Layla (Soraya) Saatchi
If there is any truth to Simone De Beauvoir's claim that we are not born but are in a constant state of becoming, my identity has been shaped, and continues to be shaped, by a sense of being on the outside looking in - not quite getting the punchline. This used to unsettle me and drive me to try and become like those around me. But, when I realized that I would never quite fit in anywhere and that was ok - I was liberated to explore me. This has led to many discoveries and disagreements. What I've realized most saliently along this journey is that disagreement is healthy and has been the foundation for fantastic discoveries, while movements toward conformity have historically been restrictive, counter-productive and sometimes violent. I have decided, then, to embrace situations where I disagree with others. Now, I am driven by a desire to positively affect those around me with my differences, and in turn allow myself to be affected. Philosophy has taught me how to reason rationally and to appreciate and evaluate the reasoning of others. Before coming to philosophy, I taught Islamic and Middle East studies as a practicing and visible Muslim woman. My classes were typically majority Muslim and I was acutely aware of my students' wary gaze: Does she speak English well? She looks like she's fresh off the boat. Is she Shi'a or Sunni? How can she teach this class objectively when she's got to be either Shi'a or Sunni? My students typically sat in three sections - Sunni, Shi'a and undecided or non-Muslim. Navigating and teaching the foundational doctrinal disagreements between Shi'as and Sunnis has provided the motivation for my work. I leave you with these thoughts: What would the world be like without disagreement? Maybe you think it would be a utopia. I think we would stagnate. I think disagreement is necessary for advancing knowledge, and that human civilization would not have advanced without it. However, the way in which we have historically (and presently) responded to disagreements has resulted in world wars, terrorism, famine, and genocide. My modest aim is to provide a positive theory for reasonable disagreement - my stretch target is to heal humanity.
Supervisors: Bruce Russell, Mark Satta, Vanessa DeGifis, and Sean Stidd
Supervisors: Bruce Russell, Mark Satta, Vanessa DeGifis, and Sean Stidd
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Papers by Layla (Soraya) Saatchi
If, as evidentialists claim, evidence is the only relevant justificatory consideration for beliefs, then peers ought to at least reduce their initial confidence if not give equal weight to the opposing view when they become aware of their peer’s opposition. But simple counterexamples reveal that modifying one's initial belief merely based on the awareness of peer disagreement is not always the rational option. These counter-examples, however, do not help explain how best to respond in other instances when it appears that awareness of peer disagreement has justificatory significance.
This project attempts to solve this puzzle by first critically examining how we think about evidence. I conclude that there are actually two senses of evidence: A metaphysical and an epistemic. Distinguishing these senses of evidence reveals that in cases of genuine reasonable peer disagreement, doxastic and propositional justification come apart such that doxastic justification sometimes does not imply propositional justification. When doxastic justification does not imply propositional justification in cases of reasonable peer disagreement, we can see how epistemic pluralism can be rational without falling prey to certain epistemic spinelessness.
Drafts by Layla (Soraya) Saatchi
If, as evidentialists claim, evidence is the only relevant justificatory consideration for beliefs, then peers ought to at least reduce their initial confidence if not give equal weight to the opposing view when they become aware of their peer’s opposition. But simple counterexamples reveal that modifying one's initial belief merely based on the awareness of peer disagreement is not always the rational option. These counter-examples, however, do not help explain how best to respond in other instances when it appears that awareness of peer disagreement has justificatory significance.
This project attempts to solve this puzzle by first critically examining how we think about evidence. I conclude that there are actually two senses of evidence: A metaphysical and an epistemic. Distinguishing these senses of evidence reveals that in cases of genuine reasonable peer disagreement, doxastic and propositional justification come apart such that doxastic justification sometimes does not imply propositional justification. When doxastic justification does not imply propositional justification in cases of reasonable peer disagreement, we can see how epistemic pluralism can be rational without falling prey to certain epistemic spinelessness.