Doctoral dissertation by Anca Gheaus
Published Papers by Anca Gheaus
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2025
Pallikkathayil argues that restrictions on abortion are inconsistent with the usual demands that ... more Pallikkathayil argues that restrictions on abortion are inconsistent with the usual demands that states place on their citizens. States don't require their citizens to make their bodies available for the protection of other people's interests. Yet, when abortion is restricted, women who can be pregnant are less entitled than other citizens to decide on how their bodies are to be used; then, states fail to treat women as equal before the law. The argument is supposed to hold even if one assumes that fetuses at various stages of development are as morally considerable as (already born) children, and even if, moreover, fetuses have passive citizenship statusthat is, if they have claims to state protection. Pallikkathayil's argument comes at excessive theoretical costs, rulling out (a) general duties to help others in the protection of vital interests via relatively non-burdening donation, e.g. of blood, and (b) plausible although demanding special duties of procreative parents. Nevertheless, I agree with Pallikkathayil's conclusion that existing legal restrictions on abortion violate the state's duty to treat its citizens as equal, and are hence illegitimate; namely, because they fail to hold all procreators-whether or not gestational-equally liable.
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Human Rights
There is wide agreement that children have human rights, and that their human rights differ from ... more There is wide agreement that children have human rights, and that their human rights differ from those of adults. What explains this difference which is, at least at first glance, puzzling, given that human rights are meant to be universal? The puzzle can be dispelled by identifying what unites children’s and adults’ rights as human rights. Here I seek to answer the question of children’s human rights – that is, rights they have merely in virtue of being human and of being children – by exploring how children’s interests are different from adults’, and how respect for children’s and adults’ moral status yields different practical requirements. If human rights protect interests, then children have many, but not all, of the human rights of adults, and, in addition, have some human rights that adults lack. I discuss the way in which children’s human rights, as I conceive of them here are, or fail to be, reflected in the law; as an illustration, I use the most important legal document listing children’s rights, namely the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Oxford Handbook of Republicanism, 2024
What would the institution of the family look like if it were reformed according to republican de... more What would the institution of the family look like if it were reformed according to republican desiderata? Would it even survive such re-shaping? This chapter examines the charges that the family dominates women and children in what is taken to be their most convincing interpretations, and considers the theoretical and practical implications. The deepest source of women's domination within the family is the gendered division of labour. Surprisingly perhaps, an analysis of how the gendered division of labour generates domination yields the conclusion that not only women, but also men who engage in very pronounced forms of gendered specialization, can be dominated; this raises the interesting questions of whether mutual (and potentially equal) dependencies can count as domination, and if yes, whether they are less or more objectionable than one-sided domination. Achieving non-domination in upbringing doesn't seem, all things considered, in children's interests. If so, justified child rearing should merely seek to minimize domination. Indeed, it is undesirable, and maybe impossible, to eliminate it not only from the family but from any imaginable form of upbringing-such as an orphanage or a kibbutz. The reason is that children need intimate relationships that can only exist in the absence of proper mechanisms that check the exercise of parental power; further, the kind of vulnerability that concerns republicans may be constitutive of the emotional intimacy that is essential to children's well-being. Finally, the chapter argues that full eradication of domination from close relationships in general is undesirable.
Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2024
John Tillson argues, on grounds of children's wellbeing, that it is impermissible to teach them r... more John Tillson argues, on grounds of children's wellbeing, that it is impermissible to teach them religious views. I defend a practice of pluralistically advocating religious views to children. As long as there are no monopolies of influence over children, and as long as advocates do not use coercion, deceit, or manipulation, children can greatly benefit without having their rational abilities subverted, or incurring undue risk to form false beliefs. This solution should counter, to some extent, both perfectionist and anti-perfectionist reasons against initiating children into religions.
Being Social. The Philosophy of Social Human Rights, 2022
This chapter explores a so-far neglected way of avoiding the bads of loneliness: by learning to v... more This chapter explores a so-far neglected way of avoiding the bads of loneliness: by learning to value solitude, where that is understood as a state of 'keeping oneself company', as J. David Velleman puts it. Unlike loneliness, solitude need not involve any deprivation, whether subjective or objective. This chapter considers the various goods to which solitude is constitutive or instrumental, with a focus on the promise that proper valuing of solitude holds for combating loneliness. The overall argument is this: If loneliness significantly detracts from individual wellbeing, and if the ability to value solitude protects against loneliness, then such an ability is obviously valuable to human flourishing. If, further, loneliness raises concerns of justice, then supporting people's ability to value solitude is a way to implement a desideratum of justice. Individuals can cultivate their ability to value solitude, an ability that others can promote or hinder.
Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2022
Talk of gender identity is at the core of heated current philosophical and political debates. Yet... more Talk of gender identity is at the core of heated current philosophical and political debates. Yet, it is unclear what it means to have one. I examine several ways of understanding this concept in light of core aims of trans writers and activists. Most importantly, the concept should make good trans people’s understanding of their own gender identities and help understand why misgendering is a serious harm and why it is permissible to require information about people’s gender identities in public life. I conclude that none of the available accounts meets these essential criteria, on the assumption that the gender norms of femininity and masculinity are unjustified. But we can, and should, pursue the feminist project without “gender identity”. Such feminism can include trans people because it is possible to account for the specific harm of misgendering without assuming a claim to the recognition of our gender identities. I conclude that we should eliminate the concept of “gender identity.” To understand the phenomena that are putatively captured by “gender identity,” we are better off employing other concepts, such as “sexual dysphoria,” (assigned or aspirational) “gender roles,” and (internalised or endorsed) “gender norms”. These concepts can usefully replace “gender identity” in an individual evaluation of each of the trans people’s claims to inclusion into particular spaces.
Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 2023
Women continue to be in charge of most childrearing; men continue to be responsible for most brea... more Women continue to be in charge of most childrearing; men continue to be responsible for most breadwinning. There is no consensus on whether this state of affairs, and the informal norms that encourage it, are matters of justice to be tackled by state action. Feminists have criticized political liberalism for its alleged inability to embrace a full feminist agenda, inability explained by political liberals' commitment to the ideal of state neutrality. The debate continues on whether neutral states can accommodate two feminist demands: to enact policies aimed at dismantling the feminization of caregiving, especially childrearing, and to compensate women for some of the disadvantages they incur by being primary care-givers. I contribute to this debate with three arguments in support of policies meant to de-gender care-giving and compensate care-givers. The first appeals to equality of opportunity to positions of advantage and justifies policies that prevent or mitigate statistical discrimination and implicit biases. The second draws attention to a possible causal relationship between the specialization of women in early childcare and misogyny; since the latter is incompatible with political liberal justice, it yields the conclusion that political liberals ought to further investigate the causal hypothesis with the aim of establishing or refuting it. The third argument concludes that legitimate childrearing prohibits adults from socializing children or, at least girls, into gender norms; it justifies duties of justice on the side of parents, educators, and economic agents, and state policies meant to offset foreseeable breaches of some of these duties.
Aging without Agism? Conceptual Puzzles and Policy Proposals, 2023
I explore how recent developments in the philosophy of childhood can be made to bear on debates a... more I explore how recent developments in the philosophy of childhood can be made to bear on debates about lowering the voting age. I don’t argue for any particular conclusion. Rather, I offer a map of how arguments for and against enfranchising children, or at least adolescents, can be enriched by reflecting on what, according to several contemporary philosophers, is uniquely good or bad about being a child.
Philosophical Inquiry in Education, 2022
This article brings into relief two desiderata in childrearing, the importance of which the pande... more This article brings into relief two desiderata in childrearing, the importance of which the pandemic has made clearer than ever. The first is to ensure that, in schools as well as outside them, children have ample opportunities to enjoy goods that are particular to childhood: unstructured time, to be spent playing with other children, discovering the world in company or alone, or indeed pursuing any of the creative activities that make children happy and help them learn. I refer to these as "special goods of childhood." The second desiderata is to turn childrearing into a more communal practice, with lesser parental monopoly of care. For this, we need to give children access to multiple caring adults, and thus more opportunities to form secure and protected relationships.
Philosophy Compass, 2021
In philosophy, there are two competitor views about the nature and value of childhood: The first ... more In philosophy, there are two competitor views about the nature and value of childhood: The first is the traditional, deficiency, view, according to which children are mere unfinished adults. The second is a view that has recently become increasingly popular amongst philosophers, and according to which children, perhaps in virtue of their biological features, have special and valuable capacities, and, more generally, privileged access to some sources of value. This article provides a conceptual map of these views and their possible interpretations, and notes their bearing on issues of population ethics and on the duties that we are owed during childhood.
Economics and Philosophy, 2021
Rationing health care by ordeals is likely to have different effects on women and men, and on dis... more Rationing health care by ordeals is likely to have different effects on women and men, and on distinct groups of women. I show how such putative effects of ordeals are relevant to achieving gender justice. I explain why some ordeals may disproportionately set back women’s interest in discretionary time, health and access to health care, and may undermine equality of opportunity for positions of advantage. Some ordeals protect the interests of the worse-off women yet set back the interests of better-off women in equal opportunities. I suggest how we can use ordeal design to advance particular aims of gender justice.
Journal of Ethics, 2021
In "Tragedy and Resentment" Ulrika Carlsson claims that there are cases when we are justified to ... more In "Tragedy and Resentment" Ulrika Carlsson claims that there are cases when we are justified to feel non-moral resentment against someone who harms us without wronging us, when the harm either consists in their attitude towards us or in the emotional suffering triggered by their attitudes. Since they had no duty to protect us from harm, the objectionable attitude is not disrespect but a failure to show love, admiration or appreciation for us. I explain why unrequited love is the wrong example to use when arguing for the possibility of justified non-moral resentment-and why, therefore, Carlsson's claim remains unsubstantiated. Pace Carlsson, people who fail to return our love are not best described as harming us, but as merely failing to benefit us by saving us from harm. Moreover, their role in the causal chain that results in our coming to harm is insufficient to warrant our resentment; more plausibly, we ourselves play a greater and more direct causal role in this process. This is a welcome result: Responding with (non-moral) resentment to someone's failure to return our love indicates that our love has not taken the form of a genuine gift. When we put conditions on successful gifting by allowing for justified resentment if the gift is not returned we are not in fact giving gifts but making a bid for an exchange: I love you so that you love me back.
What about the family?: practices of responsibility in care, 2019
This case study explores one instance of how gender norms continue to inform institutional treatm... more This case study explores one instance of how gender norms continue to inform institutional treatment of parents regarding care for children—specifically, how the exercise of fathers’ responsibilities for their children can be discouraged or altogether blocked. Expectations about fatherhood have changed significantly in Europe in the last decades in the direction of closer involvement in the lives and hands-on care of their children. At the same time, moral and political philosophers have for many years been stressing the value of family relationships, and some offer accounts of why individuals of any sex are entitled to have opportunities to develop flourishing relationships with their children.
Ethics, 2021
There is a broad philosophical consensus that both children's and prospective parents' interests ... more There is a broad philosophical consensus that both children's and prospective parents' interests are relevant to the justification of a right to parent. Against this view, I argue that it is impermissible to sacrifice children's interests for the sake of advancing adults' interest in childrearing. Therefore, the allocation of the moral right to parent should track the child's, and not the potential parent's, interest. This revisionary thesis is moderated by two additional qualifications. First, parents lack the moral right to exclude others from associating with the child. Second, children usually come into the world as part of a relationship with their gestational mother; often, this relationship deserves protection.
The Journal of Practical Ethics, 2020
Care-supporting policies incentivise women’s withdrawal from the labour market, thereby reinforci... more Care-supporting policies incentivise women’s withdrawal from the labour market, thereby reinforcing statistical discrimination and further undermining equality of opportunities between women and men for positions of advantage. This, I argue, is not sufficient reason against such policies. Supporting care also improves the overall condition of disadvantaged women who are care-givers; justice gives priority to the latter. Moreover, some of the most advantageous existing jobs entail excessive benefits; we should discount the value of allocating such jobs meritocratically. Further, women who have a real chance to occupy positions of advantage have most likely already enjoyed more than their fair share of opportunities; they lack a claim to more. Women can have a complaint grounded in the expressive disvalue of sexist discrimination. This gives them special claims against men occupying the vast majority of top positions and against their higher share of opportunities for positions of advantage. But their claim does not speak against care-supporting policies.
Political Studies, 2020
Parenting involves an extraordinary degree of power over children. Republicans are concerned abou... more Parenting involves an extraordinary degree of power over children. Republicans are concerned about domination, which, on one view, is the holding of power that fails to track the interests of those over whom it is exercised. On this account, parenting as we know it is dominating due to the low standards necessary for acquiring and retaining parental rights and the extent of parental power. Domination cannot be fully eliminated from childrearing without unacceptable loss of value. Most likely, republicanism requires that we minimise children’s domination. I examine alternative models of childrearing that are immune to republican criticism.
Essays in Philosophy, 2019
Some philosophers argue that we should limit procreation – for instance, to one child per person ... more Some philosophers argue that we should limit procreation – for instance, to one child per person or one child per couple – in order to reduce our aggregate carbon footprint. I provide additional support to the claim that population size is a matter of justice, by explaining that we have a duty of justice towards the current generation of children to pass on to them a sustainable population. But instead of, or, more likely, alongside with, having fewer children in in each family, we could also create families with more than two parents. I explore this possibility by pointing out the ways in which multi-parenting can advance children’s interests: in higher levels of well-being, in non-monopolistic child-rearing, and in a future opportunity to become themselves parents.
Analize. Journal of Gender and Feminist Studies, 2018
I propose a speculative, debunking explanation for the widespread tendency to attribute special v... more I propose a speculative, debunking explanation for the widespread tendency to attribute special value to family relationships. Instead, I suggest, the value of family relationships between adults flows from the same source as the value of intimate relationships between people who are not related by kinship: that of love. This is important because social expectations and (contested) pieces of legislation often privilege family over non-family close relationships, and often seek to preserve family relationships that, if my suggestion is correct, would be better dissolved. Moreover, if love is the source of value of all intimate relationships, this can help reframe debates such as that concerning same-sex marriage in more constructive ways. We often assume that family relationships, even with second or third degree relatives, have a special kind of value that other intimate relationships, such as friendships with non-family members, lack. I want to challenge this belief and suggest that, ultimately, the value of friendship and kinship alike flows from the same source: that of the love that bounds people. This, as I explain in due course, is part liberating and part threatening. A few terminological clarifications: I am talking about love in its broad sense, beyond the usual divides between companionate and passionate love, love for parents or for children, etc. I assume that emotional attachments to others play a huge role in our wellbeing 1 , making close relationships indispensable to the leading of a good life. When I talk about "friendship", I refer here to all close relationships based on affection and intimacy that, unlike family relationships, are chosen, rather than given. (Understood in this way, friendship and family relationships obviously intersect insofar as we choose whom to marry.
The Routledge Handbook of Ethics and Public Policy
This chapter discusses the question of how to design public policies that are informed by gender ... more This chapter discusses the question of how to design public policies that are informed by gender justice. It looks at the main policies that have been proposed by feminists and whose aim is to achieve a more just distribution of the burdens of social cooperation between women and men. Some of these have been defended as a way of giving due recognition to care work and freeing women from economic dependency on their spouses. Others have been defended as a way of resisting the traditional division of labour between women and men and getting closer to a gender-egalitarian society.
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Doctoral dissertation by Anca Gheaus
Published Papers by Anca Gheaus
· Being a child
· Childhood and moral status
· Parents and children
· Children in society
· Children and the state.
Questions covered include: What is a child? Is childhood a uniquely valuable state, and if so why? Can we generalize about the goods of childhood? What rights do children have, and are they different from adults’ rights? What (if anything) gives people a right to parent? What role, if any, ought biology to play in determining who has the right to parent a particular child? What kind of rights can parents legitimately exercise over their children? What roles do relationships with siblings and friends play in the shaping of childhoods? How should we think about sexuality and disability in childhood, and about racialised children? How should society manage the education of children? How are children’s lives affected by being taken into social care?
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of childhood, political philosophy and ethics as well as those in related disciplines such as education, psychology, sociology, social policy, law, social work, youth work, neuroscience and anthropology.