Papers by Talia Morag
Homeland and Philosophy, 2014
Sartre and Analytic Philosophy, 2023
In this chapter, I propose a new Freudian notion of the unconscious that differs from other notio... more In this chapter, I propose a new Freudian notion of the unconscious that differs from other notions one can find in Freud’s writings, in particular the one Sartre criticises, according to which the unconscious is conceived as a metaphorical secret room for conflictual mental states. At the heart of Sartre’s criticism is the notion of “the censor,” a little person within us, a homunculus, whose function is to either lock in forbidden emotions and desires in or let them out “disguised”, or symbolically distorted. The new notion I propose is still Freudian, and that is based on two interrelated psychological processes: one is what Freud calls “primary processes,” which are associative processes, and the other is Sartre’s notion of bad faith. Sartre’s notion of bad faith was meant to replace the Freudian unconscious, which he sought to demolish. And yet my aim is to show that bad faith is in fact an aspect of the Freudian unconscious. I use Sartre’s example of the date or the coquette, re-read as a case of #METOO, in order to demonstrate this new notion of the unconscious as associative patterns of inattention.
Sartre and Analytic Philosophy, 2023
In this chapter, I examine the notion that the divide between analytic and continental philosophy... more In this chapter, I examine the notion that the divide between analytic and continental philosophy is not defensible on rational grounds, in terms of e.g. content, method, or history. Building on unpublished work of Genevieve Lloyd, I suggest instead that the most fruitful way to think about the divide is as an imaginative distinction. I propose we take seriously the casual stereotypes we use for each side of the divide, and see these as “pictures” of philosophy (in Wittgenstein’s sense). Philosophical pictures here are both idealized self-images of philosophy and “negative” stereotypes, since they are associated with negative affect. I further propose a psychoanalytic “projective” explanation of the aggression that typically characterizes the way each side of the divide sees the other side.
Psychoanalysis Downunder, 2023
The Routledge Handbook of Liberal Naturalism, 2022
Mind & Language, 2022
This paper examines the puzzling phenomenon of self-directed implicit bias in the form of gender ... more This paper examines the puzzling phenomenon of self-directed implicit bias in the form of gender “stereotype threat” (ST). Bringing to light the empirical undecidability of which account of this phenomenon is best, whether a rational or an associationist explanation, the paper aims to strengthen the associationist approach by appeal to a new account of seeing-as experiences. I critically examine “alief” accounts of reason- recalcitrant ST by bringing to bear arguments from the philosophy of emotion. The new account builds on the insights and overcomes the weaknesses of “aliefs” by (a) employing associations that are imaginative and unreliable; and (b) proposing non-conceptual seeing-as experiences.
Morality in a Realistic Spirit: Essays for Cora Diamond, 2019
In her paper "The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy" (2003), Cora Diamond di... more In her paper "The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy" (2003), Cora Diamond discusses experiences and feelings that defy our regular ways of speaking. These are affectively troubling moments where we discover the limits of our characteristic taming of experience by our familiar conceptual tools and our rational capacity.
Crisis and Reconfigurations: 100 Years of European Philosophy Since WW1, 2017
How did the Great War affect psychoanalysis? The common approach to this question has to do with ... more How did the Great War affect psychoanalysis? The common approach to this question has to do with assessing the extent to which psychoanalysis has influenced the medical and military understanding of the soldiers diagnosed with "shell shock" after the war, as well as the extent to which that influence further contributed to the new interest in Freudian psychoanalysis in Britain (Lerner 2003, chapter 6; Roper 2015; Mijolla 2005). If we take a conceptual approach and ask about the impact of the Great War on the theory of psychoanalysis, we find ourselves investigating the more specific question: how did the Great War influence Freud's psychoanalysis? For no matter how severely Freud has been and still is criticized, all psychoanalytic texts and schools lead back to his writings. When one examines Freud's writings as a whole, comparing his prewar work to his postwar writings, one can notice several significant shifts. Perhaps most conspicuous is the shift in the theory of the mind as divided, a shift that is consolidated and articulated in The Ego and the Id (Freud 1923). Prior to the war the main division was "topographical," postulating more or less metaphorical "places" in the mind: consciousness, pre-consciousness, and the unconscious. After the war, the mind is divided "structurally" into three agencies, each with their own motivational functions: the Id, Ego and Super-Ego. The previous division, or rather the previous conception of the unconscious, was not abandoned. The Id, as well as parts of the Ego and the Super-Ego were said to be unconscious. But the main division of the mind had changed, especially since Freud came to understand that his conception of the unconscious did not lend itself to a unified definition. Another important and related change is a shift of emphasis and of theoretical temperament from a mechanical model to a biological model of the mind. Before the war Freud mainly writes about the "forces" of repression, regression, and resistance, which mediate the causal influence between conscious and unconscious mental states. After the war, the use of mechanical language becomes scarce and instead Freud writes more about "instincts", which are also ascribed to animals and not just to humans. This is a shift of emphasis, both since the biological language of instincts appears more or less from the beginning of Freud's work and since he never ceased using the terminology of "forces" and in particular of a mental "energy" that is some how meant to be quantifiable. It is also shift of what I call 'theoretical temperament', because both these models and the terminology they employ are metaphorical, metaphors taken from the natural sciences and are arguably not very good metaphors, since the attempt to claim a scientific status for psychoanalysis has so clearly failed and has been the subject of much criticism (Crews et al. 1997; Grünbaum 1984). It is more a question of taste or of a vision of the human as a machine or as an organism, as operating mechanically or animalistically. Finally, another shift of emphasis and perhaps also of interest is from a detailed engagement with individuals and their particularities to an interest in explaining social phenomena, such as group psychology, religion, and civilisation. Indeed, even when it comes to the study of individual psychology, we find in the post
Philosophical Approaches to Demonology, 2017
M/C Journal, 2014
available online: http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/829
Metascience, 2017
Response to Paul Griffiths, Catriona Mackenzie, and Dan Hutto on their reviews of Emotion, Imagin... more Response to Paul Griffiths, Catriona Mackenzie, and Dan Hutto on their reviews of Emotion, Imagination, and the Limits of Reason (Routledge 2016)
Argumenta , 2017
Modern philosophy of emotion has been largely dominated by what I call the Tracking Dogma, accord... more Modern philosophy of emotion has been largely dominated by what I call the Tracking Dogma, according to which emotions aim at tracking " core relational themes, " features of the environment that bear on our well-being (e.g. fear tracks dangers, anger tracks wrongs). The paper inquires into the empirical credentials of Strong and Weak versions of this dogma. I argue that there is currently insufficient scientific evidence in favor of the Tracking Dogma; and I show that there is a considerable weight of common knowledge against it. I conclude that most emotions are insensitive to the circumstances that might be thought to elicit them and often unfitting to the circumstances in which they arise. Taking Darwin's lessons seriously, even predictable emotional responses to biologically basic objects (e.g. bears, heights), should not be understood as tracking abstract categories (e.g. danger). This renders most contemporary accounts of emotion implausible. We are left with two options: one may still continue to claim that emotions aim at tracking, even if they often fail; or one may abandon the Tracking Dogma in favor of a non-representational view.
Parrhesia 28: 76-86 , 2017
What is the aim of psychoanalysis? Why should we do it? Or, to put it in capitalistic consumerist... more What is the aim of psychoanalysis? Why should we do it? Or, to put it in capitalistic consumerist terms, what is it selling? At the end of the day, one's life is somehow supposed to improve after analysis. But what would count as improvement? What are the standards against which such improvement will be evaluated and who is to set those standards? This is how the question of the aim of analysis relates to the ethical question that haunts philosophy since its beginnings in Ancient Greece. What is the good life? Is there a general answer to that question; and, if not, then how are we to approach the question of what the good life looks like in each individual life?
In Anik Waldow and Derek Matravers (eds.) Philosophical Perspectives on Empathy: Theoretical Approaches and Emerging Challenges (London: Routledge, 2018)
This chapter brings the philosophy of emotion to bear on the psychological notion of ‘affective e... more This chapter brings the philosophy of emotion to bear on the psychological notion of ‘affective empathy,’ roughly defined as ‘the vicarious sharing of affect’ (Stueber 2013), with the aim of clarifying the causal processes that give rise to it. I examine the account of the psychologist Martin Hoffman (2000), and show that it amounts to an associative process. The familiar processes of mimicry (contagion) and role-taking (simulation) – often thought to be the basis of empathy – only comprise possible triggers for the proposed associative process, and will not cause affective empathy without it. Through this critical summary, I argue that any account of second-hand emotions must accommodate their singularity: only some people will affectively empathize with a person in a certain emotional situation, and each of those people often fail to empathize with another person in a similar situation on another occasion. This challenge, I claim, is inherited from the singularity of first-hand emotions: different people often emote differently facing the same circumstances and that the same person often reacts differently, or not at all, to similar situations on different occasions. I then propose an associative account that can meet this challenge, by turning to certain insights of Freud and Hume.
Book Reviews by Talia Morag
NDPR, 2019
presents a coherent and consistent "cognitive" view of emotions, whereby emotions are intentional... more presents a coherent and consistent "cognitive" view of emotions, whereby emotions are intentional and embodied states of mind, which give us epistemic access to aspects of the world that bear on our cares and concerns, thereby also enabling selfknowledge of what is significant to us. His book enjoys a density and breadth of references and influences. It is scientifically informed and upto-date with the latest philosophical literature just as much as it is grounded in the history of philosophy, fruitfully engaging with both Anglo-American philosophy and Continental philosophy, in particular phenomenology and existentialism. Furtak begins by opposing the "cognitive" theories of emotions, which argue that emotions are intentional and provide us information on what they are about, with feeling theories that give more weight to their somatic aspect. He claims that a theory of emotion need not prioritize one aspect over another but should accommodate both (a claim I shall cast some doubt on below). He acknowledges that not all theories neatly fit in those two groups (e.g. Ben-Ze'ev 2017), but his aim is to provide a theory that
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