According to Steiner, the problem with Kant but also his successors (such as Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer) is that they did not analyze cognition well or deeply enough. Instead, they cherry-picked some elements (a claim, judgment, observation, I, etc.) and made it the starting point. But if epistemology as the basis of how we know anything, is to depart from an already formed claim –  i.e. a result of cognitive process, a dogma – how can we assert it from the onset?

Taking Kant as his example, Steiner writes:

To say that my knowledge extends to begin with only as far as my representations, is to express a quite definite judgment about cognition. In this sentence I add a predicate to the world given to me, namely, its existence in the form of representation. But how do I know, prior to all knowledge, that the things given to me are representations?[1]

 This is not to say that the starting point should be empty or devoid of content. But this content should be independent of the presuppositions about the matter at hand, namely epistemology. The starting point, Steiner argues, should be presented in self-evident sentences and “contain no assertions which will influence the content of the subsequent discussion.”[2] In this sense, Kant’s mistake lies in the fact that in his initial epistemological question seen as the basis of all his philosophy – “How are synthetical a priori judgments possible?” – he had already contained two presuppositions. The first – that we need a kind of knowledge different from sense experience, and the second – that sense experience cannot give us certain knowledge.

Prima facie those presuppositions seem to be universally valid. For one thing, in the times of mass and social media, living through news broadcasts and feeding on someone else’s interpretations and relations from their lives has become the daily bread of millions of people. The fact that internet companies and social media platforms target their users and not only provide them with biased interpretations – but also with custom-tailored advertisements and political propaganda – all this calls for radical disbelief in the certainty of direct sense experience and the insight it provides. To draw another picture, in social and political reality, if we do not want to be naïve, we cannot just rely on what someone (like a politician) says. That we do not take what someone says at the face value is important not only for leading a good and conscious life – but sometimes also for our safety and life itself. And these are only two relatively modern examples. On the other hand, we are also trained in scientific explanations of seemingly paradoxical phenomena; a straight straw in the glass of water seems to be crooked, but owing to the explanation we can understand that it was just the refraction of light in mediums of different density which caused the different direct sense experience. Our direct sense experience has much potential to lead us astray, if not dupe us.

It is easy to see that such claims (as those of Kant) which go contrary to the easiness and platitude of naïve beliefs sound convincing to us. We do not want to be brainwashed by any authority, even by the best scientist if his/her claims are not corroborated by reality. However, by acquiring such a stance we already signal that we know – or at least we have a hint about – what this reality is or should be. What should it be then? Should it be the naïve everyday outlook of claims and beliefs received from outside (parents, schooling, authorities, TV anchors)? Should it really be this naïveté that we want to transcend by our better and deeper understanding? Or, rather, should it be the reality of philosophy or science given by some scholar? But then, we again succumb to an outer source of knowledge. And why should science or philosophy dictate anything? The reality of academic disciplines with internal clashes and divisions, systems of grants and financing of academia, and last but not least, the ties between both natural and humanistic scholars – and – political parties show that no field is crystal clear and innocent (let us remember Said’s arguments from the previous chapter).

To make the matter less abstract, let us draw an example. During the global pandemic of a new type of flu, the president of country A strongly supports very light measures of dealing with the pandemic. The president’s campaign promised economic boost and creating more jobs, however, a more serious stance on the pandemic would result in an economic recession. The government is deliberately not testing for the illness, so the figures one could refer to do not reflect the pandemic situation. To make it worse, the media outlets affiliated with the president back the president’s claims with selective coverage and tailored interviews with paid experts. The opposition parties and media criticize the president and accuse him (and other media outlets) of sacrificing people’s health and lives for economic growth. Scientists are strongly criticizing the president, but at the same time, it is not a secret that during his term the president prioritized the economy over scientific research and development.
How in this situation should an individual act so that s/he can have a viable assessment of the situation so that e.g. s/he can successfully protect his or her life? If one is to be a member of parliament, a reporter, a social worker, a cook in the school cafeteria, a teacher in elementary school, etc. – what should be one’s response? How should one think about the proper response and own responsibility? It is obvious that blindly following what someone else is saying is not a solution for all situations, if hardly for any. To make this example more realistic, I might add to this that many other people (certainly much more, and with a higher degree of responsibility, than we suspect) do not have any understanding of the situation at hand. In this ignorance, they are simply promulgating an agenda that will benefit them and their party only, leaving out everyone who does not fall into the “we” category. It is frightening to think that a national or international crisis could be used to benefit someone politically, financially, emotionally, or all of the above. But situations such as this happen regularly. Wars, conflicts, any political power-play, arguments in the workplace, discussions on philosophical panels – among all of these, an individual has to make use of his understanding and act upon it.

We, individual people, want to depart from a naïve state of accepting anything for granted, but ever more complicated reality renders it an ever-more difficult task. How can we find the right way? Or, to put in a more epistemological perspective: how should one think about the world – social and natural environments which surround us – so that we have a workable approach toward anything which we can encounter – be it a thing, a person, a situation, or the end of the world? I am not only talking about the practical aspects of social behavior – but also about our knowledge of anything: scientific knowledge of the microscopic and macrocosmic world, knowledge of one’s own familial relationships, the situation of one’s nation versus other nations, biographical self-knowledge of own internalized tendencies, etc.

Kant’s appeal is there – we do not want to be aloof to all these factors, which to a bigger or smaller degree influence our lives. But how are we to know the world so that we are not constrained by a presupposed dogma or web of human interests? With this introduction, I would like to return to Steiner’s analysis of the way out from naïveté on one hand, and from the dogmatism on the other.

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[1] Rudolf Steiner, “Truth and Knowledge. Introduction to The Philosophy of Freedom. Chapter 3. Epistemology Since Kant,” Rudolf Steiner Archive & e.Lib., 1892, para. 2, https://wn.rsarchive.org/Books/GA003/English/RSPI1963/GA003_c03.html.

[2] Rudolf Steiner, “Truth and Knowledge. Introduction to The Philosophy of Freedom. Chapter 2. Kant’s Basic Epistemological Question,” Rudolf Steiner Archive & e.Lib., 1892, para. 18, https://wn.rsarchive.org/Books/GA003/English/RSPI1963/GA003_c02.html.

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