Jeff Mankoff
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia & Eurasia Program, Fellow and Deputy Director
Phone: 202-741-3897
Address: 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW
Washington, DC 20036
Address: 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW
Washington, DC 20036
less
Related Authors
Interests
Uploads
Papers by Jeff Mankoff
The near-simultaneous timing of Russia’s deployment of troops to Syria and de-escalation in eastern Ukraine is hardly coincidental. The war in Ukraine and the resulting Western sanctions are becoming increasingly problematic, and Moscow’s intervention in Syria provides the Kremlin with an opportunity to divert attention and resources away from the stagnant war. It also gives Russia the chance to deflect the waves of patriotic mobilization sparked by the seizure of Crimea and intervention in Donbass. Indeed, Moscow increasingly needs to find a face-saving exit from the Donbass conflict that does not precipitate a domestic backlash. The Syrian deployment can help the Kremlin square this circle.
investment to open up new sources of oil and gas, which will in turn allow it to play a larger role in regional security and diplomacy. Economic ties are the basis for the deepening Sino-Russian partnership, while Beijing has also provided important diplomatic support as the West has sought Russia’s
isolation. Yet to avoid excessive dependence on China, Russia has worked to cultivate relations with other Asian powers, especially India, Vietnam, and Japan. This interest in harnessing Asian economic growth gives Moscow and Washington a common interest in regional stability, but one that is
unlikely to be fully realized as long as bilateral relations remain focused on Europe and Eurasia.
11, 2001. Prior to 9/11, the United States sought to open Central Asia up to foreign investment and build new energy pipelines to reduce Central Asia’s inherited dependence
on Russia. Washington emphasized policies meant to secure the sovereignty and independence of the five Central Asian states, while devoting some effort to promoting
democracy and the rule of law as part of a broader effort to encourage democratic transitions across the territory of the former Soviet Union.
After 9/11, Washington’s focus shifted heavily to security, as Central Asia emerged as a critical strategic rear for U.S. and coalition military operations in Afghanistan. Governance
issues, never a primary emphasis for the United States, fell almost entirely by the wayside as Washington’s attention shifted to logistics, counterterrorism, and other forms of security cooperation. Central Asia became a crucial transit route for the supply of military goods and other supplies to Afghanistan, particularly with the opening of the Northern
Distribution Network in 2009. The Central Asian states were also important security partners, with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan offering the use of military bases on their soil
and all five providing some degree of access for U.S. forces.
Today, with the winding down of combat operations in Afghanistan, U.S. policy toward the states of Central Asia is transitioning to a third era. The United States now has an
opportunity to refashion its approach to the region. In doing so, it should capitalize on trends already underway, in particular the expansion of trade and transit linkages, to help
integrate Central Asia more firmly into the global economy, while also working to overcome tensions both within the region itself and among the major neighboring powers with
interests in Central Asia.
As U.S. policy transitions into this post–Afghanistan conflict period, Washington has an opportunity to rebalance its approach to Central Asia away from the security focus
that has predominated since 9/11 to give more attention to promoting economic growth and the realization of the gains offered by cooperation and connectivity, all while continuing to
promote security.
The crisis in Ukraine has led Moscow to shift back towards a more instrumental view of its partnership with China, and a more sinocentric approach to Asia.
Given Russia’s repeated interventions in breakaway regions of former Soviet states, it would be natural to assume that the strategy has worked well in the past. In fact, each time Russia has undermined the territorial integrity of a neighboring state in an attempt to maintain its influence there, the result has been the opposite. Moscow’s support for separatist movements within their borders has driven Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova to all wean themselves off their dependence on Russia and pursue new partnerships with the West. Ukraine will likely follow a similar trajectory. By annexing Crimea and threatening deeper military intervention in eastern Ukraine, Russia will only bolster Ukrainian nationalism and push Kiev closer to Europe, while causing other post-Soviet states to question the wisdom of a close alignment with Moscow.
The near-simultaneous timing of Russia’s deployment of troops to Syria and de-escalation in eastern Ukraine is hardly coincidental. The war in Ukraine and the resulting Western sanctions are becoming increasingly problematic, and Moscow’s intervention in Syria provides the Kremlin with an opportunity to divert attention and resources away from the stagnant war. It also gives Russia the chance to deflect the waves of patriotic mobilization sparked by the seizure of Crimea and intervention in Donbass. Indeed, Moscow increasingly needs to find a face-saving exit from the Donbass conflict that does not precipitate a domestic backlash. The Syrian deployment can help the Kremlin square this circle.
investment to open up new sources of oil and gas, which will in turn allow it to play a larger role in regional security and diplomacy. Economic ties are the basis for the deepening Sino-Russian partnership, while Beijing has also provided important diplomatic support as the West has sought Russia’s
isolation. Yet to avoid excessive dependence on China, Russia has worked to cultivate relations with other Asian powers, especially India, Vietnam, and Japan. This interest in harnessing Asian economic growth gives Moscow and Washington a common interest in regional stability, but one that is
unlikely to be fully realized as long as bilateral relations remain focused on Europe and Eurasia.
11, 2001. Prior to 9/11, the United States sought to open Central Asia up to foreign investment and build new energy pipelines to reduce Central Asia’s inherited dependence
on Russia. Washington emphasized policies meant to secure the sovereignty and independence of the five Central Asian states, while devoting some effort to promoting
democracy and the rule of law as part of a broader effort to encourage democratic transitions across the territory of the former Soviet Union.
After 9/11, Washington’s focus shifted heavily to security, as Central Asia emerged as a critical strategic rear for U.S. and coalition military operations in Afghanistan. Governance
issues, never a primary emphasis for the United States, fell almost entirely by the wayside as Washington’s attention shifted to logistics, counterterrorism, and other forms of security cooperation. Central Asia became a crucial transit route for the supply of military goods and other supplies to Afghanistan, particularly with the opening of the Northern
Distribution Network in 2009. The Central Asian states were also important security partners, with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan offering the use of military bases on their soil
and all five providing some degree of access for U.S. forces.
Today, with the winding down of combat operations in Afghanistan, U.S. policy toward the states of Central Asia is transitioning to a third era. The United States now has an
opportunity to refashion its approach to the region. In doing so, it should capitalize on trends already underway, in particular the expansion of trade and transit linkages, to help
integrate Central Asia more firmly into the global economy, while also working to overcome tensions both within the region itself and among the major neighboring powers with
interests in Central Asia.
As U.S. policy transitions into this post–Afghanistan conflict period, Washington has an opportunity to rebalance its approach to Central Asia away from the security focus
that has predominated since 9/11 to give more attention to promoting economic growth and the realization of the gains offered by cooperation and connectivity, all while continuing to
promote security.
The crisis in Ukraine has led Moscow to shift back towards a more instrumental view of its partnership with China, and a more sinocentric approach to Asia.
Given Russia’s repeated interventions in breakaway regions of former Soviet states, it would be natural to assume that the strategy has worked well in the past. In fact, each time Russia has undermined the territorial integrity of a neighboring state in an attempt to maintain its influence there, the result has been the opposite. Moscow’s support for separatist movements within their borders has driven Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova to all wean themselves off their dependence on Russia and pursue new partnerships with the West. Ukraine will likely follow a similar trajectory. By annexing Crimea and threatening deeper military intervention in eastern Ukraine, Russia will only bolster Ukrainian nationalism and push Kiev closer to Europe, while causing other post-Soviet states to question the wisdom of a close alignment with Moscow.