Excerpts from Austin's 1938 NE lectures, feeding into a new analysis of Aristotle's account, with... more Excerpts from Austin's 1938 NE lectures, feeding into a new analysis of Aristotle's account, with discussion of recent proposals by J. Mueller, H. Lorenz, and D. Charles.
A further critique of the claim that Aristotle's account of friendship is egocentric, with a focu... more A further critique of the claim that Aristotle's account of friendship is egocentric, with a focus upon interpersonal actualizations, and an anodyne reading of NE IX.8 1169a34-b1.
Ethics beyond the Limits: New Essays on Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, ed Chappell & Van Ackeren, 2019
This paper explores and contrasts Williams's views and Aristotle's views, and Williams's views of... more This paper explores and contrasts Williams's views and Aristotle's views, and Williams's views of Aristotle's views, on a number of issues about the nature and the unity of the virtues and the conception of human flourishing that underlies them. It argues that Williams could have found Aristotle congenial in two ways. First, Aristotle supposes that most men have some natural inclination to act virtuously, which could ground internal reasons for ethical action. Secondly, he does not assume that human values are readily compatible, as emerges in his uncertainty about the relation of theoretical contemplation to the practical demands of life. However, there is a real disagreement between Aristotle and Williams about the unity of the virtues: can an act be really courageous if it is also wrong, and can an agent be really brave if he is unjust? Here, the paper finds more plausibility in Aristotle's views that Williams was able to grant. If it has a single conclusion, it is this: Williams is always illuminating about the issues of Aristotelian ethics, but not always right. At least, when he is wrong he is wrong about things that matter.
There is a current debate about the grammar of intention: do I intend to φ (whose content is an a... more There is a current debate about the grammar of intention: do I intend to φ (whose content is an act), or that I φ (whose content is quasi-propositional)? The equivalent question in Aristotle relates especially to choice (prohairesis). I argue that, in the context of practical reasoning, choice, as also wish (boulēsis), has as its object an act. I then explore the role that this plays within his account of the relation of thought to action. In particular, I discuss the relation of deliberation to the practical syllogism, and the thesis that the conclusion of the second is an action. Keywords Aristotle – choice – wish – deliberation – practical syllogism
Rachana Kamtekar has already won a niche for herself through a series of articles on Plato that a... more Rachana Kamtekar has already won a niche for herself through a series of articles on Plato that are not only ingenious and original, but also genuinely perceptive. This, her first book pursues a seminal idea through a plurality of Platonic dialogues.
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 2005
I discuss four questions: whether decisions are derived from some 'Grand End' conception of eudai... more I discuss four questions: whether decisions are derived from some 'Grand End' conception of eudaimonia; whether there are some (though not many) exceptionless principles; whether goods are subject to variable valence; and whether practical judgement rests on more than a contentless ability of discrimination. My answer to the question is nuanced.
Being Realistic about Reasons by T. M. Scanlon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. ix + 1... more Being Realistic about Reasons by T. M. Scanlon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. ix + 132. H/b £19.99, P/b £11.99.
Writers on Aristotle's ethics commonly start by regretting that 'happiness' is equally inevitable... more Writers on Aristotle's ethics commonly start by regretting that 'happiness' is equally inevitable and misleading as a rendering of the Greek eudaimonia, and then keep prudently with the latter. This can suggest that ancient ethics, from Socrates to the Stoics, is preoccupied with a concept that is alien to us. Daniel Russell already engages our attention by his unflinching loyalty to the English term; he further maintains that the two terms connote the same concept. This makes his treatment of Greek texts relevant to our own current concerns. His question is no less than how, in general terms, we are to achieve what we all implicitly want in life. Though he cites passages of text, he is sparing in actual quotation and in engagement with rival interpreters; he writes reflectively, and focuses with an alert intelligence upon perennial philosophical issues. Anyone with ethical interests should find his attention engaged. Anyone steeped in the texts will be free to dissent from his readings of them, but is likely to be refreshed by a priority that is thematic rather than textual.
Philosophers, like politicians, pursue rationally irresolvable debates that lend themselves to fa... more Philosophers, like politicians, pursue rationally irresolvable debates that lend themselves to false contrasts. This is particularly true within moral philosophy. With respect both to values, and to obligations -as also to reasons for action, though I won't discuss these separately -we meet presumptions that may be labelled subjective or objective. Rarely, an argument arises that puts certain options out of serious play. (Take Geach's refutation, after Frege, of non-propositional construals of sentences embeddable within 'if'-clauses -not that it has terminated discussion.) Too often, preference appears to be a matter of personality, or (what is less authentic) fashion.
Excerpts from Austin's 1938 NE lectures, feeding into a new analysis of Aristotle's account, with... more Excerpts from Austin's 1938 NE lectures, feeding into a new analysis of Aristotle's account, with discussion of recent proposals by J. Mueller, H. Lorenz, and D. Charles.
A further critique of the claim that Aristotle's account of friendship is egocentric, with a focu... more A further critique of the claim that Aristotle's account of friendship is egocentric, with a focus upon interpersonal actualizations, and an anodyne reading of NE IX.8 1169a34-b1.
Ethics beyond the Limits: New Essays on Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, ed Chappell & Van Ackeren, 2019
This paper explores and contrasts Williams's views and Aristotle's views, and Williams's views of... more This paper explores and contrasts Williams's views and Aristotle's views, and Williams's views of Aristotle's views, on a number of issues about the nature and the unity of the virtues and the conception of human flourishing that underlies them. It argues that Williams could have found Aristotle congenial in two ways. First, Aristotle supposes that most men have some natural inclination to act virtuously, which could ground internal reasons for ethical action. Secondly, he does not assume that human values are readily compatible, as emerges in his uncertainty about the relation of theoretical contemplation to the practical demands of life. However, there is a real disagreement between Aristotle and Williams about the unity of the virtues: can an act be really courageous if it is also wrong, and can an agent be really brave if he is unjust? Here, the paper finds more plausibility in Aristotle's views that Williams was able to grant. If it has a single conclusion, it is this: Williams is always illuminating about the issues of Aristotelian ethics, but not always right. At least, when he is wrong he is wrong about things that matter.
There is a current debate about the grammar of intention: do I intend to φ (whose content is an a... more There is a current debate about the grammar of intention: do I intend to φ (whose content is an act), or that I φ (whose content is quasi-propositional)? The equivalent question in Aristotle relates especially to choice (prohairesis). I argue that, in the context of practical reasoning, choice, as also wish (boulēsis), has as its object an act. I then explore the role that this plays within his account of the relation of thought to action. In particular, I discuss the relation of deliberation to the practical syllogism, and the thesis that the conclusion of the second is an action. Keywords Aristotle – choice – wish – deliberation – practical syllogism
Rachana Kamtekar has already won a niche for herself through a series of articles on Plato that a... more Rachana Kamtekar has already won a niche for herself through a series of articles on Plato that are not only ingenious and original, but also genuinely perceptive. This, her first book pursues a seminal idea through a plurality of Platonic dialogues.
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 2005
I discuss four questions: whether decisions are derived from some 'Grand End' conception of eudai... more I discuss four questions: whether decisions are derived from some 'Grand End' conception of eudaimonia; whether there are some (though not many) exceptionless principles; whether goods are subject to variable valence; and whether practical judgement rests on more than a contentless ability of discrimination. My answer to the question is nuanced.
Being Realistic about Reasons by T. M. Scanlon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. ix + 1... more Being Realistic about Reasons by T. M. Scanlon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. ix + 132. H/b £19.99, P/b £11.99.
Writers on Aristotle's ethics commonly start by regretting that 'happiness' is equally inevitable... more Writers on Aristotle's ethics commonly start by regretting that 'happiness' is equally inevitable and misleading as a rendering of the Greek eudaimonia, and then keep prudently with the latter. This can suggest that ancient ethics, from Socrates to the Stoics, is preoccupied with a concept that is alien to us. Daniel Russell already engages our attention by his unflinching loyalty to the English term; he further maintains that the two terms connote the same concept. This makes his treatment of Greek texts relevant to our own current concerns. His question is no less than how, in general terms, we are to achieve what we all implicitly want in life. Though he cites passages of text, he is sparing in actual quotation and in engagement with rival interpreters; he writes reflectively, and focuses with an alert intelligence upon perennial philosophical issues. Anyone with ethical interests should find his attention engaged. Anyone steeped in the texts will be free to dissent from his readings of them, but is likely to be refreshed by a priority that is thematic rather than textual.
Philosophers, like politicians, pursue rationally irresolvable debates that lend themselves to fa... more Philosophers, like politicians, pursue rationally irresolvable debates that lend themselves to false contrasts. This is particularly true within moral philosophy. With respect both to values, and to obligations -as also to reasons for action, though I won't discuss these separately -we meet presumptions that may be labelled subjective or objective. Rarely, an argument arises that puts certain options out of serious play. (Take Geach's refutation, after Frege, of non-propositional construals of sentences embeddable within 'if'-clauses -not that it has terminated discussion.) Too often, preference appears to be a matter of personality, or (what is less authentic) fashion.
An occasion piece, presented at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association at Chicago in... more An occasion piece, presented at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association at Chicago in February 2020.
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