Derek Lam

California State University, Sacramento, Philosophy, Faculty Member

University of Virginia, Philosophy, Graduate Student

University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty Member

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I'm an assistant professor in philosophy at Cal State Sacramento. Before that, I was an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. I did my PhD in philosophy at the University of Virginia and wrote my dissertation on scientific measurement. Now, my primary philosophical interest is the metaphysics of agency, which has led me to work on various topics like metaphysics of time, practical/agential knowledge, modality, and chances. For more about me and my work: https://sites.google.com/view/derek-st-lam/home
Supervisors: Ross Cameron
Address: United States

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University of California, Irvine

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University of Bristol

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University of Notre Dame

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University of Lausanne

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Papers by Derek Lam

Real Quantitativeness: what formal investigations can(not) show

Metascience, 2022

Book Review. J. E. Wolff. The Metaphysics of Quantity. New York: Oxford University Press 2020.

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The Phenomenology and Metaphysics of the Open Future (Phil Studies 2021)

Philosophical Studies, 2021

Intuitively, the future is open and the past fixed: there is something we can do about the future... more Intuitively, the future is open and the past fixed: there is something we can do about the future but not the past. Some metaphysicians believe that a proper metaphysics of time must vindicate this intuition. Whereas philosophers have focused on the future and the past, the status of the present remains relatively unexplored. Drawing on resources from action theory, I argue that there is something we can do about the present just like there is something we can do about the future. Hence, a proper metaphysics of the open future should allow for an open present as well. I argue that none of the major metaphysics of the open future currently available can accommodate an open present adequately. Finally, I'll show that, surprisingly, the shrinking block metaphysics can.

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An Imaginative Person's Guide to Objective Modality (2021)

Epistemic Uses of Imagination, 2021

Imagination is a source of evidence for objective modality. It is through this epistemic connecti... more Imagination is a source of evidence for objective modality. It is through this epistemic connection that the idea of modality first gains traction in our intellectual life. A proper theory of modality should be able to explain our imagination's modal epistemic behaviors. This chapter highlights a peculiar asymmetry regarding epistemic defeat for imagination-based modal justification. Whereas imagination-based evidence for possibility cannot be undermined by information about the causal origin of our imaginings, unimaginability-based evidence for impossibility can be undermined by information about the causal origin of the unimaginability. It is argued that an acceptance of S4 over S5 as the true logic for objective modality best explains this epistemic asymmetry.

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Being Pessimistic about the Objective Present (Synthese 2020)

Synthese, 2020

Some philosophers argue that non-presentist A-theories (i.e. the views that the tenses-past, pres... more Some philosophers argue that non-presentist A-theories (i.e. the views that the tenses-past, present, and future-are objective features and that not only present things exist) problematically imply that we cannot know that this moment is present. The problem is usually presented as arising from the combination of the A-theoretic ideology of a privileged presentness and a non-presentist ontology. The goal of this essay is to show that the epistemic problem can be rephrased as a pessimistic induction. By doing so, I will show that the epistemic problem, in fact, stems from the A-theoretic ideology alone. Hence, once it is properly presented, the epistemic problem presents a serious threat to all A-theories.

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Stipulative Agency (Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility vol.7)

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility vol.7, 2021

Anscombe noted that an agent's knowledge of her own intentional actions (agential knowledge) is n... more Anscombe noted that an agent's knowledge of her own intentional actions (agential knowledge) is non-observational. Yet, intentional actions typically consist of happenings external to the agents. A theory is needed to explain how agents are warranted to form such beliefs independent of observation. This paper first argues for three desirable features of an ideal theory about agential knowledge. After showing that no existing theories has all three, a novel theory that has them is presented. According to this theory, agential knowledge is the same kind of knowledge as the Kripkean contingent a priori: they are knowledge justified a priori by stipulation.

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Metaphysics of Quantity and the Limit of Phenomenal Concepts (Inquiry 2019)

Quantities like mass and temperature are properties that come in degrees. And those degrees (e.g.... more Quantities like mass and temperature are properties that come in degrees. And those degrees (e.g. 5 kg) are properties that are called the magnitudes of the quantities. Some philosophers (e.g., Byrne 2003; Byrne & Hilbert 2003; Schroer 2010) talk about magnitudes of phenomenal qualities as if some of our phenomenal qualities are quantities. The goal of this essay is to explore the anti-physicalist implication of this apparently innocent way of conceptualizing phenomenal quantities. I will first argue for a metaphysical thesis about the nature of magnitudes based on Yablo's proportionality requirement of causation. Then, I will show that, if some phenomenal qualities are indeed quantities, there can be no demonstrative concepts about some of our phenomenal feelings. That presents a significant restriction on the way physicalists can account for the epistemic gap between the phenomenal and the physical. I'll illustrate the restriction by showing how that rules out a popular physicalist response to the Knowledge Argument. [word count excluding footnotes: 7028]

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Is Imagination Too Liberal for Modal Epistemology? (Synthese 2018)

Appealing to imagination for modal justification is very common. But not everyone thinks that all... more Appealing to imagination for modal justification is very common. But not everyone thinks that all imaginings provide modal justification. Recently, Dominic Gregory (2010) and Peter Kung (2010) have independently argued that, whereas imaginings with sensory imageries can justify modal beliefs, those without sensory imageries don't because of such imaginings' extreme liberty. In this essay, I defend the general modal epistemologi-cal relevance of imagining. I argue, first, that when the objections that target the liberal nature of non-sensory imaginings are adequately developed, those objections also threaten the sensory imaginings. So, if we think that non-sensory imaginings are too liberal for modal justification, we should say the same about sensory imaginings. I'll finish my defense by showing that, when it comes to deciding between saying that all imaginings are prima facie justificatory and saying that no imaginings are justificatory, there is an independent reason for accepting the former. 1 Justifying Modal Beliefs The goal of this essay is to defend the following Yablo-style modal epistemological policy against a particular kind of skeptical objection: For any statement S, if z can conceive that S, then z is prima facie justified in believing that S is possible. I'll call this principle Imaginative I would like to thank Ross Cameron, Brie Gertler, and Harold Langsam for commenting on multiple 1 early drafts of this paper and for their patience with my stubbornness in philosophical conversations. My gratitude also goes to Matt Duncan, Trenton Merricks, Peter Tan, and the audience in the departmental retreat of the Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia for their valuable feedback. I must also thank Nick Rimell and Jim Darcy, who kindly offered to help me with the linguistic aspect of the paper. Finally, I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers of Synthese for their suggestions that helped make this a much better paper.

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Real Quantitativeness: what formal investigations can(not) show

Metascience, 2022

Book Review. J. E. Wolff. The Metaphysics of Quantity. New York: Oxford University Press 2020.

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The Phenomenology and Metaphysics of the Open Future (Phil Studies 2021)

Philosophical Studies, 2021

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An Imaginative Person's Guide to Objective Modality (2021)

Epistemic Uses of Imagination, 2021

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Being Pessimistic about the Objective Present (Synthese 2020)