ABSTRACT (Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se analiza la reacción de los s... more ABSTRACT (Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se analiza la reacción de los sindicatos magisteriales y los gremios médicos a una serie de reformas del sector social en la región, incluidos la descentralización, mecanismos de pago a los prestadores de servicios y la introducción de mecanismos de evaluación del desempeño y de prestación privada de servicios. Combina la obra publicada sobre Economía y Politología para comprender las condiciones que moldean diversos patrones de comportamiento de los sindicatos y sus efectos en la aplicación de las políticas. El trabajo sugiere que las principales condiciones que influyen en el comportamiento de los sindicatos en el sector de la salud tienen que ver con la estructura del mercado (tamaño y nivel de competencia), debido a la participación combinada del sector privado y el público en el empleo. En la educación, donde el sector público es la principal fuente de empleo, los alineamientos políticos y las características organizacionales de las asociaciones magisteriales también desempeñan un papel importante para explicar el comportamiento de las organizaciones prestadoras de esos servicios. Se concluye, tomando en cuenta la naturaleza exógena de la mayoría de estas variables, presentando algunas sugerencias de políticas para alinear los objetivos de los sindicatos y los de los diseñadores de políticas mediante reformas de la normativa.
for their comments on various drafts of this paper. The participants at the seminars organized by... more for their comments on various drafts of this paper. The participants at the seminars organized by the IADB and Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Institucional provided useful suggestions.
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be attribu... more The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf. The Research Department (RES) produces the Latin American Economic Policies Newsletter, as well as working papers and books, on diverse economic issues.
A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the h... more A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which the object can best be obtained.
Since the early 1980s privatization has spread in Latin America under both right-wing rulers and ... more Since the early 1980s privatization has spread in Latin America under both right-wing rulers and populist presidents. This regional convergence toward privatization seemed to announce the end of partisan policy-making. However, not all governments implement privatization in the same way even in the context of policy convergence. Technocrats propose similar policy options in countries where capital dearth creates pressures for convergence. Yet politicians build the electoral and government coalitions that make these policies possible, and their preferences shape the institutions chosen at implementation. The “bias” introduced by politicians depends on their prior beliefs and constituencies, which shape their institutional preferences. Beliefs about economic nationalism and state intervention influence the selection of regulations at the time of privatization, whereas coalition buildingwith political constituencies shapes the definition of selling conditions in privatized companies. T...
In the late 1980s, populist labor parties, which had advanced protectionism and state interventio... more In the late 1980s, populist labor parties, which had advanced protectionism and state intervention in the postwar period, implemented market-oriented reforms in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. In all three countries, market reforms hurt their union allies. The interaction between allied unions and governing labor parties, however, varied across countries and across sectors within the same country. While some unions endorsed neoliberal reforms, others rejected them despite their long-term alliance with governing parties. While some unions obtained concessions, others failed to do so.This article argues that the incentives created by partisan loyalties, partisan competition, and union competition explain these interactions. Partisan loyalty results from the long-term affiliation of unions with a political party. Partisan competition takes place among union leaders affiliated with different political parties for the control of unions. Union competition occurs in diverse national and ...
Whereas both the literature on globalization and the literature on regulatory diffusion stress th... more Whereas both the literature on globalization and the literature on regulatory diffusion stress the pressures that led to policy convergence, this article shows how the ideology of incumbents produced different regulatory outcomes, even in the face of strong financial and technological pressures that constrained policy agency. By looking at the regulatory frameworks adopted at the time of electricity privatization in Latin America, this article shows that right-wing governments adopted regulations that eliminated barriers to entry and investment and limited the discretion of regulators (market-conforming regulations), and that former statists who had pragmatically converted to the market creed instead chose regulations that tended to impose higher barriers to entry and investment and gave regulators wide discretion in conflict resolution and price setting (marketcontrolling regulations). These findings suggest the need to look at the ideology (and ideological legacies) of government coalitions for a more nuanced understanding of the process of regulatory diffusion that took place across many sectors in most regions of the world.
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 1999
This article compares union-government relations in Mexico and Argentina when education was decen... more This article compares union-government relations in Mexico and Argentina when education was decentralized in the early 1990s. The Mexican union accepted decentralization after obtaining concessions from the government that placated its opposition; but the Argentine teachers’ unions militantly resisted the reforms, only to see government officials ignore their demands. These cases illustrate the significance of partisan identities, union fragmentation, and leadership competition in the interaction of public sector unions and government officials.
The events of December 2001 seemed to transform Argentina's international status from poster chil... more The events of December 2001 seemed to transform Argentina's international status from poster child to basket case. Throughout the 1990s, Argentina had been widely hailed as a case of successful market reform under democratic government. The radical economic transformation undertaken by the government of Carlos Saúl Menem had ended hyperinflation and restored economic growth, while the country enjoyed an unprecedented degree of democratic stability. Elections were free; civil liberties were broadly protected; and the armed forces, which had toppled six civilian governments since 1930, largely disappeared from the political scene. Yet in late 2001, Argentina suffered an extraordinary economic and political meltdown. A prolonged recession and a severe financial crisis culminated in a debt default, a chaotic devaluation, and a descent into the deepest depression in Argentine history. A massive wave of riots and protests triggered a string of presidential resignations, plunging the country into a profound crisis. For several months, Argentina teetered on the brink of anarchy. Widespread hostility toward the political elite raised the specter of a Peru-or Venezuela-style partysystem collapse. As the 2003 presidential election approached, many observers feared that the vote would be marred by violence or fraud. The April 27 election produced no such outcome. Not only did democracy survive and the vote proceed smoothly, but the top two finishers, ex-president Menem and Santa Cruz provincial Governor
Argentina's 28 October 2007 presidential election contrasted sharply with the one that preceded i... more Argentina's 28 October 2007 presidential election contrasted sharply with the one that preceded it. The 2003 race took place in the aftermath of an unprecedented economic collapse and the massive December 2001 protests that toppled two presidents in a span of ten days. That election-which was won by little-known (Peronist) Justicialist Party governor Néstor Kirchner-was held in a climate of political fragmentation and uncertainty. Little uncertainty surrounded the 2007 campaign. After four years of strong economic growth, and with the opposition in shambles, a victory by the incumbent Peronists was a foregone conclusion. The only surprise was that Kirchner, who remained popular, chose not to seek reelection. Instead, his wife, Senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, ran in his place. Cristina Kirchner captured 45 percent of the vote, easily defeating Elisa Carrió of the left-of-center Civic Coalition (23 percent) and Kirchner's former economics minister, Roberto Lavagna (17 percent), who was backed by the Radical Civic Union (UCR). In addition to winning more than three-quarters of Argentina's 23 governorships, the Justicialist Party (PJ) and other pro-Kirchner allies won large majorities in both legislative chambers. In the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Argentina's bicameral National Congress, progovernment Peronists and other Kirchner allies (including pro-Kirchner Radicals) won 160 of 257 seats, while dissident Peronists won another 10 seats. The loosely organized Civic Coalition won 31 seats, while the UCR won 30 seats. In the Senate, the Kirchnerista forces controlled 47 of 74 seats after the election, while another 5 seats were held by dissident Peronists. The PJ thus emerged from the election in a dominant position. Opposition forces
We explore the impact of issue framing on individual attitudes toward international trade. Based ... more We explore the impact of issue framing on individual attitudes toward international trade. Based on a survey experiment fielded in Argentina during 2007, which reproduces the setup of earlier studies in the United States, we show that individuals' position in the economy and their material concerns define the strength of their prior beliefs about international trade, and thereby mitigate their sensitivity to the new dimensions introduced in informational cues. Extending the analysis beyond the United States to a country with different skill endowments allows us to better explore the role of material and nonmaterial attributes on individual attitudes toward trade. We find that skill is a central predictor of support for openness. The effect is strongest for individuals in the service sector and in cities that cater to the producers of agricultural commodities. Our findings suggest that the pattern of support for economic integration reflects the predictions from recent literature...
The 1993 Argentine Elections On 3 October 1993 Argentinians voted in mid-term elections for the C... more The 1993 Argentine Elections On 3 October 1993 Argentinians voted in mid-term elections for the Chamber of National Deputies for the second time since the inauguration of the Menem administration in July 1989. The incumbent Peronist party (PJ) obtained 42 per cent of votes (65 seats); its main contender, the Radical party (UCR) of former President Raul Alfonsin, secured 30 per cent of the votes (41 seats). The government interpreted its victory as a popular endorsement of its economic programme that had brought skyrocketing Argentine inflation under control. Moreover, President Menem considered the results as a mandate to reform the Constitution and thereby allow him to seek reelection. The agreement of two-thirds of the Chamber of National Deputies and the Senate is necessary to call for a Constitutional Convention. The Peronist party is currently 45 deputies short of the two-thirds in the Chamber. President Menem has proposed a dialogue to the opposition and to the dissident Peronist senators (that include an alternative presidential candidate) to resolve this issue, while announcing his intention to call a plebiscite over the reform in support of his position. Electoral System and Concurrent Elections 0261-3794/94/02/0150-07 0 1994 Butterworth-Heinemann 6. The three parties won the provincial elections in 1983 and two of them (PAL in Corrientes and MPN in NeuquCn) have just won again in 1993. 7. Only one election for governor was held. In the province of Corrientes, the Pacto Autonomista-Liberal won the elections for governor with 46.7 per cent. However, 'ballotage' elections should decide the governorship in the absence of a majority. This 'ballotage' electoral system replaces the previous electoral college that had produced deadlocks in the 1991 and 1992 gubernatorial elections. These deadlocks were followed by federal intervention.
This article provides a new comparative methodology for the study of party–voter linkages from th... more This article provides a new comparative methodology for the study of party–voter linkages from the perspective of voters, where the critical question that distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic parties is access to publicly provided benefits. In the former case, partisan networks mediate access to goods. In the latter, beneficiaries are defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks. We show that these different access mechanisms shape voters’ distributive expectations and the nature of their linkages to political parties by developing a unique methodology to measure party networks. We test it using original survey data from Argentina and Chile and show variation both across and within countries on party–voter linkages based on differential access to benefits and parties’ organizational capacity.
... María Victoria Murillo Columbia University Prepared for Presentation at the American Politica... more ... María Victoria Murillo Columbia University Prepared for Presentation at the American PoliticalScience Association Annual Meeting, Sept. ... 7 contribute to the enforcement of regulatory rules (Levine and Forrence 1990; O'Rourke 2004; Abers and Keck 2009; Schrank 2009). ...
Comparative research on political institutions has begun to turn from issues of formal institutio... more Comparative research on political institutions has begun to turn from issues of formal institutional design to issues of institutional strength. Rather than assuming a tight fit between formal rules and political behavior, these studies examine how variation in the stability and/or enforcement of formal rules shapes actors' expectations and behavior. This article explores the emerging research agenda on institutional strength. It disaggregates the concept of institutional strength into two dimensions—enforcement and stability—and it argues that institutions vary widely on both dimensions. The article then examines the sources of this variation and its implications for comparative research. It shows how recent research on weak institutions may be used to refine existing theories of institutional effects, design, and development, which should broaden the comparative scope of these theories. The conclusion examines ways of developing comparative measures of institutional strength.
... 8 Alesina, Danninger y Rostagno (2001 ) tambi?n realizan un estudio similar respecto del empl... more ... 8 Alesina, Danninger y Rostagno (2001 ) tambi?n realizan un estudio similar respecto del empleo p?blico en Italia, 9 Iversen y Soskice (2002) ofrecen un modelo alternativo de redistribuci?n focalizada. ... Page 6. 520 ERNESTO CALVO Y MARIA VICTORIA MURILLO ...
ABSTRACT (Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se analiza la reacción de los s... more ABSTRACT (Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se analiza la reacción de los sindicatos magisteriales y los gremios médicos a una serie de reformas del sector social en la región, incluidos la descentralización, mecanismos de pago a los prestadores de servicios y la introducción de mecanismos de evaluación del desempeño y de prestación privada de servicios. Combina la obra publicada sobre Economía y Politología para comprender las condiciones que moldean diversos patrones de comportamiento de los sindicatos y sus efectos en la aplicación de las políticas. El trabajo sugiere que las principales condiciones que influyen en el comportamiento de los sindicatos en el sector de la salud tienen que ver con la estructura del mercado (tamaño y nivel de competencia), debido a la participación combinada del sector privado y el público en el empleo. En la educación, donde el sector público es la principal fuente de empleo, los alineamientos políticos y las características organizacionales de las asociaciones magisteriales también desempeñan un papel importante para explicar el comportamiento de las organizaciones prestadoras de esos servicios. Se concluye, tomando en cuenta la naturaleza exógena de la mayoría de estas variables, presentando algunas sugerencias de políticas para alinear los objetivos de los sindicatos y los de los diseñadores de políticas mediante reformas de la normativa.
for their comments on various drafts of this paper. The participants at the seminars organized by... more for their comments on various drafts of this paper. The participants at the seminars organized by the IADB and Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Institucional provided useful suggestions.
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be attribu... more The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf. The Research Department (RES) produces the Latin American Economic Policies Newsletter, as well as working papers and books, on diverse economic issues.
A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the h... more A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which the object can best be obtained.
Since the early 1980s privatization has spread in Latin America under both right-wing rulers and ... more Since the early 1980s privatization has spread in Latin America under both right-wing rulers and populist presidents. This regional convergence toward privatization seemed to announce the end of partisan policy-making. However, not all governments implement privatization in the same way even in the context of policy convergence. Technocrats propose similar policy options in countries where capital dearth creates pressures for convergence. Yet politicians build the electoral and government coalitions that make these policies possible, and their preferences shape the institutions chosen at implementation. The “bias” introduced by politicians depends on their prior beliefs and constituencies, which shape their institutional preferences. Beliefs about economic nationalism and state intervention influence the selection of regulations at the time of privatization, whereas coalition buildingwith political constituencies shapes the definition of selling conditions in privatized companies. T...
In the late 1980s, populist labor parties, which had advanced protectionism and state interventio... more In the late 1980s, populist labor parties, which had advanced protectionism and state intervention in the postwar period, implemented market-oriented reforms in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. In all three countries, market reforms hurt their union allies. The interaction between allied unions and governing labor parties, however, varied across countries and across sectors within the same country. While some unions endorsed neoliberal reforms, others rejected them despite their long-term alliance with governing parties. While some unions obtained concessions, others failed to do so.This article argues that the incentives created by partisan loyalties, partisan competition, and union competition explain these interactions. Partisan loyalty results from the long-term affiliation of unions with a political party. Partisan competition takes place among union leaders affiliated with different political parties for the control of unions. Union competition occurs in diverse national and ...
Whereas both the literature on globalization and the literature on regulatory diffusion stress th... more Whereas both the literature on globalization and the literature on regulatory diffusion stress the pressures that led to policy convergence, this article shows how the ideology of incumbents produced different regulatory outcomes, even in the face of strong financial and technological pressures that constrained policy agency. By looking at the regulatory frameworks adopted at the time of electricity privatization in Latin America, this article shows that right-wing governments adopted regulations that eliminated barriers to entry and investment and limited the discretion of regulators (market-conforming regulations), and that former statists who had pragmatically converted to the market creed instead chose regulations that tended to impose higher barriers to entry and investment and gave regulators wide discretion in conflict resolution and price setting (marketcontrolling regulations). These findings suggest the need to look at the ideology (and ideological legacies) of government coalitions for a more nuanced understanding of the process of regulatory diffusion that took place across many sectors in most regions of the world.
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 1999
This article compares union-government relations in Mexico and Argentina when education was decen... more This article compares union-government relations in Mexico and Argentina when education was decentralized in the early 1990s. The Mexican union accepted decentralization after obtaining concessions from the government that placated its opposition; but the Argentine teachers’ unions militantly resisted the reforms, only to see government officials ignore their demands. These cases illustrate the significance of partisan identities, union fragmentation, and leadership competition in the interaction of public sector unions and government officials.
The events of December 2001 seemed to transform Argentina's international status from poster chil... more The events of December 2001 seemed to transform Argentina's international status from poster child to basket case. Throughout the 1990s, Argentina had been widely hailed as a case of successful market reform under democratic government. The radical economic transformation undertaken by the government of Carlos Saúl Menem had ended hyperinflation and restored economic growth, while the country enjoyed an unprecedented degree of democratic stability. Elections were free; civil liberties were broadly protected; and the armed forces, which had toppled six civilian governments since 1930, largely disappeared from the political scene. Yet in late 2001, Argentina suffered an extraordinary economic and political meltdown. A prolonged recession and a severe financial crisis culminated in a debt default, a chaotic devaluation, and a descent into the deepest depression in Argentine history. A massive wave of riots and protests triggered a string of presidential resignations, plunging the country into a profound crisis. For several months, Argentina teetered on the brink of anarchy. Widespread hostility toward the political elite raised the specter of a Peru-or Venezuela-style partysystem collapse. As the 2003 presidential election approached, many observers feared that the vote would be marred by violence or fraud. The April 27 election produced no such outcome. Not only did democracy survive and the vote proceed smoothly, but the top two finishers, ex-president Menem and Santa Cruz provincial Governor
Argentina's 28 October 2007 presidential election contrasted sharply with the one that preceded i... more Argentina's 28 October 2007 presidential election contrasted sharply with the one that preceded it. The 2003 race took place in the aftermath of an unprecedented economic collapse and the massive December 2001 protests that toppled two presidents in a span of ten days. That election-which was won by little-known (Peronist) Justicialist Party governor Néstor Kirchner-was held in a climate of political fragmentation and uncertainty. Little uncertainty surrounded the 2007 campaign. After four years of strong economic growth, and with the opposition in shambles, a victory by the incumbent Peronists was a foregone conclusion. The only surprise was that Kirchner, who remained popular, chose not to seek reelection. Instead, his wife, Senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, ran in his place. Cristina Kirchner captured 45 percent of the vote, easily defeating Elisa Carrió of the left-of-center Civic Coalition (23 percent) and Kirchner's former economics minister, Roberto Lavagna (17 percent), who was backed by the Radical Civic Union (UCR). In addition to winning more than three-quarters of Argentina's 23 governorships, the Justicialist Party (PJ) and other pro-Kirchner allies won large majorities in both legislative chambers. In the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Argentina's bicameral National Congress, progovernment Peronists and other Kirchner allies (including pro-Kirchner Radicals) won 160 of 257 seats, while dissident Peronists won another 10 seats. The loosely organized Civic Coalition won 31 seats, while the UCR won 30 seats. In the Senate, the Kirchnerista forces controlled 47 of 74 seats after the election, while another 5 seats were held by dissident Peronists. The PJ thus emerged from the election in a dominant position. Opposition forces
We explore the impact of issue framing on individual attitudes toward international trade. Based ... more We explore the impact of issue framing on individual attitudes toward international trade. Based on a survey experiment fielded in Argentina during 2007, which reproduces the setup of earlier studies in the United States, we show that individuals' position in the economy and their material concerns define the strength of their prior beliefs about international trade, and thereby mitigate their sensitivity to the new dimensions introduced in informational cues. Extending the analysis beyond the United States to a country with different skill endowments allows us to better explore the role of material and nonmaterial attributes on individual attitudes toward trade. We find that skill is a central predictor of support for openness. The effect is strongest for individuals in the service sector and in cities that cater to the producers of agricultural commodities. Our findings suggest that the pattern of support for economic integration reflects the predictions from recent literature...
The 1993 Argentine Elections On 3 October 1993 Argentinians voted in mid-term elections for the C... more The 1993 Argentine Elections On 3 October 1993 Argentinians voted in mid-term elections for the Chamber of National Deputies for the second time since the inauguration of the Menem administration in July 1989. The incumbent Peronist party (PJ) obtained 42 per cent of votes (65 seats); its main contender, the Radical party (UCR) of former President Raul Alfonsin, secured 30 per cent of the votes (41 seats). The government interpreted its victory as a popular endorsement of its economic programme that had brought skyrocketing Argentine inflation under control. Moreover, President Menem considered the results as a mandate to reform the Constitution and thereby allow him to seek reelection. The agreement of two-thirds of the Chamber of National Deputies and the Senate is necessary to call for a Constitutional Convention. The Peronist party is currently 45 deputies short of the two-thirds in the Chamber. President Menem has proposed a dialogue to the opposition and to the dissident Peronist senators (that include an alternative presidential candidate) to resolve this issue, while announcing his intention to call a plebiscite over the reform in support of his position. Electoral System and Concurrent Elections 0261-3794/94/02/0150-07 0 1994 Butterworth-Heinemann 6. The three parties won the provincial elections in 1983 and two of them (PAL in Corrientes and MPN in NeuquCn) have just won again in 1993. 7. Only one election for governor was held. In the province of Corrientes, the Pacto Autonomista-Liberal won the elections for governor with 46.7 per cent. However, 'ballotage' elections should decide the governorship in the absence of a majority. This 'ballotage' electoral system replaces the previous electoral college that had produced deadlocks in the 1991 and 1992 gubernatorial elections. These deadlocks were followed by federal intervention.
This article provides a new comparative methodology for the study of party–voter linkages from th... more This article provides a new comparative methodology for the study of party–voter linkages from the perspective of voters, where the critical question that distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic parties is access to publicly provided benefits. In the former case, partisan networks mediate access to goods. In the latter, beneficiaries are defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks. We show that these different access mechanisms shape voters’ distributive expectations and the nature of their linkages to political parties by developing a unique methodology to measure party networks. We test it using original survey data from Argentina and Chile and show variation both across and within countries on party–voter linkages based on differential access to benefits and parties’ organizational capacity.
... María Victoria Murillo Columbia University Prepared for Presentation at the American Politica... more ... María Victoria Murillo Columbia University Prepared for Presentation at the American PoliticalScience Association Annual Meeting, Sept. ... 7 contribute to the enforcement of regulatory rules (Levine and Forrence 1990; O'Rourke 2004; Abers and Keck 2009; Schrank 2009). ...
Comparative research on political institutions has begun to turn from issues of formal institutio... more Comparative research on political institutions has begun to turn from issues of formal institutional design to issues of institutional strength. Rather than assuming a tight fit between formal rules and political behavior, these studies examine how variation in the stability and/or enforcement of formal rules shapes actors' expectations and behavior. This article explores the emerging research agenda on institutional strength. It disaggregates the concept of institutional strength into two dimensions—enforcement and stability—and it argues that institutions vary widely on both dimensions. The article then examines the sources of this variation and its implications for comparative research. It shows how recent research on weak institutions may be used to refine existing theories of institutional effects, design, and development, which should broaden the comparative scope of these theories. The conclusion examines ways of developing comparative measures of institutional strength.
... 8 Alesina, Danninger y Rostagno (2001 ) tambi?n realizan un estudio similar respecto del empl... more ... 8 Alesina, Danninger y Rostagno (2001 ) tambi?n realizan un estudio similar respecto del empleo p?blico en Italia, 9 Iversen y Soskice (2002) ofrecen un modelo alternativo de redistribuci?n focalizada. ... Page 6. 520 ERNESTO CALVO Y MARIA VICTORIA MURILLO ...
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