Economics & International Studies

According to the canon of the 'English School' of international relations theory, international society took shape sometime between 1648 and 1713. Its defining characteristic is the appearance, and acceptance, of the centralized authority of the modern state, a state that would henceforth exist within an order of other similarly constituted states. This order is often represented in terms of what it was not. It was not a feudal regnum with a multiplicity of functionally distinct authorities. It was not a theocratic imperium where one power aimed at "the control and protection of Christendom." 2 It was not even (despite some occasional flirtation with the analogy) a primitive tribe, held together by common culture and a common stock of gods. It was a society of sovereigns, of de jure equals, each of whom recognized the others' right to exist, and whose common ideological quantum was low. This moment, generally described as the "Westphalian moment" (after the Treaty of Westphalia that anticipated it), is also credited with bringing into being a new set of international institutions in its wake. According to the general consensus, diplomacy was reshaped into a new discourse among legal equals, a discourse whose logic was informed by a grammar of interests, understood in terms of raison d'etat. Alliances became more or less neutral mechanisms through which interests were articulated and pursued. The balance of power emerged as a factor limiting the violent overthrow of a plural state order, regard for which became "a duty upon governments," quoting Fenelon's Telemaque of 1690. 3 War was just or unjust, depending on whether it was directed toward the reasonable pursuit of interests (just) or toward the overthrow of the plural order as a whole (unjust). English School theorists often consider Napoleon and Hitler in terms of successive efforts to re-institute a super-or trans-state order, one that was inspired by one of several models from Europe's pre-Westphalian, and pre-modern, past. Moreover, the "system which then emerged or finally matured in Europe is the system which still holds the world in its framework.. . ." 4 What once was, still is, and any English School theorist worthy of the name will maintain that change has not altered the essential nature of the plural state system. The balance of power,

In Progressivism and US Foreign Policy Between the World Wars, Molly Cochran and Cornelia Navari present a valuable collection of essays that address the lasting impact of the Progressive Movement upon the foreign relations of the United States during the inter-war period and beyond. Although several essays draw upon the narrative and events of the Progressive Era itself, the volume primarily seeks to demonstrate that Progressivism not only shaped the deliberations over the United States’ decision to enter the First World War but established the core facets of future foreign policy debates. In their introductory chapter, the editors characterise 20th-century debates over United States foreign relations as a combination of three ‘fundamental antinomies’, namely: unilateralism versus multilateralism, regionalism versus globalism, and military engagement versus military restraint. Whilst these antimonies manifested at the turn of the century, the editors posit that it was between the t...

The Russian annexation of Crimea, together with the on-going war in eastern Ukraine, have raised fundamental questions concerning the right of a territory to secede from a larger state. Cornelia Navari writes on the influence of the Badinter Commission, which was set up to provide legal advice during the breakup of Yugoslavia. She argues that while the secession of Crimea from Ukraine remains deeply controversial, it largely followed the ‘template’ set by Badinter.

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According to the canon of the ‘English School’ of international relations theory, international society took shape sometime between 1648 and 1713. Its defining characteristic is the appearance, and acceptance, of the centralized authority of the modern state, a state that would henceforth exist within an order of other similarly constituted states. This order is often represented in terms of what it was not. It was not a feudal regnum with a multiplicity of functionally distinct authorities. It was not a theocratic imperium where one power aimed at “the control and protection of Christendom.”2 It was not even (despite some occasional flirtation with the analogy) a primitive tribe, held together by common culture and a common stock of gods. It was a society of sovereigns, of de jure equals, each of whom recognized the others’ right to exist, and whose common ideological quantum was low. This moment, generally described as the “Westphalian moment” (after the Treaty of Westphalia that ...

The English School has made three contributions to the science of peaceful change: the inevitable conflict of order and justice; the necessity of Great Power management of peaceful change; and regional orders as the locus of peaceful change. The first refers to a structural conflict between state sovereignty and human rights and also serves as the parameters of a discourse on ethical possibilities among sovereign states. The second—the requirement of Great Power management—is both an observation on the course of history and a structural determinant, arising from the gross inequalities among states. The third—the notion that regional international societies can be peacemakers—is not unique to the English School. Its contribution is that any region can be a form of international society with its own distinctive rules and adjudicative procedures, and that accordingly, any region is potentially able to become a “security community.”

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Compiled by Jack Mellish and Cornelia Navari, convenors The aim of the work shop was to place the English School theory in the context of the Realist focus on power and the Liberal focus on legitimacy. It laid out some benchmarks with regard to how power is regarded by the ES, basically as state power, and it detailed several routes through which state power in International Society is articulated and exercised. It explicated the ES position on legitimacy, essentially Weberian, and exemplified both de facto and aspirational legitimacy. On POWER, Cornelia Navari noted, ab initio, that there are many ways of conceptualizing power and no agreed 'grand theory' of power. From the empirical perspective, there are several conventional, and useful, distinctions. The most frequently employed are between inputs and outputs (i.e. between 'lists' on the one hand, and the ability to affect, on the other); between political power and economic power, and between states' territorial power and 'other actors' ideological and/or positional power.

Will the‘Lawson Boom’have the same consequences as that of Anthony Barber? Tim Congdon, of Shearson Lehman, argues that the rapid monetary growth of the past years could have serious consequences for inflation, unless the Government takes immediate preventative action.

Chile's 8-year experiment in free markets achieved spectacular advance. Its success was hailed by market economists and its failure by economic dirigistes. Was the failure inevitable or accidental? What are the lessons for other less-developed countries? Tim Congdon condemns the critics for focussing on the symptoms but ignoring the causes.