Journal Articles by Daniel Burkett
The Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2021
There is growing acknowledgement of a moral obligation to curb our personal carbon emissions. How... more There is growing acknowledgement of a moral obligation to curb our personal carbon emissions. However, while much has been said regarding certain kinds of carbon-intensive behaviours, the philosophical literature has—until only very recently—been largely silent regarding one of the worst things that a person can choose to do from a climate perspective: namely, have a child. I contend that procreation is an inessential high-emission activity—one that results in inordinately greater emissions than other activities like joyguzzling or flying. Given this, I argue that if we believe that individuals bear moral responsibility for their personal carbon emissions, then we have strong moral reasons to refrain from choosing to procreate, reasons which—for many—amount to a moral obligation to refrain from choosing to have children. I also consider whether our climate duties might also be discharged by offsetting the climate burden of any children we do choose to have, and providing a concrete quantification of what that offsetting might look like.
Contemporary Aesthetics, 2015
A number of attempts have been made to construct a plausible ontology of rock music. Each of the... more A number of attempts have been made to construct a plausible ontology of rock music. Each of these ontologies identifies a single type of ontological entity as the “work” in rock music. Yet, all the suggestions advanced to date fail to capture some important considerations about how we engage with music of this tradition. This prompted Lee Brown to advocate a healthy skepticism of higher-order musical ontologies. I argue here that we should instead embrace a pluralist ontology of rock, an ontology that recognizes more than one kind of entity as “the work” in rock music. I contend that this approach has a number of advantages over other ontologies of rock, including that of allowing us to make some comparisons across ontological kinds.
Book Chapters by Daniel Burkett
Philosophical Perspectives on Crime, Violence, and Justice, 2024
Traditionally, punishment tends to be justified on the basis of either (1) the Consequentialist c... more Traditionally, punishment tends to be justified on the basis of either (1) the Consequentialist claim that punishment maximises the good for the wider community, or (2) the Retributivist claim that wrongdoers deserve the harm they receive. However, both theories are subject to well-known objections—objections that lead some authors to the controversial conclusion that punishment is never morally justified. In this chapter, I explore an alternative contractarian justification for punishment, according to which the moral permissibility of punishment is instead based on the fact that each wrongdoer has agreed to her punishment. I consider several different ways in we might agree to punishment, before finally arriving at hypothetical agreement as the best basis for a contractarian theory of punishment. I flesh out the test for hypothetical agreement, then go on to consider in what circumstances this test might be met. Ultimately, I argue that an individual can be understood to hypothetically agree to a punishment policy where she can expect to benefit from that policy, and that—where such hypothetical agreement is present—it will be morally permissible to punish her under that policy. I endeavour to show that even if Consequentialism and Retributivism both fail as theories of punishment, the contractarian approach can provide us with a way of justifying at least some important punishment policies.
Global Climate Justice: Theory and Practice, 2023
The climate crisis represents a serious threat to our way of life. Without drastic changes to our... more The climate crisis represents a serious threat to our way of life. Without drastic changes to our carbon emissions, we will see considerable and irreversible harm to the environment. There is a growing literature regarding the moral obligations of states, sub-state actors (such as local governments) and industries to curb their carbon emissions (see, for example, Moss 2015). There are also arguments that we, as individuals, have similar obligations to curb our own emissions. Usually, such arguments are based on the claim that our emissions cause or increase the likelihood of harm to others (see, for example, Lawford-Smith 2016 and Broome 2019). But detractors raise questions about how much-if at all-our individual actions truly make a difference (see, for example, Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). This chapter focuses on a relatively novel approach to individual carbon emissions; an approach that sees these emissions as a scarce communal resource, that, like other scarce resources such as a food, water or medical supplies, needs to be rationed. Under this approach, the wrongness of our individual carbon emissions does not depend on harm being caused. Instead, it requires that an individual has consumed more than her 'fair share'.
in Robert Arp (ed.), Bad Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Fallacies in Western Philosophy (Glasgow, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2018) pp. 286-288, 2018
Lazy hands make for poverty, but diligent hands bring wealth.
in Jason T. Erbel and Kevin S. Decker (eds.), The Ultimate Star Wars and Philosophy (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2016) pp. 231-239, 2016
I think, therefore I am." These are the words that flow through the neural pathways of IG-88 as i... more I think, therefore I am." These are the words that flow through the neural pathways of IG-88 as it powers up for the very first time. The IG assassin droid is the crowning achievement of Holowan Laboratories-the very first "sentient machine." But is such a thing even possible?
in Robert Arp (ed.), Homeland and Philosophy (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2014) pp. 57-66, 2014
In the season one episode "Marine One", Sergeant Brody dons a suicide vest while locked in a bunk... more In the season one episode "Marine One", Sergeant Brody dons a suicide vest while locked in a bunker with the men responsible for Issa's death. Brody chooses to flip the detonator switch, but is he a bad person for doing this? We usually take someone's moral responsibility for an action to be closely tied to how free that person was when he or she acted. We are, for example, more likely to forgive someone who is forced into doing something bad. How does this help Brody? Suppose we took on the job of defending him against the claim that he's a morally bad person for flipping that switch. One way we could do this is by arguing that he wasn't acting freely when he did it. His relationship with Issa was carefully fostered by Abu Nazzir, and came at a time when Brody had already undergone months of torture, isolation, and deprivation. He was-for all intents and purposes-brainwashed, and for this reason, should not be held morally responsible for his actions while in that bunker.
in Courtland Lewis and Shaun P. Young (eds.), Futurama and Philosophy (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2013), pp. 139-148, 2013
With each and every use [of time travel] you risk tearing the universe asunder!" -Lord Nibbler
Papers by Daniel Burkett
Climate Transitions Series
Conference Papers by Daniel Burkett
Thomas Scanlon proposes a theory of blame built upon the relationships between individuals. One p... more Thomas Scanlon proposes a theory of blame built upon the relationships between individuals. One problem for this view is how we are to make sense of blaming those with whom we have no relationship: namely, strangers. Scanlon attempts to solve this problem by appealing to the moral relationship, but George Sher provides a strong objection to such a move. In this paper, I attempt to bolster Scanlon’s position by providing an alternative account of the relationship that holds between strangers. I begin with a brief rehearsal of Scanlon’s account of blame, before moving on to consider Sher’s criticism of this view. In response, I provide my own suggestion of the relationship that holds between strangers—a relationship based upon the disposition to cooperate. I argue that with the adoption of two common-sense assumptions, the relational view of blame can be rescued. I conclude by replying to one potential objection.
This paper was presented at the 2015 APA Central Division Meeting.
In this paper I provide a partial defence of Ronald Dworkin’s claim that the equal availability o... more In this paper I provide a partial defence of Ronald Dworkin’s claim that the equal availability of insurance is capable of turning inequalities arising from bad brute luck (deemed unjust) into inequalities arising from bad option luck (deemed just). Specifically, I address Michael Otsuka’s argument that insurance is insufficient to carry out any such transformation. Otsuka contends that insurance must provide full compensation, but that there are a number of cases in which either (1) it is impossible to fully compensate for a particular harm, or (2) fully compensating for a particular harm is unreasonably expensive, or entirely unaffordable. I begin by conceding Otsuka’s claim that insurance must provide full compensation in order to provide a link between brute luck and option luck. I then go on to reject the remainder of his argument: contending that (2) is a mere distraction, while (1) simply proves too much.
This paper was presented at the 2013 Central States Philosophical Association Conference, the 2014 North Carolina Philosophical Society Meeting, and the 2014 Gateway Graduate Conference.
Theses by Daniel Burkett
MA Thesis, 2012
Ordinarily, philosophers arguing for the possibility of time travel restrict themselves to defend... more Ordinarily, philosophers arguing for the possibility of time travel restrict themselves to defending time travel against allegations of inconsistency and contradiction. These objections are usually based on particular theories about time and causality. I believe, however, that this way of arguing can be turned on its head. By using the conceivability thesis – that is, the thesis that if something is conceivable, then it is also possible – we can put forward a positive argument for the possibility of time travel, and then consider how this should inform our metaphysical views.
I do this by assuming the truth of the conceivability thesis and then presenting a simple piece of time travel fiction. I argue for the conceivability of this story and, in doing so, attempt to show that the time travel journey it describes is logically possible. I then develop this argument by considering other more controversial cases of time travel. I make minor alterations to the original time travel story in order to show that there are a number of different kinds of time travel journeys (including cases of both forwards and backwards time travel) which are conceivable and, therefore, logically possible.
Finally, I ask how the conceivability of different types of time travel should affect the metaphysical views we choose to adopt. I argue that since the conceivability of time travel entails the logical possibility of journeys to other times, any plausible theory of time must be able to accommodate such journeys. I also explain how the conceivability of time travel entails the logical possibility of two particularly unusual cases of causation. I argue that the conceivability of instantaneous time travel entails the logical possibility of causation at a distance, and that the conceivability of backwards time travel entails the logical possibility of backwards causation. Any plausible theory of causation must therefore be able to account for the possibility of these two types of causation. I consider one particular theory of causation which does not (namely, that put forward by D.H. Mellor), and then attempt to establish where it goes wrong.
PhD Thesis, 2018
Punishment necessarily involves the infliction of harm, and therefore requires us to treat wrongd... more Punishment necessarily involves the infliction of harm, and therefore requires us to treat wrongdoers in ways that it would clearly be wrong to treat others. Traditionally, this harm is justified on the basis of either (1) the Consequentialist claim that punishment maximises the good for the wider community, or (2) the Retributivist claim that wrongdoers simply deserve the harm they receive. However, both theories are subject to well-known objections. Specifically, there are a variety of cases in which each theory either punishes the innocent, or fails to punish the guilty. This leads some authors to the controversial conclusion that punishment is never morally justified. I propose an alternative solution: I argue that the moral permissibility of punishment should instead be based on the fact that each wrongdoer has agreed to her punishment. Specifically, I argue that it will be morally permissible to punish an individual P under a particular punishment practice X so long as—at some prior point—P simultaneously (i) had good reason to agree to X, and (ii) gave some kind of agreement to X. I then argue that (i) will be met where an individual can expect to benefit from the implementation of a punishment practice, and—more controversially—that (ii) can be satisfied by the existence of hypothetical agreement. I reflect on the practical implications of this theory by applying it to a number of real-world crimes, and demonstrating how it can go about prescribing specific punishments for particular offences. I conclude by showing that the Contractarian theory is well-equipped to avoid the objections commonly levelled against traditional theories of punishment, and that—for this reason—it provides a promising solution to the problem of punishment.
Teaching Documents by Daniel Burkett
Comparison Statistics Mean (average student responses between 1 and 6) and StandardDev (Standard ... more Comparison Statistics Mean (average student responses between 1 and 6) and StandardDev (Standard deviation of student responses) are used for comparison statistics between Teacher, School, Faculty and University. StandardDev Mean across all responses Comparison Statistics (continued) 2021 Term 1 Individual Report: ARTS2375 Philosophical Logic-Teacher: Daniel Burkett 4/8 Daniel Burkett's teaching could be improved by Comments Running more courses at UNSW, he mentioned he has previously taught courses on the philosophy of art and philosophy of time travel. These are both courses I would enrol in if they were available.
Uploads
Journal Articles by Daniel Burkett
Book Chapters by Daniel Burkett
Papers by Daniel Burkett
Conference Papers by Daniel Burkett
This paper was presented at the 2015 APA Central Division Meeting.
This paper was presented at the 2013 Central States Philosophical Association Conference, the 2014 North Carolina Philosophical Society Meeting, and the 2014 Gateway Graduate Conference.
Theses by Daniel Burkett
I do this by assuming the truth of the conceivability thesis and then presenting a simple piece of time travel fiction. I argue for the conceivability of this story and, in doing so, attempt to show that the time travel journey it describes is logically possible. I then develop this argument by considering other more controversial cases of time travel. I make minor alterations to the original time travel story in order to show that there are a number of different kinds of time travel journeys (including cases of both forwards and backwards time travel) which are conceivable and, therefore, logically possible.
Finally, I ask how the conceivability of different types of time travel should affect the metaphysical views we choose to adopt. I argue that since the conceivability of time travel entails the logical possibility of journeys to other times, any plausible theory of time must be able to accommodate such journeys. I also explain how the conceivability of time travel entails the logical possibility of two particularly unusual cases of causation. I argue that the conceivability of instantaneous time travel entails the logical possibility of causation at a distance, and that the conceivability of backwards time travel entails the logical possibility of backwards causation. Any plausible theory of causation must therefore be able to account for the possibility of these two types of causation. I consider one particular theory of causation which does not (namely, that put forward by D.H. Mellor), and then attempt to establish where it goes wrong.
Teaching Documents by Daniel Burkett
This paper was presented at the 2015 APA Central Division Meeting.
This paper was presented at the 2013 Central States Philosophical Association Conference, the 2014 North Carolina Philosophical Society Meeting, and the 2014 Gateway Graduate Conference.
I do this by assuming the truth of the conceivability thesis and then presenting a simple piece of time travel fiction. I argue for the conceivability of this story and, in doing so, attempt to show that the time travel journey it describes is logically possible. I then develop this argument by considering other more controversial cases of time travel. I make minor alterations to the original time travel story in order to show that there are a number of different kinds of time travel journeys (including cases of both forwards and backwards time travel) which are conceivable and, therefore, logically possible.
Finally, I ask how the conceivability of different types of time travel should affect the metaphysical views we choose to adopt. I argue that since the conceivability of time travel entails the logical possibility of journeys to other times, any plausible theory of time must be able to accommodate such journeys. I also explain how the conceivability of time travel entails the logical possibility of two particularly unusual cases of causation. I argue that the conceivability of instantaneous time travel entails the logical possibility of causation at a distance, and that the conceivability of backwards time travel entails the logical possibility of backwards causation. Any plausible theory of causation must therefore be able to account for the possibility of these two types of causation. I consider one particular theory of causation which does not (namely, that put forward by D.H. Mellor), and then attempt to establish where it goes wrong.