Emma Mateo
Petro Jacyk Ukrainian Studies Postdoctoral Fellow at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, researching civilian engagement in the war effort during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Formerly DPhil student in Sociology at the University of Oxford. My doctoral research (funded by the ESRC) focused on regional protest during moments of mass mobilisation in Ukraine and Belarus, and investigates what accounts for the geospatial dispersion of protest events. I combine social media data, news media, archival resources and interviews to map regional mobilisation and investigate what accounts for these patterns of protest.
In 2018 I completed my MPhil in Russian and East European Studies at Oxford, for which I researched slogans and symbols of the Ukrainian Euromaidan. I also hold a BA from the University of Cambridge in Modern and Medieval Languages (Russian, Ukrainian and French).
Address: Oxford, United Kingdom
Formerly DPhil student in Sociology at the University of Oxford. My doctoral research (funded by the ESRC) focused on regional protest during moments of mass mobilisation in Ukraine and Belarus, and investigates what accounts for the geospatial dispersion of protest events. I combine social media data, news media, archival resources and interviews to map regional mobilisation and investigate what accounts for these patterns of protest.
In 2018 I completed my MPhil in Russian and East European Studies at Oxford, for which I researched slogans and symbols of the Ukrainian Euromaidan. I also hold a BA from the University of Cambridge in Modern and Medieval Languages (Russian, Ukrainian and French).
Address: Oxford, United Kingdom
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Papers by Emma Mateo
same media sources align with positive views of mass mobilizations among the public in their aftermath? And, what is the
relationship between media consumption patterns and believing disinformation about protest events? Addressing these
questions helps us to better understand not only what brings crowds onto the streets, but also what shapes perceptions
of, and disinformation about mass mobilization among the wider population. Employing original data from a nationally
representative panel survey in Ukraine (Hale, Colton, Onuch, & Kravets, 2014) conducted shortly after the 2013–2014
EuroMaidan mobilization, we examine patterns of media consumption among both participants and non-participants, as
well as protest supporters and non-supporters. We also explore variation in media consumption among those who believe
and reject disinformation about the EuroMaidan. We test hypotheses, prominent in current protest literature, related
to the influence of “new” (social media and online news) and “old” media (television) on protest behavior and attitudes.
Making use of the significance of 2014 Ukraine as a testing ground for Russian disinformation tactics, we also specifically test
for consumption of Russian-owned television. Our findings indicate that frequent consumption of “old” media, specifically
Russian-owned television, is significantly associated with both mobilization in and positive perceptions of protest and is a
better predictor of believing “fake news” than consuming “new” media sources.
same media sources align with positive views of mass mobilizations among the public in their aftermath? And, what is the
relationship between media consumption patterns and believing disinformation about protest events? Addressing these
questions helps us to better understand not only what brings crowds onto the streets, but also what shapes perceptions
of, and disinformation about mass mobilization among the wider population. Employing original data from a nationally
representative panel survey in Ukraine (Hale, Colton, Onuch, & Kravets, 2014) conducted shortly after the 2013–2014
EuroMaidan mobilization, we examine patterns of media consumption among both participants and non-participants, as
well as protest supporters and non-supporters. We also explore variation in media consumption among those who believe
and reject disinformation about the EuroMaidan. We test hypotheses, prominent in current protest literature, related
to the influence of “new” (social media and online news) and “old” media (television) on protest behavior and attitudes.
Making use of the significance of 2014 Ukraine as a testing ground for Russian disinformation tactics, we also specifically test
for consumption of Russian-owned television. Our findings indicate that frequent consumption of “old” media, specifically
Russian-owned television, is significantly associated with both mobilization in and positive perceptions of protest and is a
better predictor of believing “fake news” than consuming “new” media sources.