Political and social philosophy by Justin Bruner
Synthese (forthcoming)
Recently, philosophers have investigated the emergence and evolution of the social contract. Yet ... more Recently, philosophers have investigated the emergence and evolution of the social contract. Yet extant work is limited as it focuses on the use of simple behavioral norms in rather rigid strategic settings. Drawing on ax-iomatic bargaining theory, we explore the dynamics of more sophisticated norms capable of guiding behavior in a wide range of scenarios. Overall, our investigation suggests the utilitarian bargaining solution has a privileged status as it has certain stability properties other social arrangements lack.
Synthese (forthcoming)
We identify a novel 'cultural red king effect' that, in many cases, results in stable arrangement... more We identify a novel 'cultural red king effect' that, in many cases, results in stable arrangements that are to the detriment of minority groups. In particular, we show inequalities disadvantaging minority groups can naturally arise under an adaptive process when minority and majority members must routinely determine how to divide resources amongst themselves. We contend that these results show how inequalities disadvantag-ing minorities can likely arise by dint of their relative size and need not be a result of either explicit nor implicit prejudices, nor due to intrinsic differences between minority and majority members.
Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy (2018)
Distributive justice is a central focus of modern political philosophy. Rawls (1971) pioneers a ... more Distributive justice is a central focus of modern political philosophy. Rawls (1971) pioneers a famous approach in which principles chosen to regulate the basic structure are just if they can be endorsed by impartial individuals from behind a “veil of ignorance.” This paper attempts to experimentally determine the income distributions individuals will select from “behind the veil.” While prior experiments have been concerned primarily with only the difference principle and utilitarianism, our experiment investigates a more complete reading of Rawls, taking into account Rawls’ other principle, fair equality of opportunity. We find little support for the Difference Principle, but uncover that the consensus from behind the veil is nonetheless structured and exhibits a lexicographic ordering.
Social Epistemology, 2019
Intersectionality theory explores the special sorts of disadvantage that arise as the result of o... more Intersectionality theory explores the special sorts of disadvantage that arise as the result of occupying multiple disadvantaged demographic categories. One significant methodological problem for the quantitative study of intersectionality is the difficulty of acquiring data sets large enough to produce significant results when one is looking for intersectional effects. For this reason , we argue, simulation methods may be particularly useful to this branch of theorizing because they can generate precise predictions and causal dependencies in a relatively cheap way, and can thus guide future empirical work. We illustrate this point through models which show that intersectional oppression can arise under conditions where social groups are disadvantaged in the emergence of bargaining norms. As we show, intersectional disadvantage can arise even when actors from all social categories are completely identical in terms of preferences and abilities. The conditions necessary to derive such disadvantage are relatively minimal. And when actors behave in ways that reflect stronger intersectional identities, the potential for disadvantage increases.
Politics, Philosophy and Economics (2015)
Philosophers and social scientists have recently turned to game theory and agent-based models to ... more Philosophers and social scientists have recently turned to game theory and agent-based models to better understand social contract formation. The stag hunt game is an idealization of social contract formation. Using the stag hunt game we attempt to determine what, if any, barrier diversity is to the formation of an efficient social contract. We uncover a deep connection between tolerance, diversity and the social contract. We investigate a simple model in which individuals possess salient traits and behave cooperatively when the difference between their trait and the trait of their counterpart is less than their “tolerance level.” If traits are fixed and correspond to permanent or semi-permanent features of the individual such as religion or race social contract formation is a remote possibility. If traits are malleable, social contract formation is possible but comes at the steep cost of diversity and tolerance – individuals are unwilling to cooperate with those much different from themselves. Yet homogeneity and intolerance are not a long term feature of the population. Over time mutations allow for increasingly tolerant agents to prosper, thereby ushering in trait diversity. In the end, all reap the benefits of cooperation.
Philosophical Studies
Recently, philosophers have drawn on tools from game theory to explore behavior in Hobbes' state ... more Recently, philosophers have drawn on tools from game theory to explore behavior in Hobbes' state of nature (Vanderschraaf, 2006; Chung, 2015). I take a similar approach and argue the Lockean state of nature is best conceived of as a conflictual coordination game. I also discuss Nozick's famous claim regarding the emergence of the state and argue the path to the minimal state is blocked by a hitherto unnoticed free-rider problem. Finally, I argue that on my representation of the Lockean state of nature both widespread conflict and lasting peace are possible. This, I contend, is in line with one popular interpretation of Locke (Simmons, 1989).
Philosophical Studies, 2020
Social contract theorists often take the ideal contract to be the agreement or bargain individual... more Social contract theorists often take the ideal contract to be the agreement or bargain individuals would make in some privileged choice situation (i.e., an ‘original position’). Recently, experimental philosophers have explored this kind of decision-making in the lab. One rather robust finding is that the exact circumstances of choice significantly affect the kinds of social arrangements experimental subjects (almost) unanimously endorse. Yet prior work has largely ignored the question of which of the many competing descriptions of the original position subjects find most compelling. This paper aims to address this gap, exploring how attractive experimental subjects find various characterizations of these circumstances of choice. We find evidence suggesting that no one choice situation can fulfill the role that social contract theorists have hoped it would play. We also find that, contrary to what some prominent social contract theorists have expected, there is no robust relationship between an individual’s ranking of distributive principles and their ranking of various descriptions of the original position. In conclusion, we discuss the broader implications of these results for political philosophy.
Philosophy of biology by Justin Bruner
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Inclusive fitness has been under intense scrutiny in recent years, with many critics claiming the... more Inclusive fitness has been under intense scrutiny in recent years, with many critics claiming the framework leads to incorrect predictions. We show that one particularly influential heuristic for estimating inclusive fitness is unreliable, yielding incorrect predictions in the very case that motivated reliance on it to begin with: communication among relatives with conflicting interests. Using a neighbor-modulated fitness model, we show when and why this heuristic fails. We do not argue that the inclusive fitness framework as a whole is problematic, but that a heavily relied on method for calculating inclusive fitness misrepresents the biological reality of interactions among kin.
Philosophy of Science, Dec 2017
We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signaling game and relax a number of unreal... more We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signaling game and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often built into the framework. In particular, we motivate and explore various asymmetries that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the likelihood of signaling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this paper can also help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict of interest signaling games. 1 Signaling games and evolution Common interest signaling games were introduced by David Lewis (1969) as a game theoretic framework which treats communicative conventions as solutions to coordination problems. In recent years, this has informed a growing body of work on the evolution of communication, incorporating signaling games into an evolutionary game theoretic approach to modelling the evolution of communication and cooperation in humans (Skyrms 2010; Skyrms 1996). As the basis for such work, David Lewis signaling games are attractive in their intuitive simplicity and clear outcomes. They are coordination games between world-observing senders and action-making receivers using costless signals; in contrast to games where interests may differ and where costly signals are typically invoked. In the standard two-player, two-state, two-option David Lewis signaling game (hereafter the '2x2x2 game'), the first agent (signaler) observes that the world is in one of two possible states and broadcasts one of two possible signals which are observed by the second agent (receiver) who performs one of two possible actions. If the act chosen by the receiver matches the underlying state of the world, both agents receive a greater payoff than otherwise. Most importantly, though, the game theoretic results are unequivocal. There exist two Nash equilibria that are, in Lewis's words, signaling systems where senders condition (otherwise arbitrary) signaling behavior on the state of the world, and receivers act on those signals so as to secure the mutual payoff. The two systems only differ on which signal is associated with each state of the world 1. Huttegger (2007) and Pawlowitsch (2008) have shown that under certain conditions a signaling system is guaranteed to emerge under the replicator dynamics, a standard model of evolution further discussed in section 4. 1 The other two possible outcomes of the game are 'pooling equilibrium' which involve the receiver performing an act unconditionally.
Biology and Philosophy
The handicap principle (HP) stipulates that signal reliability can be maintained if signals are c... more The handicap principle (HP) stipulates that signal reliability can be maintained if signals are costly to produce. Yet empirical biologists are typically unable to directly measure evolutionary costs, and instead appeal to expenditure (the time, energy and resources associated with signaling behavior) as a sensible proxy. However the link between expenditure and cost is not always as straightforward as proponents of HP assume. We consider signaling interactions where whether the expenditure associated with signaling is converted into an evolutionary cost is in some sense dependent on the behavior of the intended recipient of the signal. We illustrate this with a few empirical examples and demonstrate that on this alternative expenditure to cost mapping the traditional predictions of HP no longer hold. Instead of full information transfer, a partially informative communication system similar to that uncovered by Zollman, Bergstrom and Huttegger (2012) is possible.
Philosophy of Science (2015)
One of the major puzzles in evolutionary theory is how communication and information transfer are... more One of the major puzzles in evolutionary theory is how communication and information transfer are possible when the interests of those involved conflict. Simply put, communication is possible if there are substantial costs associated with sending a signal or, alternatively, if signals themselves are difficult, if not impossible, to fake (such signals are often known as indices). In this second case, perfect information transfer seems inevitable if there are physical constraints, which limit the signal repertoire of an individual, effectively making bluffing an impossibility. This, I shall argue, is incorrect. Indices by no means guarantee information transfer. I demonstrate the existence of a so-called pooling equilibrium and discuss why the traditional argument for perfect information transfer (Frank's full disclosure principle) does not hold in all cases. Finally, I attempt to outline under what conditions signaling constraints will evolve.
Philosophy of Science
The handicap principle is one of the most influential ideas in evolutionary biology. It asserts t... more The handicap principle is one of the most influential ideas in evolutionary biology. It asserts that when there is conflict of interest in a signaling interaction signals must be costly in order to be reliable. We show how the handicap principle is a limiting case of honest signaling, which can also be sustained by other mechanisms. This fact has gone unnoticed because in evolutionary biology it is a common practice to distinguish between cues, indexes and fakable signals, where cues provide information but are not signals and indexes are signals that cannot be faked. We find that the dichotomy between indexes and fakable signals is an artifact of the existing signaling models. Our results suggest that one cannot adequately understand signaling behavior by focusing solely on cost. Under our reframing, cost becomes one-and probably not the most important-of a collection of factors preventing deception.
Synthese, 2018
We investigate how experimental subjects learn to signal in the lab.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science C, 2020
Communication can arise when the interests of speaker and listener diverge if the cost of signali... more Communication can arise when the interests of speaker and listener diverge if the cost of signaling is high enough that it aligns their interests. But what happens when the cost of signaling is not suffcient to align their interests? Using methods from experimental economics, we test whether theoretical predictions of a partially informative system of communication areborne out. As our results indicate, partial communication can occur even when interests do not coincide.
Social epistemology by Justin Bruner
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2019
J.P. Bruner), [email protected] (B. Holman). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx ... more J.P. Bruner), [email protected] (B. Holman). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (xxxx) xxx-xxx 0039-3681/
British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2018
In their recent book Merchants of Doubt [New York:Bloomsbury 2010], Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway... more In their recent book Merchants of Doubt [New York:Bloomsbury 2010], Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway describe the "tobacco strategy" , which was used by the tobacco industry to influence policy makers regarding the health risks of tobacco products. The strategy involved two parts, consisting of (1) promoting and sharing independent research supporting the industry's preferred position and (2) funding additional research, but selectively publishing the results. We introduce a model of the Tobacco Strategy, and use it to argue that both prongs of the strategy can be extremely effective—even when policy makers rationally update on all evidence available to them. As we elaborate, this model helps illustrate the conditions under which the Tobacco Strategy is particularly successful. In addition, we show how journalists engaged in "fair" reporting can inadvertently mimic the effects of industry on public belief.
Philosophy of Science (2017)
Industry is a major source of funding for scientific research. There is also a growing concern fo... more Industry is a major source of funding for scientific research. There is also a growing concern for how it corrupts researchers faced with conflicts of interest. As such, the debate has focused on whether researchers have maintained their integrity. In this paper we draw on both the history of medicine and formal modeling to argue that given methodological diversity and a merit-based system, industry funding can bias a community without corrupting any particular individual. We close by considering a policy solution (i.e., independent funding) that may seem to promote unbiased inquiry, but which actually exacerbates the problem without additional restrictions.
Philosophy of Science (2015)
In recent years the social nature of scientific inquiry has generated considerable interest. We e... more In recent years the social nature of scientific inquiry has generated considerable interest. We examine the effect of an epistemically impure agent on a community of honest truth seekers. Extending a formal model of network epistemology pioneered by Zollman, we conclude that an intransigently biased agent prevents the community from ever converging to the truth. We explore two solutions to this problem, including a novel procedure for endogenous network formation in which agents choose whom to trust. We contend that our model nicely captures aspects of current problems in medical research and gesture at some morals for medical epistemology more generally.
Episteme, Dec 2013
I examine how particular social arrangements and incentive structures encourage the honest report... more I examine how particular social arrangements and incentive structures encourage the honest reporting of experimental results and minimize fraudulent scientific work. In particular I investigate how epistemic communities can achieve this goal by promoting members to police the community. Using some basic tools from game theory, I explore a simple model in which scientists both conduct research and have the option of investigating the findings of their peers. I find that this system of peer policing can in many cases ensure high levels of honesty.
Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge, 2017
We consider how certain groups may be disadvantaged in collaborative endeavors in epistemic commu... more We consider how certain groups may be disadvantaged in collaborative endeavors in epistemic communities. In particular, we look at possible disadvantage for underrepresented groups and for those at the bottom of the academic hierarchy.
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Political and social philosophy by Justin Bruner
Philosophy of biology by Justin Bruner
Social epistemology by Justin Bruner