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David Sackris

Arapahoe Community College, Humanities & Literature, Faculty Member

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I am the philosophy program chair at Arapahoe Community College and the book reviews editor for the journal Teaching Philosophy. If you have interest in doing a book review for the journal, contact me at [email protected]

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Daniel D. Hutto

University of Wollongong

The University of Texas at Austin

The University of Texas at Austin

Kwantlen Polytechnic University

Fordham University

University of Cologne

Shaun Gallagher

University of Memphis

Louis de Saussure

University of Neuchâtel

Lucas Champollion

New York University

Armando Marques-Guedes

UNL - New University of Lisbon

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Papers by David Sackris

Some Socratic Modesty: A Reconsideration of Recent Empirical Work on Moral Judgment

Journal of value inquiry, May 24, 2024

The Perniciousness of Higher-Order Evidence on Aesthetic Appreciation

Dialogue

We demonstrate that many philosophers accept the following claim: When an aesthetic object is app... more We demonstrate that many philosophers accept the following claim: When an aesthetic object is apprehended correctly, taking pleasure in said object is a reliable sign that the object is aesthetically successful. We undermine this position by showing that what grounds our pleasurable experience is opaque: In many cases, the experienced pleasure is attributable to factors that have little to do with the aesthetic object. The evidence appealed to is a form of Higher-Order Evidence (HOE) and we consider attempts to overcome said evidence. We argue they are unsuccessful. We conclude by considering what this means for our practice of making aesthetic judgements.

Are there “Moral” Judgments?

European journal of analytic philosophy

Recent contributions in moral philosophy have raised questions concerning the prevalent assumptio... more Recent contributions in moral philosophy have raised questions concerning the prevalent assumption that moral judgments are typologically discrete, and thereby distinct from ordinary and/or other types of judgments. This paper adds to this discourse, surveying how attempts at defining what makes moral judgments distinct have serious shortcomings, and it is argued that any typological definition is likely to fail due to certain questionable assumptions about the nature of judgment itself. The paper concludes by raising questions for future investigations into the nature of moral judgment.

The disunity of moral judgment: Implications for the study of psychopathy

Philosophical Psychology

Since the 18 th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been 'moral colorbl... more Since the 18 th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been 'moral colorblindness' or an inability to form moral judgments. However, attempts at experimentally verifying this moral incapacity have been largely unsuccessful. After reviewing the centrality of 'moral colorblindness' to the study and diagnosis of psychopathy, I argue that the reason that researchers have been unable to verify that diagnosed psychopaths have an inability to make moral judgments is because their research is premised on the assumption that there is a specific moral faculty of the brain, or specific "moral" emotions, and that this faculty or set of emotions can become "impaired". I review recent research and argue that we have good reason to think that there is no such distinct capacity for moral judgment, and that, as a result, it is impossible for someone's "moral judgment faculty" to become selectively disabled. I then discuss the implications of such a position on psychopathy research, the coherence of the disorder, and the moral responsibility of psychopaths.

A Better Ape: The Evolution of the Moral Mind and How it Made us Human, by Victor Kumar and Richmond Campbell

Teaching Philosophy

Are There “Aesthetic” Judgments?

Erkenntnis

In philosophy of aesthetics, scholars commonly express a commitment to the premise that there is ... more In philosophy of aesthetics, scholars commonly express a commitment to the premise that there is a distinctive type of judgment that can be meaningfully labeled “aesthetic”, and that these judgments are distinctively different from other types of judgments. We argue that, within an Aristotelian framework, there is no clear avenue for meaningfully differentiating “aesthetic” judgment from other types of judgment, and, as such, we aim to question the assumption that aesthetic judgment does in fact constitute a distinctive kind of judgment that is in need of, or can be subject to, distinctive theorizing. We advance our argument primarily through demonstrating that leading contemporary accounts of aesthetic judgment do not successfully distinguish a type of judgment in that they do not tell us how making an aesthetic judgment differs substantially from judging that 2 + 3 = 5, that football is entertaining, or that today is Tuesday.

Preferred Qualifications: Community College Teaching Experience

APA Newsletter on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges, 2016

During the question-and-answer portion of the 2010 APA Central Division John Dewey Lecture, title... more During the question-and-answer portion of the 2010 APA Central Division John Dewey Lecture, titled "On Not Knowing Where You Are Going," speaker Alasdair MacIntyre remarked that in the future "Philosophy in the United States will be found in community colleges and other strange places." While this comment caught many by surprise, it points to an evolving presence for philosophy in two-year and community colleges. The aim of this newsletter is to foster a rich discussion concerning the nature and issues that characterize that evolution, as well as to highlight the great differences one finds from institution to institution, and the great diversity of faculty and students who populate their campuses. Accordingly, this first issue (and perhaps those that will follow) does not adhere to a single theme or topic. Instead, it reflects the very broad call for papers adopted by our committee, a breadth that we believe best gathers and presents the reality that is the twenty-first century two-year and community college. It is not the normal school of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, or the vocationaltechnical school of sixty years ago. And, while workforce programs do make up a sizeable portion of the two-year and community college curriculum, it is not unreasonable to point out that the same is true of many programs found at four-year and graduate institutions. What is unreasonable is to pretend that the two-year and community college mission is somehow inferior to that of those other higher ed institutions, or its faculty less sophisticated in their thinking than those at four-year colleges and universities. While there is certainly a greater emphasis on teaching in the former and on research in the latter, this does not entail that excellence in either is necessarily distributed accordingly. One reason there is a need for a newsletter specifically devoted to two-year and community colleges is that the challenges of teaching at two-year and community colleges, broadly conceived, not only include pedagogical issues, but professional and workload issues that differ significantly from those at senior colleges and universities. This is clearly a work in progress by any measure, but work that we believe is important to the health and well being of both the profession and philosophy. We welcome your comments, and, more importantly, we welcome your articles for publication in future issues.

How to Encourage Reading and Learning in the College Classroom in advance

Teaching Philosophy, 2020

In this article I argue that the best way to ensure that students engage with assigned reading is... more In this article I argue that the best way to ensure that students engage with assigned reading is by having open-ended questions that require textual interpretation to accompany every class session. Although this runs contrary to a recent trend of using multiple-choice questions or true/false questions to ensure reading compliance, using questions that require written responses has four key benefits: (1) such questions result in 75 percent of students completing the assigned reading; this leads to more successful class discussions, and a deeper dive into the course material. (2) Daily assignments can be used to develop specific skills that the instructor would like students to demonstrate. (3) When students come to class having completed the reading, it is much easier to assign productive group assignments. (4) When students engage in significant reading and writing tasks within a semester, critical thinking, reading and writing skills are more likely to be improved.

The disunity of moral judgment: Evidence and implications

Philosophical Psychology, Mar 28, 2022

We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment... more We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment constitutes a distinctive category of judgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts that we ordinarily consider "moral judgments". We argue that if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting that all moral judgments necessarily share common features: if diverse brain processes give rise to what we refer to as "moral judgments", then we have reason to suspect that these judgments may have different features. After advancing this argument, we show that giving up the unity of moral judgment seems to effectively dissolve the internalism/externalism debate concerning motivation within the field of metaethics.

The Arbitrariness of Aesthetic Judgment

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2020

Realists about aesthetic judgment believe something like the following: for an aesthetic judgment... more Realists about aesthetic judgment believe something like the following: for an aesthetic judgment of be correct, it must respond to the intrinsic aesthetic properties possessed by the object in question (e.g., Meskin et al., 2013; Kieran 2010). However, Cutting’s (2003) empirical research on aesthetic judgment puts pressure on that position. His work indicates that unconscious considerations extrinsic to an artwork can underpin said judgements. This paper takes Cutting’s conclusion a step further: If philosophers grant that it’s possible to appreciate artwork on the basis of unconscious biases, then we never can be fully confident that our aesthetic judgment is undergirded by the intrinsic aesthetic properties of an artwork. Furthermore, if judgment on the basis of unconscious, external reasons cannot be ruled out, we cannot be confident that our aesthetic judgments are ‘correct’. I argue that Cutting’s research is just the tip of the iceberg regarding the extrinsic, unconscious factors that influence aesthetic judgment. Expectation bias formed via social influence and context greatly influence aesthetic judgments and are unavoidable: we inevitably form expectations based on all kinds of contextual cues independently of any actual exposure to the item in question. Such factors make it terribly difficult to be confident in our aesthetic judgments. Even if there are objective properties that mark out some items as aesthetically superior to others, we cannot be sure that our judgments are responding to those properties.

Is Justification Necessary for Knowledge?

Advances in Experimental Epistemology : Series: Advances in Experimental Philosophy

Forthcoming in James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology (Continuum) Justificat... more Forthcoming in James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology (Continuum) Justification has long been considered a necessary condition for knowledge, and theories that deny the necessity of justification have been dismissed as non-starters. In this paper, we challenge this longstanding view by showing that many of the arguments offered in support of it fall short and by providing empirical evidence that individuals are often willing to attribute knowledge when epistemic justification is lacking. In the early 1990s, Crispin Sartwell (1991; 1992) attempted to call into question the traditional view that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge. Unlike some epistemic externalists who suggested that the justification condition be replaced with reliable indication, sensitivity, or some other externalist condition, Sartwell contended that no replacement was necessary. Sartwell's claims were initially met with incredulous stares and were soon largely ignored as their novelty diminished. More recently, other philosophers have taken aim at some of the other purportedly necessary conditions for knowledge. Allan Hazlett (2010; 2012), for example, has pointed to the widespread willingness of individuals to attribute knowledge in the absence of truth, arguing that the ordinary concept of knowledge may not be factive after all. Blake Myers-Schulz and Eric Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) and James Beebe (forthcoming) have gathered empirical data that display folk willingness to attribute knowledge even in the absence of occurrent or dispositional belief.

A Consideration of Carroll’s Content Theory

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2019

A Consideration of Carroll’s Content Theory

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2019

What Jancis Robinson Didn’t Know May Have Helped Her

Erkenntnis, 2018

A position has been advanced by a number of philosophers, notably by Burnham and Skilleås, that c... more A position has been advanced by a number of philosophers, notably by Burnham and Skilleås, that certain knowledge is required to aesthetically appreciate a fine wine. They further argue that pleasure is not an integral part of aesthetically appreciating wine. Their position implies that a novice cannot aesthetically appreciate a fine wine. This paper draws on research into tasting and psychology to rebut these claims. I argue that there is strong evidence from both the average consumer and from wine experts that they are unable to separate enjoyment from aesthetic evaluation; secondly, I argue that wine knowledge may actually preclude tasting of the wine as it exists in the glass due to perceptual bias. I conclude by arguing that it is unclear how exactly knowledge of things like terroir is supposed to affect the taste, as well as question what role conforming to a certain style plays in aesthetic success, as arguments that require knowledge for appreciation typically emphasize knowledge of styles of wine. A wine's first duty is to be good. Beyond that, terroir is bullshit.-Paul Draper, wine grower Within popular culture, there is a certain stereotype regarding wine: that it takes a special expertise to appreciate fine wine. Here is one statement of that popular stereotype: ''Wine is a complicated elixir, full of subtle flavors only an expert can truly distinguish, and experienced tasters are impervious to deception'' (Mcraney 2011). Recently, many philosophers who write on wine have sought to defend something along these lines (See Burnham and Skilleås 2012; Cohen 2013; Scruton & David C.

Moral objectivism across the lifespan

Philosophical Psychology, 2016

We report the results of a cross-sectional study that examined folk metaethical judgments in part... more We report the results of a cross-sectional study that examined folk metaethical judgments in participants between the ages of 12 and 88. We found that participants in their late teens and early twenties attributed less objectivity to ethical statements than participants in older or younger age groups. We also critically examine other recent investigations of folk metaethical intuitions and compare our results to certain well-known findings in the moral development literature.

Category Independent Aesthetic Experience: The Case of Wine

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2013

Famine, Affluence, and Amorality

European journal of analytic philosophy, 2021

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether suc... more I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that firs...

Feeling the Aesthetic: A Pluralist Sentimentalist Theory of Aesthetic Experience

Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics, 2020

Sentimentalist aesthetic theories, broadly construed, posit that emotions play a fundamental role... more Sentimentalist aesthetic theories, broadly construed, posit that emotions play a fundamental role in aesthetic experiences. Jesse Prinz has recently proposed a reductionistic version of sentimentalist aesthetics, suggesting that it is the discrete feeling of wonder that makes an experience aesthetic. In this contribution, we draw on Prinz's proposal in order to outline a novel version of a sentimentalist theory. Contrasting Prinz's focus on a single emotion, we argue that an aesthetic experience is rudimentarily composed of a plurality of emotions. We acknowledge and discuss significant problems that follow from such a theory, arguing that a pluralist version of sentimentalism is nonetheless the soundest position within sentimentalist aesthetics.

A Defense of Causal Creationism in Fiction

In this paper I seek defend the view that fictional characters are author-created abstract entiti... more In this paper I seek defend the view that fictional characters are author-created abstract entities against objections offered by Stuart Brock in his paper “The Creationist Fiction: The Case against Creationism about Fictional Characters.” I argue that his objections fall far short of his goal of showing that if philosophers want to believe in fictional characters as abstract objects, they should not view them as author-created. My defense of creationism in fiction in part rests on tying the act of creating a fictional character more closely to the act of story-telling. Ultimately I aim to show that the creation of

Considering the Classroom as a Safe Space

In the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, Lauren Freeman (2014) advocates that faculty tu... more In the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, Lauren Freeman (2014) advocates that faculty turn their classrooms into “safe spaces” as a method for increasing the diversity of philosophy majors. The creation of safe spaces is meant to make women and minority students “feel sufficiently comfortable” and thereby increase the likelihood that they pursue philosophy as a major or career. Although I agree with Freeman’s goal, I argue that philosophers, and faculty in general, should reject the call for turning classrooms into “safe spaces.” I begin by distinguishing extra-curricular safe spaces from the classroom as a safe space. I then argue that although faculty should not object to extra-curricular safe spaces, they should reject curricular ones. I argue that the classroom as a safe space is currently an impractical and inappropriate goal given the nature of academic philosophy, and that encouraging students to think of classrooms as safe/unsafe does not facilitate learning. Nonetheless, I agree with Freeman that faculty should take steps to ensure that students from all backgrounds have the tools they need to be successful in the classroom. I further argue that faculty calls for safe spaces creates confusion concerning the educative environment one should expect to find at the majority of America universities

Some Socratic Modesty: A Reconsideration of Recent Empirical Work on Moral Judgment

Journal of value inquiry, May 24, 2024

The Perniciousness of Higher-Order Evidence on Aesthetic Appreciation

Dialogue

We demonstrate that many philosophers accept the following claim: When an aesthetic object is app... more We demonstrate that many philosophers accept the following claim: When an aesthetic object is apprehended correctly, taking pleasure in said object is a reliable sign that the object is aesthetically successful. We undermine this position by showing that what grounds our pleasurable experience is opaque: In many cases, the experienced pleasure is attributable to factors that have little to do with the aesthetic object. The evidence appealed to is a form of Higher-Order Evidence (HOE) and we consider attempts to overcome said evidence. We argue they are unsuccessful. We conclude by considering what this means for our practice of making aesthetic judgements.

Are there “Moral” Judgments?

European journal of analytic philosophy

Recent contributions in moral philosophy have raised questions concerning the prevalent assumptio... more Recent contributions in moral philosophy have raised questions concerning the prevalent assumption that moral judgments are typologically discrete, and thereby distinct from ordinary and/or other types of judgments. This paper adds to this discourse, surveying how attempts at defining what makes moral judgments distinct have serious shortcomings, and it is argued that any typological definition is likely to fail due to certain questionable assumptions about the nature of judgment itself. The paper concludes by raising questions for future investigations into the nature of moral judgment.

The disunity of moral judgment: Implications for the study of psychopathy

Philosophical Psychology

Since the 18 th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been 'moral colorbl... more Since the 18 th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been 'moral colorblindness' or an inability to form moral judgments. However, attempts at experimentally verifying this moral incapacity have been largely unsuccessful. After reviewing the centrality of 'moral colorblindness' to the study and diagnosis of psychopathy, I argue that the reason that researchers have been unable to verify that diagnosed psychopaths have an inability to make moral judgments is because their research is premised on the assumption that there is a specific moral faculty of the brain, or specific "moral" emotions, and that this faculty or set of emotions can become "impaired". I review recent research and argue that we have good reason to think that there is no such distinct capacity for moral judgment, and that, as a result, it is impossible for someone's "moral judgment faculty" to become selectively disabled. I then discuss the implications of such a position on psychopathy research, the coherence of the disorder, and the moral responsibility of psychopaths.

A Better Ape: The Evolution of the Moral Mind and How it Made us Human, by Victor Kumar and Richmond Campbell

Teaching Philosophy

Are There “Aesthetic” Judgments?

Erkenntnis

In philosophy of aesthetics, scholars commonly express a commitment to the premise that there is ... more In philosophy of aesthetics, scholars commonly express a commitment to the premise that there is a distinctive type of judgment that can be meaningfully labeled “aesthetic”, and that these judgments are distinctively different from other types of judgments. We argue that, within an Aristotelian framework, there is no clear avenue for meaningfully differentiating “aesthetic” judgment from other types of judgment, and, as such, we aim to question the assumption that aesthetic judgment does in fact constitute a distinctive kind of judgment that is in need of, or can be subject to, distinctive theorizing. We advance our argument primarily through demonstrating that leading contemporary accounts of aesthetic judgment do not successfully distinguish a type of judgment in that they do not tell us how making an aesthetic judgment differs substantially from judging that 2 + 3 = 5, that football is entertaining, or that today is Tuesday.

Preferred Qualifications: Community College Teaching Experience

APA Newsletter on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges, 2016

During the question-and-answer portion of the 2010 APA Central Division John Dewey Lecture, title... more During the question-and-answer portion of the 2010 APA Central Division John Dewey Lecture, titled "On Not Knowing Where You Are Going," speaker Alasdair MacIntyre remarked that in the future "Philosophy in the United States will be found in community colleges and other strange places." While this comment caught many by surprise, it points to an evolving presence for philosophy in two-year and community colleges. The aim of this newsletter is to foster a rich discussion concerning the nature and issues that characterize that evolution, as well as to highlight the great differences one finds from institution to institution, and the great diversity of faculty and students who populate their campuses. Accordingly, this first issue (and perhaps those that will follow) does not adhere to a single theme or topic. Instead, it reflects the very broad call for papers adopted by our committee, a breadth that we believe best gathers and presents the reality that is the twenty-first century two-year and community college. It is not the normal school of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, or the vocationaltechnical school of sixty years ago. And, while workforce programs do make up a sizeable portion of the two-year and community college curriculum, it is not unreasonable to point out that the same is true of many programs found at four-year and graduate institutions. What is unreasonable is to pretend that the two-year and community college mission is somehow inferior to that of those other higher ed institutions, or its faculty less sophisticated in their thinking than those at four-year colleges and universities. While there is certainly a greater emphasis on teaching in the former and on research in the latter, this does not entail that excellence in either is necessarily distributed accordingly. One reason there is a need for a newsletter specifically devoted to two-year and community colleges is that the challenges of teaching at two-year and community colleges, broadly conceived, not only include pedagogical issues, but professional and workload issues that differ significantly from those at senior colleges and universities. This is clearly a work in progress by any measure, but work that we believe is important to the health and well being of both the profession and philosophy. We welcome your comments, and, more importantly, we welcome your articles for publication in future issues.

How to Encourage Reading and Learning in the College Classroom in advance

Teaching Philosophy, 2020

In this article I argue that the best way to ensure that students engage with assigned reading is... more In this article I argue that the best way to ensure that students engage with assigned reading is by having open-ended questions that require textual interpretation to accompany every class session. Although this runs contrary to a recent trend of using multiple-choice questions or true/false questions to ensure reading compliance, using questions that require written responses has four key benefits: (1) such questions result in 75 percent of students completing the assigned reading; this leads to more successful class discussions, and a deeper dive into the course material. (2) Daily assignments can be used to develop specific skills that the instructor would like students to demonstrate. (3) When students come to class having completed the reading, it is much easier to assign productive group assignments. (4) When students engage in significant reading and writing tasks within a semester, critical thinking, reading and writing skills are more likely to be improved.

The disunity of moral judgment: Evidence and implications

Philosophical Psychology, Mar 28, 2022

We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment... more We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment constitutes a distinctive category of judgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts that we ordinarily consider "moral judgments". We argue that if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting that all moral judgments necessarily share common features: if diverse brain processes give rise to what we refer to as "moral judgments", then we have reason to suspect that these judgments may have different features. After advancing this argument, we show that giving up the unity of moral judgment seems to effectively dissolve the internalism/externalism debate concerning motivation within the field of metaethics.

The Arbitrariness of Aesthetic Judgment

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2020

Realists about aesthetic judgment believe something like the following: for an aesthetic judgment... more Realists about aesthetic judgment believe something like the following: for an aesthetic judgment of be correct, it must respond to the intrinsic aesthetic properties possessed by the object in question (e.g., Meskin et al., 2013; Kieran 2010). However, Cutting’s (2003) empirical research on aesthetic judgment puts pressure on that position. His work indicates that unconscious considerations extrinsic to an artwork can underpin said judgements. This paper takes Cutting’s conclusion a step further: If philosophers grant that it’s possible to appreciate artwork on the basis of unconscious biases, then we never can be fully confident that our aesthetic judgment is undergirded by the intrinsic aesthetic properties of an artwork. Furthermore, if judgment on the basis of unconscious, external reasons cannot be ruled out, we cannot be confident that our aesthetic judgments are ‘correct’. I argue that Cutting’s research is just the tip of the iceberg regarding the extrinsic, unconscious factors that influence aesthetic judgment. Expectation bias formed via social influence and context greatly influence aesthetic judgments and are unavoidable: we inevitably form expectations based on all kinds of contextual cues independently of any actual exposure to the item in question. Such factors make it terribly difficult to be confident in our aesthetic judgments. Even if there are objective properties that mark out some items as aesthetically superior to others, we cannot be sure that our judgments are responding to those properties.

Is Justification Necessary for Knowledge?

Advances in Experimental Epistemology : Series: Advances in Experimental Philosophy

Forthcoming in James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology (Continuum) Justificat... more Forthcoming in James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology (Continuum) Justification has long been considered a necessary condition for knowledge, and theories that deny the necessity of justification have been dismissed as non-starters. In this paper, we challenge this longstanding view by showing that many of the arguments offered in support of it fall short and by providing empirical evidence that individuals are often willing to attribute knowledge when epistemic justification is lacking. In the early 1990s, Crispin Sartwell (1991; 1992) attempted to call into question the traditional view that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge. Unlike some epistemic externalists who suggested that the justification condition be replaced with reliable indication, sensitivity, or some other externalist condition, Sartwell contended that no replacement was necessary. Sartwell's claims were initially met with incredulous stares and were soon largely ignored as their novelty diminished. More recently, other philosophers have taken aim at some of the other purportedly necessary conditions for knowledge. Allan Hazlett (2010; 2012), for example, has pointed to the widespread willingness of individuals to attribute knowledge in the absence of truth, arguing that the ordinary concept of knowledge may not be factive after all. Blake Myers-Schulz and Eric Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) and James Beebe (forthcoming) have gathered empirical data that display folk willingness to attribute knowledge even in the absence of occurrent or dispositional belief.

A Consideration of Carroll’s Content Theory

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2019

A Consideration of Carroll’s Content Theory

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2019

What Jancis Robinson Didn’t Know May Have Helped Her

Erkenntnis, 2018

A position has been advanced by a number of philosophers, notably by Burnham and Skilleås, that c... more A position has been advanced by a number of philosophers, notably by Burnham and Skilleås, that certain knowledge is required to aesthetically appreciate a fine wine. They further argue that pleasure is not an integral part of aesthetically appreciating wine. Their position implies that a novice cannot aesthetically appreciate a fine wine. This paper draws on research into tasting and psychology to rebut these claims. I argue that there is strong evidence from both the average consumer and from wine experts that they are unable to separate enjoyment from aesthetic evaluation; secondly, I argue that wine knowledge may actually preclude tasting of the wine as it exists in the glass due to perceptual bias. I conclude by arguing that it is unclear how exactly knowledge of things like terroir is supposed to affect the taste, as well as question what role conforming to a certain style plays in aesthetic success, as arguments that require knowledge for appreciation typically emphasize knowledge of styles of wine. A wine's first duty is to be good. Beyond that, terroir is bullshit.-Paul Draper, wine grower Within popular culture, there is a certain stereotype regarding wine: that it takes a special expertise to appreciate fine wine. Here is one statement of that popular stereotype: ''Wine is a complicated elixir, full of subtle flavors only an expert can truly distinguish, and experienced tasters are impervious to deception'' (Mcraney 2011). Recently, many philosophers who write on wine have sought to defend something along these lines (See Burnham and Skilleås 2012; Cohen 2013; Scruton & David C.

Moral objectivism across the lifespan

Philosophical Psychology, 2016

We report the results of a cross-sectional study that examined folk metaethical judgments in part... more We report the results of a cross-sectional study that examined folk metaethical judgments in participants between the ages of 12 and 88. We found that participants in their late teens and early twenties attributed less objectivity to ethical statements than participants in older or younger age groups. We also critically examine other recent investigations of folk metaethical intuitions and compare our results to certain well-known findings in the moral development literature.

Category Independent Aesthetic Experience: The Case of Wine

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2013

Famine, Affluence, and Amorality

European journal of analytic philosophy, 2021

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether suc... more I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that firs...

Feeling the Aesthetic: A Pluralist Sentimentalist Theory of Aesthetic Experience

Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics, 2020

Sentimentalist aesthetic theories, broadly construed, posit that emotions play a fundamental role... more Sentimentalist aesthetic theories, broadly construed, posit that emotions play a fundamental role in aesthetic experiences. Jesse Prinz has recently proposed a reductionistic version of sentimentalist aesthetics, suggesting that it is the discrete feeling of wonder that makes an experience aesthetic. In this contribution, we draw on Prinz's proposal in order to outline a novel version of a sentimentalist theory. Contrasting Prinz's focus on a single emotion, we argue that an aesthetic experience is rudimentarily composed of a plurality of emotions. We acknowledge and discuss significant problems that follow from such a theory, arguing that a pluralist version of sentimentalism is nonetheless the soundest position within sentimentalist aesthetics.

A Defense of Causal Creationism in Fiction

In this paper I seek defend the view that fictional characters are author-created abstract entiti... more In this paper I seek defend the view that fictional characters are author-created abstract entities against objections offered by Stuart Brock in his paper “The Creationist Fiction: The Case against Creationism about Fictional Characters.” I argue that his objections fall far short of his goal of showing that if philosophers want to believe in fictional characters as abstract objects, they should not view them as author-created. My defense of creationism in fiction in part rests on tying the act of creating a fictional character more closely to the act of story-telling. Ultimately I aim to show that the creation of

Considering the Classroom as a Safe Space

In the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, Lauren Freeman (2014) advocates that faculty tu... more In the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, Lauren Freeman (2014) advocates that faculty turn their classrooms into “safe spaces” as a method for increasing the diversity of philosophy majors. The creation of safe spaces is meant to make women and minority students “feel sufficiently comfortable” and thereby increase the likelihood that they pursue philosophy as a major or career. Although I agree with Freeman’s goal, I argue that philosophers, and faculty in general, should reject the call for turning classrooms into “safe spaces.” I begin by distinguishing extra-curricular safe spaces from the classroom as a safe space. I then argue that although faculty should not object to extra-curricular safe spaces, they should reject curricular ones. I argue that the classroom as a safe space is currently an impractical and inappropriate goal given the nature of academic philosophy, and that encouraging students to think of classrooms as safe/unsafe does not facilitate learning. Nonetheless, I agree with Freeman that faculty should take steps to ensure that students from all backgrounds have the tools they need to be successful in the classroom. I further argue that faculty calls for safe spaces creates confusion concerning the educative environment one should expect to find at the majority of America universities

If ‘might’ and ‘knows’ are contextual, we can’t know what might be

Many philosophers and linguists are committed to the following two theses: that the semantic cont... more Many philosophers and linguists are committed to the following two theses: that the semantic content of the word ‗might' and of the word ‗knows' is dependent in part on the context of use. Keith DeRose is one such philosopher committed to these two theses. He also holds the commonly held position that knowledge is the norm of assertion. Because of the complex interaction between these two contextual terms ‗might' and ‗know', I argue that the following three propositions are inconsistent: that ‗knows' is contextual; that ‗might' is contextual; that knowledge is the norm of assertion.

Are there "aesthetic" judgments

Erkenntnis, 2023

In philosophy of aesthetics, scholars commonly express a commitment to the premise that there is ... more In philosophy of aesthetics, scholars commonly express a commitment to the premise that there is a distinctive type of judgment that can be meaningfully labeled “aesthetic”, and that these judgments are distinctively different from other types of judgments. We argue that, within an Aristotelian framework, there is no clear avenue for meaningfully differentiating “aesthetic” judgment from other types of judgment, and, as such, we aim to question the assumption that aesthetic judgment does in fact constitute a distinctive kind of judgment that is in need of, or can be subject to, distinctive theorizing. We advance our argument primarily through demonstrating that leading contemporary accounts of aesthetic judgment do not successfully distinguish a type of judgment in that they do not tell us how making an aesthetic judgment differs substantially from judging that 2 + 3 = 5, that football is entertaining, or that today is Tuesday.

The Disunity of Moral Judgment: Implications for the Study of Psychopathy

Philosophical Psychology, 2022

Since the 18th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been ‘moral colorbli... more Since the 18th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been ‘moral colorblindness’ or an inability to form moral judgments. However, attempts at experimentally verifying this moral incapacity have been largely unsuccessful. After reviewing the centrality of ‘moral colorblindness’ to the study and diagnosis of psychopathy, I argue that the reason that researchers have been unable to verify that diagnosed psychopaths have an inability to make moral judgments is because their research is premised on the assumption that there is a specific moral faculty of the brain, or specific “moral” emotions, and that this faculty or set of emotions can become “impaired”. I review recent research and argue that we have good reason to think that there is no such distinct capacity for moral judgment, and that, as a result, it is impossible for someone’s “moral judgment faculty” to become selectively disabled. I then discuss the implications of such a position on psychopathy research, the coherence of the disorder, and the moral responsibility of psychopaths.

The disunity of moral judgment evidence and implications offprint

Philosophical Psychology, 2022

We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment... more We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering
the possibility that moral judgment constitutes a distinctive
category of judgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and
arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to
indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts
that we ordinarily consider “moral judgments”. We argue that
if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting
that all moral judgments necessarily share common features:
if diverse brain processes give rise to what we refer to
as “moral judgments”, then we have reason to suspect that
these judgments may have different features. After advancing
this argument, we show that giving up the unity of
moral judgment seems to effectively dissolve the internalism/
externalism debate concerning motivation within the
field of metaethics.

Feeling the Aesthetic: A Pluralist Sentimentalist Theory of Aesthetic Experience

by Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen and David Sackris

Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics, 2020

Sentimentalist aesthetic theories, broadly construed, posit that emotions play a fundamental role... more Sentimentalist aesthetic theories, broadly construed, posit that emotions play a fundamental role in aesthetic experiences. Jesse Prinz has recently proposed a reductionistic version of sentimentalist aesthetics, suggesting that it is the discrete feeling of wonder that makes an experience aesthetic. In this contribution, we draw on Prinz's proposal in order to outline a novel version of a sentimentalist theory. Contrasting Prinz's focus on a single emotion, we argue that an aesthetic experience is rudimentarily composed of a plurality of emotions. We acknowledge and discuss significant problems that follow from such a theory, arguing that a pluralist version of sentimentalism is nonetheless the soundest position within sentimentalist aesthetics.