Papers by Bernard W. Kobes
PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness, 2005
According to a model of inter-theoretic relations advocated by Patricia S. Churchland, psychology... more According to a model of inter-theoretic relations advocated by Patricia S. Churchland, psychology will need to revise its theories so as to fit them for "smooth reduction" to the neurosciences, and this will lead to the elimination of reference to intentional contents from psychology. It is argued that this model is ambiguous; on one reading it is empirically implausible, on the other its methodology is confused. The connectionist program NETtalk, far from exemplifying the model as Churchland claims, suggests a theoretical rationale for employing relations to intentional contents in psychology. It is surely naive to suppose that all branches of information-processing psychology and all branches of the neurosciences will, or should, develop in complete
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1989
Consciousness has been defined as that annoying period between naps, and this grumpy definition m... more Consciousness has been defined as that annoying period between naps, and this grumpy definition may not be wholly facetious, if Michael Tye’s latest book is right. Tye’s main goal here is to develop a theory of the phenomenal unity of experience at a time, and its diachronic analog, the moment-to-moment continuity of one’s experiential stream from the time one wakes up to the time consciousness lapses.
In Consciousness and Cognition, Michael Thau adopts bold and engaging positions on a wide range o... more In Consciousness and Cognition, Michael Thau adopts bold and engaging positions on a wide range of connected topics; his resourceful arguments in support of these positions amply repay reflection. At the same time, readers may find it difficult to accept the resulting metaphysics as a serious candidate for belief. To some it will seem that the book contains its own unintended reductio ad absurdum, as philosophy bookseven excellent ones-sometimes do. More charitable readers may still find the account seriously incomplete in key respects, rendering any evaluation of the metaphysics premature. In what follows, I offer some reflections on the nature of what I will call ''Thau-properties''-internally specified properties that are distinct from but correspond to the colors, shapes, etc. I will argue that Thau-properties are metaphysically spookier than Thau lets on. I will also sketch a version of the theory of perceptual qualia, and argue that (a) qualia theory suggests a natural point of resistance to Thau's Mary argument for the existence of Thau-properties, and that (b) qualia are less spooky than Thau-properties. According to Thau, the colors, sizes, distances, shapes, tastes, smells, sounds, textures, etc. of perceived things, and bodily sensations-all properties which can serve as the semantic values of predicates like 'red', 'large', 'far', 'cube', 'sweet', 'rotten-egg', 'middle C', 'silky', and 'pain'-are not represented in perception. The properties with which we are perceptually acquainted are distinct from but correspond to the colors, shapes, etc., of perceived things. What distinguishes a belief that an object is red from a perception\ according to which it looks red is precisely the kind of prop
Philos Psychol, 1991
Consciousness WILLIAM G. LYCAN, 1987, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, xiii+165 pp., $23.50
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1989
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 09515089708573208, Jun 10, 2008
Philosophical Studies, 2007
The Waning of Materialism, 2010
Philosophical Topics, 1996
... Sydney Shoemaker has argued that the rational updating of beliefs and intentions in light of ... more ... Sydney Shoemaker has argued that the rational updating of beliefs and intentions in light of new experience requires that the thinker have mental access to the contents of his current beliefs and intentions.8 And there may be advantages, from the standpoint of efficient design ...
The Philosophical Review, 1991
Philosophical Psychology, 1991
Consciousness WILLIAM G. LYCAN, 1987, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, xiii+165 pp., $23.50
Philosophical Psychology, 1997
... This, then, would be the outline of a theoretical framework for defending the robust psycholo... more ... This, then, would be the outline of a theoretical framework for defending the robust psychological reality of adaptive metacognition against levels-parsimony, even in cases of subjects who do not report any conscious metacognitive states and processes. ...
Philosophical Perspectives, 1995
... I am not doubly a bystander, first in that much of the world happens independently of myactio... more ... I am not doubly a bystander, first in that much of the world happens independently of myaction or will, and second in that my belief about the world also happens independently of my action or will. ... Page 9. Telic Higher-order Thoughts / 299 objective. ...
Philosophical Perspectives, 1990
Mind and Language, 2000
In a conference hotel recently I accompanied a philosophical friend on a shopping expedition for ... more In a conference hotel recently I accompanied a philosophical friend on a shopping expedition for some bold red and green wrapping papers, to be displayed as props in his upcoming talk on sensory qualia. Most examples used in philosophical discussions of consciousness have this static, snapshot character. The vehicle for a conscious perception of red wrapping paper may be a pattern of activation in a region of the brain devoted to visual input. But while walking, a person can turn her head, notice the wrapping paper, reach out, and grasp it. Our survival often depends on our ability to negotiate a changing environment by simultaneous streams of perception and action. What do vehicles of conscious content look like when there is realistically complex interaction with the world? A dynamic view requires, according to Susan Hurley, a 'twisted rope', the strands of which are continuous multi-modal streams of inputs and outputs looping into the environment and back into the central nervous system. The twist in the rope is analogous to the unity of consciousness. The contents of conscious perceptions depend directly-non-instrumentally-on relations among inputs and outputs; similarly for conscious intentions. 1 We are evidently a long way from static red and green sensory qualia. Hurley's book is a work of formidable ambition and multidisciplinary erudition. She marshals wide-ranging literatures in the philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and dynamic systems theory. Her Kant and Wittgenstein scholarship is also impressive. Each chapter stands on
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Papers by Bernard W. Kobes