BillP's Book\Miniature\Wargame Blog

This week I read Operation Sealion: The Invasion of England 1940 by Peter Schenk and it struck me as a bit of a mixed bag. In one sense, the book was outstanding. It truly tells you everything you could possibly want to know about the German Army’s preparations for Sea Lion, the planned German invasion of Great Britain. In that sense it is indispensable. Schenk has painstakingly found ALL the data. He covers the design and construction of the barges, the technical modifications of installing ramps and debarkation devices. Additionally, he accounts for all the material and logistic factors, how many barges were prepared and where were they based? Finally, he provides a detailed look at the German Army’s plan for the actual invasion, who would land where and when they would land.

The author then moves on to the German naval and air force planning and preparations, which, as he freely points out, was fairly minimal and half-hearted. He even recounts the volume of message traffic between Berlin and the forces in the field showing that Hitler essentially knowingly allowed the Navy and Air Force to “phone it in” and just go through the motions. Schenk’s conclusion is that Hitler never actually intended to launch the invasion, but simply used the preparations to “bluff” the British into concluding some kind of peace. So far, so good.

Then the weirdness starts. Through the balance of the book, Schenck seems to believe that the invasion was a real possibility that was squandered by the desultoriness of the Air Force, and particularly, the Navy. On the last page of the books he sums up the position:

“In the autumn of 1940 the Navy had the chance to end the conflict with Britain with one lightning combined arms operation. Intellectually, as well as materially unprepared for this, the Navy let the chance slip away.”

The problem was that nothing that appeared heretofore in the book actually supports that assertion.

To be fair, the author does temper this thesis in the preface to the second edition of the book by saying:

“What changed over the years is my personal view on the German efforts and their meaning for the outcome of the war. Being more optimistic for the chances of the operation when reading all the enormous efforts made by the German side in the preserved files of the archives. I am nowadays more inclined to follow the view of Admiral Karlgeorge Schuster, who in 1940 as Commanding Admiral France, head of the landing preparations. In his recollections writing in April 1952, he concluded that for the ‘jump’ of Sealion, the shield was missing, a sufficient fleet to counter the British Navy”

It seems to me that such a fundamental change in thesis should have resulted in a significant re-working of the last part of the book for a second edition. But it didn’t.

At the end of the day though, the flawed ending doesn’t actually detract form the book’s usefulness, indeed, definitiveness, on the German preparations, so it should still be in the library of anyone seriously interested in Operation Sealion.

22 for the year

So I decided to reread Michael Connelly’s Harry Bosch series of police procedurals having last read them in 2013. Interestingly, I had the same reaction this time through as last time. The first couple were kind of a mixed bag. The plots were good, the writing was first rate, but the constant in-your-face aggressive semi-self-destruction that marked Harry’s interaction with his superiors was getting a bit tiresome. Then the series picked up and the writing, characterization, and plotting got even better.

Anyway, I’ve finished the first six: The Black Echo, The Black Ice, The Concrete Blonde, The Last Coyote, Trunk Music and The Angel Flight and they’re just as good as I remembered them. Two notes, potential readers should read these in order as the story arc of Harry’s life build throughout the series. And fans of the books will probably enjoy the Amazon Prime TV series which stars Titus Welliver as Harry.

21 for the year