How might human language have emerged; and is it essentially based on convention or intention? Th... more How might human language have emerged; and is it essentially based on convention or intention? The paper is an attempt at outlining an answer to the first question by trying to answer the second. It is not an attempt at formally modeling the evolution of language-apt creatures or the emergence of human communication. The aim is to achieve a better understanding of the phenomena (language and communication) to be modeled. Our starting point will be the idea that linguistic and other cognitive capacities must have coevolved and provided mutual scaffolding for one another. We will follow Tomasello, Bickerton and others in assuming that cooperation is the key to language evolution. This will motivate us to model the emergence of communication and meaning along game-theoretic lines, as suggested by Lewis and others. One pressing problem is the problem of equilibrium selection. We will briefly discuss an alleged solution but will find it wanting as it does not model the emergence of human language. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to arguing that combining Grice’s intention-based model of meaning with Lewis’ account of conventions helps explain how human language might have unfolded and solve the problem of equilibrium selection.
Do we need defeasible generalizations in epistemology, generalizations that are genuinely explana... more Do we need defeasible generalizations in epistemology, generalizations that are genuinely explanatory yet ineliminably exception-laden? Do we need them to endow our epistemology with a substantial explanatory structure? Mark Lance and Margaret Little argue for the claim that we do. I will argue that we can just as well do without them-at least in epistemology. So in the paper, I am trying to very briefly sketch an alternative contextualist picture. More specifically, the claim will be that although an epistemic contextualist should commit himself to epistemic holism he can nevertheless appeal to epistemic principles other than defeasible generalizations in order to provide his epistemology with a structure.
Recent scholarship emphasizes the scaffolding role of language for cognition. Language, it is cla... more Recent scholarship emphasizes the scaffolding role of language for cognition. Language, it is claimed, is a cognition-enhancing niche (Clark, 2006), a programming tool for cognition (Lupyan and Bergen, 2016), even neuroenhancement (Dove, 2019) and augments cognitive functions such as memory, categorization, cognitive control, and meta-cognitive abilities ("thinking about thinking"). Yet, the notion that language enhances or augments cognition, and in particular, cognitive control does not easily fit in with embodied approaches to language processing, or so we will argue. Accounts aiming to explain how language enhances various cognitive functions often employ a notion of abstract representation. Yet, embodied approaches to language processing have it that language processing crucially, according to some accounts even exclusively, involves embodied, modalityspecific, i.e., non-abstract representations. In coming to understand a particular phrase or sentence, a prior experience has to be simulated or reenacted. The representation thus activated is embodied (modality-specific) as sensorimotor regions of the brain are thereby recruited. In this paper, we will first discuss the notion of representation, clarify what it takes for a representation to be embodied or abstract, and distinguish between conceptual and (other) linguistic representations. We will then put forward a characterization of cognitive control and examine its representational infrastructure. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to arguing that language augments cognitive control. To that end, we will draw on two lines of research, which investigate how language augments cognitive control: (i) research on the availability of linguistic labels and (ii) research on the active usage of a linguistic code, specifically, in inner speech. Eventually, we will argue that the cognition-enhancing capacity of language can be explained once we assume that it provides us with (a) abstract, non-embodied representations and with (b) abstract, sparse linguistic representations that may serve as easy-to-manipulate placeholders for fully embodied or otherwise more detailed representations.
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, Feb 1, 2014
My aim in this paper is to motivate and defend a version of epistemic contextualism; a version, t... more My aim in this paper is to motivate and defend a version of epistemic contextualism; a version, that is, of what came to be called attributor or ascriber contextualism. I will begin by outlining, in the first part, what I take to be the basic idea of and motivation behind the version of epistemic contextualism that I favor. In the second part, a couple of examples will be presented in order to illustrate the contextualist point. Since epistemic (ascriber) contextualists commonly claim that knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive, the third part of the paper will be concerned with the phenomenon of context-sensitivity at a more general level. A more detailed inquiry into the context-sensitivity natural language expressions exhibit will prove helpful in order to counter the objection that postulating context-sensitivity in the case of knowledge ascriptions is an ad-hoc-maneuver. Given that epistemic contextualism is partly an epistemological thesis, party a linguistic thesis, the remainder of the paper will be devoted to the question of how to semantically model the kind of context-sensitivity exhibited by knowledge ascriptions. The upshot will be that there are two different ways of semantically accommodating the context-sensitivity at issue. Both call for a more or less drastic departure from epistemological and semantic orthodoxy.
My aim in the paper will be to better understand what faultless disagreement could possibly consi... more My aim in the paper will be to better understand what faultless disagreement could possibly consist in and what speakers disagree over when they faultlessly do so. To that end, I will first look at various examples of faultless disagreement. Since I will eventually claim that different forms of faultless disagreement can be modeled semantically on different forms of context-sensitivity I will, in a second step, discuss three different semantic accounts that all promise to successfully accommodate certain forms of context-sensitivity: Indexical Contextualism, Nonindexcal Contextualism (aka Moderate Relativism) and Radical Relativism (aka Assessment-sensitive Relativism). Focussing on the controversy between Indexical and Nonindexical Contextualists the remainder of the paper will be devoted to the question which theory is best suited to handle what kind of disagreement.
While the idea that thinking is a form of silent self-talk goes back at least to Plato, it is not... more While the idea that thinking is a form of silent self-talk goes back at least to Plato, it is not immediately clear how to state this thesis precisely. The aim of the paper is to spell out the notion that we think in language by recourse to recent work on inner speech. To that end, inner speech and overt speech are briefly compared. I then propose that inner speaking be defined as a mental episode that substantially engages the speech production system; the underlying model of speech production is sketched. Next, the cognitive role of inner speaking is explored, especially its role in thinking and reasoning. The question of whether it is a way of making thoughts accessible (to whomever) or whether it is a means of thinking itself is raised. I argue that there are two reasons for assuming that, occasionally, we think in language. More specifically, I will claim that some instances of thinking are instances of inner speaking as they exploit certain properties of natural language, and that some instances of inner speaking are instances of thinking as they play a decisive role in paradigmatic cases of thinking that result from internalizing and re-using certain social-linguistic practices. Finally, the Language-of-Thought hypothesis as an alternative account is critically discussed. 1 Do we Think in Language? Ever since Plato let the stranger in the dialogue Sophistes [263e] explain that thinking is a conversation of the soul with itself, speaking and thinking have been thought to be intimately intertwined (cf. Plato & Fowler 1921). One point of contention, however, was whether we think in a natural language, as Plato, for example, seemed to have assumed (Gacea 2019), or in a mental language that is not made up of natural language, as St. Augustin claimed (Meier-Oeser 2011). In modernity, St. Augustin's
That knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How be... more That knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How best to account for the context-sensitivity at issue, however, is the topic of heated debates. A certain version of nonindexical contextualism seems to be a promising option. Even so, it is incumbent upon any contextualist account to explain in what way and to what extent the epistemic standard operative in a particular context of epistemic evaluation is affected by non-epistemic factors (such as practical interests). In this paper, I investigate how non-epistemic factors come into play when knowledge is ascribed. I argue that knowledge ascriptions often serve the purpose of providing actionable information. This, in turn, requires that epistemic interests be balanced against non-epistemic interests. Moreover, it raises the question of whose interests matter, those of the ascriber, the addressee (of the knowledge ascription), or the subject of ascription. Eventually, an answer to the question is suggested. Keywords Nonindexical contextualism • Epistemic standards • Practical interests • Functions of knowledge ascriptions • Threshold problem, whose stakes? problem It is essential to realize that 'true' and 'false', like 'free' and 'unfree', do not stand for anything simple at all; but for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions.
In this paper, we distinguish two types of creativity (F-creativity and E-creativity; Sampson 201... more In this paper, we distinguish two types of creativity (F-creativity and E-creativity; Sampson 2016) and briefly address the question of language change and linguistic innovation in language acquisition. Cognitively speaking, the two types of creativity may impose different cognitive demands on a speaker. But the most pressing question, from our point of view, is the question whether E-creativity itself is constrained or forces us to ‘transcend’ the (rules of the) system. We will, eventually, argue that what looks like creative language use (metaphor, coercion, etc.) is still governed by rules (or hypermaxims). True E-creativity would then mean to step outside the system.
On the face of it, the a priori is of concern to philosophers because it marks an important subje... more On the face of it, the a priori is of concern to philosophers because it marks an important subject of philosophical inquiry. Since epistemologists are concerned with knowledge in its varieties, they are bound to deal with a pri-ori knowledge, just as they are bound to be concerned with perceptual knowledge and self-knowledge. There should, moreover, be no doubt that inquiring into whether 'a priori' primarily characterises a variety of knowledge or a sort of propositions, what a priori propositions are, what potential sources of non-experiential justification there might be, and how a priori knowledge is related to empirical knowledge are important epistemological tasks in their own right. We will subsume all this under the label of the analytic project. After all, the actual debate very much focuses on providing an analysis of what a priori knowledge amounts to. There is, however, a second reason why the a priori is of concern to philosophers. Philosophy itself is regularly classed as an a priori discipline, notably so by Kant (KrV B18), the Logical Empiricists (see Ayer 1946, chs. 2-3) and contemporary rationalists (see Bealer 1998, 2002). To do so is not to claim that philosophers exclusively rely on, or aim at, a priori knowledge. To do so is to hold that philosophers may embark on a priori inquiries aimed at a priori insights. This idea fits well with what they appear to be doing. Many philosophers neither pursue extensive empirical research, nor rely much on the latest insights the empirical sciences provide. In dealing with stick to their proverbial armchairs. If philosophy was an a priori discipline, Christian Nimtz 2009 – draft, please cite the published version 2 this could easily be explained. So is philosophy an a priori discipline? More generally, how does the a priori affect philosophical methods, aims, topics and research programmes within the different philosophical disciplines? These questions mark hotly contested issues within philosophy, and we will subsume the respective debates under the heading of the reflection project. Recent collections on the a priori have mostly been concerned with the analytic project (see Moser 1989, Casullo 1999, Boghossian/Peacocke 2000). By contrast, the contributions to this book devote a substantial part of their efforts to the reflection project. It goes without saying that these projects are not independent of one another. Rightfully classing philosophical inquiry as a priori presupposes a clear grasp of what philosophical inquiry amounts to …
In this paper, we distinguish two types of creativity (F-creativity and E-creativity; Sampson 201... more In this paper, we distinguish two types of creativity (F-creativity and E-creativity; Sampson 2016) and briefly address the question of language change and linguistic innovation in language acquisition. Cognitively speaking, the two types of creativity may impose different cognitive demands on a speaker. But the most pressing question, from our point of view, is the question whether E-creativity itself is constrained or forces us to ‘transcend’ the (rules of the) system. We will, eventually, argue that what looks like creative language use (metaphor, coercion, etc.) is still governed by rules (or hypermaxims). True E-creativity would then mean to step outside the system.
Kompa Nikola Epistemic Contextualism and the Problem of Disagreement in Jager Christoph Loffler Winfried Erkenntnistheorie Kontexte Werte Dissens Epistemology Contexts Values Disagreement Beitrage Des 34 Intern Wittgenstein Symposiums 7 13 8 2011 Papers of the 34th Intern Wittgenstein Symposium 7..., 2011
We constantly assess each other's epistemic positions. We attempt to distinguish valuable from wo... more We constantly assess each other's epistemic positions. We attempt to distinguish valuable from worthless information, reliable from unreliable informants, etc. Without established social practices of epistemic evaluations we could not navigate the flood of information we are exposed to every day in order to perform essential selections of valiable information. Yet the way we epistemically evaluate each other, ascribe or deny knowledge, who we deem knowledgeable or ignorant, and whom we refer to as an expert or a layman also crucially shape our epistemic milieu and the structure of our society. Epistemic asymmetry often results in and reflects social asymmetry; higher epistemic appraisal often increases social standing. Also, epistemic evaluations such as knowledge ascriptions are commonly performed against the background of certain epistemic and non-epistemic (e.g., practical) concerns and interests. Consequently, epistemic and non-epistemic factors interact in guiding our epistemic practice. To advance our understanding of how they do so is not only a worthwhile project from an epistemological point of view but can be expected to have repercussions on decision making, in debates within political and social theory as well as within ethics, and help us understand and evaluate how we act and even how to act. Moreover, it might shed light on the perennial question of how theoretical and practical rationality relate to one another. A much-discussed question in recent debates on knowledge ascriptions is the question of whether-and if so, how-epistemic standards (standards of how much it takes to count as knowing or as a knower) are influenced by, and/or contextually vary with, non-epistemic factors such as stakes, interests, aims, etc., and whether this in turn affects the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions or only their assertibility (or sayability) conditions. This has been a main point of contention between contextualists, invariantists and relativists (of various brands) concerning knowledge acsriptions (cf.,
How might human language have emerged; and is it essentially based on convention or intention? Th... more How might human language have emerged; and is it essentially based on convention or intention? The paper is an attempt at outlining an answer to the first question by trying to answer the second. It is not an attempt at formally modeling the evolution of language-apt creatures or the emergence of human communication. The aim is to achieve a better understanding of the phenomena (language and communication) to be modeled. Our starting point will be the idea that linguistic and other cognitive capacities must have coevolved and provided mutual scaffolding for one another. We will follow Tomasello, Bickerton and others in assuming that cooperation is the key to language evolution. This will motivate us to model the emergence of communication and meaning along game-theoretic lines, as suggested by Lewis and others. One pressing problem is the problem of equilibrium selection. We will briefly discuss an alleged solution but will find it wanting as it does not model the emergence of human language. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to arguing that combining Grice’s intention-based model of meaning with Lewis’ account of conventions helps explain how human language might have unfolded and solve the problem of equilibrium selection.
Do we need defeasible generalizations in epistemology, generalizations that are genuinely explana... more Do we need defeasible generalizations in epistemology, generalizations that are genuinely explanatory yet ineliminably exception-laden? Do we need them to endow our epistemology with a substantial explanatory structure? Mark Lance and Margaret Little argue for the claim that we do. I will argue that we can just as well do without them-at least in epistemology. So in the paper, I am trying to very briefly sketch an alternative contextualist picture. More specifically, the claim will be that although an epistemic contextualist should commit himself to epistemic holism he can nevertheless appeal to epistemic principles other than defeasible generalizations in order to provide his epistemology with a structure.
Recent scholarship emphasizes the scaffolding role of language for cognition. Language, it is cla... more Recent scholarship emphasizes the scaffolding role of language for cognition. Language, it is claimed, is a cognition-enhancing niche (Clark, 2006), a programming tool for cognition (Lupyan and Bergen, 2016), even neuroenhancement (Dove, 2019) and augments cognitive functions such as memory, categorization, cognitive control, and meta-cognitive abilities ("thinking about thinking"). Yet, the notion that language enhances or augments cognition, and in particular, cognitive control does not easily fit in with embodied approaches to language processing, or so we will argue. Accounts aiming to explain how language enhances various cognitive functions often employ a notion of abstract representation. Yet, embodied approaches to language processing have it that language processing crucially, according to some accounts even exclusively, involves embodied, modalityspecific, i.e., non-abstract representations. In coming to understand a particular phrase or sentence, a prior experience has to be simulated or reenacted. The representation thus activated is embodied (modality-specific) as sensorimotor regions of the brain are thereby recruited. In this paper, we will first discuss the notion of representation, clarify what it takes for a representation to be embodied or abstract, and distinguish between conceptual and (other) linguistic representations. We will then put forward a characterization of cognitive control and examine its representational infrastructure. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to arguing that language augments cognitive control. To that end, we will draw on two lines of research, which investigate how language augments cognitive control: (i) research on the availability of linguistic labels and (ii) research on the active usage of a linguistic code, specifically, in inner speech. Eventually, we will argue that the cognition-enhancing capacity of language can be explained once we assume that it provides us with (a) abstract, non-embodied representations and with (b) abstract, sparse linguistic representations that may serve as easy-to-manipulate placeholders for fully embodied or otherwise more detailed representations.
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, Feb 1, 2014
My aim in this paper is to motivate and defend a version of epistemic contextualism; a version, t... more My aim in this paper is to motivate and defend a version of epistemic contextualism; a version, that is, of what came to be called attributor or ascriber contextualism. I will begin by outlining, in the first part, what I take to be the basic idea of and motivation behind the version of epistemic contextualism that I favor. In the second part, a couple of examples will be presented in order to illustrate the contextualist point. Since epistemic (ascriber) contextualists commonly claim that knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive, the third part of the paper will be concerned with the phenomenon of context-sensitivity at a more general level. A more detailed inquiry into the context-sensitivity natural language expressions exhibit will prove helpful in order to counter the objection that postulating context-sensitivity in the case of knowledge ascriptions is an ad-hoc-maneuver. Given that epistemic contextualism is partly an epistemological thesis, party a linguistic thesis, the remainder of the paper will be devoted to the question of how to semantically model the kind of context-sensitivity exhibited by knowledge ascriptions. The upshot will be that there are two different ways of semantically accommodating the context-sensitivity at issue. Both call for a more or less drastic departure from epistemological and semantic orthodoxy.
My aim in the paper will be to better understand what faultless disagreement could possibly consi... more My aim in the paper will be to better understand what faultless disagreement could possibly consist in and what speakers disagree over when they faultlessly do so. To that end, I will first look at various examples of faultless disagreement. Since I will eventually claim that different forms of faultless disagreement can be modeled semantically on different forms of context-sensitivity I will, in a second step, discuss three different semantic accounts that all promise to successfully accommodate certain forms of context-sensitivity: Indexical Contextualism, Nonindexcal Contextualism (aka Moderate Relativism) and Radical Relativism (aka Assessment-sensitive Relativism). Focussing on the controversy between Indexical and Nonindexical Contextualists the remainder of the paper will be devoted to the question which theory is best suited to handle what kind of disagreement.
While the idea that thinking is a form of silent self-talk goes back at least to Plato, it is not... more While the idea that thinking is a form of silent self-talk goes back at least to Plato, it is not immediately clear how to state this thesis precisely. The aim of the paper is to spell out the notion that we think in language by recourse to recent work on inner speech. To that end, inner speech and overt speech are briefly compared. I then propose that inner speaking be defined as a mental episode that substantially engages the speech production system; the underlying model of speech production is sketched. Next, the cognitive role of inner speaking is explored, especially its role in thinking and reasoning. The question of whether it is a way of making thoughts accessible (to whomever) or whether it is a means of thinking itself is raised. I argue that there are two reasons for assuming that, occasionally, we think in language. More specifically, I will claim that some instances of thinking are instances of inner speaking as they exploit certain properties of natural language, and that some instances of inner speaking are instances of thinking as they play a decisive role in paradigmatic cases of thinking that result from internalizing and re-using certain social-linguistic practices. Finally, the Language-of-Thought hypothesis as an alternative account is critically discussed. 1 Do we Think in Language? Ever since Plato let the stranger in the dialogue Sophistes [263e] explain that thinking is a conversation of the soul with itself, speaking and thinking have been thought to be intimately intertwined (cf. Plato & Fowler 1921). One point of contention, however, was whether we think in a natural language, as Plato, for example, seemed to have assumed (Gacea 2019), or in a mental language that is not made up of natural language, as St. Augustin claimed (Meier-Oeser 2011). In modernity, St. Augustin's
That knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How be... more That knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How best to account for the context-sensitivity at issue, however, is the topic of heated debates. A certain version of nonindexical contextualism seems to be a promising option. Even so, it is incumbent upon any contextualist account to explain in what way and to what extent the epistemic standard operative in a particular context of epistemic evaluation is affected by non-epistemic factors (such as practical interests). In this paper, I investigate how non-epistemic factors come into play when knowledge is ascribed. I argue that knowledge ascriptions often serve the purpose of providing actionable information. This, in turn, requires that epistemic interests be balanced against non-epistemic interests. Moreover, it raises the question of whose interests matter, those of the ascriber, the addressee (of the knowledge ascription), or the subject of ascription. Eventually, an answer to the question is suggested. Keywords Nonindexical contextualism • Epistemic standards • Practical interests • Functions of knowledge ascriptions • Threshold problem, whose stakes? problem It is essential to realize that 'true' and 'false', like 'free' and 'unfree', do not stand for anything simple at all; but for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions.
In this paper, we distinguish two types of creativity (F-creativity and E-creativity; Sampson 201... more In this paper, we distinguish two types of creativity (F-creativity and E-creativity; Sampson 2016) and briefly address the question of language change and linguistic innovation in language acquisition. Cognitively speaking, the two types of creativity may impose different cognitive demands on a speaker. But the most pressing question, from our point of view, is the question whether E-creativity itself is constrained or forces us to ‘transcend’ the (rules of the) system. We will, eventually, argue that what looks like creative language use (metaphor, coercion, etc.) is still governed by rules (or hypermaxims). True E-creativity would then mean to step outside the system.
On the face of it, the a priori is of concern to philosophers because it marks an important subje... more On the face of it, the a priori is of concern to philosophers because it marks an important subject of philosophical inquiry. Since epistemologists are concerned with knowledge in its varieties, they are bound to deal with a pri-ori knowledge, just as they are bound to be concerned with perceptual knowledge and self-knowledge. There should, moreover, be no doubt that inquiring into whether 'a priori' primarily characterises a variety of knowledge or a sort of propositions, what a priori propositions are, what potential sources of non-experiential justification there might be, and how a priori knowledge is related to empirical knowledge are important epistemological tasks in their own right. We will subsume all this under the label of the analytic project. After all, the actual debate very much focuses on providing an analysis of what a priori knowledge amounts to. There is, however, a second reason why the a priori is of concern to philosophers. Philosophy itself is regularly classed as an a priori discipline, notably so by Kant (KrV B18), the Logical Empiricists (see Ayer 1946, chs. 2-3) and contemporary rationalists (see Bealer 1998, 2002). To do so is not to claim that philosophers exclusively rely on, or aim at, a priori knowledge. To do so is to hold that philosophers may embark on a priori inquiries aimed at a priori insights. This idea fits well with what they appear to be doing. Many philosophers neither pursue extensive empirical research, nor rely much on the latest insights the empirical sciences provide. In dealing with stick to their proverbial armchairs. If philosophy was an a priori discipline, Christian Nimtz 2009 – draft, please cite the published version 2 this could easily be explained. So is philosophy an a priori discipline? More generally, how does the a priori affect philosophical methods, aims, topics and research programmes within the different philosophical disciplines? These questions mark hotly contested issues within philosophy, and we will subsume the respective debates under the heading of the reflection project. Recent collections on the a priori have mostly been concerned with the analytic project (see Moser 1989, Casullo 1999, Boghossian/Peacocke 2000). By contrast, the contributions to this book devote a substantial part of their efforts to the reflection project. It goes without saying that these projects are not independent of one another. Rightfully classing philosophical inquiry as a priori presupposes a clear grasp of what philosophical inquiry amounts to …
In this paper, we distinguish two types of creativity (F-creativity and E-creativity; Sampson 201... more In this paper, we distinguish two types of creativity (F-creativity and E-creativity; Sampson 2016) and briefly address the question of language change and linguistic innovation in language acquisition. Cognitively speaking, the two types of creativity may impose different cognitive demands on a speaker. But the most pressing question, from our point of view, is the question whether E-creativity itself is constrained or forces us to ‘transcend’ the (rules of the) system. We will, eventually, argue that what looks like creative language use (metaphor, coercion, etc.) is still governed by rules (or hypermaxims). True E-creativity would then mean to step outside the system.
Kompa Nikola Epistemic Contextualism and the Problem of Disagreement in Jager Christoph Loffler Winfried Erkenntnistheorie Kontexte Werte Dissens Epistemology Contexts Values Disagreement Beitrage Des 34 Intern Wittgenstein Symposiums 7 13 8 2011 Papers of the 34th Intern Wittgenstein Symposium 7..., 2011
We constantly assess each other's epistemic positions. We attempt to distinguish valuable from wo... more We constantly assess each other's epistemic positions. We attempt to distinguish valuable from worthless information, reliable from unreliable informants, etc. Without established social practices of epistemic evaluations we could not navigate the flood of information we are exposed to every day in order to perform essential selections of valiable information. Yet the way we epistemically evaluate each other, ascribe or deny knowledge, who we deem knowledgeable or ignorant, and whom we refer to as an expert or a layman also crucially shape our epistemic milieu and the structure of our society. Epistemic asymmetry often results in and reflects social asymmetry; higher epistemic appraisal often increases social standing. Also, epistemic evaluations such as knowledge ascriptions are commonly performed against the background of certain epistemic and non-epistemic (e.g., practical) concerns and interests. Consequently, epistemic and non-epistemic factors interact in guiding our epistemic practice. To advance our understanding of how they do so is not only a worthwhile project from an epistemological point of view but can be expected to have repercussions on decision making, in debates within political and social theory as well as within ethics, and help us understand and evaluate how we act and even how to act. Moreover, it might shed light on the perennial question of how theoretical and practical rationality relate to one another. A much-discussed question in recent debates on knowledge ascriptions is the question of whether-and if so, how-epistemic standards (standards of how much it takes to count as knowing or as a knower) are influenced by, and/or contextually vary with, non-epistemic factors such as stakes, interests, aims, etc., and whether this in turn affects the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions or only their assertibility (or sayability) conditions. This has been a main point of contention between contextualists, invariantists and relativists (of various brands) concerning knowledge acsriptions (cf.,
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