Julian Newman
Julian Newman is a graduate of the Universities of Oxford and London. He was Professor of Computing at GCU from 2004 to 2011. His major current research interests include the Philosophy of Computing, Computational Sciences and Computer Simulation. He has also worked on CSCW, Empirical Software Engineering, Virtual Organizations and Methodology. Since 2011 he has continued research activities at GCU and as a doctoral student at Birkbeck College, University of London. He previously worked in Computing at International Computers Ltd, Heriot-Watt University and City of London Polytechnic, and in Psychology at Glasgow College and at Ulster Polytechnic. He has held research grants from EPSRC, SHEFC, Carnegie, Renault and several European Union programmes, and his national and international research collaborations have included the Universities of Cambridge, Cologne, Essen, Glasgow, Kharkov and Strathclyde.
Supervisors: Dr Robert Northcott, Birkbeck College, University of London
Supervisors: Dr Robert Northcott, Birkbeck College, University of London
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Papers by Julian Newman
1. Our knowledge of computer simulation models, as of all software artefacts, is empirical and not a priori. Hence I reject the arguments for their essential epistemic opacity.
2. Epistemic opacity is widespread in computer simulation models, arising not from their essential nature, but contingently from the neglect of good software engineering practice in model design and development.
3. Such contingent epistemic opacity is a serious problem that can undermine the adequacy of computer simulation for many practical and epistemic purposes.
4. The rise of “Post-Normal Science” has blunted the internal critical practice of scientific communities while enhancing scepticism in citizen communities.
5. Developers of computer simulations who intend them to be adequate for policy-related purposes need to recognise that the audience for Post-Normal Science has particularly demanding requirements for surveyability (what outside the field of computing would be called “transparency”).
6. Provision of adequate support for the exercise of epistemic judgement on the part of multiple audiences should be recognised as a central responsibility of developers and users of computer simulation models.
7. In this context it would be irresponsible, as well as methodologically flawed, to accept that nothing can be done to avoid epistemic opacity in computer models.