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Sarah Byers

Boston College, Philosophy, Faculty Member

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I did my PhD at Toronto. I publish on ancient and medieval philosophy, especially Augustine’s reception of Stoic ethics, psychology, and epistemology, as well as Neoplatonic metaphysics (Plotinus, Apuleius and Marius Victorinus). I have a monograph with Cambridge: Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis.
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Supervisors: Brad Inwood

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Catherine Rowett

University of East Anglia

Johannes Zachhuber

University of Oxford

Ucla

University of Edinburgh

Kati (Katalin) Prajda

University of Vienna

University of Cambridge

Jan N . Bremmer

University of Groningen

Luciana Gabriela Soares Santoprete

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique / French National Centre for Scientific Research

Università degli Studi di Firenze (University of Florence)

University of Tartu

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Books by Sarah Byers

Augustine and the Meno Paradox

Cambridge: Participation in the Divine, 2024

Trans. amended from Hayes. All subsequent translations of this text are from Hayes. 15 That kind ... more Trans. amended from Hayes. All subsequent translations of this text are from Hayes. 15 That kind of experience he calls "higher illumination," as distinct from ordinary illumination. 16 scientia Chr. 4c: "If full knowledge requires recourse to a truth that is fully immutable and stable, and to a light that is completely infallible, it is necessary for this sort of knowledge to have

Trinity and Aristotelianism in 4th c: Augustine and Victorinus

This article expands our knowledge of the historical-philosophical process by which the dominant... more This article expands our knowledge of the historical-philosophical process by which the
dominant metaphysical account of the Christian God became ascendant. It demonstrates that Marius Victorinus proposed a peculiar model of ‘consubstantiality’ that utilised a notion of ‘existence’ indebted to the Aristotelian concept of ‘prime matter’. Victorinus employed this to argue that God is a unity composed of Father and Son. The article critically evaluates this model. It then argues that Augustine noticed one of the model’s philosophical liabilities but did not publicly name Victorinus when he rejected it, thereby exemplifying the New Testament practice of private ‘rebuke’ (ἐλέγχειν).

MONOGRAPH: Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis

This book argues that Augustine assimilated the Stoic theory of perception and mental language (l... more This book argues that Augustine assimilated the Stoic theory of perception and mental language (lekta/dicibilia), and that this epistemology underlies his accounts of motivation, affectivity, therapy for the passions, and moral progress. (Since Augustine thought that moral progress is effected by grace, his use of Stoic epistemology extends to his descriptions of how grace influences motivation.) Byers elucidates seminal passages which have long puzzled commentators, such as Confessions 8, City of God 9 and 14, Replies to Simplicianus 1, and confusing sections of the later ‘anti-Pelagian’ works. Tracking the Stoic terminology, and using his sermons to supplement his treatises, Byers analyzes Augustine’s engagement with Cicero, Seneca, Ambrose, Jerome, Origen, and Philo of Alexandria, demonstrating that Augustine appropriated Stoicism with greater comparative sophistication than other religious writers. She also shows how he moved beyond the Stoics in a number of ways by enriching Stoic cognitivism with Platonism, and she argues that he did so in such a way as to create a coherent synthesis. This newly discovered Augustinian moral psychology has elements that contemporary philosophers and psychologists have identified as important. Finally, Byers makes a substantive contribution to the scholarly debate concerning the chronological development of Augustine’s theory of grace, and provides a fresh evaluation of the early modern controversy about grace and free choice (Bañez vs. Molina), in which both sides claimed to be descended intellectually from Augustine.

Papers by Sarah Byers

Augustine’s “Illumination” Theory: Correcting Bonaventure and Gilson via Plotinus and Marius Victorinus

Participation in the divine: a philosophical history, from antiquity to the modern era, 2024

This chapter shows that Augustine’s “divine illumination theory of knowledge” is merely his belie... more This chapter shows that Augustine’s “divine illumination theory of knowledge” is merely his belief that the human mind is capable of intellectual cognition because it naturally “participates” in the Divine Mind, as its image. Consequently, Bonaventure's and Gilson's claim that Augustine thought the human mind must be enlightened by special divine assistance in ordinary (non-mystical) intellectual cognition is erroneous. That is true of the whole of Augustine's writing career: earlier works such as On the Teacher and the Confessions agree with his presentation in On the Trinity 12. This resolution of a long-standing debate about how to interpret Augustine becomes possible when we pay careful attention to the ancient philosophical problems “illumination” is meant to resolve, and when we use Plotinus and the early Christian Neoplatonist Marius Victorinus to interpret his vocabulary and claims. The recovery of this late antique context greatly clarifies Augustine’s epistemological theory and reveals its explanatory power. For the Plotinian basis of the account is a synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic elements that can explain why our minds are uniquely suited to abstracting intelligibility from sensory data, and how they do so.

Augustine and the Meno Paradox

Participation in the Divine, Ch. 6 (Cambridge), 2024

I show that Augustine’s “divine illumination theory of knowledge” is merely his belief that the h... more I show that Augustine’s “divine illumination theory of knowledge” is merely his belief that the human mind is capable of intellectual cognition because it naturally “participates” in the Divine Mind, as its image. Consequently, the claim that Augustine thought the human mind must be enlightened by special divine assistance in ordinary (nonmystical) intellectual cognition is erroneous. That is true of the whole of his writing career: earlier works such as On the Teacher and the Confessions agree with his presentation in On the Trinity 12. This resolution of a longstanding debate about how to interpret Augustine becomes possible when we pay careful attention to the ancient philosophical problems “illumination” is meant to resolve, and when we use Plotinus and the early Christian Neoplatonist Marius Victorinus to interpret his vocabulary and claims. The recovery of this late antique context greatly clarifies Augustine’s epistemological theory and reveals its explanatory power. For the Plotinian basis of the account is a synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic elements that can explain why our minds are uniquely suited to abstracting intelligibility from sensory data, and how they do so.

Clean copy of printed paper will be uploaded soon.

Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2003

... | Ayuda. Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism. Autores: Charles Brittain; Localización:... more

Colloquium 4 Commentary on Shiffman

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Nov 19, 2021

This paper raises three questions about Shiffman’s thesis that Plutarch is offering a distinctive... more

Early Christian Ethics

Cambridge University Press eBooks, Dec 7, 2017

famously claimed that 'the Hebrew-Christian ethic' differs from consequentialist normative theori... more famously claimed that 'the Hebrew-Christian ethic' differs from consequentialist normative theories in its ability to ground the claim that killing the innocent is intrinsically wrong. 1 The legal character of this ethic, rooted in the divine decrees of the Torah, confers a particular moral sense of 'ought' by which this and other act-types can be 'wrong' regardless of their consequences, she maintained. 2 There is, of course, a potentially devastating counterexample to Anscombe's characterization. Within the Torah, Abraham is apparently commanded by God to slaughter and set fire to his innocent son, Isaac. 3 For attempting to do so, he is praised in the Biblical passage and by later Jewish and Christian commentators. 4 The case cannot be dismissed immediately as uncharacteristic of the 'Hebrew-Christian ethic'; Abraham and 1 Anscombe 1958: 10, 19. E.g., 'For it has been characteristic of that ethic [=Hebrew-Christian] to teach that there are certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten, such as: choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose, however good. .. the prohibition of certain things simply in virtue of their description of such-andsuch identifiable kinds of action, regardless of any further consequences, is certainly not the whole of the Hebrew-Christian ethic, but it is a noteworthy feature of it' (10). 2 Anscombe 1958: 5-6, 10. E.g., '. .. Christianity, with its law conception of ethics. For Christianity derived its ethical notions from the Torah' (5). Anscombe initially says that a law conception of ethics can in principle arise without belief in divine positive law (1958: 5, citing the Stoics), but later that it requires belief in God as a law-giver, comparing it to positive criminal law (1958: 6; strangely, she includes the Stoics again). 3 Genesis 22:2. Regarding my qualifier 'apparently', see the second half of the section 'Conceptual Parameters' below.

Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis

The psychology of compassion: Stoicism in City of God 9.5

Cambridge University Press eBooks, Oct 6, 2012

‘Consubstantiality’ as a philosophical-theological problem: Victorinus’ hylomorphic model of God and his ‘correction’ by Augustine

Scottish Journal of Theology, Feb 1, 2022

This article expands our knowledge of the historical-philosophical process by which the dominant ... more This article expands our knowledge of the historical-philosophical process by which the dominant metaphysical account of the Christian God became ascendant. It demonstrates that Marius Victorinus proposed a peculiar model of 'consubstantiality' that utilised a notion of 'existence' indebted to the Aristotelian concept of 'prime matter'. Victorinus employed this to argue that God is a unity composed of Father and Son. The article critically evaluates this model. It then argues that Augustine noticed one of the model's philosophical liabilities but did not publicly name Victorinus when he rejected it, thereby exemplifying the New Testament practice of private 'rebuke' (ἐλέγχειν).

Augustine's Debt to Stoicism in the Confessions

Seneca asserts in Letter 121 (14–16) that we mature by exercising self-care as we pass through su... more Seneca asserts in Letter 121 (14–16) that we mature by exercising self-care as we pass through successive psychosomatic “constitutions.” These are babyhood (infantia), childhood (pueritia), adolescence (adulescentia), and young adulthood (iuventus). Augustine, of course, divides the narrative of his own development into these stages in the Confessions, a text wherein he claims familiarity with more than a few works of Seneca (Conf. 5.6.11). This raises the question: Does Augustine use the renowned Stoic theory of “affiliation” (oikeiôsis, conciliatio), upon which Seneca’s account of maturation depends, as a motif in his own philosophical autobiography? If he does, that will update our understanding of the Confessions as a work in the history of philosophy. Traditionally, interpretations of this work have tended to see it as containing exclusively Neoplatonic or uniquely Christian thought. Self-affiliation is the linchpin of the Stoic ethical system, which defines living well as livi...

03.10.02, Augustine, On the Trinity

Augustine on the ‘Divided Self’

Augustinian Studies, 2007

Life as" Self-Motion": Descartes and" The Aristotelians" on the Soul as the Life of the Body

The Review of Metaphysics, 2006

DESCARTES'S ARGUMENTS THAT THE BODY can be considered a selfpropelled machine rely on a misuse of... more DESCARTES'S ARGUMENTS THAT THE BODY can be considered a selfpropelled machine rely on a misuse of the Aristotelian concept of "self-motion." They depend upon the premise that life is self-motion, the Aristotelian definition which Descartes learned from Latin handbooks at La F16che. By retaining this premise, Descartes believed he was defeating the Aristotelians on their own turf when he argued that soul is unnecessary for explaining life functions (self-motion). However, his arguments fail to establish what he intended them to, because whereas Aristotle meant the capacity for self-induced alteration (qualitative motion), Descartes interpreted "self-motion" as a reference to the local motions of the constitutive parts of a body. That this was a misunderstanding, and not simply a disagreement with Aristotle's meaning, can be demonstrated from the Meditations, the Discourse, the Treatise on Man, the Passions of the Soul, The World, and the letters. Owing to this misinterpretation, Descartes never actually addressed the Aristotelian theory, and so his physics leaves unresolved a problem that Aristotle is able to solve by positing the soul as the life of the body, namely: Why do some things metabolize, but others do not? Surprisingly, these points have not yet been made. Though Des Chene has recently drawn attention to the question of "life" in Descartes, he has not noticed this. 1 Michael Frede has noted that from

The Meaning of Voluntas in Augustine

Augustinian Studies, 2006

Augustine uses the term voluntas for dispositional and occurrent forms of hormê of a rational bei... more Augustine uses the term voluntas for dispositional and occurrent forms of hormê of a rational being, hormê being the Stoic concept of 'impulse' toward action. 1 In what follows I shall first demonstrate this, using mainly books twelve and fourteen of the De Civitate Dei. There is need of such a demonstration, for although much ink has been spilt over the sense of "will" in Augustine's texts, interpretations have varied greatly. Next I shall draw attention to a number of corroborating texts from works spanning thirty years of his writing career, highlighting how this Stoic concept, together with Stoic epistemology, makes sense of the uses of voluntas in book eight of the Confessiones and of 'free will' (libera voluntas, liberum arbitrium voluntatis) in the De Libero Arbitrio. I conclude with suggestions about specific texts and authors influencing Augustine's usage. Recent Interpretations Gerard O'Daly has sometimes seemed very close to identifying Augustine's voluntas with Stoic hormê, but has not actually done so. In Augustine's Philosophy of Mind, he once calls will "impulse," 2 but nowhere mentions the Stoic concept of "impulse" as a psychic prompt toward action. Moreover, he does

Augustine and the Philosophers

Vessey/A Companion to Augustine, 2012

Because of the immensity of Augustine's corpus and the complex intellectual patrimony that inform... more Because of the immensity of Augustine's corpus and the complex intellectual patrimony that informs it, attempts to place him within the history of philosophical traditions are often partial and in need of supplementation. In treating below of Augustine's engagement with Aristotelianism, Middle Platonism, Neoplatonism, and Stoicism, I shall be drawing attention to particular topics, lexical points, and philosophical arguments that have not received much attention in the literature up to this point, despite their centrality to Augustine's own philosophical interests. Discovery of the new philosophical material I present here is possible thanks to the use of a method only recently beginning to gain currency: that of looking for philosophical arguments and developments in Augustine's sermons and other exegetical texts (see e.g. Atkins and Dodaro 2001: xi-xii; Byers 2003: 433-4). In the past, philosophical scholarship on Augustine has treated the genre of a text as indicative of its discipline, an approach that has resulted in a fairly strict separation of philosophical research from rhetorical, "theological," or "pastoral" texts (this approach relies on methodological assumptions more appropriate to medieval scholasticism than to Augustine). In contrast, the alternative "integrative" method employed here yields a more complete picture of Augustine's relationship to various philosophical traditions. The reliability of this method is clear from the fact that its results cohere with what Augustine says on the same topics in his other, more systematic or straightforwardly philosophical works, as we shall see below. Thus the new claims here do not concern whom Augustine read (Plotinus in the translation of Victorinus or someone of similar interests and abilities, Apuleius, Cicero, Varro, Gellius, and Seneca), but rather to what degree he assimilated what he read. We turn first to what is perhaps the most controversial question, that of Augustine's Aristotelianism.

Augustine and Wittgenstein ed. by John Doody, Alexander E. Eodice, and Kim Paffenroth

Journal of the History of Philosophy

Commentary on Nawar 

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy

I offer an interpretation of the Stoic “peculiar qualification” (ἰδία ποιότης) which provides for... more I offer an interpretation of the Stoic “peculiar qualification” (ἰδία ποιότης) which provides for the identity of individuals over time and the distinguishability of discrete individuals. This interpretation is similar to but not the same as one of the strands in Lewis’s interpretation as presented by Nawar. I suggest that the “peculiar qualification”—what makes the individual be the individual—is the particular ἕξις or φύσις or ψυχή that is in an individual. That is, the peculiar quality is not the kind of πνεῦμα an entity has, nor some further qualification or disposition of the kind of πνεῦμα that it has, such as acquired characteristics of the tenor or nature or soul in its particular lived history, but simply the discrete soul or nature or tenor, extended in its own particular spatial location. The so-called peculiar quality is that portion of πνεῦμα that is proper to that individual.  

Augustinian Puzzles about Body, Soul, Flesh, and Death

Oxford Scholarship Online

Augustine’s employment of some (ultimately) Aristotelian concepts and distinctions, such as from ... more Augustine’s employment of some (ultimately) Aristotelian concepts and distinctions, such as from the work On the Soul, helped him to develop his own account of the human being as a single-substance body-soul compound, and a correlative theory of death. The recovery of his view involves some work, because he does not always explain how he thinks the core theses to which he is committed play out in detail. Nevertheless it is possible when we use his Literal Meaning of Genesis to illuminate the City of God, Book 13. The former text contains the most extended presentation of Augustine’s natural philosophy. It employs concepts from classical metaphysics—such as matter, body, form, and potentiality—which, along with some of the Aristotelian categories, are recognizable again in the City of God, a work that he commenced as he was completing the Genesis commentary.

Augustine and the Meno Paradox

Cambridge: Participation in the Divine, 2024

Trans. amended from Hayes. All subsequent translations of this text are from Hayes. 15 That kind ... more Trans. amended from Hayes. All subsequent translations of this text are from Hayes. 15 That kind of experience he calls "higher illumination," as distinct from ordinary illumination. 16 scientia Chr. 4c: "If full knowledge requires recourse to a truth that is fully immutable and stable, and to a light that is completely infallible, it is necessary for this sort of knowledge to have

Trinity and Aristotelianism in 4th c: Augustine and Victorinus

This article expands our knowledge of the historical-philosophical process by which the dominant... more This article expands our knowledge of the historical-philosophical process by which the
dominant metaphysical account of the Christian God became ascendant. It demonstrates that Marius Victorinus proposed a peculiar model of ‘consubstantiality’ that utilised a notion of ‘existence’ indebted to the Aristotelian concept of ‘prime matter’. Victorinus employed this to argue that God is a unity composed of Father and Son. The article critically evaluates this model. It then argues that Augustine noticed one of the model’s philosophical liabilities but did not publicly name Victorinus when he rejected it, thereby exemplifying the New Testament practice of private ‘rebuke’ (ἐλέγχειν).

MONOGRAPH: Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis

This book argues that Augustine assimilated the Stoic theory of perception and mental language (l... more This book argues that Augustine assimilated the Stoic theory of perception and mental language (lekta/dicibilia), and that this epistemology underlies his accounts of motivation, affectivity, therapy for the passions, and moral progress. (Since Augustine thought that moral progress is effected by grace, his use of Stoic epistemology extends to his descriptions of how grace influences motivation.) Byers elucidates seminal passages which have long puzzled commentators, such as Confessions 8, City of God 9 and 14, Replies to Simplicianus 1, and confusing sections of the later ‘anti-Pelagian’ works. Tracking the Stoic terminology, and using his sermons to supplement his treatises, Byers analyzes Augustine’s engagement with Cicero, Seneca, Ambrose, Jerome, Origen, and Philo of Alexandria, demonstrating that Augustine appropriated Stoicism with greater comparative sophistication than other religious writers. She also shows how he moved beyond the Stoics in a number of ways by enriching Stoic cognitivism with Platonism, and she argues that he did so in such a way as to create a coherent synthesis. This newly discovered Augustinian moral psychology has elements that contemporary philosophers and psychologists have identified as important. Finally, Byers makes a substantive contribution to the scholarly debate concerning the chronological development of Augustine’s theory of grace, and provides a fresh evaluation of the early modern controversy about grace and free choice (Bañez vs. Molina), in which both sides claimed to be descended intellectually from Augustine.

Augustine’s “Illumination” Theory: Correcting Bonaventure and Gilson via Plotinus and Marius Victorinus

Participation in the divine: a philosophical history, from antiquity to the modern era, 2024

This chapter shows that Augustine’s “divine illumination theory of knowledge” is merely his belie... more This chapter shows that Augustine’s “divine illumination theory of knowledge” is merely his belief that the human mind is capable of intellectual cognition because it naturally “participates” in the Divine Mind, as its image. Consequently, Bonaventure's and Gilson's claim that Augustine thought the human mind must be enlightened by special divine assistance in ordinary (non-mystical) intellectual cognition is erroneous. That is true of the whole of Augustine's writing career: earlier works such as On the Teacher and the Confessions agree with his presentation in On the Trinity 12. This resolution of a long-standing debate about how to interpret Augustine becomes possible when we pay careful attention to the ancient philosophical problems “illumination” is meant to resolve, and when we use Plotinus and the early Christian Neoplatonist Marius Victorinus to interpret his vocabulary and claims. The recovery of this late antique context greatly clarifies Augustine’s epistemological theory and reveals its explanatory power. For the Plotinian basis of the account is a synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic elements that can explain why our minds are uniquely suited to abstracting intelligibility from sensory data, and how they do so.

Augustine and the Meno Paradox

Participation in the Divine, Ch. 6 (Cambridge), 2024

I show that Augustine’s “divine illumination theory of knowledge” is merely his belief that the h... more I show that Augustine’s “divine illumination theory of knowledge” is merely his belief that the human mind is capable of intellectual cognition because it naturally “participates” in the Divine Mind, as its image. Consequently, the claim that Augustine thought the human mind must be enlightened by special divine assistance in ordinary (nonmystical) intellectual cognition is erroneous. That is true of the whole of his writing career: earlier works such as On the Teacher and the Confessions agree with his presentation in On the Trinity 12. This resolution of a longstanding debate about how to interpret Augustine becomes possible when we pay careful attention to the ancient philosophical problems “illumination” is meant to resolve, and when we use Plotinus and the early Christian Neoplatonist Marius Victorinus to interpret his vocabulary and claims. The recovery of this late antique context greatly clarifies Augustine’s epistemological theory and reveals its explanatory power. For the Plotinian basis of the account is a synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic elements that can explain why our minds are uniquely suited to abstracting intelligibility from sensory data, and how they do so.

Clean copy of printed paper will be uploaded soon.

Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2003

... | Ayuda. Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism. Autores: Charles Brittain; Localización:... more

Colloquium 4 Commentary on Shiffman

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Nov 19, 2021

This paper raises three questions about Shiffman’s thesis that Plutarch is offering a distinctive... more

Early Christian Ethics

Cambridge University Press eBooks, Dec 7, 2017

famously claimed that 'the Hebrew-Christian ethic' differs from consequentialist normative theori... more famously claimed that 'the Hebrew-Christian ethic' differs from consequentialist normative theories in its ability to ground the claim that killing the innocent is intrinsically wrong. 1 The legal character of this ethic, rooted in the divine decrees of the Torah, confers a particular moral sense of 'ought' by which this and other act-types can be 'wrong' regardless of their consequences, she maintained. 2 There is, of course, a potentially devastating counterexample to Anscombe's characterization. Within the Torah, Abraham is apparently commanded by God to slaughter and set fire to his innocent son, Isaac. 3 For attempting to do so, he is praised in the Biblical passage and by later Jewish and Christian commentators. 4 The case cannot be dismissed immediately as uncharacteristic of the 'Hebrew-Christian ethic'; Abraham and 1 Anscombe 1958: 10, 19. E.g., 'For it has been characteristic of that ethic [=Hebrew-Christian] to teach that there are certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten, such as: choosing to kill the innocent for any purpose, however good. .. the prohibition of certain things simply in virtue of their description of such-andsuch identifiable kinds of action, regardless of any further consequences, is certainly not the whole of the Hebrew-Christian ethic, but it is a noteworthy feature of it' (10). 2 Anscombe 1958: 5-6, 10. E.g., '. .. Christianity, with its law conception of ethics. For Christianity derived its ethical notions from the Torah' (5). Anscombe initially says that a law conception of ethics can in principle arise without belief in divine positive law (1958: 5, citing the Stoics), but later that it requires belief in God as a law-giver, comparing it to positive criminal law (1958: 6; strangely, she includes the Stoics again). 3 Genesis 22:2. Regarding my qualifier 'apparently', see the second half of the section 'Conceptual Parameters' below.

Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis

The psychology of compassion: Stoicism in City of God 9.5

Cambridge University Press eBooks, Oct 6, 2012

‘Consubstantiality’ as a philosophical-theological problem: Victorinus’ hylomorphic model of God and his ‘correction’ by Augustine

Scottish Journal of Theology, Feb 1, 2022

This article expands our knowledge of the historical-philosophical process by which the dominant ... more This article expands our knowledge of the historical-philosophical process by which the dominant metaphysical account of the Christian God became ascendant. It demonstrates that Marius Victorinus proposed a peculiar model of 'consubstantiality' that utilised a notion of 'existence' indebted to the Aristotelian concept of 'prime matter'. Victorinus employed this to argue that God is a unity composed of Father and Son. The article critically evaluates this model. It then argues that Augustine noticed one of the model's philosophical liabilities but did not publicly name Victorinus when he rejected it, thereby exemplifying the New Testament practice of private 'rebuke' (ἐλέγχειν).

Augustine's Debt to Stoicism in the Confessions

Seneca asserts in Letter 121 (14–16) that we mature by exercising self-care as we pass through su... more Seneca asserts in Letter 121 (14–16) that we mature by exercising self-care as we pass through successive psychosomatic “constitutions.” These are babyhood (infantia), childhood (pueritia), adolescence (adulescentia), and young adulthood (iuventus). Augustine, of course, divides the narrative of his own development into these stages in the Confessions, a text wherein he claims familiarity with more than a few works of Seneca (Conf. 5.6.11). This raises the question: Does Augustine use the renowned Stoic theory of “affiliation” (oikeiôsis, conciliatio), upon which Seneca’s account of maturation depends, as a motif in his own philosophical autobiography? If he does, that will update our understanding of the Confessions as a work in the history of philosophy. Traditionally, interpretations of this work have tended to see it as containing exclusively Neoplatonic or uniquely Christian thought. Self-affiliation is the linchpin of the Stoic ethical system, which defines living well as livi...

03.10.02, Augustine, On the Trinity

Augustine on the ‘Divided Self’

Augustinian Studies, 2007

Life as" Self-Motion": Descartes and" The Aristotelians" on the Soul as the Life of the Body

The Review of Metaphysics, 2006

DESCARTES'S ARGUMENTS THAT THE BODY can be considered a selfpropelled machine rely on a misuse of... more DESCARTES'S ARGUMENTS THAT THE BODY can be considered a selfpropelled machine rely on a misuse of the Aristotelian concept of "self-motion." They depend upon the premise that life is self-motion, the Aristotelian definition which Descartes learned from Latin handbooks at La F16che. By retaining this premise, Descartes believed he was defeating the Aristotelians on their own turf when he argued that soul is unnecessary for explaining life functions (self-motion). However, his arguments fail to establish what he intended them to, because whereas Aristotle meant the capacity for self-induced alteration (qualitative motion), Descartes interpreted "self-motion" as a reference to the local motions of the constitutive parts of a body. That this was a misunderstanding, and not simply a disagreement with Aristotle's meaning, can be demonstrated from the Meditations, the Discourse, the Treatise on Man, the Passions of the Soul, The World, and the letters. Owing to this misinterpretation, Descartes never actually addressed the Aristotelian theory, and so his physics leaves unresolved a problem that Aristotle is able to solve by positing the soul as the life of the body, namely: Why do some things metabolize, but others do not? Surprisingly, these points have not yet been made. Though Des Chene has recently drawn attention to the question of "life" in Descartes, he has not noticed this. 1 Michael Frede has noted that from

The Meaning of Voluntas in Augustine

Augustinian Studies, 2006

Augustine uses the term voluntas for dispositional and occurrent forms of hormê of a rational bei... more Augustine uses the term voluntas for dispositional and occurrent forms of hormê of a rational being, hormê being the Stoic concept of 'impulse' toward action. 1 In what follows I shall first demonstrate this, using mainly books twelve and fourteen of the De Civitate Dei. There is need of such a demonstration, for although much ink has been spilt over the sense of "will" in Augustine's texts, interpretations have varied greatly. Next I shall draw attention to a number of corroborating texts from works spanning thirty years of his writing career, highlighting how this Stoic concept, together with Stoic epistemology, makes sense of the uses of voluntas in book eight of the Confessiones and of 'free will' (libera voluntas, liberum arbitrium voluntatis) in the De Libero Arbitrio. I conclude with suggestions about specific texts and authors influencing Augustine's usage. Recent Interpretations Gerard O'Daly has sometimes seemed very close to identifying Augustine's voluntas with Stoic hormê, but has not actually done so. In Augustine's Philosophy of Mind, he once calls will "impulse," 2 but nowhere mentions the Stoic concept of "impulse" as a psychic prompt toward action. Moreover, he does

Augustine and the Philosophers

Vessey/A Companion to Augustine, 2012

Because of the immensity of Augustine's corpus and the complex intellectual patrimony that inform... more Because of the immensity of Augustine's corpus and the complex intellectual patrimony that informs it, attempts to place him within the history of philosophical traditions are often partial and in need of supplementation. In treating below of Augustine's engagement with Aristotelianism, Middle Platonism, Neoplatonism, and Stoicism, I shall be drawing attention to particular topics, lexical points, and philosophical arguments that have not received much attention in the literature up to this point, despite their centrality to Augustine's own philosophical interests. Discovery of the new philosophical material I present here is possible thanks to the use of a method only recently beginning to gain currency: that of looking for philosophical arguments and developments in Augustine's sermons and other exegetical texts (see e.g. Atkins and Dodaro 2001: xi-xii; Byers 2003: 433-4). In the past, philosophical scholarship on Augustine has treated the genre of a text as indicative of its discipline, an approach that has resulted in a fairly strict separation of philosophical research from rhetorical, "theological," or "pastoral" texts (this approach relies on methodological assumptions more appropriate to medieval scholasticism than to Augustine). In contrast, the alternative "integrative" method employed here yields a more complete picture of Augustine's relationship to various philosophical traditions. The reliability of this method is clear from the fact that its results cohere with what Augustine says on the same topics in his other, more systematic or straightforwardly philosophical works, as we shall see below. Thus the new claims here do not concern whom Augustine read (Plotinus in the translation of Victorinus or someone of similar interests and abilities, Apuleius, Cicero, Varro, Gellius, and Seneca), but rather to what degree he assimilated what he read. We turn first to what is perhaps the most controversial question, that of Augustine's Aristotelianism.

Augustine and Wittgenstein ed. by John Doody, Alexander E. Eodice, and Kim Paffenroth

Journal of the History of Philosophy

Commentary on Nawar 

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy

I offer an interpretation of the Stoic “peculiar qualification” (ἰδία ποιότης) which provides for... more I offer an interpretation of the Stoic “peculiar qualification” (ἰδία ποιότης) which provides for the identity of individuals over time and the distinguishability of discrete individuals. This interpretation is similar to but not the same as one of the strands in Lewis’s interpretation as presented by Nawar. I suggest that the “peculiar qualification”—what makes the individual be the individual—is the particular ἕξις or φύσις or ψυχή that is in an individual. That is, the peculiar quality is not the kind of πνεῦμα an entity has, nor some further qualification or disposition of the kind of πνεῦμα that it has, such as acquired characteristics of the tenor or nature or soul in its particular lived history, but simply the discrete soul or nature or tenor, extended in its own particular spatial location. The so-called peculiar quality is that portion of πνεῦμα that is proper to that individual.  

Augustinian Puzzles about Body, Soul, Flesh, and Death

Oxford Scholarship Online

Augustine’s employment of some (ultimately) Aristotelian concepts and distinctions, such as from ... more Augustine’s employment of some (ultimately) Aristotelian concepts and distinctions, such as from the work On the Soul, helped him to develop his own account of the human being as a single-substance body-soul compound, and a correlative theory of death. The recovery of his view involves some work, because he does not always explain how he thinks the core theses to which he is committed play out in detail. Nevertheless it is possible when we use his Literal Meaning of Genesis to illuminate the City of God, Book 13. The former text contains the most extended presentation of Augustine’s natural philosophy. It employs concepts from classical metaphysics—such as matter, body, form, and potentiality—which, along with some of the Aristotelian categories, are recognizable again in the City of God, a work that he commenced as he was completing the Genesis commentary.

Text of Confessions 8.11.26–27 in English and Latin

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

Perception and the Language of the Mind (Ch 1 of monograph, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation)

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

Augustine's adoption of the Stoic theory of 'language of thought' (lekta/dicibilia) and epistemol... more

Notes on the Text

A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis, 2012

25 Minute Interview on Stoicism in Augustine's Ethics

Augustine and Wittgenstein - JHP review

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2020

Review of Matthews and McKenna (trans.), Augustine: On the Trinity: Books 8-15. Series: Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

The Medieval Review, 2003

Review of Bailey, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism, OUP, 2003

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2003

Review of Veyne, Seneca: The Life of a Stoic, Routledge, 2003

Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 2003

Review of Gareth Matthews, Augustine, Blackwell, 2005, 148pp., $19.95 (pbk), ISBN 0631233474.

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2006

Review of Harrison, Augustine De Libero Arbitrio: Augustine's Way into the Will. The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De Libero Arbitrio. Pp. xii + 191

The Classical Review, 2010

CJO Search Widget (The Classical Review) What is this? ... Download a branded Cambridge Journals ... more

Review of Byers, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in NDPR by Peter King

NDPR, Jun 17, 2013