Conference Presentations by Sara Perley

Intelligence is the gathering and analysis of any information that aids one state in understandin... more Intelligence is the gathering and analysis of any information that aids one state in understanding another in order to facilitate policy decision making. There is a general conception that the military and political forces of the mid-Roman Republic lacked a sophisticated appreciation of intelligence (Dvornik, 1974, Austin and Rankov, 1995, Sheldon 2003). Such studies focus on the intelligence failures and the absence of a bureaucratic service devoted to intelligence activity. This paper challenges this conception by examining the use of counterintelligence in martial endeavours during the 3rd and 2nd centuries BCE.
Counterintelligence refers to the efforts engaged in to prevent hostile forces gaining pertinent information. Lowenthal (2006) gives it three primary goals – to investigate the intelligence capabilities of others; to prevent the dissemination of vital information; and to manipulate and mislead hostile agents. Such activities are a common feature of in Roman military activity. Extant sources reveal consistent patterns of behaviour in activities, such as the treatment of defectors and deserters, the protection of their camps against infiltration, the use of disinformation, and the countering of enemy misinformation and disinformation. There are also examples of psychological warfare in instances where primary counterintelligence attempts have failed. The development of these behaviours would not have occurred in the absence of complex thinking about intelligence and the acknowledgement of the use of information in warfare. For counterintelligence to be successful, an understanding of hostile intelligence involvement is required. It would be futile to spread disinformation without an expectation that it would reach a hostile party. This paper suggests that the utilisation of counterintelligence activities in military situations, whether successful or not, has important implications for the understanding of intelligence in the Roman Republic.
Papers by Sara Perley
In Charlemagne, Johannes Fried offers a new account of the life of the Frankish king and emperor,... more In Charlemagne, Johannes Fried offers a new account of the life of the Frankish king and emperor, one of the most influential figures in European history. Although the limited surviving resources from the period make the book more of an in-depth account of the socio-political context of Charlemagne’s reign rather than a strict biography, Sara Perley welcomes this as a well-researched and engaging read that will foster curiosity about both Charlemagne and this lesser known period of history

JOURNAL OF ANCIENT HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY, 2015
This paper explores the strategies undertaken to preserve information in an age without formal se... more This paper explores the strategies undertaken to preserve information in an age without formal services devoted to national security and counterintelligence. It examines the primary efforts of political counterintelligence denial undertaken by Roman senate during the mid-Republic. The fundamental focus revolved around restricting and monitoring access to available information. The senate determined what information, and in what detail, the public should have access to. This served to control both Roman citizens and the information available to foreigners. Extant sources mention the existence of spies and informers resident in or visiting Rome. These agents gathered information about other states in order to aid their political and martial decisions. Acknowledging this, the Republican senate undertook efforts to protect against these forces.
It is important to note that 'stability' for Waltz, rather than being the abscence of war, is ins... more It is important to note that 'stability' for Waltz, rather than being the abscence of war, is instead a situation where anarchy prevails and the number of polarities that dominate the system remains unchanged. 66 Multipolarity signifies that more than two states have equal or near equal amounts of military, economic, and cultural influence.
In Charlemagne, Johannes Fried offers a new account of the life of the Frankish king and emperor,... more In Charlemagne, Johannes Fried offers a new account of the life of the Frankish king and emperor, one of the most influential figures in European history. Although the limited surviving resources from the period make the book more of an in-depth account of the socio-political context of Charlemagne’s reign rather than a strict biography, Sara Perley welcomes this as a well-researched and engaging read that will foster curiosity about both Charlemagne and this lesser known period of history.
This thesis examines the ideology and reality of fides in Roman international relations, using th... more This thesis examines the ideology and reality of fides in Roman international relations, using the conquest of Iberia as a case study. It seeks to show that despite the ideology, the self-belief in Rome's cultural superiority and the competitive nature of the Roman state resulted in the disregard for the precepts of fides in martial diplomacy. I would like to thank my friends and family, especially my mother and Chelsea Johnston, their insights and suggestions on improvements were greatly appreciated. I am indebted to Laura Imanse. I am grateful for her continuous support and encouragement.
This thesis examines the ideology and reality of fides in Roman international relations, using th... more This thesis examines the ideology and reality of fides in Roman international relations, using the conquest of Iberia as a case study. It seeks to show that despite the ideology, the self-belief in Rome's cultural superiority and the competitive nature of the Roman state resulted in the disregard for the precepts of fides in martial diplomacy. I would like to thank my friends and family, especially my mother and Chelsea Johnston, their insights and suggestions on improvements were greatly appreciated. I am indebted to Laura Imanse. I am grateful for her continuous support and encouragement.
This paper explores the strategies undertaken to preserve information in an age without formal se... more This paper explores the strategies undertaken to preserve information in an age without formal services devoted to national security and counterintelligence. It examines the primary efforts of political counterintelligence denial undertaken by Roman senate during the mid-Republic. The fundamental focus revolved around restricting and monitoring access to available information. The senate determined what information, and in what detail, the public should have access to. This served to control both Roman citizens and the information available to foreigners. Extant sources mention the existence of spies and informers resident in or visiting Rome. These agents gathered information about other states in order to aid their political and martial decisions. Acknowledging this, the Republican senate undertook efforts to protect against these forces.
PhD Dissertation by Sara Perley

The general scholarly conception of Roman military and
political intelligence is that it was so ... more The general scholarly conception of Roman military and
political intelligence is that it was so poor as to be virtually
non-existent, that Roman armies and officials blundered through
their affairs and their world with little understanding or
appreciation of the utility and importance of intelligence about
their friends, foes, and neighbours. Some scholars who address
the growth of the Roman empire make assumptions about
intelligence usage; those who investigate intelligence practices
more closely tend to focus on military intelligence or
intelligence over long periods of Roman history. The conclusion
usually reached is that the Roman state valued and practiced
intelligence very poorly. There are no studies that focus
specifically on political intelligence, and none that focuses on
a specific period of Roman history. This study aims to illuminate
the realities of Roman political intelligence for the period of
the mid-republic, and attempts to provide a more nuanced
understanding of Rome’s appreciation for and use of
intelligence techniques in their international relations.
Analysis of ancient sources reveals that the Roman understanding
of the intelligence was neither as dire nor unsophisticated as
current scholarly consensus would have us believe. While
political intelligence endeavours often failed or from hindsight
might appear inadequate, when examined in their historical
context intelligence efforts were in fact suitable for Roman
needs. Roman officials protected their state through
counterintelligence, developed preliminary cultural dossiers
through foreknowledge, undertook concerted efforts to gain more
specific intelligence prior to major international interactions,
and on occasion engaged in covert activities to improve their
position and ensure their national security. This is indicative
of an attitude toward the broader Mediterranean world they
inhabited, and their place in that world which was neither
blindly aggressive nor defensive, that was neither passive nor
opportunistic, but that was considered, sophisticated, and
appreciative of the complexities of the Mediterranean
international system.
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Conference Presentations by Sara Perley
Counterintelligence refers to the efforts engaged in to prevent hostile forces gaining pertinent information. Lowenthal (2006) gives it three primary goals – to investigate the intelligence capabilities of others; to prevent the dissemination of vital information; and to manipulate and mislead hostile agents. Such activities are a common feature of in Roman military activity. Extant sources reveal consistent patterns of behaviour in activities, such as the treatment of defectors and deserters, the protection of their camps against infiltration, the use of disinformation, and the countering of enemy misinformation and disinformation. There are also examples of psychological warfare in instances where primary counterintelligence attempts have failed. The development of these behaviours would not have occurred in the absence of complex thinking about intelligence and the acknowledgement of the use of information in warfare. For counterintelligence to be successful, an understanding of hostile intelligence involvement is required. It would be futile to spread disinformation without an expectation that it would reach a hostile party. This paper suggests that the utilisation of counterintelligence activities in military situations, whether successful or not, has important implications for the understanding of intelligence in the Roman Republic.
Papers by Sara Perley
PhD Dissertation by Sara Perley
political intelligence is that it was so poor as to be virtually
non-existent, that Roman armies and officials blundered through
their affairs and their world with little understanding or
appreciation of the utility and importance of intelligence about
their friends, foes, and neighbours. Some scholars who address
the growth of the Roman empire make assumptions about
intelligence usage; those who investigate intelligence practices
more closely tend to focus on military intelligence or
intelligence over long periods of Roman history. The conclusion
usually reached is that the Roman state valued and practiced
intelligence very poorly. There are no studies that focus
specifically on political intelligence, and none that focuses on
a specific period of Roman history. This study aims to illuminate
the realities of Roman political intelligence for the period of
the mid-republic, and attempts to provide a more nuanced
understanding of Rome’s appreciation for and use of
intelligence techniques in their international relations.
Analysis of ancient sources reveals that the Roman understanding
of the intelligence was neither as dire nor unsophisticated as
current scholarly consensus would have us believe. While
political intelligence endeavours often failed or from hindsight
might appear inadequate, when examined in their historical
context intelligence efforts were in fact suitable for Roman
needs. Roman officials protected their state through
counterintelligence, developed preliminary cultural dossiers
through foreknowledge, undertook concerted efforts to gain more
specific intelligence prior to major international interactions,
and on occasion engaged in covert activities to improve their
position and ensure their national security. This is indicative
of an attitude toward the broader Mediterranean world they
inhabited, and their place in that world which was neither
blindly aggressive nor defensive, that was neither passive nor
opportunistic, but that was considered, sophisticated, and
appreciative of the complexities of the Mediterranean
international system.
Counterintelligence refers to the efforts engaged in to prevent hostile forces gaining pertinent information. Lowenthal (2006) gives it three primary goals – to investigate the intelligence capabilities of others; to prevent the dissemination of vital information; and to manipulate and mislead hostile agents. Such activities are a common feature of in Roman military activity. Extant sources reveal consistent patterns of behaviour in activities, such as the treatment of defectors and deserters, the protection of their camps against infiltration, the use of disinformation, and the countering of enemy misinformation and disinformation. There are also examples of psychological warfare in instances where primary counterintelligence attempts have failed. The development of these behaviours would not have occurred in the absence of complex thinking about intelligence and the acknowledgement of the use of information in warfare. For counterintelligence to be successful, an understanding of hostile intelligence involvement is required. It would be futile to spread disinformation without an expectation that it would reach a hostile party. This paper suggests that the utilisation of counterintelligence activities in military situations, whether successful or not, has important implications for the understanding of intelligence in the Roman Republic.
political intelligence is that it was so poor as to be virtually
non-existent, that Roman armies and officials blundered through
their affairs and their world with little understanding or
appreciation of the utility and importance of intelligence about
their friends, foes, and neighbours. Some scholars who address
the growth of the Roman empire make assumptions about
intelligence usage; those who investigate intelligence practices
more closely tend to focus on military intelligence or
intelligence over long periods of Roman history. The conclusion
usually reached is that the Roman state valued and practiced
intelligence very poorly. There are no studies that focus
specifically on political intelligence, and none that focuses on
a specific period of Roman history. This study aims to illuminate
the realities of Roman political intelligence for the period of
the mid-republic, and attempts to provide a more nuanced
understanding of Rome’s appreciation for and use of
intelligence techniques in their international relations.
Analysis of ancient sources reveals that the Roman understanding
of the intelligence was neither as dire nor unsophisticated as
current scholarly consensus would have us believe. While
political intelligence endeavours often failed or from hindsight
might appear inadequate, when examined in their historical
context intelligence efforts were in fact suitable for Roman
needs. Roman officials protected their state through
counterintelligence, developed preliminary cultural dossiers
through foreknowledge, undertook concerted efforts to gain more
specific intelligence prior to major international interactions,
and on occasion engaged in covert activities to improve their
position and ensure their national security. This is indicative
of an attitude toward the broader Mediterranean world they
inhabited, and their place in that world which was neither
blindly aggressive nor defensive, that was neither passive nor
opportunistic, but that was considered, sophisticated, and
appreciative of the complexities of the Mediterranean
international system.