Papers by Edward A N D R E W Greetis
Ethics & The Environment , 2025
Eco-socialists argue that capitalism is incompatible with environmental sustainability and democr... more Eco-socialists argue that capitalism is incompatible with environmental sustainability and democratic egalitarian values. They argue that capitalist reforms, including ‘green growth’ and ‘degrowth,’ fail to take capitalism’s growth imperative seriously. I argue that Rawls’s justice as fairness offers a reasonable alternative to eco-socialism. Rawls rejects capitalism as incompatible with democratic egalitarian values. I argue further that Rawls’s distributive principles do not require growth, and his account of intergenerational justice requires controlling growth. Justice as fairness, however, offers two ways to realize justice. First, a property-owning democracy (POD) broadly disperses control and ownership of productive means. Second, liberal socialism socializes ownership and disperses control of productive means. Socialists respond that POD keeps capital intact and therefore cannot control growth. I argue that the empirical literature on growth shows that the capital process is insufficient to explain growth. I contend that POD should implement degrowth policies to address the other growth imperatives. My arguments show further that the sustainability debate is wrongly focused on the capital process and ownership. Instead of trying to pinpoint some process or mechanism in capitalism as the culprit, my arguments show that we should focus on the underlying values of regimes and how to effectively realize environmental values in institutions.
Res Publica, Jan 7, 2019
G. A. Cohen argues that Rawls's difference principle is incompatible with his endorsement of ince... more G. A. Cohen argues that Rawls's difference principle is incompatible with his endorsement of incentives inequality-higher pay for certain professions is just when that pay benefits everyone. Cohen concludes that Rawls must reject both incentives inequality and 'institutionalism'-the view that egalitarian principles, including the difference principle, apply exclusively to social institutions. I argue that the premises of Cohen's 'internal criticism' of Rawls require rejecting two important parts of his theory: a 'subjective circumstance of justice' and a 'shared conception of justice'. These are important parts of Rawls's 'constructivism'. Constructivism is the view that a conception of justice is the solution to a practical interaction problem and is solved in part by examining the facts of the problem. Thus, an upshot of my arguments is that this Cohen/Rawls dispute reduces to another dispute over 'constructivism'.
Journal of Value Inquiry, May 5, 2021
The Rawlsian institutional approach holds that distributive principles apply to socioeconomic ins... more The Rawlsian institutional approach holds that distributive principles apply to socioeconomic institutions rather than transactions within the institutional framework. Critics claim that the approach is baseless. I defend Rawls’s institutionalism by showing that it has a rational basis: Rawls “constructs” a theory of justice from considered judgments, especially ideas found in the political culture and historical conditions of democracy, including the fact of reasonable pluralism, which supports his institutionalism. I use Rawls’s “fact-sensitive constructivism” to interpret his claim that “utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons.” Rawls’s claim refers to his contrast between impartial spectator reasoning for the classical principle of utility and his original position, which aims to motivate the original position’s use of mutually disinterested parties to an agreement as more accurately reflecting democracy’s fact of reasonable pluralism. Rawls then shows that these original position conditions, meant to reflect separate persons in democracy, justify his egalitarian principles over classical utility. I extend his contrast to act-egalitarianism to show that Rawls’s fact-sensitive constructivism supports his institutionalism. I argue that the original position, which reflects separate persons, only justifies the institutional difference principle and that the natural reasoning for act-egalitarianism does not take seriously the separateness of persons.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
I examine the main anticosmopolitan Rawslian argument, the 'basic structure argument.' It holds t... more I examine the main anticosmopolitan Rawslian argument, the 'basic structure argument.' It holds that distributive justice only applies to existing basic structures, there are only state basic structures, so distributive justice only applies among compatriots. Proponents of the argument face three challenges: 1) they must explain what type of basic structure relation makes distributive justice relevant only among compatriots, 2) they must explain why distributive justice (as opposed to allocative or retributive) is the relevant regulative concept for basic structures, and 3) they must put forth a plausible concept of distributive justice. I show that Rawlsians support what I will call the 'division of labor thesis' to answer the first two challenges. Briefly, the division of labor thesis holds that distributive justice only becomes relevant where members of a division of labor jointly produce some socioeconomic product. To meet the third challenge, Rawlsians seem to accept what Elizabeth Anderson calls the 'modern systemic concept of distributive justice'the idea that distributive justice organizes entire economic systems with respect to their distributive consequences or the relationships they maintain. I argue that if Rawlsians accept the systemic concept, they should reject the anticosmopolitan basic structure argument. KEYWORDS The scope of distributive justice; John Rawls; distributive justice; the basic structure; cosmopolitanism; distributive justice Arash Abizadeh calls the main anticosmopolitan Rawlsian argument 'the basic structure argument' about the scope of justice. 1 Many readers of Rawls think his case against cosmopolitanism rests on two claims: that distributive justice only becomes relevant in the context of a basic structure, and that there is no global basic structure. According to Abizadeh, there are three main ways, which all have some basis in Rawls, that anticosmopolitans interpret a basic structure to claim that that structure makes distributive justice 'relevant.' 2 First, the basic structure is a set of basic coercive institutions. Second, the basic structure is a set of institutions that determine and regulate the terms of social cooperation. Third, the basic structure is a set CONTACT Edward Andrew Greetis
Acta Analytica, 2011
One of the central problems of personal identity is to determine what we are essentially. In resp... more One of the central problems of personal identity is to determine what we are essentially. In response to this problem, Lynne Rudder Baker espouses a psychological criterion, that is, she claims that persons are essentially psychological. Baker's theory purports to bypass the problems of other psychological theories such as Dissociative Identity Disorder and the problem of individuating persons synchronically. I argue that the theory's treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder leads to untenable results, is invalid, and consequently fails to individuate persons.
The Journal of Value Inquiry
The Rawlsian institutional approach holds that distributive principles apply to socioeconomic ins... more The Rawlsian institutional approach holds that distributive principles apply to socioeconomic institutions rather than transactions within the institutional framework. Critics claim that the approach is baseless. I defend Rawls’s institutionalism by showing that it has a rational basis: Rawls “constructs” a theory of justice from considered judgments, especially ideas found in the political culture and historical conditions of democracy, including the fact of reasonable pluralism, which supports his institutionalism. I use Rawls’s “fact-sensitive constructivism” to interpret his claim that “utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons.” Rawls’s claim refers to his contrast between impartial spectator reasoning for the classical principle of utility and his original position, which aims to motivate the original position’s use of mutually disinterested parties to an agreement as more accurately reflecting democracy’s fact of reasonable pluralism. Rawls then shows that these original position conditions, meant to reflect separate persons in democracy, justify his egalitarian principles over classical utility. I extend his contrast to act-egalitarianism to show that Rawls’s fact-sensitive constructivism supports his institutionalism. I argue that the original position, which reflects separate persons, only justifies the institutional difference principle and that the natural reasoning for act-egalitarianism does not take seriously the separateness of persons.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2020
I examine the main anticosmopolitan Rawslian argument, the ‘basic structure argument.’ It holds t... more I examine the main anticosmopolitan Rawslian argument, the ‘basic structure argument.’ It holds that distributive justice only applies to existing basic structures, there are only state basic structures, so distributive justice only applies among compatriots. Proponents of the argument face three challenges: 1) they must explain what type of basic structure relation makes distributive justice relevant only among compatriots, 2) they must explain why distributive justice (as opposed to allocative or retributive) is the relevant regulative concept for basic structures, and 3) they must put forth a plausible concept of distributive justice. I show that Rawlsians support what I will call the ‘division of labor thesis’ to answer the first two challenges. Briefly, the division of labor thesis holds that distributive justice only becomes relevant where members of a division of labor jointly produce some socioeconomic product. To meet the third challenge, Rawlsians seem to accept what Elizabeth Anderson calls the ‘modern systemic concept of distributive justice’ – the idea that distributive justice organizes entire economic systems with respect to their distributive consequences or the relationships they maintain. I argue that if Rawlsians accept the systemic concept, they should reject the anticosmopolitan basic structure argument.
Res Publica, 2019
G. A. Cohen argues that Rawls’s difference principle is incompatible with his endorsement of ince... more G. A. Cohen argues that Rawls’s difference principle is incompatible with his endorsement of incentives inequality—higher pay for certain professions is just when that pay benefits everyone. Cohen concludes that Rawls must reject both incentives inequality and ‘institutionalism’—the view that egalitarian principles, including the difference principle, apply exclusively to social institutions. I argue that the premises of Cohen’s ‘internal criticism’ of Rawls require rejecting two important parts of his theory: a ‘subjective circumstance of justice’ and a ‘shared conception of justice’. These are important parts of Rawls’s ‘constructivism’. Constructivism is the view that a conception of justice is the solution to a practical interaction problem and is solved in part by examining the facts of the problem. Thus, an upshot of my arguments is that this Cohen/Rawls dispute reduces to another dispute over ‘constructivism’.
The Philosophical Forum, 2015
Thomas Pogge argues that John Rawls’s priority of liberty rule is not constraining enough: it per... more Thomas Pogge argues that John Rawls’s priority of liberty rule is not constraining enough: it permits morally unacceptable restrictions of basic liberties. Because of this, Pogge claims that Rawls fails in his two central ambitions: to construct a moral conception that (1) opposes utilitarianism and (2) matches his judgments in reflective equilibrium. Pogge attributes this error to Rawls’s “purely recipient-oriented theorizing”—assessing a society’s basic structure based on how its citizens fare. I argue that Rawls’s theory does not allow restrictions of liberty that are offensive to moral considerations. I then explain how my arguments against Pogge show that Rawls’s idea of reflective equilibrium is crucial for assessing a society’s basic structure and how it follows from this that Rawls’s theorizing is not purely recipient-oriented.
Acta Analytica, 2011
One of the central problems of personal identity is to determine what we are essentially . In res... more One of the central problems of personal identity is to determine what we are essentially . In response to this problem, Lynne Rudder Baker espouses a psychological criterion, that is, she claims that persons are essentially psychological. Baker’s theory purports to bypass the problems of other psychological theories such as Dissociative Identity Disorder and the problem of individuating persons synchronically. I argue that the theory’s treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder leads to untenable results, is invalid, and consequently fails to individuate persons
Revista Conatus: Filosofia De Spinoza, 2010
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Papers by Edward A N D R E W Greetis