| Theodicies of satisficing – defenses of God's goodness that justify creating minimally satisfac... more | Theodicies of satisficing – defenses of God's goodness that justify creating minimally satisfactory beings/worlds – originate with Robert Merrihew Adams (1972, 1979). Adams (1972) argued that in creating imperfect beings God was graceful in giving the undeserved gift of life. There have been many objections to Adams's argument; e.g., Jerome A. Weinstock (1975) objected that God still would have been graceful in granting undeserved life to superior beings, and, among others, E. Wielenberg (2004) objected that grace doesn't erase the imperfection of creating imperfection. However, Adams's theodicy arguably maintains two points: (a) non-existing superior beings cannot be harmed by not being created, and (b) if God must create superior beings, we wouldn't be them. Setting aside whether God is justified in satisficing per se, I target one element of Adams's satisficing theodicy, viz. (b), his " non-identity " thesis: we would not be the superior beings God could have created. I argue that this thesis is inconsistent with the theology informing Adams's theodicy. That theology identifies us not as our bodies, but as our nonphysical souls. On that theology's " identity thesis, " identity of subjects of experience is preserved through conception, life, death, and the afterlife , and thus is capable of preservation in alternate bodies. Thus, God could have created us as better beings in a better world, exhibiting grace and avoiding imperfection. Thus, (b) cannot support God's satisficing. I entertain an objection that God could create souls whose identities vary with their bodies, but reply that He could create souls whose identities do not vary trans-corporeally.
Edited by Rick Repetti. Routledge / Taylor & Francis (August 2016).
CONTENTS
Foreword by Danie... more Edited by Rick Repetti. Routledge / Taylor & Francis (August 2016).
CONTENTS
Foreword by Daniel Cozort Acknowledgments Contributors Preface Introduction
1 Why the Buddha Did Not Discuss ‘the Problem of Free Will and Determinism’ Christopher W. Gowans
2 Why There Should Be a Buddhist Theory of Free Will Rick Repetti
3 Uses of the Illusion of Agency: Why Some Buddhists Should Believe in Free Will Charles Goodman
4 Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for Mādhyamikas Jay Garfield
5 Negative Dialectics in Comparative Philosophy: The Case of Buddhist Free Will Quietism Owen Flanagan
6 Free Will and the Sense of Self Galen Strawson
7 What Am I Doing? Susan Blackmore
8 Freedom from Responsibility: Agent-Neutral Consequentialism and the Bodhisattva Ideal Christian Coseru
9 Free Will, Liberation and Buddhist Philosophy Marie Friquegnon
10 Buddhism and Free Will: Beyond the ‘Free Will Problem’ B. Alan Wallace
11 Degrees of Freedom: The Buddha’s Implied Views on the (Im)possibility of Free Will Martin T. Adam
12 Buddhist Paleocompatibilism Mark Siderits
13 Shifting Coalitions, Free Will, and the Responsibility of Persons Ben Abelson
14 Psychological versus Metaphysical Agents: A Theravāda Buddhist View of Free Will and Moral Responsibility Peter Harvey
15 Emotions and Choice: Lessons from Tsongkhapa Emily McRae
16 Grasping Snakes: Reflections on Free Will, Samādhi, and Dharmas Karin Meyers
17 Agentless Agency: The Soft Compatibilist Argument from Buddhist Meditation, Mind-Mastery, Evitabilism, and Mental Freedom Rick Repetti
This chapter introduces, illustrates, and explains how contemplative practices, contemplative stu... more This chapter introduces, illustrates, and explains how contemplative practices, contemplative studies, and contemplative pedagogy differ. It reviews the research in favor of contemplative education and argues that contemplative pedagogy is engaging and transformative for both students and faculty.
I argue that central Buddhist tenets and meditation methodology support a view of free will simil... more I argue that central Buddhist tenets and meditation methodology support a view of free will similar to Harry Frankfurt’s optimistic view and contrary to Galen Strawson’s pessimistic view. For Frankfurt, free will involves a relationship between actions, voli- tions, and “metavolitions” (volitions about volitions): simplifying greatly, volitional actions are free if the agent approves of them. For Buddhists, mental freedom involves a relationship between mental states and “metamental” states (mental attitudes toward mental states): simplifying greatly, one has mental freedom if one is able to control one’s mental states, and to the extent one has mental freedom when choosing, one has free will. Philosophical challenges to free will typically question whether it is compatible with “determinism,” the thesis of lawful universal causation. Both Frankfurt’s metavolitional approval and the Buddhist’s me- tamental control are consistent with determinism. Strawson has argued, however, that free will is impossible, determinism not- withstanding, because one’s choice is always influenced by one’smental state. I argue, however, that Buddhist meditation culti- vates control over mental states that undermine freedom, whether they are deterministic or not, making both mental free- dom and free will possible. The model I develop is only a sketch of a minimally risky theory of free will, but one that highlights the similarities and differences between Buddhist thought on this subject and relevantly-related Western thought and has explana- tory promise.
This is the third article in a four-article series that exam- ines Buddhist responses to the West... more This is the third article in a four-article series that exam- ines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is compatible with “determinism,” the doctrine of universal causation. The first ar- ticle (“Earlier”) focused on the first publications on this issue in the 1970s, the “early period.” The second (“Paleo- compatibilism”) and the present articles examine key responses published in the last part of the Twentieth and the first part of the Twenty-first centuries, the “middle period.” The fourth article (“Recent”) examines responses published in the last few years, the “recent period.” Whereas early-period scholars endorsed a compatibilism between free will and determinism, in the middle period the pendulum moved the other way: Mark Siderits argued for a two tiered compatibilism/incompatibilism (or semi-compatibilism) that he dubs “paleo-compatibilism,” grounded in the early Buddhist reductionist notion of “two truths”: conventional truth and ultimate truth; and Charles Goodman argued that Buddhists accept hard determinism—the view that because determinism is true, there can be no free will—because in the absence of a real self determinism leaves no room for morally responsible agency. In “Paleo-compatibilism,” I focused on Siderits’s reductionist account. The present article focuses on Goodman’s hard determinism, and the fourth article will examine the most recent publications expressing Buddhist views of free will. Together with my own meditation based Buddhist account of free will (“Meditation”), this series of articles provides a comprehensive review of the leading extant writings on this subject.
This is the first part of a three-article series that examines Buddhist accounts of free will. Th... more This is the first part of a three-article series that examines Buddhist accounts of free will. The present article introduces the issues and reviews earlier attempts by Frances Story, Walpola Rāhula, Luis Gómez, and David Kalupahana. These “early-period” authors advocate compatibilism between Buddhist doctrine, de- terminism (the doctrine of universal lawful causation), and free will. The second article reviews later attempts by Mark Siderits, Gay Watson, Joseph Goldstein, and Charles Goodman. These“middle-period” authors embrace either partial or full incompatibilism. The third article reviews recent attempts by Nicholas F. Gier and Paul Kjellberg, Asaf Federman, Peter Harvey, and B. Alan Wallace. These “recent-period” authors divide along compatibilist and incompatibilist lines. Most of the scholarly Buddhist works that examine free will in any depth are reviewed in this series. Prior to the above-mentioned early-period scholarship, scholars of Buddhism were relatively silent on free will. The Buddha’s teachings implicitly endorse a certain type of free will and explicitly endorse something very close to determinism, but attempts to articulate the implicit theory bear significant interpretive risks. The purpose of this three-article series is to review such attempts in order to facilitate a comprehensive view of the present state of the discussion and its history.
This is the fourth article in a four-article series that exam- ines Buddhist responses to the Wes... more This is the fourth article in a four-article series that exam- ines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is compatible with “determinism,” the scientific doctrine of universal lawful causation. The first article focused on “early period” scholar- ship from the 1970’s, which was primarily compatibilist, that is, of the view that the Buddhist conception of causation is compatible with free will. The second and third articles examined “middle period” incompatibilist and semi-compatibilist scholarship in the remainder of the twentieth century and first part of the twenty-first. The present article examines work published in the past few years. It largely agrees that Buddhism tacitly accepts free will (although it also explores an ultimate perspective from which the issue appears moot), but mostly divides along compatibilist and incompatibilist lines, mirroring Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhist perspectives, respectively. Of the writers I emphasize, Gier and Kjellberg articulate both perspectives; Federman and Harvey advocate Theravāda compatibilism; and Wallace argues that although determinism and free will are incompatible, subtle complexities of Mahāyāna Buddhist metaphysics circumvent the free will and determinism dichotomy. Although the pre- sent article focuses on these writers, as the culminating article in the series it also draws on and summarizes the other articles in the series, and directs the reader to other recent period works that, due to space constraints, cannot be reviewed here.
This is the second article in a four-article series that ex- amines Buddhist responses to the Wes... more This is the second article in a four-article series that ex- amines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is compatible with “deter- minism,” the doctrine of universal causation. The first ar- ticle focused on the first publications on this issue in the 1970s, the “early period”; the present article and the next examine key responses published in the last part of the Twentieth century and first part of the Twenty-first, the “middle period”; and the fourth article will examine re- sponses published in the last few years. Whereas early- period scholars endorsed compatibilism, in the middle pe- riod the pendulum moved the other way: Mark Siderits argued for a Buddhist version of partial incompatibilism, semi-compatibilism, or “paleo-compatibilism,” and Charles Goodman argued for a straightforward Buddhist hard determinism. The present article focuses on Siderits’s paleo-compatibilism; the subsequent article focuses on Goodman’s hard determinism.
I argue that an analysis of Buddhist meditation theory and practice may be used to ground a model... more I argue that an analysis of Buddhist meditation theory and practice may be used to ground a model of the possibility of free agency that stands up against four powerful arguments for free will skepticism in contemporary analytic philosophy: Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument, which asserts that if choices are lawfully necessary consequences of prior events, then they are unfree; Derk Pereboom’s two arguments for hard incompatibilism: the manipulation argument, which asserts that manipulated choices are unfree, determinism is functionally equivalent to manipulation, and thus determined choices are unfree; and the randomness argument, which asserts that we cannot claim au- thorship over random neural events; and Galen Strawson’s impossibility argument, which asserts that choices are always conditioned by mental states, so unconditioned free will is impossible. Although Buddhism sees the entire process that begins with beliefs and desires and culminates in actions as an ultimately impersonal, agentless process, Buddhism is nonetheless capable of formulating the diametrical opposite of Strawson’s impossibilism and Pereboom’s hard incompatibilism, what I call possibilism or soft compatibilism, the view that free choices and actions can emerge from conditioned or unconditioned mental states, independently of whether the world is deterministic. This is not to suggest that Buddhism contains or endorses a theory of free will, but that Buddhism may formulate such a theory.
| Theodicies of satisficing – defenses of God's goodness that justify creating minimally satisfac... more | Theodicies of satisficing – defenses of God's goodness that justify creating minimally satisfactory beings/worlds – originate with Robert Merrihew Adams (1972, 1979). Adams (1972) argued that in creating imperfect beings God was graceful in giving the undeserved gift of life. There have been many objections to Adams's argument; e.g., Jerome A. Weinstock (1975) objected that God still would have been graceful in granting undeserved life to superior beings, and, among others, E. Wielenberg (2004) objected that grace doesn't erase the imperfection of creating imperfection. However, Adams's theodicy arguably maintains two points: (a) non-existing superior beings cannot be harmed by not being created, and (b) if God must create superior beings, we wouldn't be them. Setting aside whether God is justified in satisficing per se, I target one element of Adams's satisficing theodicy, viz. (b), his " non-identity " thesis: we would not be the superior beings God could have created. I argue that this thesis is inconsistent with the theology informing Adams's theodicy. That theology identifies us not as our bodies, but as our nonphysical souls. On that theology's " identity thesis, " identity of subjects of experience is preserved through conception, life, death, and the afterlife , and thus is capable of preservation in alternate bodies. Thus, God could have created us as better beings in a better world, exhibiting grace and avoiding imperfection. Thus, (b) cannot support God's satisficing. I entertain an objection that God could create souls whose identities vary with their bodies, but reply that He could create souls whose identities do not vary trans-corporeally.
Edited by Rick Repetti. Routledge / Taylor & Francis (August 2016).
CONTENTS
Foreword by Danie... more Edited by Rick Repetti. Routledge / Taylor & Francis (August 2016).
CONTENTS
Foreword by Daniel Cozort Acknowledgments Contributors Preface Introduction
1 Why the Buddha Did Not Discuss ‘the Problem of Free Will and Determinism’ Christopher W. Gowans
2 Why There Should Be a Buddhist Theory of Free Will Rick Repetti
3 Uses of the Illusion of Agency: Why Some Buddhists Should Believe in Free Will Charles Goodman
4 Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for Mādhyamikas Jay Garfield
5 Negative Dialectics in Comparative Philosophy: The Case of Buddhist Free Will Quietism Owen Flanagan
6 Free Will and the Sense of Self Galen Strawson
7 What Am I Doing? Susan Blackmore
8 Freedom from Responsibility: Agent-Neutral Consequentialism and the Bodhisattva Ideal Christian Coseru
9 Free Will, Liberation and Buddhist Philosophy Marie Friquegnon
10 Buddhism and Free Will: Beyond the ‘Free Will Problem’ B. Alan Wallace
11 Degrees of Freedom: The Buddha’s Implied Views on the (Im)possibility of Free Will Martin T. Adam
12 Buddhist Paleocompatibilism Mark Siderits
13 Shifting Coalitions, Free Will, and the Responsibility of Persons Ben Abelson
14 Psychological versus Metaphysical Agents: A Theravāda Buddhist View of Free Will and Moral Responsibility Peter Harvey
15 Emotions and Choice: Lessons from Tsongkhapa Emily McRae
16 Grasping Snakes: Reflections on Free Will, Samādhi, and Dharmas Karin Meyers
17 Agentless Agency: The Soft Compatibilist Argument from Buddhist Meditation, Mind-Mastery, Evitabilism, and Mental Freedom Rick Repetti
This chapter introduces, illustrates, and explains how contemplative practices, contemplative stu... more This chapter introduces, illustrates, and explains how contemplative practices, contemplative studies, and contemplative pedagogy differ. It reviews the research in favor of contemplative education and argues that contemplative pedagogy is engaging and transformative for both students and faculty.
I argue that central Buddhist tenets and meditation methodology support a view of free will simil... more I argue that central Buddhist tenets and meditation methodology support a view of free will similar to Harry Frankfurt’s optimistic view and contrary to Galen Strawson’s pessimistic view. For Frankfurt, free will involves a relationship between actions, voli- tions, and “metavolitions” (volitions about volitions): simplifying greatly, volitional actions are free if the agent approves of them. For Buddhists, mental freedom involves a relationship between mental states and “metamental” states (mental attitudes toward mental states): simplifying greatly, one has mental freedom if one is able to control one’s mental states, and to the extent one has mental freedom when choosing, one has free will. Philosophical challenges to free will typically question whether it is compatible with “determinism,” the thesis of lawful universal causation. Both Frankfurt’s metavolitional approval and the Buddhist’s me- tamental control are consistent with determinism. Strawson has argued, however, that free will is impossible, determinism not- withstanding, because one’s choice is always influenced by one’smental state. I argue, however, that Buddhist meditation culti- vates control over mental states that undermine freedom, whether they are deterministic or not, making both mental free- dom and free will possible. The model I develop is only a sketch of a minimally risky theory of free will, but one that highlights the similarities and differences between Buddhist thought on this subject and relevantly-related Western thought and has explana- tory promise.
This is the third article in a four-article series that exam- ines Buddhist responses to the West... more This is the third article in a four-article series that exam- ines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is compatible with “determinism,” the doctrine of universal causation. The first ar- ticle (“Earlier”) focused on the first publications on this issue in the 1970s, the “early period.” The second (“Paleo- compatibilism”) and the present articles examine key responses published in the last part of the Twentieth and the first part of the Twenty-first centuries, the “middle period.” The fourth article (“Recent”) examines responses published in the last few years, the “recent period.” Whereas early-period scholars endorsed a compatibilism between free will and determinism, in the middle period the pendulum moved the other way: Mark Siderits argued for a two tiered compatibilism/incompatibilism (or semi-compatibilism) that he dubs “paleo-compatibilism,” grounded in the early Buddhist reductionist notion of “two truths”: conventional truth and ultimate truth; and Charles Goodman argued that Buddhists accept hard determinism—the view that because determinism is true, there can be no free will—because in the absence of a real self determinism leaves no room for morally responsible agency. In “Paleo-compatibilism,” I focused on Siderits’s reductionist account. The present article focuses on Goodman’s hard determinism, and the fourth article will examine the most recent publications expressing Buddhist views of free will. Together with my own meditation based Buddhist account of free will (“Meditation”), this series of articles provides a comprehensive review of the leading extant writings on this subject.
This is the first part of a three-article series that examines Buddhist accounts of free will. Th... more This is the first part of a three-article series that examines Buddhist accounts of free will. The present article introduces the issues and reviews earlier attempts by Frances Story, Walpola Rāhula, Luis Gómez, and David Kalupahana. These “early-period” authors advocate compatibilism between Buddhist doctrine, de- terminism (the doctrine of universal lawful causation), and free will. The second article reviews later attempts by Mark Siderits, Gay Watson, Joseph Goldstein, and Charles Goodman. These“middle-period” authors embrace either partial or full incompatibilism. The third article reviews recent attempts by Nicholas F. Gier and Paul Kjellberg, Asaf Federman, Peter Harvey, and B. Alan Wallace. These “recent-period” authors divide along compatibilist and incompatibilist lines. Most of the scholarly Buddhist works that examine free will in any depth are reviewed in this series. Prior to the above-mentioned early-period scholarship, scholars of Buddhism were relatively silent on free will. The Buddha’s teachings implicitly endorse a certain type of free will and explicitly endorse something very close to determinism, but attempts to articulate the implicit theory bear significant interpretive risks. The purpose of this three-article series is to review such attempts in order to facilitate a comprehensive view of the present state of the discussion and its history.
This is the fourth article in a four-article series that exam- ines Buddhist responses to the Wes... more This is the fourth article in a four-article series that exam- ines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is compatible with “determinism,” the scientific doctrine of universal lawful causation. The first article focused on “early period” scholar- ship from the 1970’s, which was primarily compatibilist, that is, of the view that the Buddhist conception of causation is compatible with free will. The second and third articles examined “middle period” incompatibilist and semi-compatibilist scholarship in the remainder of the twentieth century and first part of the twenty-first. The present article examines work published in the past few years. It largely agrees that Buddhism tacitly accepts free will (although it also explores an ultimate perspective from which the issue appears moot), but mostly divides along compatibilist and incompatibilist lines, mirroring Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhist perspectives, respectively. Of the writers I emphasize, Gier and Kjellberg articulate both perspectives; Federman and Harvey advocate Theravāda compatibilism; and Wallace argues that although determinism and free will are incompatible, subtle complexities of Mahāyāna Buddhist metaphysics circumvent the free will and determinism dichotomy. Although the pre- sent article focuses on these writers, as the culminating article in the series it also draws on and summarizes the other articles in the series, and directs the reader to other recent period works that, due to space constraints, cannot be reviewed here.
This is the second article in a four-article series that ex- amines Buddhist responses to the Wes... more This is the second article in a four-article series that ex- amines Buddhist responses to the Western philosophical problem of whether free will is compatible with “deter- minism,” the doctrine of universal causation. The first ar- ticle focused on the first publications on this issue in the 1970s, the “early period”; the present article and the next examine key responses published in the last part of the Twentieth century and first part of the Twenty-first, the “middle period”; and the fourth article will examine re- sponses published in the last few years. Whereas early- period scholars endorsed compatibilism, in the middle pe- riod the pendulum moved the other way: Mark Siderits argued for a Buddhist version of partial incompatibilism, semi-compatibilism, or “paleo-compatibilism,” and Charles Goodman argued for a straightforward Buddhist hard determinism. The present article focuses on Siderits’s paleo-compatibilism; the subsequent article focuses on Goodman’s hard determinism.
I argue that an analysis of Buddhist meditation theory and practice may be used to ground a model... more I argue that an analysis of Buddhist meditation theory and practice may be used to ground a model of the possibility of free agency that stands up against four powerful arguments for free will skepticism in contemporary analytic philosophy: Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument, which asserts that if choices are lawfully necessary consequences of prior events, then they are unfree; Derk Pereboom’s two arguments for hard incompatibilism: the manipulation argument, which asserts that manipulated choices are unfree, determinism is functionally equivalent to manipulation, and thus determined choices are unfree; and the randomness argument, which asserts that we cannot claim au- thorship over random neural events; and Galen Strawson’s impossibility argument, which asserts that choices are always conditioned by mental states, so unconditioned free will is impossible. Although Buddhism sees the entire process that begins with beliefs and desires and culminates in actions as an ultimately impersonal, agentless process, Buddhism is nonetheless capable of formulating the diametrical opposite of Strawson’s impossibilism and Pereboom’s hard incompatibilism, what I call possibilism or soft compatibilism, the view that free choices and actions can emerge from conditioned or unconditioned mental states, independently of whether the world is deterministic. This is not to suggest that Buddhism contains or endorses a theory of free will, but that Buddhism may formulate such a theory.
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Papers by Rick Repetti
CONTENTS
Foreword by Daniel Cozort
Acknowledgments
Contributors
Preface
Introduction
1 Why the Buddha Did Not Discuss ‘the Problem of Free Will and Determinism’
Christopher W. Gowans
2 Why There Should Be a Buddhist Theory of Free Will
Rick Repetti
3 Uses of the Illusion of Agency: Why Some Buddhists Should Believe in Free Will
Charles Goodman
4 Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for
Mādhyamikas
Jay Garfield
5 Negative Dialectics in Comparative Philosophy: The Case of Buddhist Free Will Quietism
Owen Flanagan
6 Free Will and the Sense of Self
Galen Strawson
7 What Am I Doing?
Susan Blackmore
8 Freedom from Responsibility: Agent-Neutral Consequentialism and the
Bodhisattva Ideal
Christian Coseru
9 Free Will, Liberation and Buddhist Philosophy
Marie Friquegnon
10 Buddhism and Free Will: Beyond the ‘Free Will Problem’
B. Alan Wallace
11 Degrees of Freedom: The Buddha’s Implied Views on the (Im)possibility of Free
Will
Martin T. Adam
12 Buddhist Paleocompatibilism
Mark Siderits
13 Shifting Coalitions, Free Will, and the Responsibility of Persons
Ben Abelson
14 Psychological versus Metaphysical Agents: A Theravāda Buddhist View of Free
Will and Moral Responsibility
Peter Harvey
15 Emotions and Choice: Lessons from Tsongkhapa
Emily McRae
16 Grasping Snakes: Reflections on Free Will, Samādhi, and Dharmas
Karin Meyers
17 Agentless Agency: The Soft Compatibilist Argument from Buddhist Meditation,
Mind-Mastery, Evitabilism, and Mental Freedom
Rick Repetti
Index
Repetti, Riccardo. 2010. “The Case for a Contemplative Philosophy of Education,” Contemplative Teaching and Learning 151 (October 2010), 5-15. http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0470938552.html.
CONTENTS
Foreword by Daniel Cozort
Acknowledgments
Contributors
Preface
Introduction
1 Why the Buddha Did Not Discuss ‘the Problem of Free Will and Determinism’
Christopher W. Gowans
2 Why There Should Be a Buddhist Theory of Free Will
Rick Repetti
3 Uses of the Illusion of Agency: Why Some Buddhists Should Believe in Free Will
Charles Goodman
4 Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for
Mādhyamikas
Jay Garfield
5 Negative Dialectics in Comparative Philosophy: The Case of Buddhist Free Will Quietism
Owen Flanagan
6 Free Will and the Sense of Self
Galen Strawson
7 What Am I Doing?
Susan Blackmore
8 Freedom from Responsibility: Agent-Neutral Consequentialism and the
Bodhisattva Ideal
Christian Coseru
9 Free Will, Liberation and Buddhist Philosophy
Marie Friquegnon
10 Buddhism and Free Will: Beyond the ‘Free Will Problem’
B. Alan Wallace
11 Degrees of Freedom: The Buddha’s Implied Views on the (Im)possibility of Free
Will
Martin T. Adam
12 Buddhist Paleocompatibilism
Mark Siderits
13 Shifting Coalitions, Free Will, and the Responsibility of Persons
Ben Abelson
14 Psychological versus Metaphysical Agents: A Theravāda Buddhist View of Free
Will and Moral Responsibility
Peter Harvey
15 Emotions and Choice: Lessons from Tsongkhapa
Emily McRae
16 Grasping Snakes: Reflections on Free Will, Samādhi, and Dharmas
Karin Meyers
17 Agentless Agency: The Soft Compatibilist Argument from Buddhist Meditation,
Mind-Mastery, Evitabilism, and Mental Freedom
Rick Repetti
Index
Repetti, Riccardo. 2010. “The Case for a Contemplative Philosophy of Education,” Contemplative Teaching and Learning 151 (October 2010), 5-15. http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0470938552.html.