Papers by David Christensen
Nous, 2022
It is natural to think that rationality imposes some relationship between what a person believes,... more It is natural to think that rationality imposes some relationship between what a person believes, and what she believes about what she’s rational to believe. Epistemic akrasia—for example, believing P while believing that P is not rational to believe in your situation—is often seen as intrinsically irrational. This paper argues otherwise. In certain cases, akrasia is intuitively rational. Understanding why akratic beliefs in those case are indeed rational provides a deeper explanation how typical akratic beliefs are irrational—an explanation that does not flow from akrasia per se. This understanding also allows us to diagnose where general anti-akratic arguments go wrong. We can then see why even principles designed to allow only moderate akrasia fail, and also why recognizing the possibility of rational akratic beliefs does not call for finding some other epistemic defect in agents who believe akratically. Believing akratically, in itself, is nothing to apologize for.
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 95 , 2021
Explores some of the interesting epistemological implications of theorizing about agents who are ... more Explores some of the interesting epistemological implications of theorizing about agents who are aware of themselves as believers.
K. McCain, S. Stapleford, and M. Steup (Eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (pp 165– 181). New York, Routledge., 2021
This paper concentrates on a particular sort of case where it’s plausible that epistemic requirem... more This paper concentrates on a particular sort of case where it’s plausible that epistemic requirements can conflict: cases where an agent’s higher-order evidence supports doubting her reliability in reacting to her ordinary evidence. Conflicting epistemic requirements can be seen as generating epistemic dilemmas. The paper examines two ways that people have sought to recognize conflicting requirements without allowing them to generate epistemic dilemmas: separating epistemic norms into two different varieties, and positing rational indeterminacy in cases where principles conflict. It argues that these views incur costs, and that the sense in which they avoid dilemmas does not gain them an advantage over a view that simply recognizes dilemmas as a natural outgrowth of agents’ rational reflection on their own thinking.
Philosophical Studies, 2021
Theories of epistemic rationality that take disagreement (or other higher-order evidence) serious... more Theories of epistemic rationality that take disagreement (or other higher-order evidence) seriously tend to be "modest" in a certain sense: they say that there are circumstances in which it is rational to doubt their correctness. Modest views have been criticized on the grounds that they undermine themselves-they're self-defeating. The standard Self-Defeat Objections depend on principles forbidding epistemically akratic beliefs; but there are good reasons to doubt these principles-even New Rational Reflection, which was designed to allow for certain special cases that are intuitively akratic. On the other hand, if we construct a Self-Defeat Objection without relying on anti-akratic principles, modest principles turn out not to undermine themselves. In the end, modesty should not be seen as a defect in a theory of rational belief.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2020
Many writers have recently urged that the epistemic rationality of beliefs can depend on broadly ... more Many writers have recently urged that the epistemic rationality of beliefs can depend on broadly pragmatic (as opposed to truth-directed) factors. Taken to an extreme, this line of thought leads to a view on which there is no such thing as a distinctive epistemic form of rationality. A series of papers by Susanna Rinard develops the view that something like our traditional notion of pragmatic rationality is all that is needed to account for the rationality of beliefs. This approach has undeniable attractions. But examining different versions of the approach uncovers problems. The problems help reveal why epistemic rationality is an indispensable part of understanding rationality—not only of beliefs, but of actions. We may or may not end up wanting to make a place, in our theories of epistemic rationality, for factors such as the practical or moral consequences of having beliefs. But a purely pragmatic notion of rationality—one that’s stripped of any component of distinctively epistemic evaluation—cannot do all the work that we need done.
Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, ed. by M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen, 2019
We often get evidence that bears on the reliability of some of our own first-order reasoning. The... more We often get evidence that bears on the reliability of some of our own first-order reasoning. The rational response to such “higher-order” evidence would seem to depend on a rational assessment of how reliable we can expect that reasoning to be, in light of the higher-order evidence. “Independence” principles are intended to constrain this reliability-assessment, so as to prevent question-begging reliance on the very reasoning being assessed. However, extant formulations of Independence principles tend to be vague or ambiguous, and coming up with a tolerably precise formulation turns out to be tricky. This paper aims to make some progress toward developing a more precise Independence principle, and also to highlight some of the difficulties the project entails. The hope is to take a step toward understanding how rational belief is informed by evidence bearing on agents’ cognitive reliability.
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 2018
We often get reason to doubt the reliability of some of our own reasoning. The rational response ... more We often get reason to doubt the reliability of some of our own reasoning. The rational response to such evidence would seem to depend on how reliable one should estimate that reasoning to be. Independence principles constrain that reliability-assessment, to prevent question-begging reliance on the very reasoning being assessed. But this has consequences some find disturbing: can it be rational for an agent to bracket some of her reasons—which she may, after all, be assessing impeccably? So several arguments have been offered against the very idea of an Independence principle. This paper argues that looking closely at these arguments actually strengthens the case for Independence, and yields some guidance in meeting a formidable challenge for Independence-defenders: formulating the principle in an adequate way.
We often get evidence concerning the reliability of our own thinking about some particular matter... more We often get evidence concerning the reliability of our own thinking about some particular matter. This “higher-order evidence” can come from the disagreement of others, or from information about our being subject to the effects of drugs, fatigue, emotional ties, implicit biases, etc. This paper examines some pros and cons of two fairly general models for accommodating higher-order evidence. The one that currently seems most promising also turns out to have the consequence that epistemic akrasia should occur more frequently than is sometimes supposed. But it also helps us see why this might not be a bad thing.
: Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermi... more : Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality (those that deny uniqueness). It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of rationality. This occurs when the motivation for conciliationism does not come (as is sometimes supposed) from taking disagreement as evidence of one’s own rational failings. However, divorcing the motive for conciliating from worries about rationality does not remove a feature of conciliationism that some find troubling: that conciliationism can lead to cases of “rational toxicity,” in which the most rational response to one’s evidence involves violating some rational ideal.
Many recent writers have embraced one version or another of the thought that the disagreement of ... more Many recent writers have embraced one version or another of the thought that the disagreement of equally informed, equally skillful thinkers can (in at least some circumstances), require a rational agent to revise her beliefs (to at least some extent)—even if her original assessment of the common evidence was correct. There has, of course, been much disagreement as to the amount of revision required in certain cases, and as to the theoretical underpinnings of the required revisions.
Episteme, Oct 1, 2009
One of the most salient features of forming beliefs in a social context is that people end up dis... more One of the most salient features of forming beliefs in a social context is that people end up disagreeing with one another. This is not just an obvious fact about belief-formation; it raises interesting normative questions, especially when people become aware of the opinions of others. How should my beliefs be affected by the knowledge that others hold contrary beliefs? In some cases, the answer seems easy. If I have reason to think that my friend is much better informed than I am, her dissent will often require substantial revision in my ...
One of Mill’s main arguments for free speech springs from taking disagreement as an epistemically... more One of Mill’s main arguments for free speech springs from taking disagreement as an epistemically valuable resource for fallible thinkers. Contemporary conciliationist treatments of disagreement spring from the same motivation, but end up seeing the epistemic implications of disagreement quite differently. Conciliationism also encounters complexities when transposed from the 2-person toy examples featured in the literature to the public disagreements among groups that give the issue much of its urgency. Group disagreements turn out to be in some ways more powerful defeaters of rational belief, even when opposing groups are comparable in size and epistemic credentials. And conciliationism also shows us why determining the rational response to these disagreements can in certain cases (e.g. politics) be a particularly difficult and nuanced matter.
Philosophers' Imprint, Jan 1, 2011
Responding rationally to the information that others disagree with one’s beliefs requires assessi... more Responding rationally to the information that others disagree with one’s beliefs requires assessing the epistemic credentials of the opposing beliefs. I argue that these assessments must be independent from one’s own initial reasoning on the disputed matter, and I defend this claim against recent objections. I also argue that some version of this sort of requirement comes with a wider region of epistemic territory: evaluating the possibility of one’s own malfunction.
Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re ... more Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
Intuitively, there seems to be a connection between what one is rational to believe, and what one... more Intuitively, there seems to be a connection between what one is rational to believe, and what one is rational to believe one is rational to believe. If we think of beliefs in a categorical, rather than a graded, way, a plausible thought is that rationally believing that P is incompatible with rationally believing that one's belief that P is not rational. Putting the thought in terms of justification, the idea is that (justified) higher-level doubts about the justification of one's belief that P can defeat one's justification for believing P.
Formally inclined epistemologists often theorize about ideally rational agents—agents who exempli... more Formally inclined epistemologists often theorize about ideally rational agents—agents who exemplify rational ideals, such as probabilistic coherence, that human beings could never fully realize. This approach can be defended against the well-known worry that abstracting from human cognitive imperfections deprives the approach of interest.
Philosophy Compass, Jan 1, 2009
How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others—perhaps “epi... more How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others—perhaps “epistemic peers” who seem as well-qualified as you are—hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions that thinking about this issue raises.
Philosophical Review, Jan 1, 2007
Certain situations seem to call for acknowledging the possibility that one's own beliefs are bias... more Certain situations seem to call for acknowledging the possibility that one's own beliefs are biased or distorted. On the other hand, certain sorts of epistemic self-doubts (such as 'I believe it's raining, but it's not') seem paradoxical. And some have put forth epistemic principles requiring rational agents to regard their own credences as so-called 'expert functions'.
The Journal of philosophy, Jan 1, 1999
Uploads
Papers by David Christensen