Papers by julie Brumberg-Chaumont
Logic in Questions, 2023
This chapter is focused on thirteenth-century logical hylomorphism. It describes an original chap... more This chapter is focused on thirteenth-century logical hylomorphism. It describes an original chapter in the history of logical form, when argument had "substantial forms," namely syllogistic forms, and when logical matter did "matter," as much as logical form, when defining the scope of logic and the essence of the syllogism. Various senses of logical "matter" are distinguished and the idea of a Latin "material logic" is defended. The study of a series of vexing issues, especially puzzles in modal syllogistic, shows how many arguments lingered in a "syllogistic limbo" at that period. The contribution of logical matter was such that the possibility of a logical "salvation" of these arguments, as syllogisms or as a formally valid arguments, remained undecided.
Logical Skills, 2021
This paper is dedicated to the first universities and mendicant schools, where thousands of stude... more This paper is dedicated to the first universities and mendicant schools, where thousands of students began to converge during the thirteenth century. Logic played an unpreceded role in basic and higher education. A "Parisian logical model" of education was shaped at the University of Paris, adopted by mendicant Orders in their schools of logic (studia artium), diffused in all disciplines, and progressively spread in Southern Europe. Medieval education became heavily based upon logical, and even "logician" practices, with the "syllogization" of exegetical, disputational, and evaluation practices. The notion of logical skill conveniently captures this unique situation for the discipline of logic, as well as the way medieval thinkers conceived of logic as a universal, transdisciplinary method, a natural operation of the mind, a modality of knowledge (modus sciendi), the very form of teaching and graduating, a "habitus," a technique (ars) and a science. The divisions of Aristotelian logic, the "artificial logic," were for the first time naturalized and projected on the very structure of human mind, which was thereby "logicalized" and ascribed a "natural logic." A strong anthropological dimension was bestowed on logic. The discipline of logic was deemed a necessary instrument in the philosophical "perfection" and the Christian "reparation" of man as an intellectual creature by a group of logically skilled, professional philosophers and theologians, whereas men deprived of logical education were described as "logically disabled," and stuck into inferior forms of humanity. The world of medieval intellectual elites displayed a variety of social uses of logic, beyond academic circles, especially in the performance of pastoral duties. The possible historical records of the social usefulness of logic are explored: for students, the majority in medieval universities, who left university without a degree, but with a solid logical education, for ordinary mendicant friars, dedicated to preaching and confession, who frequented logical schools, and for members of the parish clergy sent to the faculties of arts.
« La signification de la substance chez Priscien et Pierre Hélie », in Priscien Traditions et refondation de la grammaire. De l’Antiquité aux Modernes, éd. L. Holtz, M. Baratin, et B. Colombat, Turnhout, 2009, p. 503-519
« Rationalité, Féminité, Taciturnité », Ad placitum. Pour Irène Rosier-Catach, ed. L. Cesalli, F. Goubier, A. Grondeux, A. Robert, et L. Valente, Tome 1, Aracne editrice, 2021, p. 141-149, 2021
« Rationalité, Féminité, Taciturnité », Ad placitum. Pour Irène Rosier-Catach, ed. L. Cesalli, F... more « Rationalité, Féminité, Taciturnité », Ad placitum. Pour Irène Rosier-Catach, ed. L. Cesalli, F. Goubier, A. Grondeux, A. Robert, et L. Valente, Tome 1, Aracne editrice, 2021, p. 141-149
Quaestio 20, 2020, 2020
The paper wishes to investigate the way Giles of Rome thought about logic: as a discipline, as a ... more The paper wishes to investigate the way Giles of Rome thought about logic: as a discipline, as a method, through an examination of the powers of logic, but also as a teaching subject. It tries to illuminate his views on logical education, and how he may have acted in favour of the latter as an Augustinian leader. It first offers a general presentation of the logical productions, from the 1270s to 1291. It then addresses the topic of logical education from two viewpoints: by a look taken at Giles’ views on logic in the De regimine principum, and by a quick survey of the history of the teaching of logic in the studia of the Augustinian order from the mid-1280s on. The last section is dedicated to the philosophy and anthropology of logic. It tries to enlighten the originality of Giles’ s position, as a new departure taken from traditional theories regarding the absolute necessity of logic as a science, as an art, and as the underlying logic of all sciences, itself included. Rather than essentially necessary for any kind of philosophical endeavour, logic is presented a need for men, due to the fallible nature of his potential intellect. Rather than a science, it is described as a method for science which doesn’t use its more powerful instrument, i.e. the theory of scientific syllogism, since it proceeds in a non-demonstrative manner in the theory of demonstration. Logic and metaphysics are compared as respectively under and above special sciences. The last paragraph deals with the problem of the powers of logic in the context of metaphysical knowledge.
Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes, Volume 3, ed. D. Calma, 2022
Cette étude est centrée sur l’exemple de la triade ‘esse, vivum, homo’, qui apparaît dès les prem... more Cette étude est centrée sur l’exemple de la triade ‘esse, vivum, homo’, qui apparaît dès les premières propositions du Liber de Causis.
Le corpus que nous nous proposons d’évoquer commence avec l’œuvre de Roger Bacon, rédigée autour de 1245. Il s’agit d’une époque où le Liber de causis était relié à l’enseignement de la Métaphysique, comme en témoigne le Guide de l’étudiant, et pouvait en être considéré le dernier livre, selon une distinction entre les théorèmes, aristotéliciens, et leurs explications, alfarabiennes. Notre étude s’étend jusqu’aux commentaires anonymes fortement influencés par Siger de Brabant dans les années 1270-1290, en passant par le commentaire de Thomas d’Aquin, qui a identifié en Proclus la source du Liber. Comme nous le constaterons, le commentaire de Siger (1274/76) constitue un point d’orgue dans l’histoire de l’exégèse de l’exemple de la triade esse, vivum, homo.
Nous nous sommes surtout concentrée sur l’étude des stratégies exégétiques et des schèmes récurrents de questions, qui montrent la constitution d’un réseau d’adages et d’arguments. Ceux-ci révèlent également une série d’évolutions profondes sur la période considérée, avec l’agrégation à l’exégèse de l’exemple de la question du réalisme des universaux, puis de celle de la pluralité des formes substantielles.
Nous avons pu identifier, d’un point de vue exégétique, l’adoption d’un régime restreint et d’un régime complet dans l’interprétation de l’exemple de la triade, deux régimes qui ont des conséquences doctrinales importantes, bien que celles-ci n’en découlent pas mécaniquement. Dans un régime exégétique complet, on considère que l’exemple est utilisé par l’auteur du Liber pour illustrer l’ensemble des propositions initiales du premier chapitre, y compris la causalité plus grande de la cause première universelle sur l’effet de la cause seconde universelle. S’il est difficile à ‘aristotéliser’, en cas d’adhésion à la thèse qui y est exposée, le régime complet est bien davantage conforme à la lettre du texte du Liber. Dans un régime restreint, au contraire, on juge que l’exemple ne fonctionne, dans l’économie du texte, que pour la question de l’antériorité et la non-suppression de la cause formelle générique plus universelles par rapport à la cause générique moins universelles, ou par rapport à la différence ultime. Le régime restreint est, à l’évidence, plus facile à défendre d’un point de vue aristotélicien. On peut trouver dans ce cadre une place, quoique bien délimitée, à l’idée d’un ordre des causes formelles.
Le choix entre ces deux options est chez nos auteurs lié à une série de décisions philosophiques plus générales quant à la possible application, dans le cas des causes formelles, du premier théorème et de ses corolaires (non-suppression, antériorité).
Julie Brumberg-Chaumont, 2021
This paper wants to address the problem of the cultural impact of logic in Latin and Hebrew conte... more This paper wants to address the problem of the cultural impact of logic in Latin and Hebrew contexts by offering a social and spatialized history of logic during the 13th century. This approach is liable to put an end to the idea that medieval Latin logical culture would be a monolithic reality, targeted by the umbrella term of ‘Latin scholaticism’. The pluralization of Latin educational cultures is explored in terms of history of disciplines, places of knowledge, periods, institutions, self-representation, social value, educational impact and practitioners.
The first part of this paper shows how the diffusion of Aristotelian cultures was quite low in Christian Europe before the beginning of the 13th century, and remained quite so till the end of the 13th century. The second part specifically turns to the history of logic. A first section offers a brief overview of the first developments of Hebrew logic. The following one describes the weaknesses of the teaching of logic in Latin southern Europe. The third section insists on some original features of the teaching of the Tractatus. The last section shows how the development of Dominican ‘schools of logic’ in southern provinces contributed to a first ‘meridionalization’ of the Aristotelian logical culture. The conclusion suggests possible revisions of some aspects of the standard narrative about the history of Latin-Hebrew interactions in the field of logic
Julie Brumberg-Chaumont, 2020
During the Middle Ages, especially from the 13th century on, logic constituted a propaedeutic dis... more During the Middle Ages, especially from the 13th century on, logic constituted a propaedeutic discipline for any form of higher education as well as an art of ‘disputation’ (disputatio), which represented both a scientific method and a compulsory performance for gaining university degrees, socially organized and controlled by teaching institutions. Logic was also newly regarded as a science and a technique for perfecting the intellect of men. It thereby received an unprecedented anthropological signification, while it led to relegate whole social groups, thought of as deprived of logic, to inferior forms of humanity. Medieval logic represented a dominant argumentative culture, doted with a strong normative significance.
Only the normative dimension of logic remains today, but to a large extent detached from its theoretical foundation and its educational value. Our era is characterized by the disappearance of a formal teaching of logic and by the end of the practice of disputation. The concept of intelligence has undergone major evolutions, while intellectual and scientific practices no longer follow a rigid and ritualized logical pattern. The very notion of logic has also changed radically, with a divorce between formal logic and the so-called ‘informal logic’, and the disappearance the idea of logic as a unitary norm which came along the emergence of an irreducible logical pluralism. Social uses of logic are essentially discriminatory, as can be observed indirectly in intelligence tests and directly in logical tests, according to a selection program largely based on the identification of ‘native’ logical skills of the candidates. However, a concern for logical education, but under a different name, has reemerged during the 20th century, with the critical thinking movement. The reflections and practices it led to offers interesting parallels with the medieval situation of logic.
The study of the medieval situation of logic allows to point out irreversible changes, to trace long-lasting legacies and stimulating parallels, but also to reflect on modern uses of logic from a different angle. The history of the uses and values bestowed on logic along time and spaces helps pluralizing and historicizing logic, especially when used as an instrument to evaluate on the basis of a ‘universal and natural’ logic the degrees of rationality of individuals and groups whose intellectual behavior does not fit into the norm.
Arts du langage et théologie, 2011
documenti e studi sulla tradizione medievale , 2016
L'Organon dans la translatio studiorum à l'époque d'Albert le Grand, 2013
SUJET LIBRE Textes réunis sous la direction de Pour Alain de Libera, 2018
Au cours de pérégrinations dans la tradition manuscrite des commentaires anglais à la philosophie... more Au cours de pérégrinations dans la tradition manuscrite des commentaires anglais à la philosophie naturelle d'Aristote (corpus vetustius), une compilation de questions partiellement anonymes et non datées sur le De anima dans un manuscrit praguois (Praha Knihovna metropol. Kapituly M. 80, fol. 42ra-78rb) a attiré mon attention. On y trouve deux questions sur l'unicité de l'intellect possible pour tous les hommes. Or la thèse n'y est pas considérée comme une marque de fabrique de la philosophie d'Averroès, ni, a fortiori, des « averroïstes ». C'est là une situation historiographique paradoxale dont Alain de Libera a été à la fois l'inventeur et le héraut dans l'histoire de la philosophie médiévale.
L'organon dans la stranslatio studiorum à l'époque d'Albert le Grand, 2013
Indivuality in Late Antiquity, 2013
Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic, 2016
The late medieval period is widely acknowledged as one of the most salient moments of the history... more The late medieval period is widely acknowledged as one of the most salient moments of the history of logic and semantics. It not only considered logic as a sine qua non condition for scientifi c knowledge, it also begot highly sophisticated theories about both argumentation and language. The last fi fty years of increasingly intense research have brought about an ever more detailed knowledge of these theories. And yet, the questions as to what kind of logic is medieval logic, whether and to what extent it corresponds to our conception of logic, and, even, what the nature of its object was, remain challenging. That it has a formal character is widely accepted; and its semantic components display remarkable affi nities with contemporary ones. But is it formal in the way modern logic is -or believes it is? Medieval logic does not really make recourse to symbolisms, after all, and the fact that the idea of formal validity might have been born in the twelfth century does not mean that developing formal approaches was an aim of medieval logicians. And what is its semantics a semantics of? Medieval logicians use Latin to deal with Latin constructions, but do these constructions belong to natural language or are they regimented to the point of forming some sort of ideal language?
Symposium: « L'Europe de la Logic, : les traditions aristotéliciennes médiévales et modernes en c... more Symposium: « L'Europe de la Logic, : les traditions aristotéliciennes médiévales et modernes en contextes. Empire et politiques de la logique », Paris, Collège de France, en collaboration avec A. de Libera et A. Romano Talks (2018-2022) August 2022 « L'homme sans philosophie : une vie de bête », SIEPM, Paris.
The rediscovery of Aristotle's works on syllogisms in the Latin world, gave rise to sophisticated... more The rediscovery of Aristotle's works on syllogisms in the Latin world, gave rise to sophisticated views on the nature of syllogistic form and syllogistic matter in the thirteenth century. It led to debates on the ontology of the syllogism with deep consequences on the definition of logic as a universal method for all sciences and as a science itself.
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Papers by julie Brumberg-Chaumont
Le corpus que nous nous proposons d’évoquer commence avec l’œuvre de Roger Bacon, rédigée autour de 1245. Il s’agit d’une époque où le Liber de causis était relié à l’enseignement de la Métaphysique, comme en témoigne le Guide de l’étudiant, et pouvait en être considéré le dernier livre, selon une distinction entre les théorèmes, aristotéliciens, et leurs explications, alfarabiennes. Notre étude s’étend jusqu’aux commentaires anonymes fortement influencés par Siger de Brabant dans les années 1270-1290, en passant par le commentaire de Thomas d’Aquin, qui a identifié en Proclus la source du Liber. Comme nous le constaterons, le commentaire de Siger (1274/76) constitue un point d’orgue dans l’histoire de l’exégèse de l’exemple de la triade esse, vivum, homo.
Nous nous sommes surtout concentrée sur l’étude des stratégies exégétiques et des schèmes récurrents de questions, qui montrent la constitution d’un réseau d’adages et d’arguments. Ceux-ci révèlent également une série d’évolutions profondes sur la période considérée, avec l’agrégation à l’exégèse de l’exemple de la question du réalisme des universaux, puis de celle de la pluralité des formes substantielles.
Nous avons pu identifier, d’un point de vue exégétique, l’adoption d’un régime restreint et d’un régime complet dans l’interprétation de l’exemple de la triade, deux régimes qui ont des conséquences doctrinales importantes, bien que celles-ci n’en découlent pas mécaniquement. Dans un régime exégétique complet, on considère que l’exemple est utilisé par l’auteur du Liber pour illustrer l’ensemble des propositions initiales du premier chapitre, y compris la causalité plus grande de la cause première universelle sur l’effet de la cause seconde universelle. S’il est difficile à ‘aristotéliser’, en cas d’adhésion à la thèse qui y est exposée, le régime complet est bien davantage conforme à la lettre du texte du Liber. Dans un régime restreint, au contraire, on juge que l’exemple ne fonctionne, dans l’économie du texte, que pour la question de l’antériorité et la non-suppression de la cause formelle générique plus universelles par rapport à la cause générique moins universelles, ou par rapport à la différence ultime. Le régime restreint est, à l’évidence, plus facile à défendre d’un point de vue aristotélicien. On peut trouver dans ce cadre une place, quoique bien délimitée, à l’idée d’un ordre des causes formelles.
Le choix entre ces deux options est chez nos auteurs lié à une série de décisions philosophiques plus générales quant à la possible application, dans le cas des causes formelles, du premier théorème et de ses corolaires (non-suppression, antériorité).
The first part of this paper shows how the diffusion of Aristotelian cultures was quite low in Christian Europe before the beginning of the 13th century, and remained quite so till the end of the 13th century. The second part specifically turns to the history of logic. A first section offers a brief overview of the first developments of Hebrew logic. The following one describes the weaknesses of the teaching of logic in Latin southern Europe. The third section insists on some original features of the teaching of the Tractatus. The last section shows how the development of Dominican ‘schools of logic’ in southern provinces contributed to a first ‘meridionalization’ of the Aristotelian logical culture. The conclusion suggests possible revisions of some aspects of the standard narrative about the history of Latin-Hebrew interactions in the field of logic
Only the normative dimension of logic remains today, but to a large extent detached from its theoretical foundation and its educational value. Our era is characterized by the disappearance of a formal teaching of logic and by the end of the practice of disputation. The concept of intelligence has undergone major evolutions, while intellectual and scientific practices no longer follow a rigid and ritualized logical pattern. The very notion of logic has also changed radically, with a divorce between formal logic and the so-called ‘informal logic’, and the disappearance the idea of logic as a unitary norm which came along the emergence of an irreducible logical pluralism. Social uses of logic are essentially discriminatory, as can be observed indirectly in intelligence tests and directly in logical tests, according to a selection program largely based on the identification of ‘native’ logical skills of the candidates. However, a concern for logical education, but under a different name, has reemerged during the 20th century, with the critical thinking movement. The reflections and practices it led to offers interesting parallels with the medieval situation of logic.
The study of the medieval situation of logic allows to point out irreversible changes, to trace long-lasting legacies and stimulating parallels, but also to reflect on modern uses of logic from a different angle. The history of the uses and values bestowed on logic along time and spaces helps pluralizing and historicizing logic, especially when used as an instrument to evaluate on the basis of a ‘universal and natural’ logic the degrees of rationality of individuals and groups whose intellectual behavior does not fit into the norm.
Le corpus que nous nous proposons d’évoquer commence avec l’œuvre de Roger Bacon, rédigée autour de 1245. Il s’agit d’une époque où le Liber de causis était relié à l’enseignement de la Métaphysique, comme en témoigne le Guide de l’étudiant, et pouvait en être considéré le dernier livre, selon une distinction entre les théorèmes, aristotéliciens, et leurs explications, alfarabiennes. Notre étude s’étend jusqu’aux commentaires anonymes fortement influencés par Siger de Brabant dans les années 1270-1290, en passant par le commentaire de Thomas d’Aquin, qui a identifié en Proclus la source du Liber. Comme nous le constaterons, le commentaire de Siger (1274/76) constitue un point d’orgue dans l’histoire de l’exégèse de l’exemple de la triade esse, vivum, homo.
Nous nous sommes surtout concentrée sur l’étude des stratégies exégétiques et des schèmes récurrents de questions, qui montrent la constitution d’un réseau d’adages et d’arguments. Ceux-ci révèlent également une série d’évolutions profondes sur la période considérée, avec l’agrégation à l’exégèse de l’exemple de la question du réalisme des universaux, puis de celle de la pluralité des formes substantielles.
Nous avons pu identifier, d’un point de vue exégétique, l’adoption d’un régime restreint et d’un régime complet dans l’interprétation de l’exemple de la triade, deux régimes qui ont des conséquences doctrinales importantes, bien que celles-ci n’en découlent pas mécaniquement. Dans un régime exégétique complet, on considère que l’exemple est utilisé par l’auteur du Liber pour illustrer l’ensemble des propositions initiales du premier chapitre, y compris la causalité plus grande de la cause première universelle sur l’effet de la cause seconde universelle. S’il est difficile à ‘aristotéliser’, en cas d’adhésion à la thèse qui y est exposée, le régime complet est bien davantage conforme à la lettre du texte du Liber. Dans un régime restreint, au contraire, on juge que l’exemple ne fonctionne, dans l’économie du texte, que pour la question de l’antériorité et la non-suppression de la cause formelle générique plus universelles par rapport à la cause générique moins universelles, ou par rapport à la différence ultime. Le régime restreint est, à l’évidence, plus facile à défendre d’un point de vue aristotélicien. On peut trouver dans ce cadre une place, quoique bien délimitée, à l’idée d’un ordre des causes formelles.
Le choix entre ces deux options est chez nos auteurs lié à une série de décisions philosophiques plus générales quant à la possible application, dans le cas des causes formelles, du premier théorème et de ses corolaires (non-suppression, antériorité).
The first part of this paper shows how the diffusion of Aristotelian cultures was quite low in Christian Europe before the beginning of the 13th century, and remained quite so till the end of the 13th century. The second part specifically turns to the history of logic. A first section offers a brief overview of the first developments of Hebrew logic. The following one describes the weaknesses of the teaching of logic in Latin southern Europe. The third section insists on some original features of the teaching of the Tractatus. The last section shows how the development of Dominican ‘schools of logic’ in southern provinces contributed to a first ‘meridionalization’ of the Aristotelian logical culture. The conclusion suggests possible revisions of some aspects of the standard narrative about the history of Latin-Hebrew interactions in the field of logic
Only the normative dimension of logic remains today, but to a large extent detached from its theoretical foundation and its educational value. Our era is characterized by the disappearance of a formal teaching of logic and by the end of the practice of disputation. The concept of intelligence has undergone major evolutions, while intellectual and scientific practices no longer follow a rigid and ritualized logical pattern. The very notion of logic has also changed radically, with a divorce between formal logic and the so-called ‘informal logic’, and the disappearance the idea of logic as a unitary norm which came along the emergence of an irreducible logical pluralism. Social uses of logic are essentially discriminatory, as can be observed indirectly in intelligence tests and directly in logical tests, according to a selection program largely based on the identification of ‘native’ logical skills of the candidates. However, a concern for logical education, but under a different name, has reemerged during the 20th century, with the critical thinking movement. The reflections and practices it led to offers interesting parallels with the medieval situation of logic.
The study of the medieval situation of logic allows to point out irreversible changes, to trace long-lasting legacies and stimulating parallels, but also to reflect on modern uses of logic from a different angle. The history of the uses and values bestowed on logic along time and spaces helps pluralizing and historicizing logic, especially when used as an instrument to evaluate on the basis of a ‘universal and natural’ logic the degrees of rationality of individuals and groups whose intellectual behavior does not fit into the norm.
It contains :
A critical edition of three early commentaries.
An annotated English translation of the commentary by Adam of Bockenfield.
A detailed introduction to each critical edition justifies the scientific, stemmatic method followed and the complex history of manuscripts.
An extensive historical and doctrinal introduction offers a full inquiry into the first Latin reception of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, the history of the concept of memory, and the early history of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford.