In what follows, I will suggest that Parmenides’ claim concerning the impossibility of what-is-no... more In what follows, I will suggest that Parmenides’ claim concerning the impossibility of what-is-not (and his subsequent denial of change and plurality) leads to a form of monism in which Parmenidean Being can be construed as the totality of what being can be. I will also argue that Being, for Parmenides, is the only possible object of thought, and also, and more controversially, that Being itself thinks. My conclusions are based mainly on what Parmenides says at B3 and B6 1-2, which appear to tell us that what can be thought and what can be are the same. This seems to imply that if I can think of something, then it has some sort of being, i.e., that all possible objects of thought have being, regardless of whether such objects are ‘actual’ beings (although what can count as a genuine object of thought, i.e. an object of thought that has being, might have to be grounded in the object’s being a possible object, i.e., something that can be). I am inclined to interpret B3 and B6 1-2 in this way because I find it hard to believe that Parmenides wanted to say that we are not able to think of non-actual possibilities.
In what follows, I will attempt to elucidate Nietzsche’s perspectivism about truth. I will focus ... more In what follows, I will attempt to elucidate Nietzsche’s perspectivism about truth. I will focus on some of his principle arguments against (what he appears to consider) the traditional notion of truth, i.e. some sort of correspondence between “the truth” and a “ground of truth”, which he appears to associate with the “platonistic” belief in a “true reality”, superior to mere appearances, lying “behind” phenomena. I will not argue directly for Nietzschean perspectivism, but I will aim to show that an acceptance of perspectivism (understood as the denial of absolute truth) is unavoidable. I will also highlight what I take to be some of the negative consequences of accepting perspectivism by considering the effect that adopting a perspectivist position might have on our understanding and evaluation of competing interpretations of recent events. In addition, I will focus briefly on R. L. Anderson’s interpretation of perspectivism and on his claims regarding truth and objectivity, which might be seen as an objection to some of the claims which I make regarding the consequences of accepting perspectivism, and I will try to show that his interpretation still leaves certain important issues unaffected.
The following piece of writing is intended to provoke a single question, namely: Could the curren... more The following piece of writing is intended to provoke a single question, namely: Could the current “genus” of thinking, writing, etc. that is generally labelled “conspiracy theory” be a case of the truth concealing itself? The function served by “conspiracy theories” will be examined in light of Nietzsche’s claim that meaningless suffering is unbearable and leads to suicidal nihilism, and the loss of the ground of truth, and the subsequent blurring of the truth/lies distinction, will be seen as a consequence of the ubiquity of an attitude commonly described as “the suspension of disbelief”.
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (and also in the Grundrisse of 1857–1858 ),... more In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (and also in the Grundrisse of 1857–1858 ), Marx distinguishes between what might be described as two types of mediation, namely (1) objectification [Vergegenständlichung], and (2) alienation [Entäusserung]/estrangement [Entfremdung]. In the final section (entitled ‘Estranged Labour’) of the First Manuscript Marx describes objectification as ‘the realization of labour’, a realization which, under present conditions, ‘appears as loss of reality for the worker’, as ‘loss of and bondage to the object’ (Marx, 1975, p.324; italics in the original). This ‘loss of reality’ and ‘loss of and bondage to the object’ is the worker's alienation, or estrangement, from the product of his labour, from his productive activity, and from himself. In the present work we will focus on the connection between objectification and alienation in order to elucidate how, in present society, the former, which in itself is neutral and unavoidable, leads to the latter, i.e. to something negative and undesirable.
We would like to start at the beginning, in the proximity of the origin, but as Foucault makes cl... more We would like to start at the beginning, in the proximity of the origin, but as Foucault makes clear, for man, this is an ineluctably difficult task, for 'he is never contemporaneous with that origin which is outlined through the time of things even as it eludes the gaze‘ (Foucault, 2002, p.359). But what is this origin that must always elude the grasp which seeks to apprehend it, not only in its retreat, but also in its promised return? What implications (if any) might the elusiveness of man's origin have for normativity? These are some of the questions that the present work will attempt to address.
Heidegger avers that his descriptions (in Being and Time) of Dasein's everyday mode of Being are ... more Heidegger avers that his descriptions (in Being and Time) of Dasein's everyday mode of Being are ethically neutral. In fact, he clearly warns us, in §34, that his interpretation of phenomena is ‘purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein.’ (Heidegger, 1962, pp.210-211; italics mine) This suggests that any attempt to draw ethical conclusions from an analysis of the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction would be futile. Heidegger appears to associate ethics with the positive sciences (i.e. with forms of ontic inquiry), all of which he takes to be ‘less primordial’ than ontological inquiry, and so, as it is in the context of fundamental ontology that the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction is thematized, any concern about the possible ethical implications of this distinction might be considered misplaced (or even irrelevant). Nevertheless, I would here like to argue that if the ‘transition’ from inauthenticity to authenticity involves, not only a change of ‘form’, but also a change of determinate ‘content’, it might be possible to show that the ‘transition’ to authenticity is not without behavioural consequences and, therefore, not necessarily ethically neutral.
In what follows, I will suggest that Parmenides’ claim concerning the impossibility of what-is-no... more In what follows, I will suggest that Parmenides’ claim concerning the impossibility of what-is-not (and his subsequent denial of change and plurality) leads to a form of monism in which Parmenidean Being can be construed as the totality of what being can be. I will also argue that Being, for Parmenides, is the only possible object of thought, and also, and more controversially, that Being itself thinks. My conclusions are based mainly on what Parmenides says at B3 and B6 1-2, which appear to tell us that what can be thought and what can be are the same. This seems to imply that if I can think of something, then it has some sort of being, i.e., that all possible objects of thought have being, regardless of whether such objects are ‘actual’ beings (although what can count as a genuine object of thought, i.e. an object of thought that has being, might have to be grounded in the object’s being a possible object, i.e., something that can be). I am inclined to interpret B3 and B6 1-2 in this way because I find it hard to believe that Parmenides wanted to say that we are not able to think of non-actual possibilities.
In what follows, I will attempt to elucidate Nietzsche’s perspectivism about truth. I will focus ... more In what follows, I will attempt to elucidate Nietzsche’s perspectivism about truth. I will focus on some of his principle arguments against (what he appears to consider) the traditional notion of truth, i.e. some sort of correspondence between “the truth” and a “ground of truth”, which he appears to associate with the “platonistic” belief in a “true reality”, superior to mere appearances, lying “behind” phenomena. I will not argue directly for Nietzschean perspectivism, but I will aim to show that an acceptance of perspectivism (understood as the denial of absolute truth) is unavoidable. I will also highlight what I take to be some of the negative consequences of accepting perspectivism by considering the effect that adopting a perspectivist position might have on our understanding and evaluation of competing interpretations of recent events. In addition, I will focus briefly on R. L. Anderson’s interpretation of perspectivism and on his claims regarding truth and objectivity, which might be seen as an objection to some of the claims which I make regarding the consequences of accepting perspectivism, and I will try to show that his interpretation still leaves certain important issues unaffected.
The following piece of writing is intended to provoke a single question, namely: Could the curren... more The following piece of writing is intended to provoke a single question, namely: Could the current “genus” of thinking, writing, etc. that is generally labelled “conspiracy theory” be a case of the truth concealing itself? The function served by “conspiracy theories” will be examined in light of Nietzsche’s claim that meaningless suffering is unbearable and leads to suicidal nihilism, and the loss of the ground of truth, and the subsequent blurring of the truth/lies distinction, will be seen as a consequence of the ubiquity of an attitude commonly described as “the suspension of disbelief”.
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (and also in the Grundrisse of 1857–1858 ),... more In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (and also in the Grundrisse of 1857–1858 ), Marx distinguishes between what might be described as two types of mediation, namely (1) objectification [Vergegenständlichung], and (2) alienation [Entäusserung]/estrangement [Entfremdung]. In the final section (entitled ‘Estranged Labour’) of the First Manuscript Marx describes objectification as ‘the realization of labour’, a realization which, under present conditions, ‘appears as loss of reality for the worker’, as ‘loss of and bondage to the object’ (Marx, 1975, p.324; italics in the original). This ‘loss of reality’ and ‘loss of and bondage to the object’ is the worker's alienation, or estrangement, from the product of his labour, from his productive activity, and from himself. In the present work we will focus on the connection between objectification and alienation in order to elucidate how, in present society, the former, which in itself is neutral and unavoidable, leads to the latter, i.e. to something negative and undesirable.
We would like to start at the beginning, in the proximity of the origin, but as Foucault makes cl... more We would like to start at the beginning, in the proximity of the origin, but as Foucault makes clear, for man, this is an ineluctably difficult task, for 'he is never contemporaneous with that origin which is outlined through the time of things even as it eludes the gaze‘ (Foucault, 2002, p.359). But what is this origin that must always elude the grasp which seeks to apprehend it, not only in its retreat, but also in its promised return? What implications (if any) might the elusiveness of man's origin have for normativity? These are some of the questions that the present work will attempt to address.
Heidegger avers that his descriptions (in Being and Time) of Dasein's everyday mode of Being are ... more Heidegger avers that his descriptions (in Being and Time) of Dasein's everyday mode of Being are ethically neutral. In fact, he clearly warns us, in §34, that his interpretation of phenomena is ‘purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein.’ (Heidegger, 1962, pp.210-211; italics mine) This suggests that any attempt to draw ethical conclusions from an analysis of the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction would be futile. Heidegger appears to associate ethics with the positive sciences (i.e. with forms of ontic inquiry), all of which he takes to be ‘less primordial’ than ontological inquiry, and so, as it is in the context of fundamental ontology that the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction is thematized, any concern about the possible ethical implications of this distinction might be considered misplaced (or even irrelevant). Nevertheless, I would here like to argue that if the ‘transition’ from inauthenticity to authenticity involves, not only a change of ‘form’, but also a change of determinate ‘content’, it might be possible to show that the ‘transition’ to authenticity is not without behavioural consequences and, therefore, not necessarily ethically neutral.
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