Cushman's theory has implications for the philosophical debate about the nature of folk psych... more Cushman's theory has implications for the philosophical debate about the nature of folk psychological states, for it entails realism about propositional attitudes. I point out a tension within his view and suggest a different view upon which rationalization emerges as a consequence of the adaptiveness of mentalizing. This alternative avoids the strong metaphysical implications of Cushman's theory.
<p>This article examines whether, and in what ways, neuroscience can illuminate those quest... more <p>This article examines whether, and in what ways, neuroscience can illuminate those questions associated with neurophilosophy. It begins by discussing the relation between philosophy and neuroscience, in particular how they can each influence each other. It then considers how neuroscience can illuminate philosophical questions about mind, including metaphysical questions about the relation of mind and brain, questions about the nature of mental representation and content, consciousness, and even moral theory. It also looks at some of the most prevalent techniques employed by neuroscience for investigating brain structure and function; how neuroscience provides potential counterexamples to philosophical claims, by showing how brains work and suggests new interpretations of data; and the influence of neuroscience on philosophy in the area of normativity. The article concludes by examining attempts to use neuroscience to inform philosophical argument about free will.</p>
The experimental study of the brain has exploded in the past several decades, providing rich mate... more The experimental study of the brain has exploded in the past several decades, providing rich material for both philosophers of science and philosophers of mind. In this chapter, the authors summarize some central research areas in philosophy of neuroscience. Some of these areas focus on the internal practice of neuroscience, that is, on the assumptions underlying experimental techniques, the accepted structures of explanations, the goals of integrating disciplines, and the possibility of a unified science of the mind-brain. Other areas focus outwards on the potential impact that neuroscience is having on our conception of the mind and its place in nature.
This dissertation explores the relation between the mental lives of humans and animals, and argue... more This dissertation explores the relation between the mental lives of humans and animals, and argues that many of the differences that have been proposed by philosophers to set humans apart from animals are erroneous. Chapters 1 and 2 contest the hypothesis that the mental lives of humans and animals differ in kind because the content of human experience is conceptual-it necessarily involves the
No neuroscientific evidence that one could feasibly obtain could settle, by itself, whether anyon... more No neuroscientific evidence that one could feasibly obtain could settle, by itself, whether anyone has free will, since there are both philosophical and empirical components to this question. However, neuroscience could provide evidence for or against free will, given certain philosophical commitments. This chapter sketches some possibilities but ultimately argues that our interpretation of brain data and its relevance to a deep philosophical question are mediated by a lot of theory, both philosophical and psychological, and that our neuroscience is unlikely to uncover deep truths about metaphysical questions that don’t presuppose some controversial metaphysical views.
1. Am J Bioeth. 2007 Jan;7(1):55-7; discussion W1-4. The illusion of personhood. Roskies AL. Depa... more 1. Am J Bioeth. 2007 Jan;7(1):55-7; discussion W1-4. The illusion of personhood. Roskies AL. Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College Hanover, NH 03755, [email protected]. Comment on: Am J Bioeth. 2007 Jan;7(1):37-48. ...
Increasingly, scientists are observing and recording human emotions through neuroimaging. Such ca... more Increasingly, scientists are observing and recording human emotions through neuroimaging. Such capability is causing widespread uneasiness, writes Adina Roskies, for it has the potential to result in a sort of demystification of the mental that makes freedom of the will seem impossible and threatens to leave us open to manipulation as never before. Relax, the author argues: Moral responsibility is fundamentally social, and self-control is what makes us free. Understanding cognitive function may cause us to revise, but will not force us to abandon, common notions of moral responsibility and control.
Ethics is concerned with the normative or prescriptive, and science with the descriptive. These d... more Ethics is concerned with the normative or prescriptive, and science with the descriptive. These differences are illustrative of the famous gap between ‘ought’ and ‘is’. Given these differences in scope and subject matter, one might wonder what, if anything, science may have to offer ethics. Here I focus on the brain sciences, and looking at several case studies in both normative ethics and metaethics, I argue that the gap between the normative and descriptive is unbridgeable, but that despite this, neuroscience has much to contribute to ethical thought. The way in which it most clearly contributes is by providing descriptive premises to normative arguments.
Erin Kelly’s The Limits of Blame presents a critique of our current overly punitive legal system ... more Erin Kelly’s The Limits of Blame presents a critique of our current overly punitive legal system and champions a system of criminal justice that does not traffic in moral blame and is free of retributivist elements. This commentary questions the viability of such a system, and ultimately suggests that there is not much distance between a more perfect retributivist system and the kind of more nuanced and humane system of criminal justice that Kelly envisions.
face value and hold on to the idea that we have a simple-toobserve capacity to act for reasons. I... more face value and hold on to the idea that we have a simple-toobserve capacity to act for reasons. Ironically, the belief that it is obvious and uncontroversial that we act for reasons (and that it is clear to everyone what we mean by this phrase) was precisely what made the new compatibilist views so popular in philosophy: the metaphysically problematic concept of libertarian free will could be replaced with the unproblematic, mundane 'responsiveness to reasons'. In light of recent discoveries, 'responsiveness to reasons' proves an equivocal notion that needs thorough rethinking. This is the real challenge to our common concept of free will and responsibility. References 1 Roskies, A. (2006) Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.
This chapter describes one particular neuroethical project in more depth, in order to provide a g... more This chapter describes one particular neuroethical project in more depth, in order to provide a glimpse of what a neuroethical analysis might look like and the kinds of issues that such an analysis might engender. It characterizes in some detail a body of empirical results from neuroscience, and considers the implications of trying to integrate such knowledge into our social and ethical frameworks. It argues that moral belief or judgment is intrinsically motivating and that, in judging morally, one is automatically motivated to act in accordance with one&#39;s judgment.
Cushman's theory has implications for the philosophical debate about the nature of folk psych... more Cushman's theory has implications for the philosophical debate about the nature of folk psychological states, for it entails realism about propositional attitudes. I point out a tension within his view and suggest a different view upon which rationalization emerges as a consequence of the adaptiveness of mentalizing. This alternative avoids the strong metaphysical implications of Cushman's theory.
<p>This article examines whether, and in what ways, neuroscience can illuminate those quest... more <p>This article examines whether, and in what ways, neuroscience can illuminate those questions associated with neurophilosophy. It begins by discussing the relation between philosophy and neuroscience, in particular how they can each influence each other. It then considers how neuroscience can illuminate philosophical questions about mind, including metaphysical questions about the relation of mind and brain, questions about the nature of mental representation and content, consciousness, and even moral theory. It also looks at some of the most prevalent techniques employed by neuroscience for investigating brain structure and function; how neuroscience provides potential counterexamples to philosophical claims, by showing how brains work and suggests new interpretations of data; and the influence of neuroscience on philosophy in the area of normativity. The article concludes by examining attempts to use neuroscience to inform philosophical argument about free will.</p>
The experimental study of the brain has exploded in the past several decades, providing rich mate... more The experimental study of the brain has exploded in the past several decades, providing rich material for both philosophers of science and philosophers of mind. In this chapter, the authors summarize some central research areas in philosophy of neuroscience. Some of these areas focus on the internal practice of neuroscience, that is, on the assumptions underlying experimental techniques, the accepted structures of explanations, the goals of integrating disciplines, and the possibility of a unified science of the mind-brain. Other areas focus outwards on the potential impact that neuroscience is having on our conception of the mind and its place in nature.
This dissertation explores the relation between the mental lives of humans and animals, and argue... more This dissertation explores the relation between the mental lives of humans and animals, and argues that many of the differences that have been proposed by philosophers to set humans apart from animals are erroneous. Chapters 1 and 2 contest the hypothesis that the mental lives of humans and animals differ in kind because the content of human experience is conceptual-it necessarily involves the
No neuroscientific evidence that one could feasibly obtain could settle, by itself, whether anyon... more No neuroscientific evidence that one could feasibly obtain could settle, by itself, whether anyone has free will, since there are both philosophical and empirical components to this question. However, neuroscience could provide evidence for or against free will, given certain philosophical commitments. This chapter sketches some possibilities but ultimately argues that our interpretation of brain data and its relevance to a deep philosophical question are mediated by a lot of theory, both philosophical and psychological, and that our neuroscience is unlikely to uncover deep truths about metaphysical questions that don’t presuppose some controversial metaphysical views.
1. Am J Bioeth. 2007 Jan;7(1):55-7; discussion W1-4. The illusion of personhood. Roskies AL. Depa... more 1. Am J Bioeth. 2007 Jan;7(1):55-7; discussion W1-4. The illusion of personhood. Roskies AL. Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College Hanover, NH 03755, [email protected]. Comment on: Am J Bioeth. 2007 Jan;7(1):37-48. ...
Increasingly, scientists are observing and recording human emotions through neuroimaging. Such ca... more Increasingly, scientists are observing and recording human emotions through neuroimaging. Such capability is causing widespread uneasiness, writes Adina Roskies, for it has the potential to result in a sort of demystification of the mental that makes freedom of the will seem impossible and threatens to leave us open to manipulation as never before. Relax, the author argues: Moral responsibility is fundamentally social, and self-control is what makes us free. Understanding cognitive function may cause us to revise, but will not force us to abandon, common notions of moral responsibility and control.
Ethics is concerned with the normative or prescriptive, and science with the descriptive. These d... more Ethics is concerned with the normative or prescriptive, and science with the descriptive. These differences are illustrative of the famous gap between ‘ought’ and ‘is’. Given these differences in scope and subject matter, one might wonder what, if anything, science may have to offer ethics. Here I focus on the brain sciences, and looking at several case studies in both normative ethics and metaethics, I argue that the gap between the normative and descriptive is unbridgeable, but that despite this, neuroscience has much to contribute to ethical thought. The way in which it most clearly contributes is by providing descriptive premises to normative arguments.
Erin Kelly’s The Limits of Blame presents a critique of our current overly punitive legal system ... more Erin Kelly’s The Limits of Blame presents a critique of our current overly punitive legal system and champions a system of criminal justice that does not traffic in moral blame and is free of retributivist elements. This commentary questions the viability of such a system, and ultimately suggests that there is not much distance between a more perfect retributivist system and the kind of more nuanced and humane system of criminal justice that Kelly envisions.
face value and hold on to the idea that we have a simple-toobserve capacity to act for reasons. I... more face value and hold on to the idea that we have a simple-toobserve capacity to act for reasons. Ironically, the belief that it is obvious and uncontroversial that we act for reasons (and that it is clear to everyone what we mean by this phrase) was precisely what made the new compatibilist views so popular in philosophy: the metaphysically problematic concept of libertarian free will could be replaced with the unproblematic, mundane 'responsiveness to reasons'. In light of recent discoveries, 'responsiveness to reasons' proves an equivocal notion that needs thorough rethinking. This is the real challenge to our common concept of free will and responsibility. References 1 Roskies, A. (2006) Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.
This chapter describes one particular neuroethical project in more depth, in order to provide a g... more This chapter describes one particular neuroethical project in more depth, in order to provide a glimpse of what a neuroethical analysis might look like and the kinds of issues that such an analysis might engender. It characterizes in some detail a body of empirical results from neuroscience, and considers the implications of trying to integrate such knowledge into our social and ethical frameworks. It argues that moral belief or judgment is intrinsically motivating and that, in judging morally, one is automatically motivated to act in accordance with one&#39;s judgment.
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