Publications by Kristina Meshelski
Ethical Perspectives, 2016
Part of a symposium on John Rawls: Reticent Socialist by William Edmundson . In Edmundson’s accou... more Part of a symposium on John Rawls: Reticent Socialist by William Edmundson . In Edmundson’s account, pure procedural justice functions as a kind of limit to Rawls’s socialism, the point at which a socialist can find common ground with a critic of government and a defender of free markets like Hayek. Though I agree with much of what Edmundson says, I want to urge a reading of pure procedural justice that would bring Rawls more in line with Marx and further from Hayek.
Ethics & Global Politics, 2019
Amartya Sen argues that Rawls’s theory is not only unnecessary in the pursuit of justice, but it ... more Amartya Sen argues that Rawls’s theory is not only unnecessary in the pursuit of justice, but it may even be an impediment to justice in so far as it has discouraged more useful work. Against what he considers the dominance of transcendental theory, Sen calls for a more realistic and practical ‘comparative’ theory of justice. Sen’s negative point has been widely discussed, but here I develop a reconstruction of Sen’s positive theory (a combination of Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator, Social Choice Theory, and the Capabilities Approach) in order to evaluate it on its own terms. I find that the theory is technocratic, despite Sen’s insistence to the contrary.

There is widespread agreement among both supporters and opponents that affirmative action either ... more There is widespread agreement among both supporters and opponents that affirmative action either must not violate any principle of equal opportunity or procedural justice, or if it does, it may do so only given current extenuating circumstances. Many believe that affirmative action is morally problematic, only justified to the extent that it brings us closer to the time when we will no longer need it. In other words, those that support affirmative action believe it is acceptable in nonideal theory, but not ideal theory. This paper argues that affirmative action is entirely compatible with equal opportunity and procedural justice and would be even in an ideal world. I defend a new analysis of Rawlsian procedural justice according to which it is permissible to interfere in the outcomes of procedures, and thus I show that affirmative action is not morally problematic in the way that many have supposed.
Infinite modes are arguably the most original aspect of Spinoza's metaphysics. They are also the ... more Infinite modes are arguably the most original aspect of Spinoza's metaphysics. They are also the least understood. In the first part of Spinoza's Ethics we are right away given definitions of the main elements of Spinoza's metaphysics, which at least in name would have been familiar enough to his readers -substance, attribute, and mode. He tell us that by mode he means "the affections of substance, that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else" (EID5). There is only one thing that exists, one substance, but seemingly infinite modes (EIP16) and some of these modes are themselves infinite. 1 These infinite modes "must have necessarily followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily and as infinite" (EIP23).

Two Kinds of Definition in Spinoza's Ethics, Jan 1, 2011
Spinoza scholars have claimed that we are faced with a dilemma: either Spinoza's definitions in h... more Spinoza scholars have claimed that we are faced with a dilemma: either Spinoza's definitions in his Ethics are real, in spite of indications to the contrary, or the definitions are nominal and the propositions derived from them are false. I argue that Spinoza did not recognize the distinction between real and nominal definitions. Rather, Spinoza classified definitions according to whether they require a priori or a posteriori justification, which is a classification distinct from either the real/nominal or the intensional/extensional classification. I argue that Spinoza uses both a priori and a posteriori definitions in the Ethics and that recognizing both types of definitions allows us to understand Spinoza's geometric method in a new way. We can now understand the geometric method as two methods, one resulting in propositions that Spinoza considers to be absolutely certain and another resulting in propositions that Spinoza does not consider certain. The latter method makes use of a posteriori definitions and postulates, whereas the former method uses only a priori definitions and axioms.
Blogs/Misc. by Kristina Meshelski
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Publications by Kristina Meshelski
Blogs/Misc. by Kristina Meshelski