Alexander Bird

Univeristy Of Cambridge, Philosophy, Faculty Member

University of Bristol, Philosophy, Honorary member

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Supervisors: David Papineau

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Simone Gozzano

Università Degli Studi Dell'Aquila

Toby Friend

Gabriel Segal

Hong Yu Wong

University of Tubingen

Ronald P Endicott

North Carolina State University

Sevi Siljola

Jonathan Cohen

Ignacio Cea

Universidad Católica de Temuco

Aaron Griffith

College of William and Mary

Samuel Kimpton-Nye

King's College London

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Papers by Alexander Bird

Fundamental Powers, Evolved Powers, and Mental Powers

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018

Powers have, in recent years, become a central component of many philosophers' ontology of proper... more Powers have, in recent years, become a central component of many philosophers' ontology of properties. While I have argued that powers exist at the fundamental level of properties, many other theorists of powers hold that there are non-fundamental powers also. In this paper I articulate my reasons for being sceptical about the existing reasons for holding that there are non-fundamental powers. However, I also want to promote a different argument for the existence of a certain class of non-fundamental powers: properties whose existence and nature have natural selection to thank. Such properties will include functional properties of organisms and so may include their mental properties also.

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Essences and Natural Kinds

Routledge eBooks, Apr 2, 2009

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Is Evidence Non-Inferential?

The Philosophical Quarterly, Apr 1, 2004

Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from... more Evidence is often taken to be foundational, in that while other propositions may be inferred from our evidence, evidence propositions are themselves not inferred from anything. I argue that this conception is false, since the non-inferential propositions on which beliefs are ultimately founded may be forgotten or undermined in the course of enquiry. 1 P. Maher, 'Subjective and Objective Confirmation', Philosophy of Science,  (), pp. -, at p. .

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Evidence and Inference

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Jul 4, 2016

I articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evidence, according to which evidenc... more

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The Illusion of Nomic Contingency

Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 1, 2007

Kuhn and Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science

Annals of the Japan Association For Philosophy of Science, 2004

Review. The metaphysics of science. C Dilworth

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1997

Kuhn'sThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions revisited

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 1995

The present paper argues that there is an affinity between Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Rev... more The present paper argues that there is an affinity between Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is maintained, in particular, that Kuhn's notion of paradigm draws on such Wittgensteinian concepts as language games, family resemblance, rules, forms of life. It is also claimed that Kuhn's incommensurability thesis is a sequel of the theory of meaning supplied by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As such its assessment is not fallacious, since it is not an empirical hypothesis and it does not have the relativistic implications Kuhn's critics repeatedly indicated. Although concepts are indeed relative to a language game or paradigm, interparadigmatic intelligibility is preserved through the standard techniques of translation or praxis. The impossibility of radical translation which is captured by the claim of incommensurability lies with that which cannot be said but only shown.

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Creativity without value

Routledge eBooks, Feb 21, 2018

The standard definition of creativity takes is to be essential to creativity that it is disposed ... more

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LANGE AND LAWS , KINDS , AND COUNTERFACTUALS Alexander Bird

In this paper I examine and question Marc Lange’s account of laws, and his claim that the law del... more

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Manifesting Time and Space: Background-Free Physical Theories

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017

Temporal and spatial relations are often regarded as paradigmatic categorical properties that pro... more Temporal and spatial relations are often regarded as paradigmatic categorical properties that pro-vide a counterexamples to the claim that all fundamental natural properties powers (potencies)—properties that are dispositional in nature/essence. In this chapter, I consider the consequences for this debate of thinking that a good physical theory should be background-independent. I propose that the conception of time and space not as a background but as an active component of the physical universe help show that temporal and spatial properties and relations need not be considered as necessarily categorical.

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Fundamentals of Philosophy

Aristotle

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Friedrich Waismann - Causality and Logical Positivism

Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, 2011

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ESSENCES OF NATURAL KINDS: DISCOVERED OR STIPULATED? Remarks on Joseph LaPorte's Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change

LaPorte gives a range of interesting and informative examples. Most of these are in biology but s... more LaPorte gives a range of interesting and informative examples. Most of these are in biology but some come from chemistry. I shall start with the latter. LaPorte starts with the example of jade and argues that contrary to the tradition following Putnam, jade present an example very similar to his Twin Earth thought experiment, but with a different outcome. For many centuries the jade that the Chinese work with and called 'yü' was just nephrite. Only towards the end of the eighteenth century was jadeite from Burma introduced into China. Chinese jade experts were aware that it was a different material, but nonetheless decided also to regard it as 'yü'. LaPorte argues that the terms 'jade' and 'yü' have a certain kind of vagueness, such that it was not determinate whether the new jade, jadeite, was within the extension of those terms. A decision was made to include the new material, thus introducing a change to the concepts 'jade' and 'yü', rater than an application of previous, unchanging concepts. Furthermore, that decision went in a different direction to the direction that is alleged in the Twin Earth story. There we are supposed to reject XYZ as water despite superficial similarity. With jade the chemically different but superficially similar jadeite was included, not rejected. If LaPorte's understanding of this case is right, then the extension of 'yü' is not fully determinate but is vague. Given that for centuries the Chinese only ever knew nephrite, one might have expected, from Putnam's Twin Earth story, that they would reject jadeite, on the grounds that is is different kind of substance. But, they eventually decided against that. LaPorte then contrasts the cases of topaz and ruby. Topaz was initially identified by its yellow colour, but the discovery that some blue minerals have the same chemical composition led to their inclusion under the extension of 'topaz'. Ruby is also identified by its colour, this time red, but in this case the existence of blue minerals with the same underlying structure were not included within the term's extension. The contrasting cases seems to suggest that it is a matter of choice whether we take the extension of a term to include newly discovered items that share some of the features of established sample but not others. Since it is a matter of choice that topaz is the mineral with formula Al 2 SiO 4 (F,OH) 2-presumably the discovery of blue minerals with the same formula could, as in the case of ruby, have led to a restriction of 'topaz' just to the yellow variety of the mineral-that essence is a matter of stipulation. The story here, I think, may be a little more complicated. For in the case of ruby there was already a term available for the mineral species of which ruby is a variety, viz. corundum, and furthermore, there was already a name available for blue corundum, viz. sapphire. So it is not clear how much choice played a part in the case of ruby. In which case it would not offer a fair contrast to the case of topaz, which in turn may then look less like a case of choice too. However, the real problem with the cases of jade, topaz, and ruby is that we are dealing here with gemstones and so there are interests competing here with the scientific ones. It would not be a surprise to find that when there is tension between the two that the former predominate. It is not that the scientific concept is forgotten completely but rather that some compromise is sought. And so one could take the view that jade really was just nephrite but that the makers of jade artifacts decided that it was in their interests to allow jadeite also to count as jade. As LaPorte makes clear, not just any old

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Incommensurability Naturalized

Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison, 2008

In this paper I argue that we can understand incommensurability in a naturalistic, psychological ... more In this paper I argue that we can understand incommensurability in a naturalistic, psychological manner. Cognitive habits can be acquired and so differ between individuals. Drawing on psychological work concerning analogical thinking and thinking with schemata, I argue that incommensurability arises between individuals with different cognitive habits and between groups with different shared cognitive habits.

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Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 2015

If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination... more If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.

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Kripke

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A Dispositional Account of Causation, with Some Remarks on the Ontology of Dispositions

Synthese Library, 2020

I outline and consider the prospects for (and significance of) an account of causation in terms o... more I outline and consider the prospects for (and significance of) an account of causation in terms of dispositions. The basic idea is (roughly) that C causes E when C is the stimulus of some disposition of which E is the manifestation. Such an account suggests that causes are conditionally sufficient (rather than necessary) for their effects. I consider what semantics for subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals this requires, and examine the consequences for making a distinction between causes and mere conditions and between collective or complete causes and mere parts of causes. Finally, I review the significance of this account of causation for a metaphysics of powers (potencies, essentially dispositional properties). I argue that it would be a mistake to see a successful dispositional account of causation (whether this or another account) as vindicating an ontology of powers.

Philosophy of Science and Epistemology

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Against Creativity

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018

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Fundamental Powers, Evolved Powers, and Mental Powers

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018

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Essences and Natural Kinds

Routledge eBooks, Apr 2, 2009

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Is Evidence Non-Inferential?

The Philosophical Quarterly, Apr 1, 2004

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Evidence and Inference

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Jul 4, 2016

I articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evidence, according to which evidenc... more

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The Illusion of Nomic Contingency

Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 1, 2007

Kuhn and Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science

Annals of the Japan Association For Philosophy of Science, 2004

Review. The metaphysics of science. C Dilworth

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1997

Kuhn'sThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions revisited

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 1995

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Creativity without value

Routledge eBooks, Feb 21, 2018

The standard definition of creativity takes is to be essential to creativity that it is disposed ... more

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LANGE AND LAWS , KINDS , AND COUNTERFACTUALS Alexander Bird

In this paper I examine and question Marc Lange’s account of laws, and his claim that the law del... more

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Manifesting Time and Space: Background-Free Physical Theories

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017

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Fundamentals of Philosophy

Aristotle

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Friedrich Waismann - Causality and Logical Positivism

Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, 2011

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ESSENCES OF NATURAL KINDS: DISCOVERED OR STIPULATED? Remarks on Joseph LaPorte's Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change

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Incommensurability Naturalized

Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison, 2008

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Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 2015

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Kripke

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A Dispositional Account of Causation, with Some Remarks on the Ontology of Dispositions

Synthese Library, 2020

Philosophy of Science and Epistemology

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Against Creativity

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018

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A Dispositional Account of Causation, with Some Remarks on the Ontology of Dispositions

I outline and consider the prospects for (and significance of) an account of causation in terms o... more I outline and consider the prospects for (and significance of) an account of causation in terms of dispositions. The basic idea is (roughly) that C causes E when C is the stimulus of some disposition of which E is the manifestation. Such an account suggests that causes are conditionally sufficient (rather than necessary) for their effects. I consider what semantics for subjunctive and coun-terfactual conditionals this requires, and examine the consequences for making a distinction between causes and mere conditions and between collective or complete causes and mere parts of causes. Finally I review the significance of this account of causation for a metaphysics of powers (potencies, essentially dispositional properties). I argue that it would be a mistake to see a successful dispositional account of causation (whether this or another account) as vindicating an ontology of powers.

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Overpowering. (How the powers ontology has over-reached itself)

Many authors have argued in favour of an ontology of properties as powers and it has been widely ... more Many authors have argued in favour of an ontology of properties as powers and it has been widely argued that this ontology allows us to address certain philosophical problems in novel and illuminating ways, for example causation, representation, intentionality, free will, and liberty. I argue that the ontology of powers, even if successful as an account of fundamental natural properties, does not provide the insight claimed as regards the aforementioned non-fundamental phenomena. I illustrate this argument by criticizing the powers theory of causation presented by Mumford and Anjum (2011) and showing that related criticisms can be directed at other abuses of (the ontology of) powers.

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The metaphysics of natural kinds

This paper maps the landscape for a range of views concerning the metaphysics of natural kinds. I... more This paper maps the landscape for a range of views concerning the metaphysics of natural kinds. I consider a range of increasingly ontologically committed views concerning natural kinds and the possible arguments for them. I then ask how these relate to natural kind essentialism, arguing that essentialism requires commitment to kinds as entities. I conclude by examining the homeostatic property cluster view of kinds in the light of the general understanding of kinds developed.

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Limitations of Power

which he calls abundant properties, and in the narrow sense, which he calls sparse properties. Le... more which he calls abundant properties, and in the narrow sense, which he calls sparse properties. Lewis takes abundant properties to be sets of (actual and possible) objects; property is any such set, and consequently every self-consistent predicate determines an abundant property. My preference is to think of abundant properties to be intensional abstract objects; something similar to the senses of predicates. Sparse properties correlate with some subset of the predicates that will be found in a complete, correct scientific description of the world. Lewis needs sparse properties, which we may think of as the natural properties, for certain important philosophical tasks, and recognizes that the ontology of universals, in particular as promoted by David Armstrong (1978), can do this work. On this view sparse and abundant properties are very different categories of things: sparse properties are universals and abundant properties are something else, such as sets (Lewis) or intensions (my view). So if we use 'property' to include both, then 'property' is a pseudo-category, being a hybrid of two different categories. The sparse properties, universals, are a basic ontological component; their existence does important explanatory work, whereas abundant properties are not basic or explanatory in this way.

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What are Natural Kinds?

by Katherine Hawley and Alexander Bird

Philosophical Perspectives, 2011

Distinguish two questions about natural kinds. First, the naturalness question: what, if anything... more Distinguish two questions about natural kinds. First, the naturalness question: what, if anything, makes a natural kind natural? Perhaps the members of a natural kind, unlike the members of an arbitrary group, stand in some natural similarity relation to one another. Perhaps they share an essence or some other natural feature. Or perhaps, as conventionalists argue, the boundaries of natural kinds do not correspond to distinctions in nature.

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Time, Chance, and the Necessity of Everything

Chance and Temporal Asymmetry, 2014

There is no contingency in the world. This chapter shows how premises that all have some plausibi... more There is no contingency in the world. This chapter shows how premises that all have some plausibility in metaphysics and physics lead to this conclusion, that every true proposition is necessarily true (for example, the proposition that there is thought). The argument turns on the necessity of laws of nature, the claim that there is no absolute distinction between laws and initial conditions, and the EverettÐ-De Witt 'many worlds' hypothesis.

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Dispositional Expressions

Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, 2000

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ARE NATURAL KINDS REDUCIBLE?

Proceedings of the 31th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2008, 2009

... 261277. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Boyd, R. 1999. Homeostasis, Species, and High... more

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Causation and the Manifestation of Powers

Strong Necessitarianism: The Nomological Identity of Possible Worlds

Ratio, 2004

Dispositional essentialism, a plausible view about the natures of (sparse or natural) properties,... more Dispositional essentialism, a plausible view about the natures of (sparse or natural) properties, yields a satisfying explanation of the nature of laws also. The resulting necessitarian conception of laws comes in a weaker version, which allows differences between possible worlds as regards which laws hold in those worlds and a stronger version that does not. The main aim of this paper is to articulate what is involved in accepting the stronger version, most especially the consequence that all possible properties exist in all worlds. I also suggest that there is no particularly strong reason for preferring the weaker to the stronger version. For example, Armstrong's instantiation condition on universals entails that according to strong necessitarianism every property is instantiated in all possible worlds. But first we do not need to accept Armstrong's instantiation condition, in part because his arguments for it are forceful only for a contingentist about laws and properties. Secondly, even if we do accept the condition, the consequence that all properties are instantiated is not itself contradictory, so long as any form of necessitarianism holds. Strong necessitarianism is prima facie counter-intuitive. But for that matter so is weak necessitarianism. Accepting either weak or strong necessitarianism requires denying the force of intuition in this area. And indeed we have every reason to deny the force of intuition and its primary source, imagination, concerning modal facts.

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THE REGRESS OF PURE POWERS?

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2007

Kripke

12 Modern Philosophers, 2009

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Essences and Natural Kinds

The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, 2011

Laws and criteria

Looking for laws

Lange and Laws, Kinds, and Counterfactuals

Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science, 2011

In this paper I examine and question Marc Lange's account of laws, and his claim that the law del... more

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Nature's Metaphysics

Antidotes all the way down?

Theoria an International Journal For Theory History and Foundations of Science, 2004

This paper concerns the relationship between dispositions and ceteris paribus laws. Dispositions ... more

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Structural properties

Synthese Vol 149 No. 3 Metaphysics in Science

Group Belief

forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, (eds. Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham... more

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Inference to the Best Explanation, Bayesianism, and Knowledge

How do we reconcile the claim of Bayesianism to be a correct normative theory of scientific reaso... more How do we reconcile the claim of Bayesianism to be a correct normative theory of scientific reasoning with the explanationists' claim that Inference to the Best Explanation provides a correct description of our inferential practices? I first develop Peter Lipton's approach to compatibilism and then argue that three challenges remain, focusing in particular on the idea that IBE can lead to knowledge. Answering those challenges requires renouncing standard Bayesianism's commitment to personalism, while also going beyond objective Bayesianism regarding the constraints on good priors. The result is a non-standard, super-objective Bayesianism that identifies probabilities with evaluations of plausibil-ity in the light of the evidence, conforming to Williamson's account of evidential probability.

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EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE

I articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evidence, according to which evidenc... more

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Scepticism and contrast classes

Analysis, 2001

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SOCIAL KNOWING: THE SOCIAL SENSE OF ‘SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE’

Philosophical Perspectives, 2010

There is a social or collective sense of 'knowledge', as used, for example, in the phrase 'the gr... more There is a social or collective sense of 'knowledge', as used, for example, in the phrase 'the growth of scientific knowledge'. In this paper I show that social knowledge does not supervene on facts about what individuals know, nor even what they believe or intend, or any combination of these or other mental (including epistemic) states. Instead I develop the idea that social knowing is an analogue to individual knowing, where the analogy focuses on the functional role of social and individual knowing.

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Justified Judging

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2007

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Inference to the Only Explanation

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2007

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Distributed Cognition, Scientific Knowledge, and the Social Epistemic Subject

Is Evidence non-inferential?

What is evidence? One line of thought is that our evidence is where our reasoning ultimately orig... more What is evidence? One line of thought is that our evidence is where our reasoning ultimately originates. Much of what we know or believe is inferred. Our evidence is that from which those beliefs or knowledge are inferred. Such a view is favoured, for example, by foundationalist accounts of evidence. It is closely related to Patrick Maher's account of evidence as knowledge given directly by experience. 1 On this view, then, evidence is non-inferential. Non-inferential what? Non-inferential belief, noninferential justified belief, non-inferential knowledge, or something else? For reasons I am about to explain, this paper will focus on the claim that our evidence is non-inferential knowledge. I intend to show that this prima facie plausible claim is false. However, along the way I shall replace it with another, correct, view of the relationship between evidence and inference.

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Inductive Knowledge

The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, 2000

Abductive knowledge and Holmesian inference

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Justified judging

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Nozick's fourth condition

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Understanding the Replication Crisis as a Base Rate Fallacy

The replication (replicability, reproducibility) crisis in social psychology and clinical medicin... more The replication (replicability, reproducibility) crisis in social psychology and clinical medicine arises from the fact that many apparently well-confirmed experimental results are subsequently overturned by studies that aim to replicate the original study. The culprit is widely held to be poor science: questionable research practices, failure to publish negative results, bad incentives, and even fraud. In this paper I argue that the high rate of failed replications is consistent with high quality science. We would expect this outcome if the field of science in question produces a high proportion of false hypotheses prior to testing. If most of the hypotheses under test are false, then there will be many false hypotheses that are apparently supported by the outcomes of well conducted experiments and null-hypothesis significance tests with a type-I error rate (α) of 5%. Failure to recognize this is to commit the fallacy of ignoring the base rate. I argue that this is a plausible diagnosis of the replication crisis and examine what lessons we thereby learn for the future conduct of science.

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Understanding the Replication Crisis as a Base Rate Fallacy

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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Scientific Realism and Epistemology

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What Is Scientific Progress?

Nous, 2007

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Scientific progress as accumulation of knowledge: a reply to Rowbottom

I defend my view that scientific progress is constituted by the accumulation of knowledge against... more

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The epistemology of science—a bird’s-eye view

Synthese, 2010

In this paper I outline my conception of the epistemology of science, by reference to my publishe... more In this paper I outline my conception of the epistemology of science, by reference to my published papers, showing how the ideas presented there fit together. In particular I discuss the aim of science, scientific progress, the nature of scientific evidence, the failings of empiricism, inference to the best (or only) explanation, and Kuhnian psychology of discovery. Throughout, I emphasize the significance of the concept of scientific knowledge.

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Underdetermination and Evidence

Images of Empiricism, 2007

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The Historical Turn in the Philosophy of Science

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, 2000

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SELECTION AND EXPLANATION

BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 2000

Explanations appealing to natural selection have an unusual and prima facie paradoxical feature. ... more Explanations appealing to natural selection have an unusual and prima facie paradoxical feature. While we may explain general truths using such explanations, those explanations do not transfer to the particular instances of those general truths. Thus natural selection and the selective advantage of speed in escaping predators can explain why healthy, normal, adult gazelles can run fast.

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Scientific revolutions and inference to the best explanation

Scientific Revolutions and Inference to the Best Explanation

Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 1999

Scientific and theological realism

Philosophy of science

Arguing about science

Review of Cees Leijenhorst: The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’ Natural Philosophy

Review: Squaring the Circle: The War Between Hobbes and Wallis

Annals of Science, 2001

Review: Science, Truth, and Democracy

Mind, 2003

Kuhn and the Historiography of Science

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 2015

This article discusses Kuhn conception of the history of science by focussing on two respects in ... more

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La filosofía de la historia de la ciencia de Thomas Kuhn

En el presente artículo defiendo que la evaluación de una idea científica es requiere que él sea ... more

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The philosophy of history of science of Thomas Kuhn

I argue that Kuhn was a historicist in two respects. First, he was a conservative in Mannheim's s... more I argue that Kuhn was a historicist in two respects. First, he was a conservative in Mannheim's sense-tradition is important for understanding scientific change, and the evaluation of a scientific idea is relative to historical context. Secondly, Kuhn embraced determinism-there is a pattern to scientific change, akin to laws of scientific development. I show that Kuhn's determinism requires that he is an internalist about the causes of scientific change; Kuhn's internalism contrasts with the externalism that characterises much post-Kuhnian science studies. I conclude by considering how Kuhn's historicism relates to the philosophical purposes of Kuhn's history of science.

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Kuhn, Naturalism, and the Social Study of Science

September 7, 2012) I have argued that the Kuhn of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions promote... more September 7, 2012) I have argued that the Kuhn of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions promotes a naturalistic study of science. The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge is also seen by many of its proponents as a naturalistic approach to science, and as such may be seen as part of the Kuhnian legacy. Nonetheless, I argue that it has been an inadequate successor to Kuhn. In particular, its emphasis on externalist explanations of scientific change are inconsistent with Kuhn's model of scientific development. A more faithful and fruitful heir to Kuhn's legacy is the cohort of psychological and cognitive studies into scientific reasoning as based on exemplars and their like.

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The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and its Significance: An Essay Review of the Fiftieth Anniversary Edition

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2012

Kuhn and Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century

What can cognitive science tell us about scientific revolutions?

THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2012

Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which it drew on the... more Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his published work. Nonetheless, in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive evaluation of Kuhn's proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on case-based reasoning, analogical thinking, dynamic frames, and the like to illuminate and develop various aspects of Kuhn's thought in Structure. In particular this work aims to give depth to the Kuhnian concepts of a paradigm and incommensurability. I review this work and identify two broad strands of research. One emphasizes work on concepts; the other focusses on cognitive habits. After contrasting these, I argue that the conceptual strand fails to be a complete account of scientific revolutions. We need a broad approach that draws on a variety of resources in psychology and cognitive science.

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Thomas Kuhn's Relativistic Legacy

Incommensurability naturalized

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Naturalizing Kuhn

I argue that the naturalism of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which he hi... more I argue that the naturalism of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which he himself later ignored, is worthy of rehabilitation. A naturalistic conception of paradigms is ripe for development with the tools of cognitive science. As a consequence a naturalistic understanding of world-change and incommensurability is also viable.

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Thomas Kuhn

Kuhn, naturalism, and the positivist legacy

Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2004

Kuhn’s wrong turning

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2002

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Kuhn on Reference and Essence

Philosophia Scientiae, 2004

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Kuhn, Nominalism, and Empiricism*

Philosophy of Science, 2003

In this paper I draw a connection between Kuhn and the empiricist legacy, specifically between hi... more In this paper I draw a connection between Kuhn and the empiricist legacy, specifically between his thesis of incommensurability, in particular in its later taxonomic form, and van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. I show that if it is the case the empirically equivalent but genuinely distinct theories do exist, then we can expect such theories to be taxonomically incommensurable. I link this to Hacking's claim that Kuhn was a nominalist. I also argue that Kuhn and van Fraassen do not differ as much as might be thought as regards the claim that observation is theory laden.

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Three conservative Kuhns

Social Epistemology, 2003

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Thomas Kuhn (Chesham, UK: Acumen, 2000; Princeton

Thomas Samuel Kuhn

What is in a Paradigm?

Richmond Journal of Philosophy, 2002

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Thomas S. Kuhn

Systematicity knowledge and bias

This paper shows that the history of clinical medicine in the eighteenth century supports Paul Ho... more This paper shows that the history of clinical medicine in the eighteenth century supports Paul Hoyningen-Huene's thesis that there is a correlation between science and systematicity. For example, James Jurin's assessment of the safety of variolation as a protection against smallpox adopted a systematic approach to the assessment of interventions in order to eliminate sources of cognitive bias that would compromise inquiry. Clinical medicine thereby became a science. I use this confirming instance to motivate a broader hypothesis, that systematicity is a distinctive feature of science because systematicity is required by processes of knowledge generation that go beyond our everyday cognitive capacities, and these processes are required to produce knowledge of the kinds that science aims at.

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Eliminative abduction: Examples from medicine

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2010

Peter Lipton argues that inference to the best explanation (IBE) involves the selection of a hypo... more Peter Lipton argues that inference to the best explanation (IBE) involves the selection of a hypothesis on the basis of its loveliness. I argue that in optimal cases of IBE we may be able to eliminate all but one of the hypotheses. In such cases we have a form of eliminative induction takes place, which I call 'Holmesian inference'. I argue that Lipton's example in which Ignaz Semmelweis identified a cause of puerperal fever better illustrates Holmesian inference than Liptonian IBE. I consider in detail the conditions under which Holmesian inference is possible and conclude by considering the epistemological relations between Holmesian inference and Liptonian IBE.

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What can philosophy tell us about Evidence-Based Medicine?

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The epistemological function of Hill's criteria

Preventive Medicine, 2011

Objective This article outlines an epistemological framework for understanding how Hill's criteri... more Objective This article outlines an epistemological framework for understanding how Hill's criteria may aid us in establishing a causal hypothesis (A causes B) in an observational study. Method We consider Hill's criteria in turn with respect to their ability or otherwise to exclude alternative hypotheses (B causes A; there is a common cause of A and B; there is no causal connection between A and B). Results We may classify Hill's criteria according to which of the alternative hypotheses they are able to exclude, and also on the basis of whether they relate to (a) evidence from within observational study or (b) evidence independent of that study. It is noted that no criterion is able to exclude the common cause hypothesis in a systematic way. Conclusion Observational studies are typically weaker than experimental studies, since the latter can systematically exclude competing hypotheses, whereas observational studies lack a systematic way of ruling out the common cause hypothesis.

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The Logic in Logicism

Dialogue, 1997

Squaring the Circle: Hobbes on Philosophy and Geometry

Journal of the History of Ideas, 1996

Illocutionary Silencing

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2002

Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby have argued that pornography might create a climate whereby a wo... more Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby have argued that pornography might create a climate whereby a woman's ability to refuse sex is literally silenced or removed. Their central argument is that a failure of 'uptake' of the woman's intention means that the illocutionary speech act of refusal has not taken place. In this paper, I challenge the claims from the Austinian philosophy of language which feature in this argument. I argue that uptake is not in general required for illocution, nor is it required for refusal in particular. I conclude with remarks on the relationship between illocutionary and perlocutionary speech-acts.

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Rationality and the structure of self-deception

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Using prediction markets to forecast research evaluations

Royal Society Open Science, 2015

The 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF2014) was conducted to assess the quality of research ... more The 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF2014) was conducted to assess the quality of research carried out at higher education institutions in the UK over a 6 year period. However, the process was criticized for being expensive and bureaucratic, and it was argued that similar information could be obtained more simply from various existing metrics. We were interested in whether a prediction market on the outcome of REF2014 for 33 chemistry departments in the UK would provide information similar to that obtained during the REF2014 process. Prediction markets have become increasingly popular as a means of capturing what is colloquially known as the &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;wisdom of crowds&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;, and enable individuals to trade &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;bets&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#39; on whether a specific outcome will occur or not. These have been shown to be successful at predicting various outcomes in a number of domains (e.g. sport, entertainment and politics), but have rarely been tested against outcomes based on expert judgements such as those that formed the basis of REF2014.

Alexander Bird

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