Books by H. D. P. Envall
A political leader is most often a nation’s most high-profile foreign policy figure, its chief di... more A political leader is most often a nation’s most high-profile foreign policy figure, its chief diplomat. But how do individual leadership styles, personalities, perceptions, or beliefs shape diplomacy? In Japanese Diplomacy, the question of what role leadership plays in diplomacy is applied to Japan, a country where the individual is often viewed as being at the mercy of the group and where prime ministers have been largely thought of as reactive and weak. In challenging earlier, simplified ideas of Japanese political leadership, H. D. P. Envall argues that Japan’s leaders, from early Cold War figures such as Yoshida Shigeru to the charismatic and innovative Koizumi Jun’ichirō to the present leadership of Abe Shinzō, have pursued leadership strategies of varying coherence and rationality, often independent of their political environment. He also finds that different Japanese leaders have shaped Japanese diplomacy in some important and underappreciated ways. In certain environments, individual difference has played a significant role in determining Japan’s diplomacy, both in terms of the country’s strategic identity and summit diplomacy. What emerges from Japanese Diplomacy, therefore, is a more nuanced overall picture of Japanese leadership in foreign affairs.
Refereed Articles by H. D. P. Envall
Asian Journal of Political Science, 2011
On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the 'prince' of Japanese politics. A ... more On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the 'prince' of Japanese politics. A year later, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party had suffered a major electoral defeat and Abe's time as his country's leader was over. As a study of political leadership, this article seeks to explain the leadership outcomes of Abe's brief prime ministership, in particular the dramatic fall in public support Abe suffered during his tenure. It is argued that, despite the difficult circumstances Abe faced, the nature of his political demise cannot be fully accounted for by structural factors alone. It is also necessary to understand the role played by Abe himself and, in particular, his flawed leadership strategy. In the end, Abe's political demise followed a basic logic: high expectations followed by disillusionment characterised by sudden plunges in approval*a tragedy of hubris leading to nemesis.
Asian Security, 2015
Abstract Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominen... more Abstract Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent “thorn in the side” of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa’s base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa’s significance on the US–Japan alliance—the “Okinawa effect”—in terms of the alliance’s strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance’s strategic effectiveness, alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies, this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance’s solidarity and effectiveness.
Survival
Japan’s recent policy shifts suggest a national strategy designed to present a counterweight to C... more Japan’s recent policy shifts suggest a national strategy designed to present a counterweight to China without challenging it for regional primacy.
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
Since 2012, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has sought to remake the country’s foreign and secu... more Since 2012, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has sought to remake the country’s foreign and security policy. Abe’s agenda, which is increasingly called an ‘Abe Doctrine’, has prompted considerable debate as to its true nature. Is the Abe Doctrine nationalist, revisionist, or realist? This article contributes to these debates by tracing the competing characterizations of an Abe Doctrine’s policy ideas and assessing these against the doctrine’s policy prescriptions. It argues that the Abe Doctrine–situated within the long-term evolution of Japanese policymaking – is chiefly realist rather than nationalist in its policy prescriptions. In fact, where the doctrine does constitute a major departure from past policy practice, largely unrecognized until now, is not so much in how it expands Japan’s international role but in how it narrows this role. The underlying logic of the Abe Doctrine may therefore be pushing Japan towards a new form of regional realism.
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2013
The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with p... more The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.
Japanese Studies, 2008
The orthodox view or ‘rule’ of Japanese politics over past decades has been that Japanese leaders... more The orthodox view or ‘rule’ of Japanese politics over past decades has been that Japanese leadership is weak and reactive. As such, Koizumi Jun'ichirō, a recent Japanese prime minister, is seen as a great exception to this rule. This article seeks to re-evaluate this orthodoxy in light of wider leadership theory and recent studies on Japanese political leadership. Focusing especially on how assessments of Koizumi's leadership compare to those of previous leaders, it looks at how the literature on Japanese politics has viewed both Japan's political environment and its political leaders. It argues that Koizumi interacted with, not merely reacted to, his political environment. At the same time, he employed a leadership style which, although distinctive, shared important similarities with previous leaders. Accordingly, he was less an exception to this rule than a confirmation of the historical diversity of Japanese political leadership.
Japan has been a strong supporter of America’s ‘pivot’, or ‘rebalance’, to the Asia-Pacific. Why ... more Japan has been a strong supporter of America’s ‘pivot’, or ‘rebalance’, to the Asia-Pacific. Why has it responded in such a way? Japan’s established position in the region naturally makes it a keen supporter of the status quo and thus of the US-led order. Yet this does not fully explain Japan’s support. This article contends that to understand Japan’s position, it is necessary to more closely consider how Japan views the rebalance’s probable strategic benefits and costs. In fact, increasingly difficult Sino-Japanese relations have led Japan to reassess such costs and benefits, with Japan becoming more anxious to ensure that the United States continues to provide strategic reassurance to the region, even if this means that Japan is required to restructure its own security role in return. In turn, Japan’s security restructuring has important implications not only for its national security but also for wider regional stability.
This article examines the use of strategic partnerships by Asian states as a means of enhancing n... more This article examines the use of strategic partnerships by Asian states as a means of enhancing national and regional security, as well as advancing economic and other objectives. It argues that strategic partnerships are best conceived as a new practice that signals the emergence of new forms of “security governance” in the region. It observes, however, that whereas early strategic partnerships were based on substantive shared agreement on “system principles,” contemporary strategic partnerships take different forms, some grounding closer cooperation between like-minded partners and some intending to facilitate better management of partners with divergent values and interests. The contemporary behavior of the United States and its traditional and new security partners in the region conform to this general pattern. The article concludes that the proliferation of strategic partnerships and the emergence of regional security governance should prompt a reappraisal of traditional approaches to Asian security, which tend to concentrate on architecture and community at the expense of practices.
Discontent over US military bases in Japan's Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent " thorn... more Discontent over US military bases in Japan's Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent " thorn in the side " of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa's base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa's significance on the US–Japan alliance—the " Okinawa effect " —in terms of the alliance's strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance's strategic effectiveness , alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies , this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance's solidarity and effectiveness.
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2013
The US military bases in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa have long been a source of domestic p... more The US military bases in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa have long been a source of domestic political opposition to the US–Japan alliance. As an alliance management issue, the ongoing troubles surrounding the bases raise questions as to when and why states adopt particular bargaining strategies when dealing with allies. Why, for instance, has the Japanese government not made greater use of this ‘Okinawa card’ when negotiating alliance issues with the USA? Even though highlighting particular domestic problems as a part of a negotiating strategy (known as tying hands) should appeal to a weaker ally such as Japan, this article argues that in the Okinawan case the reverse has been true. Japan has generally, though not always, sought to minimise or downplay domestic opposition to its alliance agreements, essentially preferring a cutting-slack to a tying-hands approach. The Japanese experience suggests that when states which are directly dependent on an alliance for their security see their security environment as unstable, they view tying-hands strategies as too likely to undermine their bargaining credibility. Maintaining credibility is important in an alliance bargaining context because it is a way for such states to signal their commitment to an alliance and so guard against abandonment.
The Obama Administration has embraced multilateral security politics in the Asia-Pacific more vis... more The Obama Administration has embraced multilateral security politics in the Asia-Pacific more visibly and more extensively than its predecessors. It has done so, however, by applying several key preconditions for the U.S. involvement in this process: such involvement must be consistent with the purpose and maintenance of its bilateral alliances in the region, must reflect clear and shared interests and values which the U.S. could endorse and support, and must pursue clearly designated action plans to realize those interests and values. Subsequent to designating those criteria, U.S. policy planners have employed alternate strategies of multilateral retrenchment and counterpunching which, it is argued here, have muddled Washington's determination to achieve such conditions. Yet Washington has been reluctant to reconcile multilateral retrenchment and counterpunching by nominating a single unifying strategy to realize more concrete regional security and order-building. It is argued here that the convergent security approach provides an opportunity for the U.S. to become a more enduring and meaningful player in evolving multilateral regional security architectures. The risk incurred in adopting this strategy is that its success depends on the willingness of the U.S. traditional allies in the region to collaborate more effectively with each other. To date, Washington has adopted a combination of bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral security approaches to realize more effective institution-building as a way to underwrite regional stability. It has not nominated any one Asia-Pacific institution to achieve this policy objective. Instead, it has pursued what is at least a tacit convergent security posture by nominating different institutions and networks to achieve a diversity of policy interests and outcomes.
On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the ‘prince’ of Japanese politics. A ... more On becoming prime minister in 2006, Abe Shinzō was feted as the ‘prince’ of Japanese politics. A year later, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party had suffered a major electoral defeat and Abe's time as his country's leader was over. As a study of political leadership, this article seeks to explain the leadership outcomes of Abe's brief prime ministership, in particular the dramatic fall in public support Abe suffered during his tenure. It is argued that, despite the difficult circumstances Abe faced, the nature of his political demise cannot be fully accounted for by structural factors alone. It is also necessary to understand the role played by Abe himself and, in particular, his flawed leadership strategy. In the end, Abe's political demise followed a basic logic: high expectations followed by disillusionment characterised by sudden plunges in approval—a tragedy of hubris leading to nemesis.
This article examines whether there is an identifiable Gaullist tradition in post-war Japanese se... more This article examines whether there is an identifiable Gaullist tradition in post-war Japanese security politics and how the security policies of Koizumi Jun'ichirō, a recent Japanese prime minister, compare to such a tradition. The article argues that Gaullism has been a minority tradition in domestic Japanese politics and so its practitioners have often compromised on their goals out of political necessity. Its most distinctive characteristic, therefore, has been its inward-looking agenda, the preoccupation with achieving a domestic political transformation in order to make Japan's domestic politics more conducive to its agenda. Although Koizumi did not pursue a strategy encompassing all of Gaullism's goals, he did make great efforts to pursue the Gaullist agenda. More importantly, he followed this established pattern of directing his efforts inward, toward a transformation of Japan's domestic politics of security.
Book Chapters by H. D. P. Envall
Defined as a "special strategic partnership," the Japan-Australia relationship is qualitatively d... more Defined as a "special strategic partnership," the Japan-Australia relationship is qualitatively distinct from many of Tokyo's other bilateral relationships. In particular, it exhibits features that mark it out as a security alignment and perhaps even a "quasi-alliance," in that it is sustained by the two countries' relationships with the United States. This chapter argues that the Japan-Australia partnership has developed as a multi-faceted alignment mechanism founded upon shared interests and values. It encompasses a full spectrum of functions and, moreover, represents an attempt by the two countries to promote an "Indo-Pacific" vision, which embodies their shared worldview and common agenda for action.
Reconsidering Postwar Japanese History: A Handbook, 2023
Japan's alliance with the United States remains the cornerstone of the country's security policy.... more Japan's alliance with the United States remains the cornerstone of the country's security policy. Indeed, the alliance has long delivered Japan considerable strategic advantages, such as greater deterrence of regional security threats. Yet the alliance has also come with costs. It has institutionalized Tokyo's dependence on Washington, thus limiting the country's strategic autonomy. This chapter examines how Japan has sought to manage the task of reconciling such tensionsbetween the often-conflicting goals of deterrence and autonomy. It argues that, while Japan has pursued autonomy where possible, it has repeatedly prioritized deterrence as the country's primary national security goal.
National perspectives on a multipolar order, 2021
Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century, Jun 28, 2017
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Books by H. D. P. Envall
Refereed Articles by H. D. P. Envall
Book Chapters by H. D. P. Envall
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: This Occasional Paper was written with the generous support of the Australia-Japan Foundation. The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options. The East-West Center in Washington provides US and Indo-Pacific government stakeholders and program partners with innovative training, analytical, dialogue, exchange, and public diplomacy initiatives to meet policy priorities.
CITATION: Envall, HDP, Hatakeyama, Kyoko Wilkins, Thomas S., and Hirono, Miwa (2024) “Japan/Australia Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific (II): Advancing Cooperation in Order-Building and Geoeconomics,” East-West Center Occasional Paper 10, 10 June, Washington, DC: East-West Center.
This East-West Center Occasional Paper is part of an Australia-Japan Foundation funded project, entitled “Enhancing Australia-Japan Cooperation: New Approaches to Minilateralism,” undertaken by Thomas Wilkins, Miwa Hirono, Kyoko Hatakeyama, and H.D.P. Envall. It is the first in a series of two papers. The second is entitled “Japan/Australia Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific (II): Advancing Cooperation in Order-Building and Geoeconomics.”
CITATION: Wilkins, Thomas S., Hirono, Miwa, Hatakeyama, Kyoko and Envall, HDP (2024) “Indo-Pacific Minilateralism and Strategic Competition (I): Australia/Japan and Chinese Approaches Compared,” East-West Center Occasional Paper 9, 9 June, Washington, DC: East-West Center.
As a regional order-builder, Japan has come to play an key role in the Indo-Pacific. According to Saori Katada, it has become something of a “pivotal state” driving regionalism and shaping the norms and rules of the Indo-Pacific. Japan is also significant for Australia. First, as an entrepreneurial state engaged in order-building, Japan represents a useful model for Australia as it pursues its own order-building initiatives. Second, Japan’s preferred vision for regional order, FOIP, is well aligned to Australia’s own thinking.
So, what might Australia learn from Japan’s attempts at order-building in the Indo-Pacific? And how might the two countries cooperate more effectively as they pursue their visions for the region? The aims of this paper are to: (1) outline Japanese and Australian approaches to order-building in the Indo-Pacific; (2) compare the two approaches and ascertain their strengths, weaknesses, and differences; and (3) using Japan’s FOIP as a guide, consider options for Australia to enhance its role as an Indo-Pacific order builder and to further develop its partnership with Japan in regional order-building.