Papers by Edward Aspinall
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2016
How do politicians win elected office in Indonesia? To find out, research teams fanned out across... more How do politicians win elected office in Indonesia? To find out, research teams fanned out across the country prior to Indonesia’s 2014 legislative election to record campaign events, interview candidates and canvassers, and observe their interactions with voters. They found that at the grassroots political parties are less important than personal campaign teams and vote brokers who reach out to voters through a wide range of networks associated with religion, ethnicity, kinship, micro enterprises, sports clubs and voluntary groups of all sorts. Above all, candidates distribute patronage—cash, goods and other material benefits—to individual voters and to communities. Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia brings to light the scale and complexity of vote buying and the many uncertainties involved in this style of politics, providing an unusually intimate portrait of politics in a patronage-based system.
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Aug 31, 2016
Press. 472 pages. ISBN-13: 978-9814722049. Paperback, $34.00. Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati ... more Press. 472 pages. ISBN-13: 978-9814722049. Paperback, $34.00. Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati (eds.). 2016. "Unity in diversity" "from Sabang to Merauke"-if the two slogans that represent Indonesia's heterogeneity and geographical reach have become clich es, forgive me for combining the two to describe the fascinating edited volume Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientism at the Grassroots by Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati. The volume certainly comes very close to covering Indonesia's geographic expanse, although Eastern Indonesia gets short shrift as Sumatra and Java comprise the bulk of the cases, but the first slogan is certainly manifest in Electoral Dynamics. It is an exploration of two aspects of patronage in the Indonesian electoral system-the diversity of its implementation throughout the archipelago as well as its "unity," so to speak, in its persistence among victors and losers alike. Toward this end, several research teams examined 22 legislative elections in 2014 with an eye to studying patron-client ties. After a description of the volume's research goals and a discussion of the Indonesian party system, varieties of patronage and descriptions of mobilization networks, the case studies begin. Since the onset of democratization and the messiness that comes with it, Indonesian voters have many different parties to choose from (although among these parties there is little ideological diversity) and many opportunities for patronage windfalls at election time. "Success teams" are tasked with distributing patronage, and, as the book points out, voters are savvy enough to occasionally take the goods or benefit from broader patronage programs such as assistance to sports clubs and other community projects, or promises of development, without delivering a vote-in short, free riding. At the same time, authors argue that cultural norms of reciprocity or obligation may factor into a party's success as it is bolstered by kinship or ethnic relations, a common village heritage, or religious ties. Mostly absent from the analysis are connections to structural, institutional, or cultural approaches to the study of democracy and democratization. Francis Fukuyama receives a nod in the discussion of culture, but the examples are predominantly straightforward narratives of the campaigns and results. The volume, nevertheless, provides ample case studies for others to dissect, with an eye on these theoretical approaches. Lest one think that Indonesian politics is simply about delivering cash, goods or other benefits to (potential) constituents, the volume describes the strategies
Third World Quarterly, 2021
Around the world, legislatures are dominated by politicians who are wealthier and more educated t... more Around the world, legislatures are dominated by politicians who are wealthier and more educated than their constituents. This is particularly so in developing democracies, where clientelist politics and wealth inequalities make it difficult for lower-class citizens to run for office. We contribute to scholarly debates about the substantive consequences of descriptive inequality by analysing a new and important case-Indonesia, the world's third most populous democracy. Indonesian politicians have much higher levels of education and income than citizens, and they are more likely to have professional backgrounds. To explore the implications of these inequalities, we survey and compare politicians' and voters' positions on a range of economic policy issues. We find the views of Indonesian politicians are generally more congruent with those of upper-class voters. However, we also find variation across policy areas. There is much cross-class agreement on statist interventions like price controls-in part reflecting politicians' dependence upon the state; however, the gap between voters and politicians widens substantially on the issue of economic redistribution. Upper-class biases within Indonesian legislatures thus obscure a large lower-class constituency in favour of a more redistributive economic regime, a consituency largely unrepresented by Indonesia's parties.
Electoral Studies, 2020
Do parties represent the ideological preferences of voters in clientelistic political systems? We... more Do parties represent the ideological preferences of voters in clientelistic political systems? We answer this question by studying the case of Indonesia, whose politics analysts usually describe as being based on patronage. We reassess this proposition using an original survey of over 500 Indonesian legislators. We show that, while party positions are similar on economic policy, they are differentiated on religious issues. To explore the implications of this cleavage, we develop a new measure of policy preferences about state-Islam relations, and match survey responses from legislators and citizens. Our analysis shows a high degree of congruence in party dyads of voters and politicians, which indicates that ideology is more salient than existing research suggests. We further suggest that clientelistic networks may have been pivotal in ensuring the survival of this religious-based ideological cleavage through decades of authoritarianism and democratic politics characterized by ideological moderation.
, we received invaluable assistance from the University's Department of Political and Social Chan... more , we received invaluable assistance from the University's Department of Political and Social Change and particularly its head, Professor Ben Kerkvliet, as well as the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies. Beverley Fraser at the Department of Political and Social Change, as well as many other individuals, helped to organise the conference. We especially thank those colleagues and friends of Harold Crouch who presented papers at the conference, many of whom travelled long distances at their own expense to attend, and most of whom subsequently revised their papers for inclusion in this book. We thank them for their responsiveness and patience during a lengthy editorial and publication process. Several individuals who presented papers at the conference, notably, Andrew MacIntyre, David Bourchier, Simon Philpott and Richard Robison, were not able to contribute book chapters, but we appreciate their participation. Our greatest thanks are reserved for Allison Ley, a member of staff of the Department of Political and Social Change, and herself a long-time colleague of Harold Crouch. She has done an outstanding job copy-editing the book and coordinating its preparation. We have relied heavily on Allison during the publication process and her good judgement, sense of humour and patience have made working with her a pleasure. Most importantly, without her professionalism and persistence we would not have been able to produce this book and we are very grateful to her for all her hard work. Finally, we would like to express our sincere appreciation to Craig Reynolds and editorial staff at the ANU E-Press for their invaluable support and assistance, and also to the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on the draft manuscript.
Offering comprehensive coverage of decentralization in Indonesia, this work contains contribution... more Offering comprehensive coverage of decentralization in Indonesia, this work contains contributions on a wide range of topics relating to democratization, devolution and the blossoming of local-level politics.
Journal of East Asian Studies, 2017
What underlying logic explains candidate participation in vote buying, given that clientelist exc... more What underlying logic explains candidate participation in vote buying, given that clientelist exchange is so difficult to enforce? We address this question through close analysis of campaigns by several dozen candidates in two electoral districts in Java, Indonesia. Analyzing candidates’ targeting and pricing strategies, we show that candidates used personal brokerage structures that drew on social networks to identify voters and deliver payments to them. But these candidates achieved vote totals averaging about one quarter of the number of payments they distributed. Many candidates claimed to be targeting loyalists, suggestive of “turnout buying,” but judged loyalty in personal rather than partisan terms, and extended their vote-buying reach through personal connections mediated by brokers. Candidates were market sensitive, paying prices per vote determined not only by personal resources, but also by constituency size and prices offered by competitors. Accordingly, we argue that a ...
Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia
Third World Quarterly, 2021
Around the world, legislatures are dominated by politicians who are wealthier and more educated t... more Around the world, legislatures are dominated by politicians who are wealthier and more educated than their constituents. This is particularly so in developing democracies, where clientelist politics and wealth inequalities make it difficult for lower-class citizens to run for office. We contribute to scholarly debates about the substantive consequences of descriptive inequality by analysing a new and important case –Indonesia, the world’s third most populous democracy. Indonesian politicians have much higher levels of education and income than citizens, and they are more likely to have professional backgrounds. To explore the implications of these inequalities, we survey and compare politicians’ and voters’ positions on a range of economic policy issues. We find the views of Indonesian politicians are generally more congruent with those of upper-class voters. However, we also find variation across policy areas. There is much cross-class agreement on statist interventions like price ...
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies
Journal of Democracy
On 22 July 2017, the tiny Southeast Asian island nation of Timor-Leste (East Timor) held its thir... more On 22 July 2017, the tiny Southeast Asian island nation of Timor-Leste (East Timor) held its third parliamentary election since its vote to secede from Indonesia in 1999. Timor-Leste now rivals Indonesia as Southeast Asia's most democratic country. Freedom House's survey for 2016 scores Timor-Leste as Partly Free in terms of civil and political liberties. Elections are held regularly and are generally considered to be free and fair. Freedom of association and expression are respected, and there is a lively public sphere and vigorous competition among parties. Many of the country's formal institutions, however, function poorly; structural constraints such as limited media capacity, low levels of education and literacy, and growing corruption and inequality mean that not all citizens enjoy equal protection under the law or equal access to basic rights such as education and healthcare. There are particular concerns about interference in the judicial system-especially after, in 2014, the government sacked international judges and legal advisers, a feature of the country's justice system dating back to a postindependence period of UN administration. Fears of violent disorder haunt the country's politics. A major episode of communal violence erupted in 2006-2007, linked to national political conflict, and many Timorese worry about a recurrence. Over the last decade, Timor-Leste has nonetheless enjoyed an extended period of stability, though this era may be nearing its end.
Democratization
The current worldwide democratic regression has prompted debate about the drivers of democratic d... more The current worldwide democratic regression has prompted debate about the drivers of democratic decline. One country experiencing decline is Indonesia, where most analysts blame the shift on actions of illiberal elites, casting the public as a democratic bulwark. Yet, as in other fragile democracies, regression in Indonesia has come at the hands of politicians enjoying popular support. To investigate drivers of democratic decline we ask: How democratic are Indonesian citizens when compared to the politicians they elect? We answer this question using an original, representative survey of provincial legislators, which we compare to a general survey of the Indonesian population. While both populations express overwhelming support for democratic government, we find significant differences between how elites and masses conceive of democracy, and in their commitment to liberal norms. Though neither group is a bulwark of liberal values, we find the legislators are systematically more liberal than voters. These findings challenge widely held assumptions about Indonesia’s political class, and suggest a public that is either indifferent to, or supportive of, an increasingly illiberal democratic order. Our study demonstrates that comparing elite and mass attitudes to democracy and liberalism is one fruitful technique for investigating sources of democratic resilience and fragility.
Journal of Democracy
When Indonesia, whose more than 260 million people make it the world's third most populous democr... more When Indonesia, whose more than 260 million people make it the world's third most populous democracy, held national elections on 17 April 2019, it was easy to view the outcome as a confirmation of the country's democratic status quo. The incumbent president, Joko Widodo (commonly known as Jokowi), defeated an authoritarian-era general, Prabowo Subianto, by 55 to 44 percent. Jokowi's parliamentary coalition scored an even more impressive result, gaining 60 percent of the seats on 63 percent of the vote. Prabowo ran a classic populist campaign, backed by illiberal Islamist groups. Jokowi, by contrast, offered a mellow developmentalist vision and cited his first-term achievements. He drew support from religious minorities as well as from Islamic organizations that have long advocated religious pluralism. At first sight, therefore, Indonesia may seem like an exception to the populist and illiberal trend that has been sweeping the world in recent years. The reality, however, is more troubling. The election continued the country's slow-motion slide toward democratic regression, and marked a decoupling of the politics of religious pluralism from those of democracy. In this decoupling process, Jokowi and other backers of pluralism have become less concerned with upholding other democratic ideals; instead, the defense of Indonesia as a nation-state for all religions has become a supreme, almost sacrosanct, goal. In their view, pluralism's foes-that is, the Islamists supporting Prabowo-must be kept from power at all costs, even if this means reducing democratic freedoms. This tendency was evident in all phases of the 2019 electoral process. The approach of the election saw Jokowi-a self-described defender of democracy during the previous balloting in 2014-applying increasingly authoritarian measures to constrain the opposition. The results them
Contemporary Southeast Asia
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Papers by Edward Aspinall