.
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9.3. Payload Privacy
Receipts are designed to capture decision metadata, NOT request
content. Implementations MUST NOT include raw prompts, tool
arguments, API keys, or other sensitive parameters in receipt
payloads.
The tool_name and decision fields are considered non-sensitive. The
session_id field SHOULD be an opaque identifier that is not
correlatable across sessions.
9.4. Canonicalization Attacks
The signing process relies on JCS [RFC8785] for deterministic
serialization. Implementations MUST use a conformant JCS
implementation to prevent canonicalization divergence attacks where
the signed bytes differ from the verified bytes.
9.5. Key Distribution and Trust Anchors
Receipts are designed to be verified by parties who do not trust the
issuer and did not observe the decision being made. This property
(the "issuer-blind" property) is the basis for the third-party
auditability claim of this document. The property holds only if the
verification key a verifier uses to check a signature is sourced
through a channel outside the signed payload itself.
Verifiers MUST NOT accept a verification key transported inside the
receipt envelope (including but not limited to fields such as
public_key, verification_key, verification_jwk, or any equivalent
name under the signed payload) unless that key is independently
anchored by an authenticated trust source. An embedded key is
strictly controllable by any party able to produce the rest of the
payload; a signature that verifies under an attacker-chosen key
provides no authenticity guarantee against tampering and is strictly
worse than no signature at all, because it provides false assurance.
Conformant verifiers MUST resolve verification keys through one or
more of the following external mechanisms, in order of preference
when multiple are available:
1. A JWK Set [RFC7517] retrieved from a URL bound to the issuer by
an independently authenticated trust root (e.g., a server TLS
certificate validated via the Web PKI, or a signed DNS record).
2. A DID Document whose authenticity follows from the DID method's
own verification procedure.
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3. A trust anchor configured out-of-band by the verifier operator
(e.g., a pinned Ed25519 public key loaded from a verifier
configuration file).
4. A well-known endpoint of the issuer's domain, as described in
Section 5.3, provided the domain binding is independently
authenticatable.
Verifiers SHOULD expose the externally sourced key provenance to the
caller (e.g., via a keySource field in structured output) so that the
caller can distinguish a verification anchored by --jwks from one
anchored by a locally configured trust anchor. This supports defense
in depth when an operator layers key provenance constraints above
signature verification.
Implementations MAY provide a deprecated escape hatch (e.g., a
command-line flag) that allows acceptance of embedded keys during a
migration window. Such an escape hatch MUST be off by default, MUST
emit a visible warning when engaged, and MUST be removed in a
subsequent release. See the reference verifier
[I-D.verify-reference] for one such implementation.
This section was added in draft-02 in response to a public stress-
test of draft-01 that identified the embedded-key pattern as a
conformance gap. A negative conformance test vector set
([I-D.agent-governance-testvectors]) exercises the required rejection
behavior across representative envelope shapes (flat v1, structured
v2, Passport-style, full-JWK-embedded).
9.6. Verifier Identity Is Not Receipt Content
A receipt is signed by its issuer at issue time. Nothing a verifier
learns or computes later can be added to it without invalidating that
signature. A field describing which verifier checked a receipt
therefore cannot be a member of the signed payload, and a prior
revision of this document listed one.
Where a deployment needs to record which verifier performed a check,
that belongs in a separate verification report that references the
receipt by its hash and is signed by the verifier. Such a report is
out of scope for this document. A verifier MUST NOT add members to a
receipt it has verified, and a consumer MUST NOT treat any member of
a receipt as evidence about the party that verified it.
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9.7. Chain Completeness and Truncation
A receipt chain proves that the receipts a verifier holds have not
been altered and have not been reordered. It does not prove that the
verifier holds all of them.
Removing receipts from the end of a chain leaves every remaining link
and every remaining signature valid. A verifier presented with the
truncated set cannot distinguish it from a complete one, because
nothing in the set commits to how long the set is. This is the
omission most worth guarding against: the receipt an operator would
prefer a reviewer not to see is usually the most recent. Removing
receipts from the middle is detectable, since the next receipt's
previousReceiptHash will not match, and that difference is easy to
mistake for completeness.
Detecting truncation requires a commitment, external to the chain, to
the number of receipts and the terminal hash at a given point, signed
by the issuer. A verifier that checks a chain against such a
commitment can detect omission at the end; a verifier given no
commitment MUST NOT report the set as complete, and SHOULD report
that it verified integrity only.
The commitment is only worth as much as its location. Stored
alongside the receipts it describes, it is deletable by whoever
deletes the receipts, and the truncated set verifies clean again. It
constrains an issuer only once it has reached somewhere that issuer
cannot later rewrite. This document does not specify that
destination, which depends on what infrastructure the deployment
already has and what an adversary controls within it.
A further property is out of scope here: these mechanisms let one
verifier detect omission from the set it was given, but they do not
establish that every verifier was given the same set. An issuer can
maintain divergent histories and show each verifier a self-consistent
one. Detecting that requires verifiers to compare what they were
shown, through a mechanism such as a witnessed or gossiped log, and
no construction in this document provides it.
9.8. Decisions Are Not Executions
An Access Decision Receipt attests that a policy was evaluated and
what it returned. It does not attest that the action then executed,
that it succeeded, or what it returned. An "allow" receipt records
permission, not performance, and a verifier MUST NOT read one as
evidence that the tool ran.
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Where a deployment needs the executed fact, that is a separate post-
execution receipt issued after the invocation returns, binding the
decision it acted on to the observed outcome. tool_duration_ms and
sandbox_state (Section 2.2) belong to that second receipt, and their
presence in a receipt is what distinguishes it from a decision-time
one. The value "require_approval" makes the same separation explicit
for held actions.
Conflating the two is a common error in receipt formats, and it fails
in the direction that matters: a reviewer concludes an action
occurred because it was permitted, or that it was blocked because no
execution receipt exists, when the receipt set only ever established
the decision.
9.9. Evidence Predicate: False Assurance
The OPTIONAL evidence field (Section 4) can make a decision LOOK
well-founded without being so: source.authority, source.kid, and the
dimension states are all under the receipt signer's control. A
relying party MUST derive assurance ONLY from source.sig values it
verifies under out-of-band-pinned keys that are DISTINCT from the
receipt signer (see Section 4.3), never from the presence of
evidence, a plausible authority, or a matching kid. Two forgeries
are defeated by the trust model, each exercised as a negative
reference vector ([I-D.agent-governance-testvectors]) that verifies
as a receipt yet corroborates nothing: a named-key forgery (a trusted
kid copied in with no valid sig) and self-corroboration (the signer
signs the claim with its own key). An implementation that surfaces
evidence to a human or a downstream policy MUST visibly distinguish
dimensions carrying an independent, verified source.sig from those
that do not.
10. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
Future versions of this specification MAY request registration of:
* A receipt-type registry for namespaced receipt type identifiers.
* A well-known URI suffix for /.well-known/acta-keys.json.
* A media type for the receipt serialization defined in this
document. Receipts are currently exchanged as application/json,
which does not let a recipient distinguish a receipt from
arbitrary JSON before parsing it.
11. References
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11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8037] Liusvaara, I., "CFRG Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
and Signatures in JSON Object Signing and Encryption
(JOSE)", RFC 8037, DOI 10.17487/RFC8037, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8037>.
[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.
[RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
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[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
11.2. Informative References
[RFC9497] Davidson, A. and C. A. Wood, "Oblivious Pseudorandom
Functions (OPRFs) Using Prime-Order Groups", RFC 9497,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9497, December 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9497>.
[RFC9901] Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective
Disclosure for JSON Web Tokens (SD-JWT)", RFC 9901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9901, November 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9901>.
[MCP] "Model Context Protocol Specification", 2025,
<https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification>.
[I-D.serra-mcp-discovery-uri]
Serra, M., "The mcp URI Scheme and MCP Server Discovery
Mechanism", 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
serra-mcp-discovery-uri/>.
[I-D.google-cfrg-libzk]
Google, "The libzk Library for Zero-Knowledge Proofs of
Predicates over Existing Credentials", 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-google-cfrg-
libzk/>.
[I-D.verify-reference]
Farley, T., "Veritas Acta Reference Verifier
(@veritasacta/verify)", 2026,
<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@veritasacta/verify>.
[I-D.agent-governance-testvectors]
Farley, T., "Agent Governance Cross-Implementation Test
Vectors", 2026, <https://github.com/ScopeBlind/agent-
governance-testvectors>.
Appendix A. Implementation Status
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of publication.
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A.1. protect-mcp (Reference Implementation)
* Organization: ScopeBlind
* Implementation: https://www.npmjs.com/package/protect-mcp
* Description: Security gateway for MCP servers with Cedar WASM
policy evaluation, Ed25519-signed decision receipts, and Claude
Code hook integration. Supports stdio proxy mode, HTTP hook
server mode, shadow mode (log-only), and enforce mode.
* Coverage: Access Decision Receipts, Restraint Receipts, Agent
Lifecycle Receipts, Spending Authority Receipts.
* Licensing: MIT.
* Version: 0.11.1.
A.2. @veritasacta/verify (Verifier)
* Organization: Veritas Acta
* Implementation: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@veritasacta/verify
* Description: Standalone CLI and library for offline receipt
verification. Zero runtime dependencies on ScopeBlind.
* Coverage: All receipt types defined in this specification.
* Licensing: Apache-2.0.
A.3. @scopeblind/passport (Identity SDK)
* Organization: ScopeBlind
* Implementation: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@scopeblind/passport
* Description: Agent identity SDK for generating manifests, signing
receipts, and managing trust tier evidence bundles.
* Coverage: All receipt types, manifest signing, key management.
* Licensing: Apache-2.0.
A.4. protect-mcp-adk (Google ADK)
* Organization: ScopeBlind
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* Implementation: https://pypi.org/project/protect-mcp-adk/
* Description: Google Agent Development Kit plugin for Ed25519
receipt signing. BasePlugin subclass, wraps tool calls.
* Coverage: Access Decision Receipts.
* Licensing: MIT.
A.5. scopeblind-pydantic-ai (Pydantic AI)
* Organization: ScopeBlind
* Implementation: https://pypi.org/project/scopeblind-pydantic-ai/
* Description: Pydantic AI Capability for Ed25519 receipt signing.
Uses wrap_tool_execute hook for policy evaluation and signing.
* Coverage: Access Decision Receipts.
* Licensing: MIT.
A.6. scopeblind-llamaindex (LlamaIndex)
* Organization: ScopeBlind
* Implementation: https://pypi.org/project/scopeblind-llamaindex/
* Description: LlamaIndex CallbackHandler for FUNCTION_CALL events.
Signs tool calls via BaseCallbackHandler, composes with other
handlers (Langfuse, Arize, etc.).
* Coverage: Access Decision Receipts.
* Licensing: MIT.
A.7. @scopeblind/vercel-ai (Vercel AI SDK)
* Organization: ScopeBlind
* Implementation: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@scopeblind/vercel-
ai
* Description: Hooks into Vercel AI SDK's
experimental_onToolCallStart and experimental_onToolCallFinish for
per-tool-call receipt signing.
* Coverage: Access Decision Receipts.
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* Licensing: MIT.
A.8. @scopeblind/langchain (LangChain + LangGraph)
* Organization: ScopeBlind
* Implementation: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@scopeblind/
langchain
* Description: Evidence wrapper for LangChain tool calls and
LangGraph node transitions. Produces decision/execution/outcome
receipt DAGs.
* Coverage: Access Decision Receipts, graph-level receipts.
* Licensing: MIT.
* Version: 0.2.0.
A.9. Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit (Enterprise Consumer)
* Organization: Microsoft
* Implementation: https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-
toolkit
* Description: Consumes receipts via a Cedar policy bridge (PR
#667), governed examples for software tool calls (PR #1159) and
physical attestation (PR #1168). Not a signing implementation;
reads and validates receipts produced by other implementations.
* Coverage: Access Decision Receipts (consumer-only).
* Licensing: MIT.
A.10. AWS Cedar for Agents (WASM Policy Engine)
* Organization: AWS / Cedar Policy
* Implementation: https://github.com/cedar-policy/cedar-for-agents
* Description: WASM bindings for Cedar policy evaluation in JS/TS
agent hosts. SchemaGenerator (PR #64, merged) and
RequestGenerator (PR #73) enable Cedar-native policy evaluation
that produces the policy_digest field referenced in receipts.
* Coverage: Policy evaluation inputs; does not produce receipts
directly.
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* Licensing: Apache-2.0.
A.11. Sigstore Rekor (Transparency Log Anchor)
* Organization: Linux Foundation / Sigstore
* Implementation: https://rekor.sigstore.dev
* Description: Receipts submitted as DSSE entries to Rekor's public
transparency log. Provides an independent temporal anchor: the
Rekor inclusion proof and signed entry timestamp prove the receipt
existed at a specific time without trusting the receipt operator.
Working proof-of-concept submitted (issue #2798).
* Coverage: Temporal anchoring of any receipt type.
* Notes: Uses DSSE envelope with payloadType "application/
vnd.scopeblind.receipt+json". Ed25519ph (prehash variant)
required for the alternative hashedrekord entry type.
Appendix B. Example: Complete Verification Flow
The following example demonstrates end-to-end receipt creation and
verification.
B.1. Step 1: Generate Issuer Keys
import { generateIssuerKey } from '@scopeblind/passport';
const issuer = generateIssuerKey();
// issuer.issuerId = "sb:issuer:4Kpm7Q3wXx2b"
B.2. Step 2: Sign a Receipt
import { signReceipt } from '@scopeblind/passport';
const receipt = signReceipt(
{
type: "protectmcp:decision",
tool_name: "deploy",
decision: "allow",
agent_tier: "privileged",
policy_digest: "sha256:a8f3...c91e",
issued_at: "2026-03-22T14:32:06.551Z",
issuer_id: issuer.issuerId
},
issuer.secretKeyHex,
issuer.issuerId
);
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B.3. Step 3: Verify (CLI)
$ npx @veritasacta/verify receipt.json --key issuer-public.json
[ok] Signature valid
[ok] Issuer: sb:issuer:4Kpm7Q3wXx2b
[ok] Decision: allow (deploy)
[ok] Issued: 2026-03-22T14:32:06.551Z
Appendix C. Changes from -02
* New normative section Section 6.8: the policy digest construction
(acta-policy-digest-v1) is specified rather than implementation-
defined, with a per-file-hash manifest that avoids concatenation
ambiguity, and a compatibility note for pre-0.10.0 truncated
digests.
* New section Section 6.8.1: the acta.policy-bundle.v1 publication
format at .well-known/acta-policies/<hex>.json, recomputable from
the bundle bytes alone.
* Access decision receipts: "require_approval" added to the decision
value set for actions held pending human approval.
* New OPTIONAL predicate Section 4: records the evidentiary basis a
decision rested on (dimension, state, source, and an optional
as_of), additive and ignorable by existing verifiers. Section 4.3
states the condition under which a dimension counts as independent
corroboration, and Section 9.9 records the false-assurance risk:
every field is inside the payload the receipt signer controls, so
a named authority or key id is not proof that the named authority
attested anything.
* Section 6.7: previousReceiptHash carries an explicit "sha256:"
prefix, matching policy_digest and source.ref rather than being
the one bare digest in the document, and the preimage is stated as
the whole receipt with its signature. Implementations differed on
both points: some hashed the payload alone, which cannot
distinguish a re-signed receipt from the original, and some
encoded as base64url. The bare-hex form is accepted for
compatibility and no longer emitted.
* Section 2.2: verifier_sigil is removed. It described the verifier
that checked a receipt but was listed as a signed payload member,
which cannot be produced: the issuer signs the payload before any
verifier sees it. See Section 9.6.
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* Section 2.1: names the envelope as the shape new implementations
emit and points at the flat shape, rather than presenting one
shape as the only receipt and introducing the second later.
* Section 5.2: the procedure no longer assumes the envelope in the
steps around the signing input. It extracted a payload member a
flat receipt does not have, read the key identifier from a
signature object a flat receipt does not have, and named Ed25519
in a document that permits ES256.
* Section 6: removed a claim that the leaf construction is byte-
identical to SD-JWT. It is not. SD-JWT ([RFC9901], which also
replaces a citation to an expired draft) uses salted hashes in an
_sd array with no tree, while this builds an RFC 6962 Merkle tree.
Deployments that need selective disclosure over JWT claims and no
tree are now pointed at SD-JWT instead.
* Section 6.9: corrected the post-quantum paragraph, which claimed
SHA-256 gives 128-bit security against quantum collision attacks.
Collision resistance is already 128-bit classically by the
birthday bound; Grover applies to pre-image.
* Corrected the receipt type count, which said four and listed six;
added the missing normative references for [RFC2119], [RFC8174]
and [RFC9497]; removed a reference to a policy_id field this
document does not define.
* New Section 9.7: a chain proves no alteration and no reordering,
not that the verifier holds every receipt. Truncating the newest
receipts leaves all remaining links and signatures valid,
detecting it requires an external commitment to count and terminal
hash, and that commitment constrains an issuer only once it
reaches somewhere the issuer cannot rewrite. Records non-
equivocation as out of scope rather than implied.
* New Section 9.8: a decision receipt attests policy evaluation, not
that the action executed. Names the post-execution receipt as the
separate artifact and identifies the fields that distinguish one
from the other, a distinction the prior text carried only in a
single field description.
* Section 2.2: evidence and committed_fields_root are listed in the
common payload table. Both were defined in their own sections and
appeared in no field table, the same omission reported against
previousReceiptHash. The table's scope is now stated, so a member
defined elsewhere that may appear in any payload type is listed
there.
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* Section 4.1: source.sig is no longer pinned to Ed25519 at a fixed
length. It takes an OPTIONAL alg defaulting to "EdDSA", and its
encoded length derives from that algorithm. The prior text would
have excluded an attesting authority holding P-256 keys, including
implementations of the ES256 profile this document already permits
for receipt signatures.
* Section 4.2: specifies how evidence composes with Section 6. The
unit of selective disclosure is the whole entry, because
disclosing a dimension and state without its source strips the
independence signal the trust model depends on.
* Section 6.6, Section 5.1, and Section 5.2: the signing input is
now named once and defined in one place. The prior text described
the signature as covering payload and then redefined payload mid-
sentence to mean the receipt with its signature removed, so the
two sections specified different byte strings. The signing input
is the receipt without its signature member. The verification
procedure carried the same defect. Checking the deployed
implementations showed the two statements were not a drafting
error but two real receipt shapes described in one place: an
envelope carrying a payload member and a structured signature,
signed over JCS(payload), and a flat form carrying its fields at
the top level with a hexadecimal signature, signed over the
receipt minus that member. Both are in use and both verify today.
Section 6.6 now defines the shapes separately and requires an
implementation to determine the shape before computing the signing
input.
* Section 2.2: previousReceiptHash is listed as an optional payload
member with its cardinality and genesis behaviour, having
previously been defined only inside the optional commitment
extension and listed in no field table.
* Section 2.1.1: the fixed 128-character signature length is removed
and the algorithm list defers to Section 6.9. The prior text
pinned an Ed25519-sized encoding that the agility section's own
recommended algorithms cannot satisfy.
* Section 6.5: states that the sibling side in an inclusion proof is
derived from index and tree_size under the split rule and is
deliberately not carried, so implementers do not assume a padded
fixed-depth tree and diverge on non-power-of-two trees.
* Section 9.1: the freshness window is scoped to live presentation
and explicitly does not apply to archival verification, which it
would otherwise have rejected wholesale.
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* Change-log appendices: corrected a crossed anchor and an appendix
that named the wrong source revision.
Appendix D. Changes from -01
This section summarizes the changes from draft-farley-acta-signed-
receipts-01.
action_ref: Added action_ref as an OPTIONAL common payload field
(Section 2.2). Provides a normative cross-engine correlation
anchor computed as SHA-256 of the JCS-canonicalized action inputs.
Enables bilateral verification across independent governance
engines evaluating the same action. Motivated by successful
composition testing between ScopeBlind Cedar and Agent Passport
System delegation engines, where 8 receipts from 2 engines
verified against a single action reference.
verifier_sigil: Added verifier_sigil as an OPTIONAL common payload
field (Section 2.2). Carries the fingerprint of the Sigil
commitment on the verifier that checked the receipt. Enables
downstream consumers to distinguish receipts verified by the
canonical @veritasacta/verify from those verified by forks or
modified copies. Produced at verification time, not at signing
time.
iteration_id: Added iteration_id as an OPTIONAL common payload field
(Section 2.2). Supports behavioral analysis of multi-step agent
workflows by providing a logical grouping identifier. Designed
for optimization loops, multi-round deliberations, and meta-agent
modification chains. Agent-declared, covered by the receipt
signature for tamper evidence but not a security boundary.
ES256 algorithm support: Updated the alg field specification
(Section 2.1.1) to permit "ES256" (ECDSA with P-256 and SHA-256)
as an additional supported algorithm alongside the mandatory-to-
implement "EdDSA" (Ed25519). Motivated by ecosystem providers
(compliance risk attestation, multi-attestation envelopes) that
use P-256 keys natively.
Transparency log anchoring: Documented Sigstore Rekor as an OPTIONAL
temporal anchor for receipts. Receipts wrapped in DSSE envelopes
(payloadType "application/vnd.scopeblind.receipt+json") can be
submitted to Rekor's public transparency log. The Rekor inclusion
proof provides an independent timestamp from the Linux
Foundation's append-only log, giving receipts a second
verification path beyond the signer's Ed25519 key. Motivated by
the need to prevent operators from backdating receipts.
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Physical attestation use case: Extended the specification's
applicability from software agent tool calls to physical sensor
attestation. A cold chain attestation sensor (ATECC608B secure
element, SHT40 temp, LIS2DH12 accel, L76K GPS, VEML7700 lux)
produces receipts using the same format, same canonicalization,
and same verification CLI as software agent receipts.
Demonstrates that the receipt format is domain-agnostic: the same
envelope carries software decisions and physical-world
observations.
SLSA provenance mapping: Documented field-by-field correspondence
between receipt payload fields and SLSA v1.0 provenance
predicates. When an AI agent builds software and protect-mcp
generates a signed receipt chain, the chain constitutes build
provenance at SLSA L1/L2. The policy_digest field provides
governance metadata that standard SLSA provenance does not carry.
Implementation count: Updated from 3 implementations (protect-mcp,
verify, passport) to 11 implementations across 8 frameworks, 4
enterprise ecosystems (Microsoft AGT, AWS Cedar, Linux Foundation
Sigstore, OWASP DependencyTrack), and 2 registries (npm, PyPI).
Combined monthly downloads exceed 10,000.
Appendix E. Acknowledgements
The Acta receipt format was developed as part of the Veritas Acta
protocol, an infrastructure for verifiable machine decision-making.
The design draws on work in the IETF OAuth and Web Authentication
communities, particularly RFC 9449 (DPoP) for proof-of-possession
patterns and RFC 8785 (JCS) for deterministic serialization.
The evidence predicate in Section 4 originated in a proposal from
Seydou Diaby of UseTruth, who identified that a receipt records which
decision was made but not the basis it rested on, and who contributed
the closed value sets and the structured source object. The
requirement that the attesting key be independent of the receipt
signer, and the false-assurance analysis that follows from it, were
developed jointly.
Thanks to Michael Msebenzi for a detailed errata review of the -02
revision, conducted by building an independent verifier and
recomputing against pinned bytes. That review identified the
signing-scope contradiction between Sections 2.2, 4.1 and 5.6, the
unspecified location and lifecycle of previousReceiptHash, the
conflict between the fixed signature length and algorithm agility,
the freshness window's effect on archival verification, the absent
note on deriving sibling side in inclusion proofs, and errors in the
change-log appendices. All are addressed in this revision.
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Thanks to Sam Gardner for identifying an inconsistency in the
signature preimage definition in the -01 revision, where the
signature scope section described signing over SHA-256(JCS(payload))
while the signature object and the signing and verification
procedures signed over the canonical JCS bytes directly. The
signature scope section (Section 6.6) was corrected in -02 to match
the signing process (Section 5.1). Sections are named rather than
numbered here because the numbering has changed across revisions.
The action_ref normative definition was developed in collaboration
with the Agent Passport System project. The verifier_sigil mechanism
was motivated by the Sigil visual commitment primitive. The
iteration_id field was proposed by contributors to the HyperAgents
safety policy discussion. Cross-engine composition testing was
performed against receipts from ScopeBlind (Cedar policy), Agent
Passport System (delegation scope), and AgentID (identity
verification).
The Rekor transparency log integration was informed by feedback from
Hayden-IO (Sigstore contributor), who clarified the Ed25519ph
requirement for hashedrekord entries and confirmed DSSE as the
recommended entry type for Ed25519-signed attestations.
The physical attestation extension was motivated by the Australian
Emerging Technology Commercialisation Fund (ETCF) grant program and
by discussions on Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit issue #787
(Physical AI agents: OWASP coverage gap for robotic/actuator systems)
with contributions from SINT Protocol (physical constraint
enforcement) and the agent-governance-vocabulary project
(context_dimensions for physical-world policy attributes).
The SLSA provenance mapping was proposed in collaboration with the
SLSA framework specification community (issue #1606).
Author's Address
Tom Farley
ScopeBlind (Veritas Acta)
Email: [email protected]
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