
Miha Hribernik
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Papers by Miha Hribernik
We used our portfolio of global risk indices to stress test the US president’s assertions by measuring the investability of 198 countries across the key areas of corporate governance; the regulatory framework; property rights protections; and respect of human rights.
On the upside, the region will remain one the most politically stable in the world, with Indonesia, Australia, China and India – four of the region’s biggest capex hotspots – continuing to offer stable political environments in which to operate.
However, according to our Government Stability Index Projection, downside risks will rise in some key investment destinations. We expect the worst news to come out of Myanmar and Thailand, where upcoming elections will increase the potential for political upheaval and likely stall much needed industry reforms. But, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) could also be in for a bumpy political ride with potential implications for investors.
Here’s our roundup of what to watch for across these four markets.
He has pledged to resume dialogue and revive economic cooperation with the North, and to persuade Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. While highly ambitious, Moon’s goal is ultimately unrealistic. The likelihood of Kim Jong-un agreeing to give up his nuclear arsenal – the only guarantee of regime survival – is virtually non-existent, regardless of the economic or other incentives on offer. The best Moon can hope is that the fresh approach can help him to manage tensions better than his predecessor.
Although overall piracy rates declined in 2016, transnational criminal networks and extremist groups such as Abu Sayyaf have continued to carry out growing numbers of well-organized attacks. This includes a spate of crew abductions in the Sulu and Celebes seas, which has continued into 2017. Since late 2016, Abu Sayyaf has also been actively targeting large commercial vessels underway – previously considered at lower risk due to their size and speed. As a result, multilateral cooperation is more important than ever. Tackling these more complex forms of piracy will require structured and sustained law enforcement cooperation between regional countries. Unless such cooperation is institutionalized among countries across Southeast Asia, it will diminish as government priorities (and resources) shift elsewhere.
Japan is well placed to regain the regional initiative, either by expanding ReCAAP’s mandate to include all forms of maritime crime, or by establishing a new organization. This paper argues that Tokyo will need to navigate deeply entrenched sovereignty concerns across the region while keeping its counter-piracy efforts separate from the wider competition with China.
To address any concerns over the PCM, this paper also recommends the establishment of a new Public Diplomacy Coordination Mechanism (PDCM), which would closely coordinate with the new partnership programs and draw upon the resources of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the US State Department.
The article concludes with four recommendations for regional policy-makers. Despite the surge in attacks seen in 2014, Southeast Asian countries may still stem the rising tide by expanding multinational patrols, prioritising counter-piracy in mutilateral forums, and strengthening existing mechanisms.
While these recommendations are specific to the Japan-Korea relationship, they are also tied to the US rebalance and its desire for stronger trilateral cooperation with Japan and Korea. One of the areas explored argues for enhancing Japan-Korea inter-parliamentary exchanges as another avenue for political cooperation. The report also has briefs focused on improving security cooperation between Japan and Korea with a focus on deterrence against North Korea as well as contingency planning for eventual unification of the Korean Peninsula. Finally, the report details other critical areas for cooperation including energy security and counter-piracy.
This article contributes to the body of knowledge on normative power by analyzing the case study of Japan, from the standpoint of a country that has increased and then applied its normative power as an important means through which traditional (interest-based) foreign, security and defense goals can be pursued. In the analysis of Japan’s aspirations to become recognized as a global normative power advocate, we analyze the impact of the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War on the country’s perception of its strategic environment, and subsequent efforts to redefine its role in promoting a new norms-based framework. We also identify three areas in which Japan has been able to strengthen its hard security while simultaneously reinforcing its normative power: its security alliance with the United States, its multi- and bilateral (military) cooperation with other states, and its ability to bolster both its hard and its normative power in an emerging multipolar international system.
Bilateral initiatives could include more frequent bilateral naval and coast guard exercises; information sharing and structured dialogue; an exchange programme for coast guard officers; and a Coastal Communities Initiative, which would help develop poor coastal communities in parts of Southeast Asia, where many of the pirate attacks originate.
Multilateral initiatives could include enhanced cooperation within existing mechanisms (such as the Singapore-based ReCAAP, ASEAN, or the ASEAN Regional Forum), or the establishment of new regional fora, such as the proposed Asia-Pacific Coast Guard Forum.
We used our portfolio of global risk indices to stress test the US president’s assertions by measuring the investability of 198 countries across the key areas of corporate governance; the regulatory framework; property rights protections; and respect of human rights.
On the upside, the region will remain one the most politically stable in the world, with Indonesia, Australia, China and India – four of the region’s biggest capex hotspots – continuing to offer stable political environments in which to operate.
However, according to our Government Stability Index Projection, downside risks will rise in some key investment destinations. We expect the worst news to come out of Myanmar and Thailand, where upcoming elections will increase the potential for political upheaval and likely stall much needed industry reforms. But, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) could also be in for a bumpy political ride with potential implications for investors.
Here’s our roundup of what to watch for across these four markets.
He has pledged to resume dialogue and revive economic cooperation with the North, and to persuade Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. While highly ambitious, Moon’s goal is ultimately unrealistic. The likelihood of Kim Jong-un agreeing to give up his nuclear arsenal – the only guarantee of regime survival – is virtually non-existent, regardless of the economic or other incentives on offer. The best Moon can hope is that the fresh approach can help him to manage tensions better than his predecessor.
Although overall piracy rates declined in 2016, transnational criminal networks and extremist groups such as Abu Sayyaf have continued to carry out growing numbers of well-organized attacks. This includes a spate of crew abductions in the Sulu and Celebes seas, which has continued into 2017. Since late 2016, Abu Sayyaf has also been actively targeting large commercial vessels underway – previously considered at lower risk due to their size and speed. As a result, multilateral cooperation is more important than ever. Tackling these more complex forms of piracy will require structured and sustained law enforcement cooperation between regional countries. Unless such cooperation is institutionalized among countries across Southeast Asia, it will diminish as government priorities (and resources) shift elsewhere.
Japan is well placed to regain the regional initiative, either by expanding ReCAAP’s mandate to include all forms of maritime crime, or by establishing a new organization. This paper argues that Tokyo will need to navigate deeply entrenched sovereignty concerns across the region while keeping its counter-piracy efforts separate from the wider competition with China.
To address any concerns over the PCM, this paper also recommends the establishment of a new Public Diplomacy Coordination Mechanism (PDCM), which would closely coordinate with the new partnership programs and draw upon the resources of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the US State Department.
The article concludes with four recommendations for regional policy-makers. Despite the surge in attacks seen in 2014, Southeast Asian countries may still stem the rising tide by expanding multinational patrols, prioritising counter-piracy in mutilateral forums, and strengthening existing mechanisms.
While these recommendations are specific to the Japan-Korea relationship, they are also tied to the US rebalance and its desire for stronger trilateral cooperation with Japan and Korea. One of the areas explored argues for enhancing Japan-Korea inter-parliamentary exchanges as another avenue for political cooperation. The report also has briefs focused on improving security cooperation between Japan and Korea with a focus on deterrence against North Korea as well as contingency planning for eventual unification of the Korean Peninsula. Finally, the report details other critical areas for cooperation including energy security and counter-piracy.
This article contributes to the body of knowledge on normative power by analyzing the case study of Japan, from the standpoint of a country that has increased and then applied its normative power as an important means through which traditional (interest-based) foreign, security and defense goals can be pursued. In the analysis of Japan’s aspirations to become recognized as a global normative power advocate, we analyze the impact of the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War on the country’s perception of its strategic environment, and subsequent efforts to redefine its role in promoting a new norms-based framework. We also identify three areas in which Japan has been able to strengthen its hard security while simultaneously reinforcing its normative power: its security alliance with the United States, its multi- and bilateral (military) cooperation with other states, and its ability to bolster both its hard and its normative power in an emerging multipolar international system.
Bilateral initiatives could include more frequent bilateral naval and coast guard exercises; information sharing and structured dialogue; an exchange programme for coast guard officers; and a Coastal Communities Initiative, which would help develop poor coastal communities in parts of Southeast Asia, where many of the pirate attacks originate.
Multilateral initiatives could include enhanced cooperation within existing mechanisms (such as the Singapore-based ReCAAP, ASEAN, or the ASEAN Regional Forum), or the establishment of new regional fora, such as the proposed Asia-Pacific Coast Guard Forum.