Publications by Gregory E Antill
Yale Law Journal, 2022
This paper compares the familiar Purpose, Knowledge, Recklessness, and Negligence (‘PKRN’) concep... more This paper compares the familiar Purpose, Knowledge, Recklessness, and Negligence (‘PKRN’) conception of subjective culpability laid out in the Model Penal Code and dominant in American criminal law with the ‘Reasons-Responsiveness’ conception of subjective culpability widespread among contemporary moral theorists. While many criminal law theorists are cognizant of these different conceptions of subjective culpability, this paper argues that criminal law theorists has deeply underestimated the degree to which these conceptions are in tension with one another. In particular, while criminal law theorists have noted ways in which a reasons-responsiveness picture of subjective culpability may lead to more fine-grained distinctions of criminal responsibility than the PKRN picture, almost all theorists have assumed that the two pictures of subjective culpability converge when it comes to the general relative culpability judgements of actions performed purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently.
In contrast, this paper shows that the reasons-responsiveness picture of subjective culpability leads not just to intra-hierarchical differences but to inter-hierarchical differences. That is, if the reasons-responsiveness picture of subjective culpability is correct, we should expect frequent cases where, e.g., an agent who acts purposefully is less culpable than an agent who performs that same action recklessly, or negligently.
This result has both important normative and empirical consequences for the downstream practice and study of substantive American criminal law. In particular, this paper argues that if the ‘reasons-responsiveness’ account of subjective culpability is correct then not only is the PKRN picture of subjective culpability mistaken, so too is the Model Penal Code’s PKRN grading regime. If PKRN are not the final grounds of moral responsibility, then the Model Penal Code’s grading system will often fail to track offenders’ relative culpability and result in predictably disproportionate punishments not merely within but also across grades of crimes. The paper concludes with some preliminary suggestions for amending the MPC in light of these concerns.
AI and Ethics, 2024
Traditional debates about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence typically center around the... more Traditional debates about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence typically center around the question of whether such artificial beings are, or could in principle be, conscious. Those on both side of the debate typically assume that consciousness is a necessary condition for moral status. In this paper, I argue that this assumption is a mistake. I defend the claim that functionally sophisticated artificial intelligences might still be the appropriate objects of reactive attitudes, like love, and thus still be the appropriate objects of moral concern, even if they lack consciousness. While primarily concerned with the question of whether future AI could in principle have moral status, the paper also shows how this conclusion has important consequences for recent debates about the moral and legal status of current Generative AI.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2019
One reason the phenomenon of practical akrasia — cases where an agent acts contrary to her consid... more One reason the phenomenon of practical akrasia — cases where an agent acts contrary to her considered judgments about what she has most reason to do — has been of such lasting interest to philosophers is due to the thought that the possibility of practical akrasia can tell us something important about the structure of practical agency more generally.
Just as the existence of practical akrasia has been treated as important evidence for the existence of our practical agency, the alleged absence of epistemic akrasia – cases where a believer believes some proposition contrary to her considered judgments about what she has most reason to believe – has recently be marshalled as grounds for skepticism about the existence of similar forms of epistemic agency.
In this paper, I defend the existence of epistemic agency against such objections. Rather than argue against the impossibility of epistemic akrasia, I argue that the impossibility of epistemic akrasia is actually compatible with the existence of epistemic agency. The crucial mistake, I argue, is that skeptics about epistemic agency are failing to carefully distinguish between differences in the structure of believing and acting and differences in the structure of normative reasons to believe and normative reasons to act. I show that once these differences are properly distinguished, we can see that practical and epistemic agency are on a par with one another.
Synthese, 2020
Philosophers have recently argued that self-fulfilling beliefs, because of their exceptional stru... more Philosophers have recently argued that self-fulfilling beliefs, because of their exceptional structure, constitute an important counter-example to the widely accepted theses that we ought not and cannot believe at will. Cases of self-fulfilling belief are thought to constitute a special class where we enjoy the epistemic freedom to permissibly believe for pragmatic reasons, because whatever we choose to believe will end up true.
In this paper, I argue that this view fails to distinguish between the aim of acquiring a true belief and the aim of believing what is true. While one cannot usually fail to establish that one will acquire a true belief without establishing the truth of the believed proposition, in the case self-fulfilling belief the two can come apart. I argue that insofar as the aim of belief has to do with determining whether the believed proposition is true, it will be both impossible and impermissible to believe for pragmatic reasons.
American Philosophical Quarterly, 2019
This paper considers the relationship between evidence and self-fulfilling beliefs – beliefs whos... more This paper considers the relationship between evidence and self-fulfilling beliefs – beliefs whose contents will be true just in case an agent believes them because she believes them. Following Grice (1971), many philosophers hold that believing such propositions would involve an impermissible form of bootstrapping.
I argue that such objections gets their force from a popular but problematic model of theoretical deliberation which pictures deliberation as a function, treating the deliberation’s inputs as given, fixed prior to and independently from the deliberation. Though such a picture may seem plausible, attending to the case of self-fulfilling beliefs can help us see how such a function-model is inadequate for a general understanding of theoretical deliberation. Because it is unable to accommodate the possibility that the outcomes of our deliberation can sometimes be evidence for the proposition we are deliberating about, the function model is unable to account for cases where what we believe affects the truth of what is believed.
I show that on a revised model of theoretical deliberation our evidence will problematically underdetermine any appropriate doxastic attitude: when belief in a proposition is self-fulfilling, our evidence is insufficient to support belief, disbelief, or even suspended judgment toward that proposition.
Papers by Gregory E Antill
A striking feature of our knowledge of our own actions is its distinctive first-personal characte... more A striking feature of our knowledge of our own actions is its distinctive first-personal character. Some philosophers have argued that we can only account for this first-personal character by identifying an agent’s intention to act with her belief about her action. Others have worried that in reducing intention to a species of belief, we will be unable to account for the different psychological roles the two types of mental states play in guiding our activity.
In this paper, I argue that there is space for a view which does not reduce intentions to a species of belief but which will still be satisfying to those deeply impressed with the important first- and third- personal asymmetries of practical knowledge. Rather than identifying our beliefs about our actions and our intention we should instead identify the reasoning by which we arrive at each. If we can determine whether we will act by deciding to act, the same piece of reasoning can give rise to two distinct attitudes – a belief that you will act and an intention to act – justified on the basis of the same reasons.
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Publications by Gregory E Antill
In contrast, this paper shows that the reasons-responsiveness picture of subjective culpability leads not just to intra-hierarchical differences but to inter-hierarchical differences. That is, if the reasons-responsiveness picture of subjective culpability is correct, we should expect frequent cases where, e.g., an agent who acts purposefully is less culpable than an agent who performs that same action recklessly, or negligently.
This result has both important normative and empirical consequences for the downstream practice and study of substantive American criminal law. In particular, this paper argues that if the ‘reasons-responsiveness’ account of subjective culpability is correct then not only is the PKRN picture of subjective culpability mistaken, so too is the Model Penal Code’s PKRN grading regime. If PKRN are not the final grounds of moral responsibility, then the Model Penal Code’s grading system will often fail to track offenders’ relative culpability and result in predictably disproportionate punishments not merely within but also across grades of crimes. The paper concludes with some preliminary suggestions for amending the MPC in light of these concerns.
Just as the existence of practical akrasia has been treated as important evidence for the existence of our practical agency, the alleged absence of epistemic akrasia – cases where a believer believes some proposition contrary to her considered judgments about what she has most reason to believe – has recently be marshalled as grounds for skepticism about the existence of similar forms of epistemic agency.
In this paper, I defend the existence of epistemic agency against such objections. Rather than argue against the impossibility of epistemic akrasia, I argue that the impossibility of epistemic akrasia is actually compatible with the existence of epistemic agency. The crucial mistake, I argue, is that skeptics about epistemic agency are failing to carefully distinguish between differences in the structure of believing and acting and differences in the structure of normative reasons to believe and normative reasons to act. I show that once these differences are properly distinguished, we can see that practical and epistemic agency are on a par with one another.
In this paper, I argue that this view fails to distinguish between the aim of acquiring a true belief and the aim of believing what is true. While one cannot usually fail to establish that one will acquire a true belief without establishing the truth of the believed proposition, in the case self-fulfilling belief the two can come apart. I argue that insofar as the aim of belief has to do with determining whether the believed proposition is true, it will be both impossible and impermissible to believe for pragmatic reasons.
I argue that such objections gets their force from a popular but problematic model of theoretical deliberation which pictures deliberation as a function, treating the deliberation’s inputs as given, fixed prior to and independently from the deliberation. Though such a picture may seem plausible, attending to the case of self-fulfilling beliefs can help us see how such a function-model is inadequate for a general understanding of theoretical deliberation. Because it is unable to accommodate the possibility that the outcomes of our deliberation can sometimes be evidence for the proposition we are deliberating about, the function model is unable to account for cases where what we believe affects the truth of what is believed.
I show that on a revised model of theoretical deliberation our evidence will problematically underdetermine any appropriate doxastic attitude: when belief in a proposition is self-fulfilling, our evidence is insufficient to support belief, disbelief, or even suspended judgment toward that proposition.
Papers by Gregory E Antill
In this paper, I argue that there is space for a view which does not reduce intentions to a species of belief but which will still be satisfying to those deeply impressed with the important first- and third- personal asymmetries of practical knowledge. Rather than identifying our beliefs about our actions and our intention we should instead identify the reasoning by which we arrive at each. If we can determine whether we will act by deciding to act, the same piece of reasoning can give rise to two distinct attitudes – a belief that you will act and an intention to act – justified on the basis of the same reasons.
In contrast, this paper shows that the reasons-responsiveness picture of subjective culpability leads not just to intra-hierarchical differences but to inter-hierarchical differences. That is, if the reasons-responsiveness picture of subjective culpability is correct, we should expect frequent cases where, e.g., an agent who acts purposefully is less culpable than an agent who performs that same action recklessly, or negligently.
This result has both important normative and empirical consequences for the downstream practice and study of substantive American criminal law. In particular, this paper argues that if the ‘reasons-responsiveness’ account of subjective culpability is correct then not only is the PKRN picture of subjective culpability mistaken, so too is the Model Penal Code’s PKRN grading regime. If PKRN are not the final grounds of moral responsibility, then the Model Penal Code’s grading system will often fail to track offenders’ relative culpability and result in predictably disproportionate punishments not merely within but also across grades of crimes. The paper concludes with some preliminary suggestions for amending the MPC in light of these concerns.
Just as the existence of practical akrasia has been treated as important evidence for the existence of our practical agency, the alleged absence of epistemic akrasia – cases where a believer believes some proposition contrary to her considered judgments about what she has most reason to believe – has recently be marshalled as grounds for skepticism about the existence of similar forms of epistemic agency.
In this paper, I defend the existence of epistemic agency against such objections. Rather than argue against the impossibility of epistemic akrasia, I argue that the impossibility of epistemic akrasia is actually compatible with the existence of epistemic agency. The crucial mistake, I argue, is that skeptics about epistemic agency are failing to carefully distinguish between differences in the structure of believing and acting and differences in the structure of normative reasons to believe and normative reasons to act. I show that once these differences are properly distinguished, we can see that practical and epistemic agency are on a par with one another.
In this paper, I argue that this view fails to distinguish between the aim of acquiring a true belief and the aim of believing what is true. While one cannot usually fail to establish that one will acquire a true belief without establishing the truth of the believed proposition, in the case self-fulfilling belief the two can come apart. I argue that insofar as the aim of belief has to do with determining whether the believed proposition is true, it will be both impossible and impermissible to believe for pragmatic reasons.
I argue that such objections gets their force from a popular but problematic model of theoretical deliberation which pictures deliberation as a function, treating the deliberation’s inputs as given, fixed prior to and independently from the deliberation. Though such a picture may seem plausible, attending to the case of self-fulfilling beliefs can help us see how such a function-model is inadequate for a general understanding of theoretical deliberation. Because it is unable to accommodate the possibility that the outcomes of our deliberation can sometimes be evidence for the proposition we are deliberating about, the function model is unable to account for cases where what we believe affects the truth of what is believed.
I show that on a revised model of theoretical deliberation our evidence will problematically underdetermine any appropriate doxastic attitude: when belief in a proposition is self-fulfilling, our evidence is insufficient to support belief, disbelief, or even suspended judgment toward that proposition.
In this paper, I argue that there is space for a view which does not reduce intentions to a species of belief but which will still be satisfying to those deeply impressed with the important first- and third- personal asymmetries of practical knowledge. Rather than identifying our beliefs about our actions and our intention we should instead identify the reasoning by which we arrive at each. If we can determine whether we will act by deciding to act, the same piece of reasoning can give rise to two distinct attitudes – a belief that you will act and an intention to act – justified on the basis of the same reasons.