I finished two more books, neither of which was very good.
First up was I’m Staying with My Boys: The Heroic Life of Sgt. John Basilone, USMC by Jim Proser and Jerry Cutter. This was, quite simply horrible, it purports to be a biography of one of the legends of the USMC, Gunnery Sgt. “ Manila” John Basilone. Basilone was a machine gunner at Guadalcanal who was instrumental in breaking the back of the massive Japanese assault on Henderson Field on 24/25 October 1942. For his bravery and effectiveness Basilone was awarded the Medal of Honor and sent on a War Bond tour. After the tour, Basilone was assigned to train Marines for later amphibious assaults. In 1945, he gave up his safe state-side training billet, demanding to accompany his trainees into combat. He was killed on the first day of the Iwo Jima invasion after single-handedly destroying a Japanese bunker that was pinning down his unit.
The book was not nearly worthy of Gunny Basilone. In the first place, somebody decided to write the damn thing in the “first person” as if Basilone himself were the author. Since everyman and his dog knows that Basilone died in combat, this is just creepy. Second, there is a lot of “mental explanation” in the book (the authors, one of whom is Gunny Basilone’s cousin, probably chose the “first person” perspective so they could put this crap in the book), but it is largely stuff the authors had no way of knowing. Stuff like How Basilone felt about a particular girl back home, or how he ended a “friends with benefits” type of relationship he had with another woman.
The book in short on facts, but long on made up stuff about what GySgt Basilone was thinking or about how he felt, which stuff the authors have no way of knowing since the man has been dead for 65 years.
Don’t be suckered by the blatant attempt on the cover to tie in with the new HBO. This book just sucked. GySgt Basilone deserves a better biography.
Second was The Candy Bombers: The Untold Story of the Berlin Airlift and America’s Finest Hour by Andrei Cherny. Again, this purports to be a history of the Berlin Airlift, but instead, is really anything but. The book seems to have two primary theses; first, that the Berlin Airlift was instrumental in changing public perception of Truman from being “weak on Communism” and thus paved the way for his improbable victory over Dewey. Second is the proposition that before the Berlin Airlift the average Berliner hated Americans and the American military, but that the airlift won their “hearts and minds” changing them into friends of America. Either or both of these theses could be true, unfortunately the author provides no hard evidence. There are many attempts to infer or extrapolate from events, but nothing concrete.
In addition to his largely unsupported theses, the author has a number of smaller axes to grind, first is a (well deserved) smacking around of Gen Curtis Lemay. Throughout the years, Lemay has taken much of the credit for the airlift, when in fact the entire thing was the work of Gen William Tunner, who also designed and executed the airlift over the Himalaya Mountains that supplied China during WWII. Cherny also goes to great pains to show us that virtually the entire US military establishment was against the airlift, feeling that it was a waste of aviation resources they would need in the near future to fight the Soviets. Lastly, Cherny, for reasons known only to himself, also includes a fairly detailed description of the trials and tribulations of James Forrestal, the first SecDef, which ultimately ended with Forrrestal’s descent into madness and suicide in May of 1949.
Notably absent from the book, is any comprehensive history of the Berlin Airlift itself, there are only the vaguest references to tonnages delivered with no sense of when (or how) the airlift turned the corner to ultimately deliver a higher tonnage of goods that was delivered by train. In fact, the fact that, at its height, the airlift was delivering more stuff to Berlin that the trains had pre-blockade wasn’t even in the book. Nor is there any description of the scheduling of the crews, the technical details of the IFR systems or the maintenance operations. Even the fact that GCA systems were used for the first time is glossed over as are the contributions of the British and the US Navy which were only mentioned in the most perfunctory way.
In short, this book really doesn’t know what it wants to be when it grows up. If it had more (any?) documentation, it could be a decent explanation of Truman’s victory. If it provided more information on Gen Tunny, it could be a great biography of him, if it actually provided any data on the Berlin Airlift; it could be a decent history of Operation Vittles. As it is, it is none of those, and not recommended by me.
16 for the year