This book offers one of the first substantial critical analyses of Axel Honneth’s work in English... more This book offers one of the first substantial critical analyses of Axel Honneth’s work in English. It also assesses the future of the project of the Frankfurt School in light of Honneth’s approach and places Honneth into the mainstream debate in analytic political philosophy. Honneth is one of the most influential social and political philosophers in contemporary German political thought and one of the central figures of the third generation of the Frankfurt School. Honneth’s philosophical project presents at once a solution to a problem that has beset Frankfurt School Critical Theory from the first generation onwards, and offers a re-conceptualisation of social philosophy and its methodology in general. Honneth’s work presents a viable alternative to mainstream (especially Rawlsian) political philosophy by taking on challenges mainstream theories tend to avoid. Against the limitations of a mainstream social philosophy consigned to dealing with specific issues that arise within a liberal framework of social justice, Honneth strives to return to the grand tradition begun by Rousseau. The proper subject area of social philosophy, for Honneth, is the determination and explanation of social misdevelopments, i.e. social developments which prevent members of a society from living the good life. This traditional project of social philosophy is beset by methodological problems to which Critical Theory can be seen as providing one sort of answer. Given (the social fact of) value pluralism and (epistemological) perspectivism, how can social philosophy either provide a universally valid conception of the “good life” or else provide a universally applicable standard against which to judge social developments? Honneth combines his answer to the methodological problem of social philosophy with a response to the problem of a critical standpoint for Frankfurt School Critical Theory in particular. As one of the main representatives of the third generation of the Frankfurt School, Honneth revives and re-defines the first generation programme of social critique. Honneth interprets the history of the Frankfurt School partly in terms of a search for a normative standpoint of critique. This standpoint must serve not only as a norm but also as a practical guide and it must also possess descriptive value. In other words, the standpoint must help us understand social practices and their underlying mechanisms on a descriptive level. It must also allow an evaluation of these social practices, and point to practical possibilities of improvement. Further, remaining true to the key tenets of the early Frankfurt School, the critical standpoint must not be derived from an abstract (moral) theory that we impose on the world. Rather, it must stem from pre-theoretical social experiences that “transcend” immediate experience and point to a normative framework. The particular pre-theoretical experience Honneth focuses on is that of misrecognition or disrespect. The fact that we feel disrespected points to pre-theoretical moral expectations, which are violated. If these moral expectations can be shown to be legitimate, we can construct a normative standpoint from them. Honneth provides a complex theory of recognition, in which the prima facie normative legitimacy of recognition claims is established partly with reference to psychoanalytic theories, partly with reference to the value of “self-realization”. He proposes standards against which to adjudicate between legitimate and illegitimate recognition claims and in the end proposes a theory that serves as a theory of justice in private, social and legal spheres and a theory of social “health” against which we can understand systemic pathologies. In addition to his substantial work on recognition, Honneth has recently shifted his attention to the reconstruction of a theory of social freedom, which serves as the basis of a critique of capitalism and points to a viable alternative. His latest work is in many ways more practically oriented than his earlier works, as Honneth aims to formulate a new programme for the new left. While Honneth has received increasing attention in the English speaking world, there are rarely any books which offer a systematic overview of his thought in its complexity. This book aims to provide such an overview. It also sets out to show how Honneth relates to the two opposing sides in political and social thought: postmodernism on the one hand and analytic political philosophy on the other. It will further offer a critical reconstruction of some aspects of Honneth’s work and finally assess the contribution Honneth makes in light of what we ought to expect from a theory of justice and a critical theory of society.
Axel Honneth proposes a recognition theoretical approach to justice, where justice is a matter of... more Axel Honneth proposes a recognition theoretical approach to justice, where justice is a matter of the recognition of individuals in the three spheres of ethical life he identifies. The value of recognition is based on the value of ‘self-realization’. Given the intimate relation between self-realization on the one hand and autonomy and authenticity on the other, autonomy and authenticity also play an important normative role in Honneth’s recognition theoretical approach to justice. In this paper I will examine Honneth’s conceptions of autonomy and authenticity. I will argue that these conceptions manage to meet some of the descriptive challenges faced by recognition theories, but fail to provide recognition with the required normative underpinnings. In order to gain or retain normative force, Honneth needs to provide an account of ‘true self’ or objective human well-being, which in turn would fail to meet the descriptive challenge and move dangerously close to traditional theory.
There appears to be a conflict between autonomy and solidarity which rests on the belief that sol... more There appears to be a conflict between autonomy and solidarity which rests on the belief that solidarity requires that individuals renounce at least some fundamental aspects of autonomy. Solidarity, as a means to bringing about socio-political change, requires that people cooperate reliably and that cooperation endures over time, and so appears to demand a form of group-rule and deference to group judgments. Autonomy, on the other hand, is thought to require that we pursue goals and choose means according to our own best judgment, ultimately independent of others.
In this paper I argue that there is a back-story to autonomy that needs to be considered as well, so that we can distinguish two aspects of autonomy: autonomy as an ongoing process, and instantaneous autonomy. Solidarity will be shown to enhance autonomy as an ongoing process, while the demand of instantaneous autonomy will sometimes override solidarity but not threaten it.
In the literature we can distinguish two different approaches to national solidarity. The affecti... more In the literature we can distinguish two different approaches to national solidarity. The affective or communitarian approach takes the embedded subject as a starting point and emphasizes an affective bond between those in solidarity with each other, mostly based on the similarity of the members making up a group and their contribution to each other’s identity. Here solidarity is conceived of in terms of “civic friendship” or fraternity, analogous to familial bonds. The voluntaristic approach, itself divided into liberal and republican traditions, takes the autonomous subject as its starting point. This autonomous subject enters into relations of solidarity out of choice, based on shared values. While affective bonds are meant to develop here as well, they are an achievement of individuals rather than a given individuals are born into.
This paper will argue that both types of approach fail to make a convincing case for national solidarity. If we accept a conception of solidarity that is undemanding enough to extend beyond small traditional groups (e.g. family, friends), this conception will always also pull beyond national or state boundaries, towards a cosmopolitan solidarity.
This book offers one of the first substantial critical analyses of Axel Honneth’s work in English... more This book offers one of the first substantial critical analyses of Axel Honneth’s work in English. It also assesses the future of the project of the Frankfurt School in light of Honneth’s approach and places Honneth into the mainstream debate in analytic political philosophy. Honneth is one of the most influential social and political philosophers in contemporary German political thought and one of the central figures of the third generation of the Frankfurt School. Honneth’s philosophical project presents at once a solution to a problem that has beset Frankfurt School Critical Theory from the first generation onwards, and offers a re-conceptualisation of social philosophy and its methodology in general. Honneth’s work presents a viable alternative to mainstream (especially Rawlsian) political philosophy by taking on challenges mainstream theories tend to avoid. Against the limitations of a mainstream social philosophy consigned to dealing with specific issues that arise within a liberal framework of social justice, Honneth strives to return to the grand tradition begun by Rousseau. The proper subject area of social philosophy, for Honneth, is the determination and explanation of social misdevelopments, i.e. social developments which prevent members of a society from living the good life. This traditional project of social philosophy is beset by methodological problems to which Critical Theory can be seen as providing one sort of answer. Given (the social fact of) value pluralism and (epistemological) perspectivism, how can social philosophy either provide a universally valid conception of the “good life” or else provide a universally applicable standard against which to judge social developments? Honneth combines his answer to the methodological problem of social philosophy with a response to the problem of a critical standpoint for Frankfurt School Critical Theory in particular. As one of the main representatives of the third generation of the Frankfurt School, Honneth revives and re-defines the first generation programme of social critique. Honneth interprets the history of the Frankfurt School partly in terms of a search for a normative standpoint of critique. This standpoint must serve not only as a norm but also as a practical guide and it must also possess descriptive value. In other words, the standpoint must help us understand social practices and their underlying mechanisms on a descriptive level. It must also allow an evaluation of these social practices, and point to practical possibilities of improvement. Further, remaining true to the key tenets of the early Frankfurt School, the critical standpoint must not be derived from an abstract (moral) theory that we impose on the world. Rather, it must stem from pre-theoretical social experiences that “transcend” immediate experience and point to a normative framework. The particular pre-theoretical experience Honneth focuses on is that of misrecognition or disrespect. The fact that we feel disrespected points to pre-theoretical moral expectations, which are violated. If these moral expectations can be shown to be legitimate, we can construct a normative standpoint from them. Honneth provides a complex theory of recognition, in which the prima facie normative legitimacy of recognition claims is established partly with reference to psychoanalytic theories, partly with reference to the value of “self-realization”. He proposes standards against which to adjudicate between legitimate and illegitimate recognition claims and in the end proposes a theory that serves as a theory of justice in private, social and legal spheres and a theory of social “health” against which we can understand systemic pathologies. In addition to his substantial work on recognition, Honneth has recently shifted his attention to the reconstruction of a theory of social freedom, which serves as the basis of a critique of capitalism and points to a viable alternative. His latest work is in many ways more practically oriented than his earlier works, as Honneth aims to formulate a new programme for the new left. While Honneth has received increasing attention in the English speaking world, there are rarely any books which offer a systematic overview of his thought in its complexity. This book aims to provide such an overview. It also sets out to show how Honneth relates to the two opposing sides in political and social thought: postmodernism on the one hand and analytic political philosophy on the other. It will further offer a critical reconstruction of some aspects of Honneth’s work and finally assess the contribution Honneth makes in light of what we ought to expect from a theory of justice and a critical theory of society.
Axel Honneth proposes a recognition theoretical approach to justice, where justice is a matter of... more Axel Honneth proposes a recognition theoretical approach to justice, where justice is a matter of the recognition of individuals in the three spheres of ethical life he identifies. The value of recognition is based on the value of ‘self-realization’. Given the intimate relation between self-realization on the one hand and autonomy and authenticity on the other, autonomy and authenticity also play an important normative role in Honneth’s recognition theoretical approach to justice. In this paper I will examine Honneth’s conceptions of autonomy and authenticity. I will argue that these conceptions manage to meet some of the descriptive challenges faced by recognition theories, but fail to provide recognition with the required normative underpinnings. In order to gain or retain normative force, Honneth needs to provide an account of ‘true self’ or objective human well-being, which in turn would fail to meet the descriptive challenge and move dangerously close to traditional theory.
There appears to be a conflict between autonomy and solidarity which rests on the belief that sol... more There appears to be a conflict between autonomy and solidarity which rests on the belief that solidarity requires that individuals renounce at least some fundamental aspects of autonomy. Solidarity, as a means to bringing about socio-political change, requires that people cooperate reliably and that cooperation endures over time, and so appears to demand a form of group-rule and deference to group judgments. Autonomy, on the other hand, is thought to require that we pursue goals and choose means according to our own best judgment, ultimately independent of others.
In this paper I argue that there is a back-story to autonomy that needs to be considered as well, so that we can distinguish two aspects of autonomy: autonomy as an ongoing process, and instantaneous autonomy. Solidarity will be shown to enhance autonomy as an ongoing process, while the demand of instantaneous autonomy will sometimes override solidarity but not threaten it.
In the literature we can distinguish two different approaches to national solidarity. The affecti... more In the literature we can distinguish two different approaches to national solidarity. The affective or communitarian approach takes the embedded subject as a starting point and emphasizes an affective bond between those in solidarity with each other, mostly based on the similarity of the members making up a group and their contribution to each other’s identity. Here solidarity is conceived of in terms of “civic friendship” or fraternity, analogous to familial bonds. The voluntaristic approach, itself divided into liberal and republican traditions, takes the autonomous subject as its starting point. This autonomous subject enters into relations of solidarity out of choice, based on shared values. While affective bonds are meant to develop here as well, they are an achievement of individuals rather than a given individuals are born into.
This paper will argue that both types of approach fail to make a convincing case for national solidarity. If we accept a conception of solidarity that is undemanding enough to extend beyond small traditional groups (e.g. family, friends), this conception will always also pull beyond national or state boundaries, towards a cosmopolitan solidarity.
Uploads
Books by Dagmar Wilhelm
Papers by Dagmar Wilhelm
In this paper I argue that there is a back-story to autonomy that needs to be considered as well, so that we can distinguish two aspects of autonomy: autonomy as an ongoing process, and instantaneous autonomy. Solidarity will be shown to enhance autonomy as an ongoing process, while the demand of instantaneous autonomy will sometimes override solidarity but not threaten it.
This paper will argue that both types of approach fail to make a convincing case for national solidarity. If we accept a conception of solidarity that is undemanding enough to extend beyond small traditional groups (e.g. family, friends), this conception will always also pull beyond national or state boundaries, towards a cosmopolitan solidarity.
Talks by Dagmar Wilhelm
In this paper I argue that there is a back-story to autonomy that needs to be considered as well, so that we can distinguish two aspects of autonomy: autonomy as an ongoing process, and instantaneous autonomy. Solidarity will be shown to enhance autonomy as an ongoing process, while the demand of instantaneous autonomy will sometimes override solidarity but not threaten it.
This paper will argue that both types of approach fail to make a convincing case for national solidarity. If we accept a conception of solidarity that is undemanding enough to extend beyond small traditional groups (e.g. family, friends), this conception will always also pull beyond national or state boundaries, towards a cosmopolitan solidarity.