Emmanuel Levinas' semi-phenomenological analyses of the "face-to-face" encounter with "the other"... more Emmanuel Levinas' semi-phenomenological analyses of the "face-to-face" encounter with "the other" are frequently alluded to in the therapeutic literature. Indeed, for some therapists, Levinas provides the conceptual apparatus to reconfigure traditional therapeutic practice. While acknowledging the importance of his work, in this article I raise critical questions about the way Levinas' ideas are often used by psychotherapists. The discussion is divided into five sections: First, I provide a short explanation of the motivations for writing this paper. Second, I offer an overview of some prominent themes therapists typically draw from Levinas' writings. Next, I present my own reconstruction of the face-to-face encounter. Then, drawing on the previous reconstruction, I outline the main questions Levinas-inspired therapists need to address. Finally, I reconsider the potential significance of Levinas' work for therapists.
... in Heidegger, Levinas and ordinary life 122 Introduction 122 Conscience and guilt in Heidegge... more ... in Heidegger, Levinas and ordinary life 122 Introduction 122 Conscience and guilt in Heidegger's Being and ... Toward the end of On Certainty Wittgenstein imagines someone whose beliefs and practices seem ... Supposing we met people who did not regard that as a telling reason ...
We commonly think of grief as a response to, and thus something that follows from a significant l... more We commonly think of grief as a response to, and thus something that follows from a significant loss. But not all forms of grief have this temporal structure, for we can also grieve prospectively, ...
Emmanuel Levinas’ semi-phenomenological analyses of the “face-to-face” encounter with “the other”... more Emmanuel Levinas’ semi-phenomenological analyses of the “face-to-face” encounter with “the other” are frequently alluded to in the therapeutic literature. Indeed, for some therapists, Levinas provides the conceptual apparatus to reconfigure traditional therapeutic practice. While acknowledging the importance of his work, in this article I raise critical questions about the way Levinas’ ideas are often used by psychotherapists. The discussion is divided into five sections: First, I provide a short explanation of the motivations for writing this paper. Second, I offer an overview of some prominent themes therapists typically draw from Levinas’ writings. Next, I present my own reconstruction of the face-to-face encounter. Then, drawing on the previous reconstruction, I outline the main questions Levinas-inspired therapists need to address. Finally, I reconsider the potential significance of Levinas’ work for therapists.
This article argues for four interrelated claims: (i) Metaphilosophy is not one sub-discipline of... more This article argues for four interrelated claims: (i) Metaphilosophy is not one sub-discipline of philosophy, nor is it restricted to questions of methodology. Rather, metaphilosophical inquiry encompasses the general background conditions of philosophical practice. (ii) These background conditions are of various sorts, not only those routinely considered “philosophical” but also those considered biographical, historical, and sociological. Accordingly, we should be wary of the customary distinction between what is proper (internal) and merely contingent (external) to philosophy. (iii) “What is philosophy?” is best understood as a practical question concerning how members of different philosophical sub-communities identify what is pertinent to their respective activities and self-conceptions. (iv) Given (i)–(iii), understanding what philosophy is requires us to take more seriously the social-institutional dimension of contemporary philosophical practice.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2006
... 85 85 Derrida, Acts of Religion, p. 388; see also 'To Forgive', p. 43; Jacques Derr... more ... 85 85 Derrida, Acts of Religion, p. 388; see also 'To Forgive', p. 43; Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. ... 90 90 Jacques Derrida, 'Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida', in R. Kearney and M. Dooley (eds) Questioning Ethics Contemporary ...
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2011
Abstract Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious and magical practices are often thought to harbour t... more Abstract Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious and magical practices are often thought to harbour troubling fideistic and relativistic views. Unsurprisingly, commentators are generally resistant to the idea that religious belief constitutes a ‘language‐game’ governed by its own peculiar ‘rules’, and is thereby insulated from the critical assessment of non‐participants. Indeed, on this fideist‐relativist reading, it is unclear how mutual understanding between believers and non‐believers (even between different sorts of believers) would be possible. In this paper I do three things: (i) show why the fideist‐relativist reading of Wittgenstein is not wildly implausible (Sections 1–2); (ii) argue that, despite its initial plausibility, this reading fails to take into account Wittgenstein’s naturalism (Sections 3–4); and (iii) explain what sort of naturalism this is, and how it sheds light on Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief (Sections 5–6).
If mortality is the most important fact about us, then it is reasonable to think that fear of dea... more If mortality is the most important fact about us, then it is reasonable to think that fear of death is our most fundamental fear. Indeed, while philosophers continue to disagree about whether it is rational to fear death, they tend to assume that fear is the most common, natural response our mortality provokes. I neither want to deny the reality of this fear nor evaluate its rationality. Rather, drawing on Derrida’s remarks on ‘quasi-death’, I will argue that (1) fearful or not, death pervades everyday life; (2) imagining one’s own death, and thereby remaining semi-present as a spectral observer, is not (as some allege) inherently misleading; and (3) taking these imaginings seriously highlights another response we have toward our own mortality that is at least as significant as fear; namely, prospective, self-directed grief.
Notwithstanding the burgeoning literature on death, philosophers have tended to focus on the sign... more Notwithstanding the burgeoning literature on death, philosophers have tended to focus on the significance death has (or ought/ought not to have) for the one who dies. Thus, while the relevance one's own death has for others (and the significance others' deaths have for us) is often mentioned, it is rarely attributed any great importance to the purported real philosophical issues. This is a striking omission, not least because the deaths of others – and the anticipated effects our own death will have on those we leave behind – are normally of great importance outside the confines of academic philosophy. In this paper I want to do three things: (i) argue that philosophers' treatment of death tends to distort the issue (Sections I–III); (ii) outline some of the ways others' deaths figure in how we assess our own mortality (Sections IV–V); and (iii) raise some general questions about the value of ‘theorising’ death (Section VI).
... eds. (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 26, 5657. ... 4... more ... eds. (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 26, 5657. ... 45f., 55. This madness Derrida also sees as touching forgiveness (On Cosmopolitanism, pp. 39, 45, 49) and the decision ('By Force of Mourning', p. 177). 7 ...
... conscience'. Related research. Emmanuel Levinas and Iris Murdoch: Ethics As Exit? C Fred... more ... conscience'. Related research. Emmanuel Levinas and Iris Murdoch: Ethics As Exit? C Fred Alford in Philosophy and Literature (2002). 1 reader Save reference to library · Related research. Levinas and an Ethics for Science Education. ...
... Jill Robbins, ed., Is It Righteous To Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas Reviewed by. Bob P... more ... Jill Robbins, ed., Is It Righteous To Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas Reviewed by. Bob Plant. Keywords. philosophy, book reviews. Bookmark and Share. This journal is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommerical 3.0 Unported license. ...
In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly "religious man" thinks himself... more In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly "religious man" thinks himself to be, not merely "imperfect" or "ill," but wholly "wretched." While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideistrelativist conclusions) I argue that the distinctly ethical conception of religion (specifically Christianity) that Wittgenstein presents should lead us to a quite different assessment. In particular, his preoccupation with the categorical nature of religion suggests a conception of "genuine" religious belief which disrupts both the economics of eschatological-salvationist hope, and the traditional ethical precept that "ought implies can." In short, what Wittgenstein presents ...
Emmanuel Levinas' semi-phenomenological analyses of the "face-to-face" encounter with "the other"... more Emmanuel Levinas' semi-phenomenological analyses of the "face-to-face" encounter with "the other" are frequently alluded to in the therapeutic literature. Indeed, for some therapists, Levinas provides the conceptual apparatus to reconfigure traditional therapeutic practice. While acknowledging the importance of his work, in this article I raise critical questions about the way Levinas' ideas are often used by psychotherapists. The discussion is divided into five sections: First, I provide a short explanation of the motivations for writing this paper. Second, I offer an overview of some prominent themes therapists typically draw from Levinas' writings. Next, I present my own reconstruction of the face-to-face encounter. Then, drawing on the previous reconstruction, I outline the main questions Levinas-inspired therapists need to address. Finally, I reconsider the potential significance of Levinas' work for therapists.
... in Heidegger, Levinas and ordinary life 122 Introduction 122 Conscience and guilt in Heidegge... more ... in Heidegger, Levinas and ordinary life 122 Introduction 122 Conscience and guilt in Heidegger's Being and ... Toward the end of On Certainty Wittgenstein imagines someone whose beliefs and practices seem ... Supposing we met people who did not regard that as a telling reason ...
We commonly think of grief as a response to, and thus something that follows from a significant l... more We commonly think of grief as a response to, and thus something that follows from a significant loss. But not all forms of grief have this temporal structure, for we can also grieve prospectively, ...
Emmanuel Levinas’ semi-phenomenological analyses of the “face-to-face” encounter with “the other”... more Emmanuel Levinas’ semi-phenomenological analyses of the “face-to-face” encounter with “the other” are frequently alluded to in the therapeutic literature. Indeed, for some therapists, Levinas provides the conceptual apparatus to reconfigure traditional therapeutic practice. While acknowledging the importance of his work, in this article I raise critical questions about the way Levinas’ ideas are often used by psychotherapists. The discussion is divided into five sections: First, I provide a short explanation of the motivations for writing this paper. Second, I offer an overview of some prominent themes therapists typically draw from Levinas’ writings. Next, I present my own reconstruction of the face-to-face encounter. Then, drawing on the previous reconstruction, I outline the main questions Levinas-inspired therapists need to address. Finally, I reconsider the potential significance of Levinas’ work for therapists.
This article argues for four interrelated claims: (i) Metaphilosophy is not one sub-discipline of... more This article argues for four interrelated claims: (i) Metaphilosophy is not one sub-discipline of philosophy, nor is it restricted to questions of methodology. Rather, metaphilosophical inquiry encompasses the general background conditions of philosophical practice. (ii) These background conditions are of various sorts, not only those routinely considered “philosophical” but also those considered biographical, historical, and sociological. Accordingly, we should be wary of the customary distinction between what is proper (internal) and merely contingent (external) to philosophy. (iii) “What is philosophy?” is best understood as a practical question concerning how members of different philosophical sub-communities identify what is pertinent to their respective activities and self-conceptions. (iv) Given (i)–(iii), understanding what philosophy is requires us to take more seriously the social-institutional dimension of contemporary philosophical practice.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2006
... 85 85 Derrida, Acts of Religion, p. 388; see also 'To Forgive', p. 43; Jacques Derr... more ... 85 85 Derrida, Acts of Religion, p. 388; see also 'To Forgive', p. 43; Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. ... 90 90 Jacques Derrida, 'Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida', in R. Kearney and M. Dooley (eds) Questioning Ethics Contemporary ...
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2011
Abstract Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious and magical practices are often thought to harbour t... more Abstract Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious and magical practices are often thought to harbour troubling fideistic and relativistic views. Unsurprisingly, commentators are generally resistant to the idea that religious belief constitutes a ‘language‐game’ governed by its own peculiar ‘rules’, and is thereby insulated from the critical assessment of non‐participants. Indeed, on this fideist‐relativist reading, it is unclear how mutual understanding between believers and non‐believers (even between different sorts of believers) would be possible. In this paper I do three things: (i) show why the fideist‐relativist reading of Wittgenstein is not wildly implausible (Sections 1–2); (ii) argue that, despite its initial plausibility, this reading fails to take into account Wittgenstein’s naturalism (Sections 3–4); and (iii) explain what sort of naturalism this is, and how it sheds light on Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief (Sections 5–6).
If mortality is the most important fact about us, then it is reasonable to think that fear of dea... more If mortality is the most important fact about us, then it is reasonable to think that fear of death is our most fundamental fear. Indeed, while philosophers continue to disagree about whether it is rational to fear death, they tend to assume that fear is the most common, natural response our mortality provokes. I neither want to deny the reality of this fear nor evaluate its rationality. Rather, drawing on Derrida’s remarks on ‘quasi-death’, I will argue that (1) fearful or not, death pervades everyday life; (2) imagining one’s own death, and thereby remaining semi-present as a spectral observer, is not (as some allege) inherently misleading; and (3) taking these imaginings seriously highlights another response we have toward our own mortality that is at least as significant as fear; namely, prospective, self-directed grief.
Notwithstanding the burgeoning literature on death, philosophers have tended to focus on the sign... more Notwithstanding the burgeoning literature on death, philosophers have tended to focus on the significance death has (or ought/ought not to have) for the one who dies. Thus, while the relevance one's own death has for others (and the significance others' deaths have for us) is often mentioned, it is rarely attributed any great importance to the purported real philosophical issues. This is a striking omission, not least because the deaths of others – and the anticipated effects our own death will have on those we leave behind – are normally of great importance outside the confines of academic philosophy. In this paper I want to do three things: (i) argue that philosophers' treatment of death tends to distort the issue (Sections I–III); (ii) outline some of the ways others' deaths figure in how we assess our own mortality (Sections IV–V); and (iii) raise some general questions about the value of ‘theorising’ death (Section VI).
... eds. (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 26, 5657. ... 4... more ... eds. (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 26, 5657. ... 45f., 55. This madness Derrida also sees as touching forgiveness (On Cosmopolitanism, pp. 39, 45, 49) and the decision ('By Force of Mourning', p. 177). 7 ...
... conscience'. Related research. Emmanuel Levinas and Iris Murdoch: Ethics As Exit? C Fred... more ... conscience'. Related research. Emmanuel Levinas and Iris Murdoch: Ethics As Exit? C Fred Alford in Philosophy and Literature (2002). 1 reader Save reference to library · Related research. Levinas and an Ethics for Science Education. ...
... Jill Robbins, ed., Is It Righteous To Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas Reviewed by. Bob P... more ... Jill Robbins, ed., Is It Righteous To Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas Reviewed by. Bob Plant. Keywords. philosophy, book reviews. Bookmark and Share. This journal is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommerical 3.0 Unported license. ...
In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly "religious man" thinks himself... more In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly "religious man" thinks himself to be, not merely "imperfect" or "ill," but wholly "wretched." While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideistrelativist conclusions) I argue that the distinctly ethical conception of religion (specifically Christianity) that Wittgenstein presents should lead us to a quite different assessment. In particular, his preoccupation with the categorical nature of religion suggests a conception of "genuine" religious belief which disrupts both the economics of eschatological-salvationist hope, and the traditional ethical precept that "ought implies can." In short, what Wittgenstein presents ...
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