Articles by Gry Thomasen
After Ukraine: How Can We Ensure Stability in the Arctic?
International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 2023
How has Arctic coastal state cooperation affected the Arctic Council?
Marine Policy, 2020
The Ilulissat Meeting in 2008 was widely seen as the onset of enhanced cooperation between the fi... more The Ilulissat Meeting in 2008 was widely seen as the onset of enhanced cooperation between the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United States, commonly known as the A5). At the time, many diplomats and analysts feared that this enhanced emphasis of coastal state cooperation would undermine existing governance structures in the region, most importantly the Arctic Council. This article looks back at the period between 2008 and 2019 in order to examine what impact the A5 has had on the Arctic Council. It demonstrates that the A5 has changed over time to become a functional supplement to the Arctic Council. The Ilulissat Meeting did not specify whether the A5 would become a competitor of the Arctic Council nor did the coastal states’ behavior dispel the critics’ fear that it would undermine the Arctic Council. However, from 2010, the coastal states changed how they use the A5, which has become a low level forum predominantly for scientists and civil servants to address issues that are not easily covered by the Arctic Council, and where other actors besides the coastal states are occasionally invited to attend meetings. This change of practice has thus diminished the tensions between the A5 and the Arctic Council. However, some of the underlying ambiguities of the key features of the A5 have not been addressed. The role of the A5 can change in the future, which could reactivate the tensions of the past.
Non-Proliferation at Any Cost? Greenlandic Uranium, Denmark and Euratom, 1958–1985
The International History Review, 2020
Danish Euratom membership was particularly difficult for Denmark as its most Northern part Greenl... more Danish Euratom membership was particularly difficult for Denmark as its most Northern part Greenland, had vast uranium resources within its territory that in effect made Denmark a potential proliferator of nuclear material. Apart from being a window to the evolution of how countries developed their thinking on nuclear weaponry during the progression of the Cold War, this article shows how and why a small state may choose to proliferate nuclear material for a weapon despite having a non-proliferation policy. It argues that a small state like Denmark, caught between powerful political forces in the Cold War and in Europe made concessions to its uranium policy. This article is a contribution to the emerging scholarship on non-proliferation policy during the Cold War, specifically contributing with a perspective from a small state. In addition, the article is the first on the Danish Euratom history.
Book chapters by Gry Thomasen
Lyndon B. Johnson and the Building of East-West Bridges: Catching up with Détente in Europe, 1963–1966
The Long Détente: Changing Concepts of Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1950s–1980s, 2017
There is strong evidence that elements of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration’s bridge-building ... more There is strong evidence that elements of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration’s bridge-building policies toward the Eastern bloc between 1963 and 1966 were largely crafted as a response to the early European East-West détente efforts. Primarily, the Johnson administration’s détente policies were about stabilizing the military relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as influencing and facilitating political developments in Eastern Europe in order to transform the socio-political systems in the East; however, U.S. détente policies were also about accommodating the West European allies’ aspirations and demands for more equality in the alliance and a move toward a joint transatlantic détente effort with the East. The latter perspective is unfolded in this chapter. While West European aspirations and interests were diverse, the Johnson administration’s response was about aligning those aspirations to those of the United States and about preserving the cohesion of the alliance. In effect, this effort resulted in a substantial West European influence on the Johnson administration’s bridge-building policies from 1963 to 1966.
Reports by Gry Thomasen
NATO And Climate Change: Towards A Joint Understanding And Response, 2024
This report shows that different states have different approaches to climate change and security.... more This report shows that different states have different approaches to climate change and security. It suggests that some states still consider climate change effects on security of less importance than traditional considerations, or perhaps that some states believe that adapting their war fighting ability to the effects of climate change is detracting from its primary responsibility of protecting and defending the state.
Arctic Diplomacy at a Crossroads Addressing Present and Future Geopolitical and Strategic Risk, 2023
BASIC and Programme Manager of BASIC's programme on Risk Reduction. She is an expert in NATO, inc... more BASIC and Programme Manager of BASIC's programme on Risk Reduction. She is an expert in NATO, including NATO-Russia relations, nuclear non-proliferation and the Arctic and she leads BASIC's work in these areas. Gry has published in high impact journals such as Marine Policy and International Journal, and she is the coeditor of The Palgrave Handbook of Non-State Actors in East-West Relations. She has also authored policy reports and policy briefs providing advice directly to governments. Gry holds a PhD in Cold War history from the University of Copenhagen and was awarded a postdoc grant by the Carlsberg Foundation and the Danish Ministry of Defence to undertake research into nuclear non-proliferation at the Danish Institute for International Studies. Prior to joining BASIC, she has also been Visiting Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Cold War History Research Centre in Budapest and a Visiting Researcher at the Centre for Science and Security Studies, King's College, London. Dr Chiara Cervasio is a Policy Fellow at BASIC and Programme Manager of BASIC's Programme on Nuclear Responsibilities. Chiara's expertise is in nuclear diplomacy and trust-building, nuclear risk reduction, and crisis management and de-escalation practices, especially in Southern Asia. Chiara is also interested in investigating security dynamics in the Arctic. Chiara has published in high impact journals, such as International Relations, and regularly writes policy briefs and reports on nuclear risk reduction, China-India / India-Pakistan relations, and the Arctic. Chiara has provided talks at Wilton Park (UK FCDO) and at the MINDS briefing expert series for the Government of Canada (DND) and has presented her research at several conferences, such as the British International Studies Association (BISA), the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), and the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). Chiara holds a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security (ICCS) at the University of Birmingham. Her PhD focused on distrust reduction and crisis management in contemporary China-India relations. Mhairi McClafferty is a Policy Fellow at BASIC, having joined the organisation in August 2022 as Policy Intern, where she works on the Nuclear Responsibilities and Risk Reduction programmes. Her research focuses on nuclear diplomacy, conflict resolution, and exploring nuclear weapons policy from humanitarian and gender perspectives. Mhairi holds a Master's degree in Diplomacy and International Security, as well as a Bachelor's degree in History from the University of Strathclyde. She also participated in the Erasmus Exchange Programme, attending the University of Groningen during her undergraduate studies. BASIC is a London-based think tank that promotes meaningful dialogue amongst governments and experts in order to build international trust, reduce nuclear risks, and advance disarmament. We have a global reputation for convening distinctive and empathic dialogues that help states overcome complex strategic and political differences. Our established networks and expertise, developed since 1987, enable us to get the right people in the room and facilitate effective, meaningful exchange between siloed and often hostile political communities.
Managing Resources and Sea Routes in the Arctic Looking to the Future, 2022
This report is part of BASIC's project Risk Reduction in the Arctic, generously funded by the Dep... more This report is part of BASIC's project Risk Reduction in the Arctic, generously funded by the Department of National Defence of the Government of Canada (DND). The report does not directly reflect the views of the Canadian Government. BASIC is grateful for the financial support received for this project. I would like to thank the anonymous peer reviewer for valuable comments and suggestions to previous drafts of this report.
BASIC Clashes of Perceptions. Bridging Perspectives on Security in Europe, 2022
There is a clash of perceptions of secuirty in Europe. Bridging these are neccessary to create a ... more There is a clash of perceptions of secuirty in Europe. Bridging these are neccessary to create a stable and sustainable secuirty architecture in Europe.
Risks and Risk Reduction: A View from the South-eastern Flank , 2022
In September 2022, BASIC held a track 1.5 workshop in Sofia to discuss risk and threat assessment... more In September 2022, BASIC held a track 1.5 workshop in Sofia to discuss risk and threat assessments in South-eastern and Northern Europe. The workshop is part of the two-year project ‘Phase 2: Applying a Systematic Approach to NATO-Russia Risk Reduction’ that BASIC is undertaking in collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
NATO-Russia Relationship: Perspectives from Russia , 2022
This report is written based on a workshop with participation of Russian experts prior to the Rus... more This report is written based on a workshop with participation of Russian experts prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. While the subsequent events following the Russian invasion have been factored into some of the analysis in the later sections of the report, it does not provide commentary on the war in Ukraine.
Risk Reduction and De-Escalation , 2022
In June 2022, BASIC held a roundtable with Russian experts to discuss risk reduction and crisis d... more In June 2022, BASIC held a roundtable with Russian experts to discuss risk reduction and crisis de-escalation in general terms. The roundtable discussed the nature of political and military escalation, NATO-Russia relations, non-proliferation and arms control. This roundtable report outlines these findings and presents a set of policy recommendations.
Applying a Systematic Approach to NATO-Russia Risk Reduction: NATO’s North-Eastern Flank Reacts to the War in Ukraine, 2022
This report is the third in a series of four reports that address the current threat assessments ... more This report is the third in a series of four reports that address the current threat assessments and perceptions of nuclear and conventional escalation risks in Eastern Europe and Russia. The report is part of the two-year project ‘Phase 2: Applying a Systematic Approach to NATO-Russia Risk Reduction’ that BASIC is undertaking in collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The workshop took place in Vilnius with participation of government officials and experts from all four countries. The workshop was held over two days one month after the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine and the workshop agenda was adapted to reflect the current situation. BASIC asked speakers and participants to discuss NATO’s deterrence and defence, risk reduction, off-ramps and humanitarian issues in light of the conflict in Ukraine and the impact this conceivably will have on NATO-Russia relations in the future.
Applying a Systematic Approach to NATO-Russia Risk Reduction. Perspectives from the North-Eastern Flank, 2022
Applying a Systematic Approach to NATO-Russia Risk Reduction: Perspectives from the North-Eastern... more Applying a Systematic Approach to NATO-Russia Risk Reduction: Perspectives from the North-Eastern Flank addresses the current threat assessments and perceptions of nuclear and conventional escalation risks in Eastern Europe and Russia. The report is part of the two-year project ‘Applying a Systematic Approach to NATO-Russia Risk Reduction’ that BASIC is undertaking in collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The report finds that the historic experiences NATO’s north-eastern flank countries have had with Russia and the West continues to inform current threat and risk assessments as does the near proximity to Russia and Russian allies. This arguably manifests itself in a tension between actual risk and heightened fear which ultimately may feed into an insecurity spiral.
With the current situation in Europe the risk of escalation of conflict between Russia and NATO is real. It is paramount that diplomacy and the risk reduction agenda between NATO and Russia is revitalised. The report has unearthed at least two perspectives that are important to the revitalisation of this risk reduction agenda. First, risk reduction between NATO and Russia is also about disentangling actual risk from fear – on both sides. Second, understanding and conclusions about Russian intentionality cannot rest on overstretched concepts and assumptions.
This report was written prior to the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The report is based on the deliberations with government officials and experts from NATO’s north-eastern flank countries at a one-day workshop on NATO-Russia risk assessments in September 2021. The outbreak of the war may have changed or reinforced certain risk and threat assessments.
Learning from the Ilulissat Initiative State Power, Institutional Legitimacy, and Governance in the Arctic Ocean 2007-18
CMS Report. Learning from the Ilulissat Initiative State Power, Institutional Legitimacy, and Governance in the Arctic Ocean 2007-18, 2018
In May 2018, 10 years will have passed since representatives from the five Arctic coastal states ... more In May 2018, 10 years will have passed since representatives from the five Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States, collectively referred to as the A5) and the Home Rule government of Greenland met for the Ilulissat meeting in Greenland after a joint Danish-Greenlandic initiative. The meeting resulted in the Ilulissat Declaration, whereby the coastal states declared that existing international law provided a firm basis for handling Arctic Ocean issues, that the coastal states would settle disagreements peacefully and in accordance with international law, including the continental shelf issue, and that they would cooperate on a host of other issues through existing regional institutions, such as the Arctic Council.
DIIS REPORT Governing Uranium in the Danish Realm, 2015
When the 2009 Act granting Greenland self-government was passed, giving the territory full author... more When the 2009 Act granting Greenland self-government was passed, giving the territory full authority over its natural resources, a complex and mixed legal system was introduced within the ‘Commonwealth of the Realm’, which includes Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. This system has been further complicated by Denmark’s membership and Greenland’s non-membership of the European Union. Much of the debate today on Greenland’s uranium potential is focused on clarifying
issues of competence and authority between Greenland and Denmark, the aim being to move beyond the notion of ‘zero tolerance’ to developing concrete legislative and regulatory measures.
Comments and Briefs by Gry Thomasen
CMS Memo, 2018
• Ilulissat-mødet i 2008 var med til at skabe opbakning om den statsbaserede orden i Arktis på et... more • Ilulissat-mødet i 2008 var med til at skabe opbakning om den statsbaserede orden i Arktis på et tidspunkt, hvor den blev kritiseret for at vaere utilstraekkelig. • Ilulissat-mødet førte til øget samarbejde mellem de fem ark-tiske kyststater (A5). A5 var i starten en kontroversiel, poten-tiel konkurrent til Arktisk Råd. Siden 2010 er A5 dog blevet accepteret som et pragmatisk, inkluderende og lavpraktisk samarbejde, der supplerer Arktisk Råd. • Den arktiske orden er i stadig forandring, og Rigsfaellesska-bet kan og bør gennem aktivt Arktis-diplomati styrke det regionale samarbejde og Danmark, Faerøerne og Grønlands samlede position i regionen. Arktisk diplomati er over de seneste årtier blevet stadig mere vigtigt. Globaliseringen og klimaforandringerne er ved at åbne regionen for menneskelig aktivitet, hvilket skaber både nye mu-ligheder og udfordringer. Internationalt samarbejde er nødven-digt for at håndtere disse udfordringer, og de seneste årtier er en mosaik af internationale institutioner opstået i regionen (et regime-kompleks). Arktisk diplomati er ikke kun vigtigt, fordi det muliggør prakti-ske løsninger på regionale udfordringer og mindsker risikoen for konflikt mellem stormagterne i regionen. De arktiske institutio-ner raekker ud over regionen og giver dermed samtidig russiske og vestlige diplomater et forum til at diskutere bredere ikke-ark-tiske spørgsmål, selv efter de diplomatiske relationer mellem øst og vest er blevet anstrengte som følge af Ukrainekrisen. Det regionale diplomatiske samarbejde mellem de arktiske stater er i vid udstraekning fortsat efter den russiske invasion af Krim. Det skyldes dels, at Rusland har staerke økonomiske incitamenter til at fastholde de fredelige relationer i Arktis, dels at de nordlige fora giver diplomater en sjaelden mulighed for at mødes og debattere. Arktisk diplomati er saerligt afgørende for Rigsfaellesskabet
DIIS Comment, 2014
In 2013 Greenland’s parliament lifted the so-called zero-tolerance policy by a narrow majority, t... more In 2013 Greenland’s parliament lifted the so-called zero-tolerance policy by a narrow majority, thus opening up Greenland’s vast uranium reserves for extraction. The genesis of the zero-tolerance policy is however, unclear. This demonstrates the Kingdom must articulate a clearly defined policy for uranium production and trade.
New uranium deal between Denmark and Greenland clarifies competences
DIIS Comment, 2016
New uranium deal between Denmark and Greenland clarifies competences. Greenland retains control o... more New uranium deal between Denmark and Greenland clarifies competences. Greenland retains control over mining, environment and safety, Denmark over non-proliferation.
Danish-Greenlandic declaration on nuclear safeguards: A stepping stone to legislation.
DIIS Comment, 2016
Danish-Greenlandic declaration towards uranium trade
DIIS Comment, 2016
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Articles by Gry Thomasen
Book chapters by Gry Thomasen
Reports by Gry Thomasen
The workshop took place in Vilnius with participation of government officials and experts from all four countries. The workshop was held over two days one month after the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine and the workshop agenda was adapted to reflect the current situation. BASIC asked speakers and participants to discuss NATO’s deterrence and defence, risk reduction, off-ramps and humanitarian issues in light of the conflict in Ukraine and the impact this conceivably will have on NATO-Russia relations in the future.
With the current situation in Europe the risk of escalation of conflict between Russia and NATO is real. It is paramount that diplomacy and the risk reduction agenda between NATO and Russia is revitalised. The report has unearthed at least two perspectives that are important to the revitalisation of this risk reduction agenda. First, risk reduction between NATO and Russia is also about disentangling actual risk from fear – on both sides. Second, understanding and conclusions about Russian intentionality cannot rest on overstretched concepts and assumptions.
This report was written prior to the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The report is based on the deliberations with government officials and experts from NATO’s north-eastern flank countries at a one-day workshop on NATO-Russia risk assessments in September 2021. The outbreak of the war may have changed or reinforced certain risk and threat assessments.
issues of competence and authority between Greenland and Denmark, the aim being to move beyond the notion of ‘zero tolerance’ to developing concrete legislative and regulatory measures.
Comments and Briefs by Gry Thomasen
The workshop took place in Vilnius with participation of government officials and experts from all four countries. The workshop was held over two days one month after the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine and the workshop agenda was adapted to reflect the current situation. BASIC asked speakers and participants to discuss NATO’s deterrence and defence, risk reduction, off-ramps and humanitarian issues in light of the conflict in Ukraine and the impact this conceivably will have on NATO-Russia relations in the future.
With the current situation in Europe the risk of escalation of conflict between Russia and NATO is real. It is paramount that diplomacy and the risk reduction agenda between NATO and Russia is revitalised. The report has unearthed at least two perspectives that are important to the revitalisation of this risk reduction agenda. First, risk reduction between NATO and Russia is also about disentangling actual risk from fear – on both sides. Second, understanding and conclusions about Russian intentionality cannot rest on overstretched concepts and assumptions.
This report was written prior to the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The report is based on the deliberations with government officials and experts from NATO’s north-eastern flank countries at a one-day workshop on NATO-Russia risk assessments in September 2021. The outbreak of the war may have changed or reinforced certain risk and threat assessments.
issues of competence and authority between Greenland and Denmark, the aim being to move beyond the notion of ‘zero tolerance’ to developing concrete legislative and regulatory measures.