Elle Garner
Philosophy research masters student at the University of Bristol.
Currently working on issues in the philosophy of sex and pornography.
Continuing interest in ethics and the philosophy of technology.
Supervisors: Seiriol Morgan
Currently working on issues in the philosophy of sex and pornography.
Continuing interest in ethics and the philosophy of technology.
Supervisors: Seiriol Morgan
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Papers by Elle Garner
As the quest to move into posthumanity focuses on the science behind anatomical and physiological advances, we are left with ambiguity as to how these advancements would impact the posthuman’s moral compass. I argue that there are several outcomes of this advancement to posthumanity leading to the indifference of morals. Firstly, the potential of a posthuman, so unlike the humans of today, that they are unable to have a moral faculty at all. Secondly, the reactions exhibited from the posthuman due to reflection on the human or transhuman that they have left behind. It’s conceivable that the posthuman may resent those without possession of the enhanced standards they have reached, or alternately project their own insecurities onto them as a consequence of the reminder of imperfection from which they have evolved.
Either way it is uncontroversial to conclude the lack of necessity placed by Hauskeller and others on the realisation of a moral posthuman, even if we are in agreement of the life promoting principles and values the transhumanists aim for.
Drafts by Elle Garner
As the quest to move into posthumanity focuses on the science behind anatomical and physiological advances, we are left with ambiguity as to how these advancements would impact the posthuman’s moral compass. I argue that there are several outcomes of this advancement to posthumanity leading to the indifference of morals. Firstly, the potential of a posthuman, so unlike the humans of today, that they are unable to have a moral faculty at all. Secondly, the reactions exhibited from the posthuman due to reflection on the human or transhuman that they have left behind. It’s conceivable that the posthuman may resent those without possession of the enhanced standards they have reached, or alternately project their own insecurities onto them as a consequence of the reminder of imperfection from which they have evolved.
Either way it is uncontroversial to conclude the lack of necessity placed by Hauskeller and others on the realisation of a moral posthuman, even if we are in agreement of the life promoting principles and values the transhumanists aim for.