Papers by Hannes M Nykänen
The paper aims at making explicit and question the dominant conception that morality is a matter ... more The paper aims at making explicit and question the dominant conception that morality is a matter of values and valuation. This conception is usually taken as the self-evident frame of analysis, both in ethical theorizing and in everyday life and also in most discussions of ethics in medical contexts (e.g. in debates about 'values-based practice'). We argue that the dominant conception is deeply flawed insofar as it implies a repression of the fundamental importance of I–you relationships. As a consequence of this repression, what are commonly taken to be 'personal' and even 'individualist' moral outlooks are, in fact, merely the reverse side of collective norms and values, just as 'particularism' in ethics is not a real alternative to 'universalism', but rather both are variations on the same repressive theme. In showing this, we also outline the sense in which the moral relationship between an 'I' and a 'you' has an altogether different 'grammar' or sense.
This is a response to Stephen Buetow's comments on our paper 'Collectivity, evil and the dynamics... more This is a response to Stephen Buetow's comments on our paper 'Collectivity, evil and the dynamics of moral value'.
This is a response to Stephen Buetow’s comments on our paper ‘Collectivity, evil and the dynamics... more This is a response to Stephen Buetow’s comments on our paper ‘Collectivity, evil and the dynamics of moral value’.
The aim of the paper is to show that moral reasoning is not really reasoning in the sense usually... more The aim of the paper is to show that moral reasoning is not really reasoning in the sense usually assumed in moral philosophy. Instead, moral reasoning is one aspect of repressing conscience. The formal dimensions of moral reasoning function as a repressive depersonalisation of our sense of being an I who stands in a relationship to a you. For instance, “moral principle” invokes a formal and hence impersonal understanding of a moral problem. The thinking person loses her sense of being a particular person related to another particular person and focuses instead on the moral principles with their inherent, systematic implications. However, and as I will show in connection to so-called moral dilemmas, the thinking person does not actually act in the rational
manner that is presupposed by reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning will reveal itself as a discourse for repressing conscience. Part of the aim of the paper is to show that, contrary to what is generally assumed, repression is a
morally related phenomenon that arises as a result of a person’s difficulties with acknowledging the character of a moral difficulty; an acknowledgement that is an essential aspect of moral understanding.
Is there within the domains of morality a distinction that can be properly drawn by using the con... more Is there within the domains of morality a distinction that can be properly drawn by using the concepts of applied and theoretical ethics? Could not all ethics be an application of something that has no theoretical foundation -- or perhaps only another kind of foundation? Or perhaps ethics could also be a theory about something that is altogether inapplicable? Moral philosophers have not managed to rule out the possibilities indicated by questions such as these and this fact could perhaps be taken as a reminder that a relevant moral philosophy should probably not distance itself too much from either putatively theoretical or applied aspects of moral issues. In the present volume a number of writers wrestle with the problem concerning applied and theoretical ethics, illuminating it from different angles.
Questions of ethics and the study of culture are tightly interwoven. Are we to see ethics as one ... more Questions of ethics and the study of culture are tightly interwoven. Are we to see ethics as one thread in the fabric created by human culture or does ethics rather transcend culture? The discussions in this volume take place within this spectrum. Eleven Wittgenstein-scholars explore how ethics is embedded in everyday activities and speech. The topics dealt with range from the ways we speak about human practices and nature, religious belief, gender, and moral understanding to questions about Wittgenstein's views on ethics and what it means to understand and attend to a particular individual. Central points of departure are, firstly, that ethics cannot be reduced to any specific cultural form and, secondly, that how we conceive of language is crucially connected with how we perceive the relation between culture and ethics. The points of view put forth frequently pose radical questions to the mainstream of philosophy. The different uses to which Wittgenstein's thought is put also raise important questions about how one should understand the role of language, ethics and culture in his philosophy.
In this paper I want to show in what sense Wittgenstein's later philosophy is an ethics and in wh... more In this paper I want to show in what sense Wittgenstein's later philosophy is an ethics and in what senses ethical and philosophical problems involve repression. However, there is a reason why it is not so easy to see how ethics and repression enter Wittgenstein's thinking. This is because what in my view gives Wittgenstein's remarks their illuminating power is not directly stated by him; probably he did not think explicitly of it. I try to show that this source of clarity is something I call the I-you perspective. Throughout his later philosophy Wittgenstein refuses to argue for or against general, metaphysical claims. Instead, he invites his reader to abandon the perspective where the metaphysical dichotomies “force” themselves on us. One could say that his general strategy is to invite the reader to imagine what it would mean to utter the claims under consideration to a particular person; to a “you”. – The I-you perspective is central also to Freud even if he does not recognise this. Elaborating this perspective will show what the affinities between Freud and Wittgenstein are, in what sense ethics is fundamental in a non-metaphysical way, and why it is important to view philosophical and ethical problems as instances of repression.
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Papers by Hannes M Nykänen
manner that is presupposed by reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning will reveal itself as a discourse for repressing conscience. Part of the aim of the paper is to show that, contrary to what is generally assumed, repression is a
morally related phenomenon that arises as a result of a person’s difficulties with acknowledging the character of a moral difficulty; an acknowledgement that is an essential aspect of moral understanding.
manner that is presupposed by reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning will reveal itself as a discourse for repressing conscience. Part of the aim of the paper is to show that, contrary to what is generally assumed, repression is a
morally related phenomenon that arises as a result of a person’s difficulties with acknowledging the character of a moral difficulty; an acknowledgement that is an essential aspect of moral understanding.